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Abstract
Italian Americans were a key constituency of the white-ethnic voting bloc that
formed one of the main pillars of the New Deal coalition. However, few historians have
looked at motives for the group’s allegiance beyond economic necessity and machine
politics. This approach has falsely colored enthusiasm for the New Deal as a reflexive
reaction to the Great Depression. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” argues that Italian
Americans living in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, from Pittsburgh through
Cleveland, voted heavily for the New Deal during the 1930s because of their unique
political reshaping during the preceding two decades. In this explanation, politicians such
as Franklin Roosevelt harnessed a group already susceptible to a modern liberal ideology
rather than persuaded Italian Americans to support them out of sheer economic desperation.
This dissertation helps explain why the Democratic Party’s New Deal liberalism changed
the American political paradigm for a generation. By tracing ideological roots to the
previous decades, it becomes clear why that liberalism became part of the Italian-American
identity as opposed to an aberration that disappeared with the resolution of the economic
crisis.
Italian Americans created the foundation for accepting modern liberalism because
they synthesized three major influences circulating in their community. American civic
nationalism contributed ideas about democracy and personal rights. Radical leftists,
including socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, convinced people of the need for
unionization and concessions to workers. Finally, Italian Fascism showed the benefits of
iv

an activist government willing to intervene in the economy to solve crises. Although these
influences are well-documented in Italian-American historiography, historians have treated
them as mutually exclusive trends. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” explains how each
component impacted average people. Through each stage, Italian Americans purged the
conflicting aspects of the influences to create a fusion that resembled modern American
liberalism and was ripe for appropriation by the New Dealers.
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Introduction
In July 1928, Angelo Di Renzo, the editor of Il Cittadino Italo-Americano,
Youngstown, Ohio’s Italian-language newspaper, penned an opinion piece titled “The
Problem of Unemployment.” Printed more than a year before the Wall Street stock market
crash of 1929, during a supposed period of mass prosperity, Di Renzo outlined a political
platform remarkably similar to the New Deal that would begin to unfold over four years
later. Written in the context of the upcoming presidential election, the editor argued that
the current American political parties had no answers to problems experienced by ordinary
people. Socialist Norman Thomas had an agenda, but it was “not feasible.” The Democrats
and their candidate, Al Smith, were silent about an economic proposal to address the
employment problem, while the Republicans only repeated claims that they brought
prosperity. Unfortunately, Di Renzo continued, “this famous Coolidgian prosperity, that is
of the Nation and not of the people.”1 Average working Americans did not benefit from
the laissez-faire policies of the Calvin Coolidge administration, nor from record stock
prices, and America’s political parties appeared unwilling or unable to address these
concerns.
Di Renzo laid out several policy considerations to address a new mechanized
economy that displaced workers. He began cautiously, first telling readers that a change in
the political paradigm was a prerequisite to the adoption of his suggestions, or, in his words,

A. Di Renzo, “Il Problema della Disoccupazione,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
(Youngstown, OH), 14 July 1928, 1.
1

1

that “the resolution of the problem of unemployment depends mainly on the modification
of part of the current legislative system.” A “class struggle” was not practical, and
Americans instead needed “class collaboration.” This emphasis, he argued, would lessen
unemployment and eliminate “krumiraggio,” the use of “scabs” or strikebreakers to
undermine workers. Collaboration would extend economic benefits to all Americans; it
would go beyond favoring only the trade unionists, a likely allusion to aiding the unskilled
and semiskilled through industrial unionism rather than continuing organized labor’s
favoritism toward the skilled craft workers. Di Renzo proposed new programs, including
“one for pensions to the disabled and to the elderly,” which ideally would include all those
over the age of sixty and some people between fifty and sixty, and another plan to cover
“involuntary unemployments.” To pay for the new programs, “the employers, the banks,
and the trusts of any nature” would contribute alongside the workers. He called for laws to
bar women from certain occupations, prohibit employing youth under eighteen, and shorten
working hours. These efforts would open jobs for the un- and underemployed, while other
measures designed “to stimulate production and commerce, encourage export, [and]
promote public works” would supply additional opportunities. As Di Renzo concluded,
“there is the path, but it takes courage to travel it. It is a matter of initiative, of will, and of
sincerity. Sooner than socialism, this path would lead to the opening of a more equitable
distribution of wealth.”2
Di Renzo’s political evaluation begs the question of how he arrived at a platform
that mirrored significant aspects of the New Deal over a year before the Wall Street crash.

A. Di Renzo, “Il Problema della Disoccupazione,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 14 July
1928, 1.
2
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Similar to the Italian-American editor, Franklin Roosevelt and his “Brain Trust” concluded
that the government needed to address mechanization, modern business, and the depression
by restructuring the economy. The idea of class collaboration was at the heart of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which established a massive public works
program and sought to balance capital and labor through the National Recovery
Administration (NRA). After the Supreme Court struck down the NRA in 1935,
Roosevelt’s government responded with targeted legislation that delivered much of what
Di Renzo sought. Government regulation of some businesses continued, such as with the
Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Guffey-Snyder Coal Act of 1935, replaced in
1937 by the Guffey-Vinson Coal Act. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 protected
and encouraged industrial unionism, thereby lessening opportunities for strikebreaking.
Pensions for the elderly and unemployment insurance became a reality with the Social
Security Act of 1935. Di Renzo’s call for a shorter workweek and the end of child labor
became provisions in the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Most Italian-American political
desires, as expressed by Di Renzo, became a reality under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.
This raises the question of ideological origins: How and why did Italian Americans become
New Dealers before the New Deal existed?
At the heart of this project is the inquiry of why Italian Americans responded
enthusiastically to the New Deal and became part of its coalition. There is a common
assertion among historians that Italian Americans – whether noted individually or as part
of the larger group of “white ethnics,” those new immigrants and their children originating
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from southern and eastern Europe – became a core constituency in the New Deal coalition.3
Nationally, Italian Americans affirmed their faith in Franklin Roosevelt’s governance by
returning the president to office by wide margins: 88 percent in 1936 and 75 percent in
1940.4 This project seeks to understand the foundations for this electoral support. It is less
concerned with what happened, the statistical shift of Italian Americans into the
Democratic Party, and more with why that realignment took place.
“Building a New (Deal) Identity” argues that Italian Americans living in western
Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, from Pittsburgh through Cleveland, voted heavily for the
New Deal during the 1930s because of their unique political reshaping during the preceding
two decades. Studying the roots of ideological acceptance of the New Deal is necessary to
understand its longevity. If the New Deal coalition and paradigm lasted into the 1960s or
1970s, as many scholars contend, it was built on a solid foundation.5 Acceptance of
Roosevelt’s work was not a knee-jerk reaction to a crisis; if it had been, then political
adherence would have collapsed once those stimuli dissipated. As Lizabeth Cohen argued
in Making a New Deal, “working-class Americans underwent a gradual shift in attitudes
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston,
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and behavior over the intervening decade and a half as a result of a wide range of social
and cultural experiences.”6 Italian-American ideological beliefs developed over several
years before the New Deal. In this explanation, politicians such as Franklin Roosevelt
harnessed a group already susceptible to a modern liberal ideology rather than persuaded
Italian Americans to support them out of sheer economic desperation. By tracing
ideological roots to the previous decades, this dissertation helps explain why the
Democratic Party’s New Deal liberalism changed the American political paradigm for a
generation rather than operated as a temporary aberration that disappeared with the
resolution of the economic crisis.
Italian Americans created the foundation for accepting modern American
liberalism because they synthesized three major influences circulating in their community.
Through their public sphere organized around their ethnicity, they merged their beliefs
about civic nationalism, leftism, and Fascism to inform their politics. 7 American civic
nationalism contributed concepts about democracy and personal rights. Radical leftists,
including socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, convinced people of the need for
unionization and concessions to workers. Finally, Italian Fascism showed the benefits of
an activist government willing to intervene in the economy to solve crises. Although these
influences are historiographically well-documented, scholars have treated them as
mutually exclusive trends. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” explains how each impacted
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Cohen, Making a New Deal, 5.
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average people. Through every stage of adoption, Italian Americans purged the conflicting
aspects of the influences to create a fusion that resembled modern American liberalism. In
this assessment, neither the Wall Street crash of 1929 nor the advent of the New Deal
prompted a fundamental ideological change. The events of the early 1930s only confirmed
and sharpened beliefs that had been percolating for a decade. Developments within the
Italian-American community before Franklin Roosevelt’s election primed the constituency
for appropriation by the New Dealers.
“Building a New (Deal) Identity” synthesizes historiographical trends to argue this
new interpretation. The problem with the histories of civic nationalism, leftism, and
Fascism is that they are analyzed independently or viewed as constantly in conflict with
one another. This project instead merges different parts of Italian-American historiography.
Scholars have too often limited their treatment of politics within the Italian-American
community. Some documented the Americanizing influences on immigrants. Others noted
the prevalence of radical-leftist ideology, or they sought to understand the popularity of
Fascism within the community. While these are helpful steps in understanding ItalianAmerican politics, the approaches artificially imply single impetuses of political influence.
They suggest that one could not be Americanized and see benefits in parts of leftist
ideology. They infer that people who listened and found value in the words of leftist
radicals, such as Carlo Tresca, could not have found any parts of Fascism acceptable. In
actuality, all of these ideas circulating within the Italian-American community served as
influences for domestic politics. Regular people routinely heard multiple positions, even if
historians have interpreted them as the antitheses of each other. Consider, for example, an
anonymous letter to the editor published in the Pittsburgh Press in 1927. The author, “an
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American of Italian parentage,” admitted that he or she “frequently visit[ed] Fascist and
anti-fascist meetings” in the area.8 While the core members of the groups differed on their
views of radicalism and events in Italy, most other people, like the anonymous writer,
mingled within both circles, accepting, rejecting, and synthesizing ideas from all sides.
This is the story about the large, moderate center, or what might be called the
influenced, not the adherents. Most people were not doctrinaires, nor were they politically
apathetic. Their political lives existed somewhere in the middle. As the exiled anti-Fascist
Gaetano Salvemini observed during the 1930s, ten percent of people were anti-Fascist,
while “out-and-out Italian-American Fascists constitute[d] no more than 5 percent of the
Italian population.”9 His observations were not that different from those presented by
Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel, head of the Fascist League of North America, who claimed
in 1926 “that 10% of Italian Americans were ‘eager advocates’ of Fascism.”10 Many were
favorable or open to Benito Mussolini and his system, but they were not particularly
devout.11 The majority of Italian Americans did not prepare daily for the advent of Fascism
in the United States, nor did they visit leftist groups multiple times a week to discuss
anarcho-syndicalism, socialism, or communism and plot revolution. Instead, they talked
politics weekly. They were familiar with, but not experts of, the ideologies circulating
around them. In this context, the adage ‘Mussolini made the trains run on time’ becomes

Press Reader, “Naturalization Bluff, Native Born Claims,” Pittsburgh Press (Pittsburgh,
PA), 30 July 1927, 6.
9
Gaetano Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities in the United States, ed. Philip V.
Cannistraro (New York, NY: Center for Migration Studies, 1977), 244.
10
Philip V. Cannistraro, Blackshirts in Little Italy: Italian Americans and Fascism,
1921–1929 (West Lafayette, IN: Bordighera Press, 1999), 113.
11
Salvemini, Italian Fascist Activities in the United States, 244–45; Cannistraro,
Blackshirts in Little Italy, 113.
8
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intelligible. Most had a superficial understanding of Fascism (and the various forms of
leftism, for that matter). They knew the general themes and ideas, but they were not
political scientists. Occasional news and discussion created a mass of influenced people,
not ideologues bound to particular doctrines, ideas, and arguments. This project seeks to
understand the large, moderate middle of Italian Americans.
Location is important. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” studies Italian Americans
residing in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, a geographic area covering a wide
range of communities to tell a more extensive political history of a people. This range
includes the metropolises of Cleveland and Pittsburgh, two of the most significant urban
centers in the United States at the time, along with the cities and towns throughout the
region that formed an interconnected web of Italian-American communities, a detail further
explained in chapter one. More specifically, this includes the following areas of ItalianAmerican settlement: greater Cleveland, moving south to Akron; Youngstown, Ohio, and
the Mahoning Valley, including towns to the east across the Pennsylvania state line; the
southwest corner of Pennsylvania east to the Allegheny Mountains, which includes greater
Pittsburgh, smaller industrial cities along the Beaver, Monongahela, Allegheny, and Ohio
Rivers, and various coal mining towns and crossroads, mainly due east and south of the
metropolis; and, some smaller Ohio mining towns west of Pittsburgh along the Ohio River.
Numerous ethnic newspapers served this area, sometimes with overlapping coverage.
Importantly, population concentrations were not large enough for residents to
operate in a political vacuum. Part of this project’s argument relies on the notion of an
Italian-American public sphere, the concept that ideology originated from conversations
and debates in ethnic organizations, Italian-language newspapers, and everyday encounters

8

with friends and neighbors. The sheer number of people in New York City, which
contained about a quarter of foreign-born Italians living in the United States, along with its
status as an arrival port, allowed the opportunity for competing public spheres for the
ideological fringes.12 For example, in late 1926 and early 1927, rumors about the possible
arrival of the anti-Fascist Colonel Ricciotti Garibaldi, grandson of Italian hero Giuseppe
Garibaldi, in New York animated the Fascist and anti-Fascists in the city.13 The high
concentration of people allowed those at the fringes to operate within circles of like-minded
people. Certainly, radicals existed in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio; however, the
lower physical concentration of people forced most to engage with diverse others, which
created a moderating influence.
“Building a New (Deal) Identity” tells the story of how the Italian Americans
became New Deal Democrats from their perspective, so this project relies heavily on their
sources of information, especially ethnic newspapers, along with oral histories that
interpret events and life experiences. The following chapters document not what historians
might have found noteworthy about the period but what Italian Americans were discussing.
Searching the long arc of American political development, numerous scholars have drawn
parallels between earlier eras and the New Deal, usually by describing Progressives as
bequeathing an ideological foundation on which the New Dealers built.14 There is certainly
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United States Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States Taken in
the Year 1920, vol. II: Population, 1920 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1922), 758.
13
“Ricciotti Garibaldi Profugo in America?,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 13 November
1926, 1; Jay Cassino, “Garibaldi in Cuba as U. S. Frowns,” Daily News (New York, NY),
23 February 1927, 6.
14
Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (New
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 344–45; Patrick D. Reagan, Designing a New
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validity to this, especially since Franklin Roosevelt modeled himself as a progressive
during his final years in the Woodrow Wilson administration while he sought higher
political office.15 Italian Americans had different influences. An occasional reference
appeared, such as a 1921 article in Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano suggesting
that the city needed more civic works in the model offered by its early-twentieth-century
mayor, Tom L. Johnson, but these were few and far between.16 When Italian Americans
looked toward new leadership after the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929, they
specifically had Benito Mussolini, not Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt, or some other
progressive, in mind.
Since this project is about creating an ideology, historical facts are less important
than what people perceived as truths at the time. The Fascist “third-way” economic
experiment of corporatism was not a success; it existed more on paper than in practice.
However, those living in the United States absorbed the propaganda that appeared in their
ethnic press and through transmission organizations such as the Italian consulates and
fraternal societies. Whether Mussolini actually made the trains run on time is irrelevant.
Italian Americans came to believe that Fascist methods worked and offered examples
worthy of replication. The same is true for interviews used in this project. As Alessandro
Portelli argued, oral history offers a method to understand the personal meaning of events

America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890–1943 (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2000), 2, 8–12, 19–22.
15
Roger Daniels, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal, 1882–1939 (Urbana, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 2015), 42–43.
16
“Fiddleing [sic] to No Purpose,” La Voce del Popolo Italiano (Cleveland, OH), 12
February 1921, 2.
10

and decisions.17 Beliefs are seldom the result of rigorous intellectual research; instead, they
derive from perceived truths, life experiences, and everyday interactions. In an oral
interview about his early life and nativism in Youngstown, Ohio, Nicola Criscione
described an event in which Italian-American railroad workers were recalled to the yard
because of a train wreck, a situation that kept them from voting after their shift on election
day. As Criscione explained, there was no wreck. It appeared to be a ruse to keep people
from the polls.18 The validity of this story is unknown, and it likely will never be known;
the importance lies in the fact that Criscione and others believed that the entrenched local
power structure sought to keep people like themselves from participating in American
democracy. Such beliefs can be more potent than absolute truth in forming worldviews and
ideologies.
Although this project analyzes political behavior, the political culture and ideology
of Italian Americans, it does not use typical political science methodology related to
quantitative methods. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” documents people’s thoughts
rather than final vote counts. As Criscione’s example shows, local factors could provide
false or artificial vote tallies, a subject described in chapter six. Registration statistics can
also mislead because this was a time of realignment. Some Republicans were New Dealers.
The most famous example was Fiorello La Guardia, described in Pittsburgh’s Unione as
“one of the foremost men in America, … as great an exponent of the ‘New Deal’ as exists

17

Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories: Form and
Meaning in Oral History (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 50–
55.
18
Nicola Criscione, interview by William Jenkins, transcript, 8 May 1984, 14–15,
Youngstown State University Oral History Program: Ku Klux Klan Project: Personal
Experiences, O. H. 311, Maag Library, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH.
11

in America today.” La Guardia was no different from Democrat Ferdinand Pecora, famed
for his investigation of Wall Street malpractice, in that both were “two self-same
champions of the people” divided only by party name.19 Others, such as Charles J.
Margiotti and Michael A. Musmanno in Pittsburgh, ran for office as Republicans before
switching parties.20 As Unione stated in 1934 concerning realignment, “progressive
Republicans, independent Republicans, and superficial Democrats will have to disappear.”
They would be replaced by “the Democrat, believer in President Roosevelt’s active and
farsighted policy and in his New Deal[,] and the Republican of the old guard loyal to high
finance, protector of big business and defender of the millionaires and of the capitalists of
all colors.”21 This process was uneven and dependent on local politics. Cleveland’s Little
Italy returned its Republican city councilman, Alessandro “Sonny” DeMaioribus, for two
decades (elected in 1927, resigned 1947), even as the community increasingly voted
Democratic in national elections.22 This project is foremost about affiliation with New Deal
ideology, which, as Unione stated, became synonymous only later with the Democratic
Party.
This shift was generational and a process. Many Italian Americans who show up in
this work were under forty when the stock market crashed. Contemporary newspaper
articles noted that the younger generations led political advancement by rejecting old ways,

Al Tronzo, “Pecora Blunders!,” Unione (Pittsburgh, PA), 20 October 1933, 2.
Stefano Luconi, From Paesani to White Ethnics: The Italian Experience in
Philadelphia (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 69–71; Stefano
Luconi, “Musmanno, Michael A. (1897–1968),” in The Italian American Experience: An
Encyclopedia, ed. Salvatore J. LaGumina et al. (New York, NY: Garland, 2000), 396.
21
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22
David D. Van Tassel and John J. Grabowski, eds., The Encyclopedia of Cleveland
History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 337; Luconi, “Italian
Americans and the New Deal Coalition,” 10.
19
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12

shedding the jealousy and self-interest that harmed the collective community.23 It is
unlikely that people in their sixties and seventies experienced a political awakening.
Instead, those who came of age during the 1910s and 1920s experienced the intense
influences of Americanization, leftism, and Fascism, and they synthesized these ideas into
a new ideology.
Just as it took years to build their beliefs, it also took time to see the Democrats as
their desired party. As the New Deal moved closer and closer to Italian-American ideology
by the mid to late 1930s, the ethnic group became more attached to the Democratic Party
and Roosevelt in particular. As Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, residents Bert Iacobucci and
Ormond Montini explained from their experiences, Italian Americans first considered the
Democratic Party during the late 1920s, but it took additional campaigns to consolidate the
ethnicity under its umbrella.24 Party attachments and world views often remain with people
for years, and partisan group realignments can occur over several election cycles.25 The
process took two decades to unfold, but that slow development baked resiliency into the
coalition so that it would last beyond a time of economic turmoil.

“Giovinezza!,” Unione, 2 February 1934, 1; Don Ercole Dominicis, “L’Avanzata degli
Italiani,” Unione, 23 February 1934, 2; “La voce del Pubblico: Una Lettera del Sig.
Loverti,” Unione, 2 March 1934, 3.
24
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh; Bert Iacobucci, interview by
unknown, transcript, 5 December 1979, 18–22, box 2, folder 49, Beaver Valley Labor
History Society Collection, 1909–1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives & Special Collections,
University of Pittsburgh; Ormond Montini, interview by unknown, transcript, 2 August
1978, 30–31, box 2, folder 55, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Collection, 1909–
1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.
25
V. O. Key, Jr., “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” Journal of Politics 21, no.
2 (May 1959): 204–8, https://doi.org/10.2307/2127162.
23

13

Keeping within the scope of the New Deal, this project documents economic
beliefs. Ideology is complex, which is why a multidimensional graph, rather than a single
linear spectrum, is the best means to document a person’s political positions. At a
minimum, analysts can dissect views across the core areas of economics, society, and
foreign policy. “Building a New (Deal) Identity” follows the paradigm created by
Roosevelt and focuses on Italian-American beliefs concerning the economy and the role of
the government in that sphere. Occasionally, this delves into social aspects, such as
Prohibition and American nativism. It does not address cultural issues, such as obscenity
and family values, that became prominent decades later when the New Deal generation
reached old age.26 This project also leaves out views about foreign policy. One reason for
the decline in Roosevelt’s vote between 1936 and 1940 was because Italian Americans
broke with the president over a lack of support for Fascist Italy and a more hostile American
foreign policy.27 In 1936, State Representative Frank J. Zappala of Pittsburgh defended
Italian-American advocation for Italy’s war in Ethiopia with the analogy that a man could
love his wife and still aid his parents; Italian Americans could support their motherland
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Cultural issues could have created new cleavages. For example, Unione contributor Al
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believed that those under the age of 18 should not have been reading these books, and
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Dealers, these were not issues that rose to the forefront during the 1930s because they
could have divided white ethnics much differently. See Al Tronzo, “The Pessoptimist,”
Unione, 29 January 1932, 8.
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and remain loyal and committed to the United States.28 Economic concerns suppressed
their foreign policy considerations until the growing potential for a European conflict
began to dominate the debate during the late 1930s. Foreign policy views peeled away
some Italian-American voters, but that story is outside the purview of this project.
To support the argument that Italian Americans formed a New Deal-style ideology
that the Democrats later appropriated, chapters one through five offer slices of political
development before placing them in the context of Franklin Roosevelt’s election and
governance in chapter six. The story is linear but interconnected. Built from an ethnic
public sphere, Italian Americans combined civic nationalism, leftism, and Fascism into a
new amalgamation at ethnic political clubs. The final chapter shows how the mediated
synthesis manifested itself in American politics.
Chapter one rebuilds the Italian-American community and its public sphere as they
existed in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio between the two world wars.
Underpinning this section is the argument that this was a time of hyphenated identity.
Before the First World War, many immigrants were Italians living in the United States.
They resided in closed communities that experienced constant arrivals and departures,
which perpetuated, rather than arrested, their Italian identity. Many intended to return to
Italy, and they did not attempt to assimilate.
The Great War and American immigration restriction ended the prospect of a
temporary sojourn in the United States. During the 1920s, those who remained with their
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American-born children became Italian-Americans, a hyphenated people that drew from
both sources of identity. This ethnicity promoted group cohesion. The Italian-American
identifier subdued regional markers, such as Sicilian, Neapolitan, Tuscan, and the like, that
previously kept people separated. Likewise, the inability to escape their ethnicity soothed
potential class divisions. The middle class and many elites still socialized with the wider
heavily working-class Italian-American population.
As Italian Americans, they developed a semi-closed community. They increasingly
interacted with other ethnicities and became more involved in mainstream American life.
However, they still spent much of their time socializing within their own networks,
including ethnic lodges and clubs, churches, and neighborhoods. They formed a public
sphere for the creation of political ideology. It was within these physical places that people
informally discussed ideas and found consensus. Their ethnic press supported this public
sphere, and newspapers repeated and amplified ideas circulating within the community.
They functioned as gatekeepers by interpreting the facts offered by the American press.
This public sphere was not permanent, which is why this is a generational story. As
the next cohort continued the trend of assimilation, people ceased to be Italian Americans
and became Americans of Italian heritage. The Second World War devastated the ItalianAmerican press and forced most papers to close. Ethnic organizations continued but in a
different form. As Richard Ponzio, born in 1938 Pittsburgh, expressed succinctly: “We’d
sign up, but we never really participated as much as the old timers.”29 Younger generations
fled to the suburbs making everyday interactions with Italian-American neighbors and
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clubs less likely. The New Deal coalition formed at a particular point in the development
of Italian-American identity.
Chapter two documents American civic nationalism, one of three core influences
on Italian-American ideology and the foundation on which the subsequent two rested. Civic
nationalism was the belief that Italian Americans had the opportunity to enter into the
broader body politic as long as they adhered to fundamental American values such as
equality for all citizens regardless of wealth or background, freedom of expression, and the
duty to stay politically informed and engaged. Most Italian immigrants had an ambivalent
view of the state upon their arrival in America because Italy lacked a history of mass
democracy and participatory politics. By the late 1910s and early 1920s, various factors
pushed those in the United States toward citizenship and new concepts concerning their
relationship with the state. American nativism, as manifested by immigration restriction
and Prohibition (which white ethnics viewed as a law targeting them and their ‘foreign’
behaviors), drove aliens to naturalize as protection. Potential rewards pulled them in the
same direction. Citizenship meant not only protection from deportation and legal
intimidation but also possible advancements in the workplace, the ability for wives and
children in Italy to skirt immigration quotas, and for people to have a say in the American
system of governance.
As immigrants increasingly underwent citizenship testing and their children
experienced American education, the community moved toward civic nationalism and an
appreciation for democratic government. At the turn of the twentieth century, enterprising
political bosses built loyal bases of voters by pushing aliens through often lax citizenship
requirements, which created numerous Americans on paper but not in mentality. The
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Naturalization Act of 1906 introduced stricter, universal testing, necessitating an extensive
knowledge of the American government. Local organizations, such as the Hiram House
social settlement that served Cleveland’s “Big Italy,” taught American values to
immigrants as part of their journey toward citizenship. These same entities – the settlement
houses and public schools – educated their American-born children in the principles related
to democracy and freedom.
This rising generation of Italian Americans came to value civic nationalism as
interpreted through their community. They did not adopt the white, middle-class
progressivism with its religious and paternalist undertones held by many local leaders who
wanted to Americanize the foreigners. Italian Americans worked closely with nationality
workers, such as Hiram House’s Frank Casper, an Italian immigrant. They adopted the
basic tenets of Americanism related to civics, but they found inspiration for their economic
values from other sources within their community.
Chapter three documents the second core influence, a leftist ideology that built upon
American civic nationalism. In standard American history, the Red Scare that began during
the First World War and extended into 1920 decimated radicalism and ushered in a decade
of reactionary conservative politics. While the Red Scare drove the most overt
manifestations of radicalism underground, the trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo
Vanzetti offered a veil for continual diffusion of leftist ideas.
Cells of Galleanists, the violent anarchists who were the archetype of the radicals
hunted during the Red Scare, existed throughout the region, but their ideas did not become
popular. The Galleanists were doctrinaires and proponents of insurrectionary anarchism.
While Italian Americans agreed with the Galleanists’ criticisms of capitalism, they could
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not excuse the violence and anti-statism. Civic nationalism had taught them that
government involvement could answer their problems, even if they were still leery of the
state’s authority. Furthermore, the dangers of association with these radicals were too
severe for most to commit.
The Sacco and Vanzetti trial offered a solution. The pair became causes célèbres
because many projected themselves onto the radicals. The court convicted the two men for
murder, not on evidence but because they were working-class immigrants who expressed
a distaste of American capitalism. The Italian-American radical Carlo Tresca, who was
associated with the Industrial Workers of the World and syndicalism, used the growing
social movement to proselytize audiences. Tresca and associates scheduled fundraisers and
informational meetings throughout the region. Locals justified attendance not because they
listened to a radical talk but because they came out to support two wrongfully convicted
men. The background of Sacco and Vanzetti allowed Tresca and others to discuss topics
that derived from working-class and immigrant grievances. The audience departed the
events convinced that they needed to hold the United States accountable for breaches of
American values, such as freedom of speech and equality under the law, which reinforced
civic nationalism. They also came away with the leftist belief that mass unionism was the
only solution to their economic problems.
The third and final core influence was Fascism, the subject of chapter four. Similar
to leftist ideology, Fascism disseminated across the community. Italian Americans were
open to the new system because it reinforced their argument for civic nationalism at home.
Italian success abroad blunted nativists’ assertions that new immigrants were inferior and
unworthy of complete social and political equality. Fascism spread quickly through
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“transmission belts,” organizations and individuals connected to Italy that dispersed the
state’s propaganda.30
Misinformation colored Italian Americans’ understanding of Fascism. As Benito
Mussolini tightened his control of the press and silenced opposition, those living in the
United States received propaganda that appeared to them as fact. They believed the
narrative that conservative elements were cast aside in favor of the syndicalist wing of the
Fascist Party. The state increased economic intervention, first in currency manipulation
and agriculture, and then in the lives of the working class and resultant corporatist state.
Fascist accomplishments were minor in reality, but Italian Americans came to believe the
propaganda that argued Fascism was a successful method to solve the problems of modern,
industrial society.
People discarded areas in which Fascism clashed with American civic values, and
they adopted parts that presented solutions to leftist grievances. Italian Americans never
accepted the totalitarian aspects related to the freedoms of speech, debate, and press
because they were antithetical to the previously described core influences. Instead, they
embraced the economic measures of Fascism that appeared as evolutions of leftist ideas.
Corporatism, which organized workers and employers into bargaining units, offered a type
of mass unionism protected and empowered by the state. The success of Italian
interventionism created a favorable disposition to massive public works projects,
government economic meddling, a more powerful executive leader, and a willingness to
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provide legal concessions and social safety nets to workers. Fascism informed ItalianAmerican ideology because it offered tested solutions to their problems.
Chapter five rebuilds a network of political clubs that proliferated throughout the
region and helped moderate ideological influences and build consensus. Americanization
efforts taught immigrants about civic nationalism and the ability to enact change through
democratic means. Political clubs became the organizations by which to accomplish such
goals. Spurred by a need to defend themselves against nativism, local communities
organized political clubs to hold Italian-American voters together as a bloc to have a voice
in elections.
The Italian American Political Association of Youngstown, Ohio, was an example
of a typical club. Members inaugurated their group in 1924 specifically to protect and
defend their rights as American citizens. The Political Association acted as a mediator by
hosting local politicians and their surrogates and then endorsing candidates across party
lines. The organization spread its influence and sponsored outreach and open events.
Notably, the club was not an instrument for a few men to grow a political machine as yearly
elections rotated those in leadership positions. It was an overt example of the local public
sphere at work. Celestino Petrarca, the publisher of the local newspaper Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, was involved throughout the years and granted ample column space to the
group. Political news, such as printed decisions to endorse particular candidates, derived
from the debates and discussions that took place within the Political Association. While
chapter five uses the Youngstown group as a case study, political clubs proliferated
throughout western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.
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Ethnic solidarity bridged the ideological divide. Italian Americans sought unified
voting blocs to have a strong voice in local politics. As mentioned earlier, most Italian
Americans were not adherents of leftism or Fascism, but each influenced them to different
extents. The need to present one opinion forced philo-Fascists and anti-Fascists under one
roof and into the same debate. The Italian American Political Association of Youngstown
included collaborators like Innocenzo Vagnozzi, whom his detractors described as a
communist, and Carlo Caselli, editor of Il Cittadino Italo-Americano and an apologist for
Mussolini and Fascism. Vagnozzi, Caselli, and others fought one another and, in the
process, moderated their opinions toward consensus.
Chapter six documents the results of these combined ideological currents and how
the New Deal merged with Italian-American preferences. First, it addresses the issue of
timing. Voter suppression was common during this period and hid many people’s true
preferences. Joseph Costa worked as the foreman of a labor gang for Pittsburgh Railways,
which operated almost six hundred miles of streetcar track between Pittsburgh and its
interurban lines during the mid-1920s.31 According to his daughter, the family only became
Democrats after Costa retired because, as she explained, “my dad was told he had to be
Republican” by the company.32 The political clubs spoke against coercion, but an unknown
multitude of people refused to express their true thoughts publicly because they needed
their livelihoods. Furthermore, as the above 1934 Unione article illustrated, both political
parties contained conservative and progressive elements. In many pre-New Deal political
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campaigns, politicians offered voters no alternative to conservative economic policies.
Many Italian Americans refused to risk their jobs to support a candidate solely as a protest
vote.
The Great Depression offered relief from undue influence but not a change in
ideology. Mass unemployment and the depletion of local government resources lessened
the hold that employers and political machine bosses exerted over voters. Criticism,
however, remained constant. The same critique that Italian Americans made about Calvin
Coolidge concerning his closeness with finance and industry carried over to Herbert
Hoover. The Wall Street crash amplified but never changed the message. Roosevelt’s
victory in 1932 brought reprieve but not optimism. Few foresaw the new president acting
radically different than his predecessors.
The unfolding of the New Deal brought Italian Americans into the coalition. It
fulfilled their hunger for political parity. The group had criticized American politics for
blocking its potential ascent, therefore failing the basic tenets of American civic
nationalism, such as equality of opportunity regardless of national origin, religion, and
ethnicity. Commentators noted with pride that the Democratic Party under Roosevelt
accepted them with open arms. The New Deal shattered norms about the place of
government in the economy and people’s lives. For the better part of a decade, Italian
Americans had been learning about the benefits of an activist government and strong leader
as they existed in Fascist Italy. They clamored for public works projects that created jobs
and improved the nation. They did not fear broadened executive power but instead
embraced President Roosevelt and the National Industrial Recovery Act as domestic
replicas of Mussolini and corporatism.
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Italian Americans approached Fascism from the left, and their understanding of
corporatism was not a business cartel system but a means by which the state addressed
working-class grievances. Their critique a year into the Roosevelt administration was about
not government overreach but the inability of the National Recovery Administration to
deliver on aspects beneficial to working people. As the New Deal entered its second phase,
Roosevelt delivered the unfulfilled promises made by the NIRA through a series of laws.
The government continued to intercede in industries considered in the public’s interest,
such as coal and power utilities. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, through its
newly empowered board, protected and encouraged industrial unionism. The Social
Security Act granted old-age pensions and contained provisions for unemployment
insurance. Finally, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 gave workers a forty-hour
workweek and minimum pay, thereby establishing a solid foundation from which unions
could bargain for better wages and conditions. The second New Deal was a continuation
of the promises initially offered by the NIRA and the first New Deal. Italian Americans
embraced the new legislation.
In the end, Italian Americans realigned with the parties. The contrast between an
activist New Deal philosophy and conservative Republican laissez-faire beliefs became too
strong to ignore. Perhaps nowhere was this clearer than in the 1938 appeal offered by
Michael A. Musmanno, a popular Alleghany County (Pittsburgh) politician and judge who
later became an allied military governor in Italy, presided over the SS-Einsatzgruppen case
as part of the Nuremberg Trials, and served on Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court.33 He began
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his legal career during the 1920s fighting for Italian-American miners and Sacco and
Vanzetti. In 1928, Musmanno won election as a Republican to the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, which he held until resigning in 1931 to serve on the Allegheny County
Court.34 His 1938 message to voters excoriated his previous party. As Musmanno
explained, “I still recall the heart pangs I suffered as I stood on the floor of the House of
Representatives in 1931, pleading that [the] Republican Legislature do something” to help
the people. The economic downturn was akin to a war that Republicans refused to fight.
Representative Musmanno “urged a program of public works … [but] what did that
Republican Legislature do? It did nothing.” They had the opportunity to end sweatshops,
provide living wages to workers, and reign in utilities, but they declined to act. Instead,
“the Democratic Party eliminated all these evils.” The decision in 1938 was clear: “This
election transcends all personalities. It is a clash between opposing theories of government.
Shall we have a government that appreciates human needs and acts to supply them or shall
we have a government that believes human suffering is not within its orbit of concern?”
Musmanno urged Italian-American voters to select a straight Democratic ticket in 1938 as
a message of support for Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.35
In the end, Italian Americans built themselves a New Deal identity. Michael
Musmanno was correct; the decision became a contest between opposing theories of
government, a paradigm that held over the next generation. The New Deal put into action

70 Years,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 39 (2016–
2017): 96–97, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/loyint39&i=110.
34
Luconi, “Musmanno, Michael A. (1897–1968),” 396.
35
“Judge Musmanno Endorses Democrats,” Unione, 28 October 1938, 1. To make sure
that every reader clearly understood Musmanno’s appeal, the newspaper printed a
translated copy in Italian the following week. See “Il Giudice Musmanno si dichiara per
la intera Scheda Democratica,” Unione, 4 November 1938, 1–2.
25

a political philosophy based on ideas that had been circulating within the ethnic community
for years. Italian-American enthusiasm was entirely justified. Franklin Roosevelt may have
erected the New Deal, but he built it atop an ideological foundation already laid by Italian
Americans.
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Chapter One
Italian-American
The Creation of a Hyphenated Identity in Western Pennsylvania and
Eastern Ohio
In 1919, Charles W. Coulter, a sociologist at Western Reserve University,
published a short description of the local Italian-American community for the Cleveland
Americanization Committee. He noted that the city contained both a “Big Italy” and a
“Little Italy,” along with another six smaller areas that acted as ethnic enclaves. Within
these neighborhoods, the Ohio-born, second-generation Italian American was “reared in
what [was] practically an Italian colony, where the mother tongue [was] spoken, Italian
traditions, ideals, and customs [were] perpetuated and a national solidarity [was]
maintained.”1
Coulter was correct that ethnic communities could perpetuate certain traditions,
ideals, and customs, but his definition of “Italian colony” requires further explanation. In
actuality, the enclaves were not groups of Italians picked up in Italy and deposited in select
neighborhoods across American cities, thereby copying their culture and norms verbatim
in a new land. Instead, they were Italian-Americans, a hyphenated identity, a group with
Italian traditions, ideals, and customs modified for their new American environment.
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This hyphenated ethnicity produced an Italian-American political ideology. In
order to understand why most Italian Americans came to favor the New Deal and Franklin
Roosevelt’s policies, it is first necessary to understand the parameters within which this
group of white ethnics operated. Western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio contained an
interconnected web of communities that acted as a public sphere for ideas and information.
This network was concurrently within and separated from mainstream America. National
and local news from the outside entered, only to be digested, interpreted, and transmitted
throughout the web to other Italian Americans. Overlapping newspapers served the region,
while connections via road, rail, and streetcar carried people and their opinions between
neighborhoods and towns. Immigrants and their children continued the dispersal through
personal contacts with friends, neighbors, coworkers, and fellow ethnic organization
members. Ideas, opinions, and – most importantly – ideology percolated up from these
conversations to inform the Italian-American ethnic press. Within this circulation of ideas
laid the roots for the New Deal’s Italian-American acceptance.
This hyphenated identity came at a particular time in Italian-American history.
Although more secure in the American environment than when most arrived ten, twenty,
or thirty years prior, the group had not yet entirely assimilated. Class divisions failed to
override ethnicity as a primary identifier. Although the community increasingly produced
professionals such as store owners, doctors, and lawyers, most of these people tied their
fortunes to the predominantly working-class Italian-American clientele they served. The
fact that many began life at the bottom of the social hierarchy before rising created
interclass empathy. American nativism and discrimination suppressed Italian regional
identities, and immigrants and their children increasingly thought of themselves as Italian
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Americans. This community and its public sphere were defined and formed by the 1920s,
and the Great Depression acted as a solidifier, a moment of crisis that prompted reflection,
as people found themselves with less work and more time to debate politics and ideas.
The hyphenated identity and the Italian-American public sphere were temporary
creations. The Second World War ended the Italian-American press. After the conflict,
people increasingly purchased homes in new suburbs, benefited from educational
opportunities and white-collar jobs, and spent less time at ethnic societies. Some
neighborhoods retained an older Italian-American core, but most within the rising, next
generation became Americans of Italian ethnicity. They lost their hyphenated identity and
its accompanying public sphere for ideas.

The “Discovery” of Italian-American Communities and Their Public
Sphere
Charles W. Coulter and his contemporaries understood an aspect of immigrant life
that took historians decades to document: ethnic communities existed in the United States
with their own support structures, culture, and personal interactions. It was not until after
the Second World War that historians treated immigrants and their children as subjects of
inquiry, and these initial attempts were not without issues. The earliest works described the
immigrant experience as universal and the newcomers as opposites to Americanism. It was
not until the New Social History turn of the 1960s and 1970s that scholars produced case
studies of specific ethnic groups that documented these various communities’
characteristics.
The United States has long been described as a nation of immigrants, but their full
stories were absent from early-twentieth-century historical academic research. Prominent
29

figures such as Charles Beard and Arthur M. Schlesinger expanded the scope of acceptable
scholarship to include fields beyond politics and government, but historians still lacked any
notable immigration specialist before the 1920s. Social scientists, many of whom had an
interest in the debate about Americanization and immigration restriction, produced the bulk
of research.2 Like Coulter, this group viewed immigrant communities as semi-closed
spaces isolated by ethnicity. Settlement house pioneer Jane Addams described Italians,
Jews, and Bohemians (Czechs) as ethnic “foreign colonies” residing in the Chicago
neighborhoods surrounding Hull House.3 Other researchers believed that these enclaves
perpetuated specific immigrant values, such as Italian ex-agricultural laborers spurring
American-style family farms in favor of replicating, in American cities, the small, closeknit towns and villages that they had left.4 Social worker Grace Abbott expressed the most
accurate assessment concerning the ethnic enclaves: “To many Americans the so-called
foreign colonies in New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, seem to be reproductions
of Italy, Greece, Poland or Russia. But to the immigrant the street on which he lives is so
unlike the one on which he lived at home, that he believes them to be thoroughly American.
These foreign neighborhoods of ours are neither Italian, Greek, Polish or Russian, nor are
they American.”5
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Early immigration histories failed to consider these dual influences, or they offered
a limited scope concerning hyphenated identity. For example, Marcus Lee Hansen’s The
Atlantic Migration (1940) discussed European expulsive factors before the Civil War but
did not document immigrant life in the United States.6 Hansen’s The Immigrant in
American History (1940) addressed the other side of the issue. However, he still treated
immigration as linear and universal, at one point arguing that for scholars within the
immigration field, “settlement will be viewed as a continuous process from its beginnings
in 1607 to its virtual close in 1914.”7 In Boston’s Immigrants (1941), Oscar Handlin argued
that new Irish arrivals carved out their own, unique place in American society: “The
development of Irish ideas created a further range of differences between themselves and
all others in the city [of Boston] that stimulated and developed consciousness of group
identity.”8 However, Handlin did not view the antebellum United States as a pluralistic
nation, but one in which “newcomers entered smoothly into the flow of life about them …
[or] remained a discordant element in the closely-knit society.”9 In this view of the
immigrant experience, the process of assimilation was dichotomic; instead of being
incorporated step-by-step into American society and culture, newcomers either became
American or stayed foreign. The creation of popular, enduring ethnic organizations and
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institutions separated and reaffirmed foreignness rather than aided assimilation.10 Handlin
continued this line of explanation in The Uprooted (1951) by arguing the universality of
the immigrant experience. The shock of transplanting roots to a new land created a feeling
of alienation, one in which “men faced the enormous compulsion of working out new
relationships, new meanings to their lives” without the help “of institutions and social
patterns which formerly guided their actions.”11
John Higham’s Strangers in the Land (1955) reaffirmed Handlin’s paradigm by
noting how nativism, defined by “anti-Catholic, anti-radical, and Anglo-Saxon traditions,”
created a system that either accepted people as Americans or condemned them as
foreigners.12 Scholars like Hansen, Handlin, and Higham expanded the field of immigration
history. However, by describing immigrants as only operating within a paradigm of either
total assimilation or complete foreignness, these historians unintentionally slighted the
processes that created a transitional, hyphenated ethnic identity.
Historians challenged this interpretation during the New Social History turn of the
1960s and 1970s. Coinciding with a call from the 1969 Organization of American
Historians conference to discuss ethnicity beyond the yardstick of assimilation, case studies
of specific ethnic groups proliferated along with the view of identity formation as an
ongoing process dependent on each community’s specific background and influences.13 It
became clear to historians that Grace Abbott’s description was correct; these were not
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Italian – or Jewish, or Greek, or Polish – colonies, nor were they American. These ethnic
enclaves melded two cultures into something new and created unique hyphenated identities
that required singular studies. Immigrant religion was an overt example. The German, Irish,
and Italian Catholics that worshiped at the turn of the twentieth century were
interchangeable foreigners to native-born Americans, especially those nativists described
by Higham. However, as Rudolph J. Vecoli, Silvano M. Tomasi, and Robert A. Orsi later
explained, these ethnicities were often in conflict because they expressed religion
differently. Many Italian immigrants distrusted the Catholic hierarchy because it was
exploitive in southern Italy. They wanted the freedom to practice their own form of
Catholicism, complete with saint veneration and festivals.14 These conflicts led to the
creation of ethnic parishes that served “as a compromise between the demands of
immediate assimilation and the resistance of immigrants to abandon their traditional
religiosity.”15
In this sense, ethnic groups formed subcommunities within larger populations,
necessitating the need for case studies. As Handlin concluded at one point in The Uprooted,
“if the immigrants were to achieve the adjustment to their new environment, it had to be
within the confines of the ghettos the environment created.”16 Vecoli went further in his
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1964 article “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of The Uprooted.” He cautioned historians
against Handlin’s generalization of the immigrant experience and argued for more
emphasis on individual community study. Italian immigrants in Chicago replicated much
of their previous society within numerous Little Italies, which influenced not only religion
but also settlement patterns, employment, and the development of ethnic organizations. 17
Documenting the Italian-American experience necessitated the study of individual
communities since the process of assimilation occurred within a network of relationships
connected via churches, newspapers, work, and personal contacts.
This approach prompted numerous case studies to fill the gap about ItalianAmerican communities in cities and towns across the United States. 18 Humbert S. Nelli’s
Italians in Chicago continued Vecoli’s insistence that Italians in the Illinois metropolis
formed unique communities.19 Others followed suit by rebuilding late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth-century enclaves and their attributes in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Providence.20 While some, such as Josef Barton’s
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Cleveland study, Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians, and Slovaks in an
American City, and John Bodnar, Roger Simon, and Michael P. Weber’s Lives of Their
Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh, used comparative approaches, these works
still asserted uniqueness for each nationality group’s experience.21 Commonalities in
employment patterns, housing, and social life created semi-insular populations of Italian
Americans.
By rebuilding communities comprised of Italian immigrants and their children,
these studies suggested that assimilation was an ongoing process rather than an immediate
shift from foreigner to American. This concept is fundamental for understanding ItalianAmerican history because most Italian migrants to the United States initially identified
themselves by village or region rather than the Italian state, a phenomenon known as
campanilismo (a reference to those within earshot of the local church bell tower, and thus
considered community). Scholars rejected Handlin’s dichotomic terms to explain the
ethnic experience in the United States. More accurately, assimilation occurred in a series
of stages in which individuals and communities progressed from Sicilian, Neapolitan,
Abruzzese, and other regional identities to Italian American and, eventually, to nondescript
American of Italian origin.22 As Stefano Luconi argued in From Paesani to White Ethnics,
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a book-length study about acculturation and assimilation, Italian-American ethnicity “in
Philadelphia was the product of a continuous process of redefinition.”23 Since ethnicity is
a cultural construct, individual membership within the group is highly malleable because
criteria for inclusion and exclusion can change over time. The formation of ethnicity
“occurs within a dialectic situation[, in which] both interaction with others and labelling
from the outside contribute to the subjective and voluntary process of self-identification on
behalf of the group.”24 Their self-identity was a journey that took most from the
parochialism of the early 1900s to a national “Italian” marker by the Second World War.25
New attributes of the ethnic community, such as the use of standard Italian for newspapers,
the adoption of Columbus Day as a celebration of nationality, and the consolidation of
ethnic societies under the Order of the Sons of Italy and other federations, aided the shift
from regionalism to a broader Italian-American identity.26
This process was visible to Italian Americans living through it. As their press
contended in 1932, a rising American-born generation competed with older Italian
immigrants in ethnic organizations.27 Regional tensions remained to some extent, but future
progress in America meant adopting the new views from Italy, where people now thought
of themselves as one Italian nation.28 As Paul Del Rosso reminisced years later, when he
and his friends sought to revive a defunct Trafford, Pennsylvania, ethnic club during the

23

Luconi, From Paesani to White Ethnics, 2.
Luconi, 3.
25
Luconi, 149–51.
26
Thomas A. Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago,
1890–1945 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31.
27
“Italiani o Italo Americani,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano (Youngstown, OH), 23
January 1932, 1.
28
“Bell’Esempio,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 13 August 1932, 1.
24

36

1930s, they did not limit membership to one region as had happened in years past. As he
explained succinctly, when “you’re Italian, you’re Italian. I don’t care what part of Italy
you come from.”29
The shift from regionalism to an Italian-American identity is an example of an
“imagined community.” As Benedict Anderson explained in his landmark book: “It is
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image
of their communion.”30 During the time between the world wars, most Italian immigrants
and their children living in the United States came to self-identify as part of this imagined
nation that was, as Grace Abbott explained earlier, both part of and separate from
mainstream America.31 Few would ever personally interact, but their commonalities in
experience, culture, and institutions shaped them into a unified ethnic group. By creating
this unique identity, Italian Americans reinforced the importance of interpersonal
connections with other members of their ethnicity, further strengthening their community
and its institutions.
These contacts and institutions created a public sphere for the circulation of
political ideology. As Jürgen Habermas theorized in The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere, as Western states changed from absolute monarchy to democratic,
parliamentary representation, political decision-making shifted from a small group of court
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advisors to a larger, bourgeois body politic. The public sphere developed as a forum for
ideas. Literate masses debated ideology within salons, coffeehouses, and various societies.
Newspapers complemented the forum by circulating the opinions created within these
spaces. In turn, readers absorbed ideas from the periodicals, which then prompted further
discussion and debate.32
The Italian-American public sphere, as documented in this work, builds from
refined versions of this theory. Although Habermas was initially vague concerning the
public sphere’s size and membership, he and others clarified the parameters. 33 When
discussing the European Union’s consolidation, the theorist admitted that far from creating
one mass forum for European opinion, “the political public sphere is fragmented into
national units.”34 Habermas and his followers asserted a post-structural concept of a counter
sphere. Different groups can create their own forums for discussion and ideology creation,
competing with the larger, mainstream public sphere that is sometimes exclusionary for
specific populations.35 These include sub-spheres based on ethnic and racial divisions for
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groups like Jews and African Americans.36 Whether defined as a public sphere, counter
sphere, or competing sphere, Italian Americans during the early twentieth century fit the
model of a group building an ideology around areas of interaction. These debate locations
were not the bourgeois salons and coffeehouses described by Habermas; instead, ethnic
society halls, festivals, and compatriots’ dining room tables served the same function.
Furthermore, ethnic newspapers understood their purpose within this model; as one
admitted in 1925, its goal was to be “the mouthpiece of the masses [and] … a
communicative means between people.”37 Local Italian-language papers further selfsegregated this public sphere. Within this unique community, a political ideology favorable
to the New Deal developed and flourished.

The Parameters of the Public Sphere
The Italian-American Community of Western Pennsylvania and
Eastern Ohio
People’s engagement with information and opinions provided by community texts
and social contacts shaped Italian-American political ideology. Opinion formation relied
on two poles with information passing between them, each complementing, clarifying, and
building from the other. The first pole consisted of community information dispersers. The
ethnic media, especially Italian-language newspapers, were the most prominent, but oral
addresses and lectures were also part of this group. The second pole consisted of sites of
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interaction and discussion, which for the Italian-American community meant any place
where political opinions would have been shared and debated, such as in ethnic halls.38 It
was a cyclical exchange; media provided facts for ordinary people to debate, and these
mass conversations inspired newspaper coverage. The use of the Italian language played a
gatekeeping function. Bilingualism allowed for the creation of a specific public sphere that
was closed to other populations. In order to evaluate how a unique ideology percolated
within the Italian-American community of western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio, it is
first necessary to describe the region’s interconnectedness, including its people’s
movements and socialization patterns, the range of its press, and some typical ethnic
organizations.
This project is deliberately a case study of a region rather than a city because an
overlapping hinterland of smaller municipalities and towns connected the metropolises of
Cleveland and Pittsburgh. Many lived in coal mining communities that supplied both cities’
industries, while others worked as pick and shovel laborers, creating and maintaining the
rail and road networks that connected these places. These were people who had left family
and traveled thousands of miles from Europe seeking employment, so they had few qualms
about relocating to another town in the region for work. Miners moved from town to town
as jobs became available.39 Others left the profession permanently and found employment
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in growing industries, such as in the Jones and Laughlin steel mill in Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania.40 Professionals were also transient, such as Father Americo Ciampichini,
who was the pastor at churches in Cleveland, Youngstown, and Lorain, Ohio, at various
times during the 1920s and 1930s.41 When necessary, people were mobile, with many
staying temporarily in one city before settling in another, such as going from Pittsburgh to
Warren, Ohio, Cleveland to Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, Erie, Pennsylvania to New Castle,
Pennsylvania, and Ravenna, Ohio, to Warren.42
Transportation networks encouraged this movement and created a vast network of
socialization throughout the region. From 1900 until the 1920s, interurban railroads
facilitated excursions to visit and interact with nearby clusters of Italian Americans. In
1907 and 1908, the completion of tracks in the Youngstown area connected the Cleveland
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and Pittsburgh networks.43 Although passenger service was not quick by later standards,
the interurban streetcars still made day trips to nearby cities possible. The thirty-four-mile
journey between Cleveland and Akron, for example, took one hour and fifty minutes, and
a limited express service reduced the time to under an hour and a half.44 The completed
network connected many locations that periodically arise in this work, including Cleveland,
Akron, and Youngstown, Ohio, and Pittsburgh, New Castle, and Greensburg,
Pennsylvania. However, while the interurbans linked western Pennsylvania to eastern
Ohio, the network did not extend into eastern Pennsylvania.45 The Allegheny Mountains,
distance, and lack of population in mid-Pennsylvania made connecting Pittsburgh to
Philadelphia unfeasible and impractical. A glance at the Pittsburgh Press’s Italian Societies
section attests to the scale of regional travel. In late December 1917, the middle of winter
during wartime, Pittsburgh had notable Italian-American visitors from Wheeling, West
Virginia, Youngstown, Ohio, and the Pennsylvania towns of Indiana, Vandergrift,
Uniontown, Kittanning, Leechburg, New Castle, Altoona, Greensburg, Reading, Donora,
Canonsburg, Aliquippa, Monongahela, and Johnstown.46 Excursions were not limited to
the affluent, and many young Italian-American miners in places like Westmoreland County
traveled into Pittsburgh (in neighboring Alleghany County) when they had free time.47
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The proliferation of automobiles during the 1920s complemented this network and
allowed Italian Americans to sustain and broaden their movement in the region. For
example, the Lega Toscana’s Filodrammatica, an amateur Italian-American theater troupe
based in Pittsburgh, regularly performed in the nearby communities of New Castle,
Monessen, New Kensington, and Washington.48 Ethnic clubs could socialize with others,
such as in 1930 when the entire membership of New Castle’s Rinascenza lodge traveled
twenty miles by automobile to attend the inauguration of a new branch in Farrell,
Pennsylvania.49 A young Henry Mancini made a car trip with his father in 1935 from West
Aliquippa to Loew’s Penn Theater in Pittsburgh, where he saw his first “talkie,” Cecil B.
De Mille’s The Crusades, which sparked his career choice as a film composer.50 Streetcars
and later automobiles encouraged Italian Americans’ movement throughout the region and
kept individuals and communities in contact.
Italian Americans thought of themselves as inhabitants of this region of the United
States. In a 1933 letter to the Italian ambassador, the leaders of the Italian Sons and
Daughters of America (ISDA), a Pennsylvania-based umbrella organization for mutual aid
societies, requested elevating the vice-consulate of Pittsburgh to a full consulate. They
included numerous reasons as justification. The distance between western Pennsylvania
and the existent consulate in Philadelphia, some three to four hundred miles, justified a
second Pennsylvania consul. The Pittsburgh area had grown substantially over the previous
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twenty years, and “today the Western part of Pennsylvania is completely independent from
the Eastern part, … not only as [a] center of culture and of industry, but also in politics.”
The area of influence extended beyond the commonwealth as Pittsburgh was the “center
also of very important Districts of the neighboring States, Ohio and West Virginia,” which
contained many Italian residents.51 Considering that the distance separating Pittsburgh and
Cleveland was less than half of the amount between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, it was
logical that those residing in western Pennsylvania felt more connected to compatriots in
Ohio and West Virginia than in the eastern part of their state.
An interconnected region meant community interaction. Given the area’s size, not
all western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio residents associated with each other personally;
instead, their communities overlapped. Circles of friends and acquaintances extended
between ethnic neighborhoods and towns, and they formed layered webs of relationships.
News, feelings, opinions, and beliefs spread across these entangled connections and built
the foundation for a shared ideology. The sites of this interaction were important.
The neighborhood, in this case, the ethnic enclave or immigrant “ghetto,” was the
first location of these interactions. Cleveland contained seven of these by the late 1920s.
Big Italy, the area between Woodland and Orange Avenues stretching from East Ninth
Street to East Fortieth Street, was the largest. A second notable neighborhood, Little Italy,
existed to the west around the intersection of Mayfield and Murray Hill Roads.52 The latter
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was exceptionally homogeneous. According to the 1911 Dillingham Commission, this
section contained ninety-eight families, with ninety-seven headed by an Italian-American
father of foreign or American birth.53 Pittsburgh hosted notable enclaves in the Strip and
Lower Hill Districts, adjacent to downtown, and in East Liberty and Bloomfield to the
west.54 One past resident of Larimer, a neighborhood adjacent to East Liberty, claimed that
during his youth in the 1930s and 1940s, the area must have been 95 percent Italian
American because it took until he was a teenager to realize that people without Italian
ethnicity existed.55 Other Italian-American sections, ranging from a street to an entire
neighborhood, flourished in cities and towns throughout the region. Henry Mancini
claimed that his neighborhood of West Aliquippa “was at least 90 percent Italian,” with a
few Slovak, Croatian, and Jewish families mixed in.56 In Beyer, Pennsylvania, there was a
road colloquially called “macaroni street” because of its inhabitants.57 A similar pattern
developed in Trafford, Pennsylvania, where de facto segregation created a section for more
affluent Irish- and German-American tradesmen and separate streets for Italian-, Polish-,
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and Serbian-American residences.58 Others remembered towns, such as Hillsville, Walston,
Heilwood, and Apollo, Pennsylvania, containing large numbers of Italian Americans or the
clustering of ethnicities.59
It is irrelevant whether Italian Americans actually predominated in specific
neighborhoods and towns; the importance is that people believed these communities
existed.60 As David R. Roediger explained in Working Toward Whiteness, “statistical
proofs that new immigrant areas of cities were polyglot are fully compatible with the
possibility that groups within them still imagined themselves as living in an Italian (or
Jewish or Greek) quarter, neighborhood, or even ghetto.”61 The physical enclave was often
multiethnic, and sometimes even multiracial, but most day-to-day contact occurred within
nationality groups. These were generally tight-knit neighborhoods where Italian Americans
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visited each other for informal conversations over coffee, wine, cards, or bocce.62 These
interactions colored their perceptions of community and identity.
Churches reinforced Italian Americanness. During this period, the Catholic Church
served predominantly as a marker of identity rather than a place to learn a newAmericanized style of Catholicism. After arrival in the United States, many Italian
immigrants shunned the Catholic Church. Anticlericalism ran deep in Italy, and they did
not appreciate Irish-Catholic control of the institution’s hierarchy in the United States. Men
often immigrated alone, especially during the earlier years of Italian migration, and they
were not inclined to attend mass without the rest of their families. There was a change after
Pope Leo XIII allowed the establishment of ethnic churches, which proliferated to
hundreds of Italian-American parishes by the end of the First World War. Rather than
convince parishioners to favor domestic American Catholicism, the ethnic parishes instead
perpetuated old-country rituals and cultures, including festivals to various saints.63
Congregants attended the obligatory baptisms and weddings, but Sunday mass was
optional.64 In the case of St. Peter’s in Pittsburgh, for example, it was common for Italian
Americans that lived across the city to convene at the church for more significant events
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like marriages and funerals, thereby providing them with a broader sense of community.65
Stories of Irish-American priests refusing to baptize Italian-American children deepened
this connection to their ethnic churches and reinforced identity.66
Formal religion likely had little ideological sway on Italian Americans outside the
fact that church attendance and festivals created a sense of community with others. Some
anticlericalism remained with the immigrant population. One Pittsburgh resident
remembered a grandfather asking the local priest, “are you going to put shoes on their
feet?,” reflecting the belief that the Church hierarchy took without giving much back to the
community.67 Those in one company town felt betrayed by their local priest because he
told workers not to strike and appreciate the money that the employers gave them. Rather
than supporting the needs of his flock, they believed that the pastor “was in cahoots with
the company.”68 One Italian-American barber admitted to skipping mass because he
worked long hours and felt that his free time was better spent having dinner with family. 69
Before the era of unionization and the forty-hour workweek, most would have agreed with
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these sentiments. Although religious, many Italian Americans refused to look toward the
American Catholic Church establishment to interpret morality.
Ethnic societies further strengthened community identity. While some
disagreement exists concerning emigrants’ familiarity with these organizations in Italy,
associations certainly proliferated once immigrants became established in the United
States.70 Early arrivals organized mutual aid societies by their origin, usually a village or
region. The associations provided social networks beyond family for transitioning to life
in the United States.71 These groups grew in tandem with Italian immigration until they
reached two to three thousand in number in 1915.72 If Chicago serves as an example of the
evolution of the Italian-American mutual aid society for this region, then the interwar
decades formed a critical consolidation period. While overall membership growth
stagnated, likely due to immigration restriction, independent associations increasingly gave
way to those operating under a national organization, such as the Sons of Italy.73
Consolidation, in turn, reinforced an Italian-American, rather than regional, self-identity.
Membership growth may have plateaued, but the interwar period created stability
for many of these organizations, even with the advent of the Great Depression. A 1941
Jewish Community Relations Council of Pittsburgh report concerning various nationalities
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in western Pennsylvania implied that Italian-American organizations were too numerous
to list. It ultimately concluded that “there is hardly an Italian who is not a member of at
least one of the many fraternal and other organizations,”74 a point backed up by some
personal recollections of this period.75 The Sons of Italy claimed over fifty lodges in Ohio
in 1925, including seventeen in Cleveland and twelve in Youngstown and the surrounding
communities.76 A 1932 banquet honoring the ex-Grand Venerable Dr. Giovanni A.
Barricelli brought representatives from most of these lodges, forty-six in total, together for
the event.77 The Pittsburgh-oriented Italian Sons and Daughters of America noted with
pride in 1933 that the organization recently opened a fifty-sixth lodge, which far surpassed
its enrollment goal of forty-seven.78 This period created a sense of permanence as societies
built or remodeled halls.79 For example, in 1935, the Ohio State Lodge of the Sons of Italy
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dedicated a new 75,000 dollar building in Cleveland with a crowd of 15,000 in attendance,
a clear sign that ethnic clubs continued to thrive even during the Great Depression.80
Many ethnic organizations throughout the region were quite large, and gatherings
brought hundreds, if not thousands, of people into contact with one another. Youngstown’s
Napoleone Colaianni lodge claimed “300 active members” in 1926,81 which translated to
“800 and more affiliated members” by 1928.82 Its crosstown rival, the Duca degli Abruzzi
society, was similarly large.83 Pittsburgh’s Ateleta club contained over 200 members that
were described as “all very active.”84 Events hosted by a state grand lodge, such as the
above 1935 example in Cleveland, or a consortium of local societies could attract
thousands of members and their families. A 1928 Sons of Italy picnic hosted by the
Cleveland and Akron lodges drew 10,000 people, including many from Youngstown,
Lorain, Ashtabula, and Alliance, in 2,300 automobiles to Orchard Park.85 A few weeks
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later, a tenth-anniversary celebration for Youngstown’s Napoleone Colaianni lodge
brought approximately 20,000 people to Idora Park, the local amusement park and dance
hall. The event included Barricelli and other leaders from the Sons of Italy state Grand
Council, an inter-lodge baseball game between Akron’s Dante Alighieri and Cleveland’s
Operaia, a musical concert, speeches by local notables, including one by Innocenzo
Vagnozzi about “the rights and needs of Italo-American citizens,” and a fireworks display
that included representations of the American and Italian flags, politicians Al Smith and
Herbert Hoover, and Niagara Falls.86
Ethnic societies and their meeting places served as sites for conversation and
debate. According to Romeo Franchini, the founder of the traveling Filodrammatica group
mentioned previously, he and other Lega Toscana mutual aid society members created the
troupe because “not everybody want[ed] to go to the club to go and discuss politics and
play cards.”87 However, Franchini and the Filodrammatica group comprised only a fraction
of Lega Toscana, twenty-five to thirty people, maybe a tenth of the total membership.88
The norm for the vast majority of society members was to use the ethnic hall to socialize
informally. In fact, Lega Toscana traced its roots to that purpose. Before its creation, the
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founders had visited each other’s homes to fraternize. The organization formalized these
relationships and provided a meeting place.89 Italian Americans found comfort in Lega
Toscana and similar groups where they played games like cards, morra, and bocce, often
accompanied by glasses of wine.90 When passing the time in these places, members shared
ideas, news, and opinions.
In an editorial from Il Cittadino Italo-Americano about politics, the writer described
their ethnic tendencies with a joke: “one Italian, a great laborer; two Italians, thirteen kids;
three Italians, twenty-seven opinions.” This argumentative nature of his people frustrated
the author.91 These attributes, however, worked well for the formation of a public sphere.
Italian Americans’ ability to hold diverse opinions and views, argue about them, and
remain civil with each other, ensured a robust community debate. They enjoyed quarreling
with friends and family.92 According to Everett Pesci, the Blairsville, Pennsylvania, mutual
aid society attended by his father and grandfather had packed and raucous meetings in
which people “argue[d] like hell.” However, members never took disagreements personally
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when he attended in his youth, likely just before the Second World War: “they’d get into a
hot argument which seemed there was no resolution, the sergeant at arms would jump up
and he’d go ‘uno, due, tre, salute the [bandiera],’ everybody would jump up and salute the
[American] flag and that was the end of the argument. You went on to a new subject.” 93
Pittsburgh’s Ateleta club also had a policy that encouraged free speech and debate.
Numerous politicians sought a platform around election season, and the society allowed a
few minutes of floor time to address the membership. However, the group did not endorse
any candidate and refused to allow partisan comments from the assembly. Instead, after the
meetings, people discussed the speeches among themselves and shared opinions.94 Ethnic
societies reinforced community and offered physical places in which the public sphere
could operate.
Ethnic businesses and work patterns complemented mutual aid societies as
interaction sites. Language barriers and ethnic affinity fashioned loyal Italian-American
clientele and created trust between the small business operators and the patrons that they
served.95 For example, in one Italian-American-owned store in Indiana County,
Pennsylvania, coal miners were free to describe their employers as “SOBs” and talk about
shared hardships.96 In Aliquippa, the initial organizing drive for Italian-American
steelworkers during the early 1930s happened in compatriot-owned barbershops and a pool
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hall. These provided safe spaces to converse and sign-up members as information flowed
around the neighborhood.97 Ethnic businesses filled the role of the ethnic hall in areas that
lacked enough people to fund a specific building, such as in Beyer, Pennsylvania, where a
barbershop and pool hall served as places to socialize.98 Italian-American contractors
tended to employ compatriots.99 American businesses used Italian-American labor
recruiters and “straw bosses” – padrone-type figures that operated as bilingual low-level
managers for American employers to find and control immigrant workers – as part of their
operations.100 These factors kept many within Italian-American circles in the workplace.
Language served a vital role in the creation of the Italian-American community and
public sphere. As Nancy C. Carnevale stated in A New Language, a New World, “firstgeneration Italian immigrants spoke a creolized dialect that consisted of a fusion and
elaboration of standard Italian, Italian dialects, English, and Italianized English words.” 101
Through this Italian-American language, immigrants carved out and maintained a new
identity within the United States.102 Language, therefore, served to unify Italian Americans

97

Joe Di Ciero, interview by unknown, transcript, 20 November 1978, 5–6, box 2, folder
46, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Collection, 1909–1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives
& Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.
98
Marcoline, interview, 37–38.
99
Massaro, interview, 6.
100
Elizio Montini, interview by unknown, transcript, 12 December 1979, 4, box 2, folder
54, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Collection, 1909–1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives
& Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh; Guido Ferrari, interview by Nicholas P.
Ciotola, transcript, 5 November 1998, 3, box 1, folder 2, Beneficial Society of North Italy
Oral History Collection, 1928–1998, MSS 597, Detre Library and Archives, Senator John
Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA; Bert Iacobucci, interview by unknown, transcript,
23 October 1979, 5, box 2, folder 49, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Collection,
1909–1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.
101
Nancy C. Carnevale, A New Language, A New World: Italian Immigrants in the
United States, 1890–1945 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 11.
102
Carnevale, 11–14.
55

while providing a gatekeeping function for the creation of ideology. Since Italian
immigrants and their children conversed in a language foreign to native-born Americans,
members of the ethnic community self-isolated themselves. The use of this language
reinforced hyphenated identity and held people within the Italian-American public sphere
in a way that others found difficult to break into or overcome. For example, when
steelworkers initially sought to unionize in Aliquippa, language proved a barrier for
potential allies. Outsider Andy Lopata sought to enroll men from the local Italian-American
clubs and neighborhood, but it was difficult to break the ice because he did not speak their
language.103 Instead, it took men like Joe Di Ciero to talk to Italian Americans in their own
tongue to bring this group into the union.104
The continued use of Italian kept many of the second generation within the
community and public sphere. Language maintenance occurred for identity and practical
reasons. As Carnevale explained concerning New York City, domestic and foreign agents
sought to spread the use of standard Italian. Community leaders believed that its
continuation aided and sustained the shift from regionalism to a unified Italian-American
people. Fascist representatives promoted language to strengthen Italy’s connection with the
American-born population.105 It was part of a more comprehensive cultural campaign to
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use soft power to influence American foreign policy.106 Although derived from two
different impetuses, both used language as a means of identity formation.
Western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio were no exceptions to these pressures.
Pittsburgh’s Unione carried appeals from New York’s Casa Italiana about studying the
language, including news of a short, illustrated periodical for use in high school and
extension classes.107 The editor of Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, Carlo
Caselli, addressed the issue of identity in 1930. The local community had made significant
progress in growing a professional class of citizens, and it appeared that “every Italian
family boasts the educated man: The doctor, the lawyer, the engineer, the accountant and
the administrative employee.” This advancement also elucidated “the absolute ignorance
of his own language,” which, fortunately, the establishment of Italian evening classes
began to correct.108 There was great enthusiasm by community leaders for formal language
acquisition, including a movement to have Italian recognized as a foreign language option
within public schools.109 The editor’s commitment went beyond rhetoric. He taught Italian
at Youngstown’s East High School and South High School.110 When the latter ended its
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program in early 1932, probably as a cost-cutting measure because of the Great Depression,
Caselli volunteered to teach free Italian lessons every Wednesday evening from seven to
nine o’clock.111 Pittsburgh started its Italian-language pilot program at Westinghouse High
School before expanding to seven other locations. When the school board decided to add
evening classes to the schedule, total enrollment doubled to eight hundred students.112
Other language programs existed through religious institutions, such as Pittsburgh’s St.
Peter’s, or via ethnic lodges, including Youngstown’s Napoleone Colaianni and
Pittsburgh’s Lega Toscana.113
While Caselli and others pushed Italian for purposes of pride and identity, the
majority of Italian Americans learned the language out of practicality. People spoke Italian
in the streets and the ethnic halls.114 Some organizations continued to hold meetings and
record minutes in Italian even after the inclusion of younger, American-born members.115
The children and grandchildren of Italian immigrants found it necessary to learn the
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language – either in full, in part, or in dialect – to converse with family and relatives. 116
The families of grocers and shopkeepers that operated in ethnic enclaves found the ability
to speak some Italian necessary to serve older patrons.117 As one Catholic priest noted,
before the Second World War, they read the gospels and sermons in both languages.118 The
continuation of the Italian language assisted in holding the second and third generations
within the larger ethnic community and Italian-American public sphere, even as
assimilation increased during the interwar period.
The ethnic press was the textual aspect of the Italian-American public sphere.
Newspapers that catered to these people existed throughout the region and underlaid
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intellectual conversation. They guided readers. Some published information was unique to
the communities and could not have been gained elsewhere, such as news about Italy and
local ethnic events, but the press also served an interpretational function. Ethnic
newspapers engaged with stories printed by other sources, including English-language
periodicals. They directed readers to important information or corrected perceived
misinterpretations of events and ideas. In these cases, they were supplementary and added
editorial to the news gained elsewhere. These sources included information and concerns
derived from the public, the newspapers’ readers, thus providing a symbiotic relationship.
Contrary to popular perceptions, illiteracy within the Italian-American community
was likely much lower than believed at the time.119 American nativists, led by Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, had long sought to use the ability to read as a barrier for immigration.
A literacy test nearly passed multiple times – 1903, 1907, 1913, and 1915 – before being
codified as law via a Congressional veto override in 1917. The new restriction required
immigrants to read a passage in their native language, but the statute also allowed
exceptions for those fleeing religious persecution and members of an admissible alien’s
immediate family.120 The law was late coming. The 1901 Italian census was the last to have
found that the majority of Italian women were illiterate.121 The Italian state made some
advances in education during the late 1800s and early 1900s, which benefited young adults,
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the group most likely to have sought opportunity abroad. By 1904, the government required
all municipalities with over four thousand inhabitants to provide compulsory fifth- and
sixth-year primary school classes.122 This action did not eliminate illiteracy, but rates
indeed fell. In southern Italy, the origin for most Italian-American immigrants, illiteracy
rates in 1871 averaged over 80 percent. In 1911, rates had fallen, and they stood at a high
of 69.6 percent in Calabria and a low of 53.7 percent in Campania, with most other areas
around 60 percent.123 Furthermore, chain migration aided higher education rates in towns
that sent large numbers of residents abroad. Remittances stimulated small villages’
economies, which encouraged the building of more schools. Emigrants returned with
cautionary tales about the negative impact of illiteracy, while the Italian government sought
to increase education as insurance against American Congressional efforts to restrict
immigration through literacy provisions.124 The ability to read and write was imperative for
those who wished to remain in contact with family once they left the village.
Italian-American illiteracy in the United States also declined. According to a survey
conducted by Cleveland’s Alta House settlement in 1901, the majority (around 56 percent)
of people living on Mayfield Road, which laid in the heart of Little Italy and was almost
entirely Italian American (241 out of 253 residents), were able to read and write.125 In
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subsequent years, the United States Census noted that the number of illiterate arrivals from
all nationalities fell precipitously from around 23 percent in 1900–1914, to 10 percent in
1915–1919, and to under 3 percent for the 1920s.126 In light of these declining numbers,
the Italian-American press was probably accurate when it reported in 1924 that only 13.1
percent of foreign-born Americans were illiterate, according to the latest census figures. 127
In this context, the story told by one woman about her father illustrates the dissonance
between immigrant occupations and education for those living in the region. Although her
father, a Calabrian farmer who arrived in the United States in 1899, worked for some time
as a lowly municipal street sweeper for Pittsburgh, he was still literate and taught his
daughter Italian.128 The exact extent of reading and writing abilities could be debated, but
a significant portion of the Italian-American population was likely able to understand the
elementary articles within the ethnic press by 1920.129 This group then spread the
information to illiterate family members, neighbors, and friends in conversations.
Italian-American media flourished in ethnic enclaves throughout the United States.
In 1919, they numbered well over one hundred daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers and
magazines.130 In 1940, this figure remained relatively unchanged at 129 Italian-American
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newspapers.131 There was widespread availability. In 1919 Cleveland, Italian Americans
had access to at least seven ethnic newspapers: four from New York City, including Il
Progresso Italo-Americano, Il Bollettino della Sera, and L’Araldo Italiano, Philadelphia’s
Giornale d’Italia, and the two local papers, La Voce del Popolo Italiano and La Stampa.
Founded in 1903 by manager and editor Olindo G. Melaragno, La Voce del Popolo Italiano
was the most important for the community, with a circulation of 15,000 in Cleveland and
“30,000 throughout the Middle States.”132 Five newspapers and two magazines were
available to Pittsburghers, including prominently Unione and La Trinacria.133 Smaller
cities and towns had their Italian-language papers. Youngstown’s Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano ran from 1902 to 1938.134 Il Patriota of Indiana, Pennsylvania, existed from
1914 to 1955.135 La Stella d’Italia served Greensburg, Pennsylvania, from 1907 until it
consolidated with La Trinacria in 1924.136 Sentinel Press reestablished a Greensburg-based
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paper around 1933.137 Canton and Steubenville, Ohio, had Voce della Verità and
Messaggero, respectively, and Erie, Pennsylvania, was the home of Gazzetta.138
Newspapers served surrounding communities, which created an overlapping web
of media. In 1922, Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano had representatives in
Bridgeville and Delmont, which were in the Pittsburgh area, and in Wellsville, along the
Ohio River.139 Readers from diverse places sent occasionally printed comments, and these
attest to the wide range of circulation. One March 1925 example included messages from
the following places: the nearby cities of Niles and Warren, Ohio, and Farrell,
Pennsylvania; Bellaire, Ohio, which was around ninety miles to the south; Cleveland and
neighboring Lorain; and, Verona, a town a few miles up the Allegheny River from
Pittsburgh.140 In July 1925, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano absorbed La Gazzetta di New
Castle, an ethnic paper printed in the namesake city across the Ohio state line, further
consolidating its reach into western Pennsylvania.141 Beyond locally published sources,
more prominent newspapers served and included the region. Philadelphia’s Il Popolo
Italiano – founded in 1935 after New York businessman Generoso Pope bought out the
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city’s previous paper, L’Opinione – carried a section about western Pennsylvania written
by F. Di Girolamo from his downtown Pittsburgh office on Smithfield Street.142
Circulation rates were high for communities populated heavily by the working
class, which had less disposable income. Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano claimed
a 30,000-copy circulation in 1922. Pittsburgh’s La Trinacria had around half that number
of subscribers (14,000) the same year.143 The papers from Canton (Voce della Verità) and
Youngstown (Il Cittadino Italo-Americano) each had a circulation of at least 7,000.144
Greensburg’s La Stella d’Italia distributed between 7,000 and 10,000 copies before it
consolidated with La Trinacria.145 The reported circulation numbers told only part of the
story. They understated diffusion because these sources often passed from hand to hand
with multiple people utilizing the same physical newspaper.
In some cases, particularly during the early years of the twentieth century, literate
Italian Americans read stories aloud to illiterate friends and family. Libraries, especially
those located in neighborhoods with high immigrant populations, carried copies of ethnic
newspapers.146 Il Cittadino Italo-Americano was an official organ for the Ohio Sons of
Italy, and Unione had sections catering to the Pennsylvania-based Italian Sons and
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Daughters of America and the Sons of Columbus.147 Some ethnic societies bought
subscriptions for the benefit of their members. The desire for these sources was significant
enough that when the women of Youngstown’s Casa Savoia lodge learned in 1928 that
they would no longer receive complimentary copies of Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, they
voted unanimously to purchase a subscription for the group.148 During the depths of the
Great Depression in 1932, members of Loggia Nazionale Armando V. Diaz passed a
resolution to buy a fifteen-copies-per-week subscription to the paper.149 The desire for
ethnic newspapers was a common recollection about this period for those interviewed
decades later. Ed Paraggio, a late arrival to the United States in 1938, described a
generational difference. Born in 1922, he was reluctant to read ethnic newspapers, but the
older people in the community sought these sources.150 Others remembered the availability
of these publications and parents and grandparents reading New York City’s Il Progresso
and the local papers, including Unione and Il Patriota.151
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Italian Americans did not limit their news consumption to the foreign-language
press. Marco Mastrangelo, who arrived in the Pittsburgh area in 1929, began reading Il
Progresso, but another man advised him to read English-language papers in addition to
help his transition to America.152 As Il Cittadino Italo-Americano noted humorously in
1930, Ralph Vitullo, who was then president of the local Italian American Political
Association, and other past paperboys donned old aprons – this time for charity – to hawk
the ethnic weekly and the Youngstown Vindicator, one of the prominent English-language
locals for the city.153 The ethnic press, however, played an outsized role in the community.
When comparing the two, it is best to think of American dailies, such as the
Youngstown Vindicator, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, as
sources of information while the ethnic papers supplied opinions and interpretations. They
noted inconsistencies in the mainstream press, such as when Unione pointed out columnist
Arthur Brisbane’s paradoxical view of Fascist Italy. The famed newsman called the Italian
government “the most tyrannical in the civilized world,” only to write a week later about
Benito Mussolini performing miracles to improve the nation.154 Other articles documented
cases of inaccuracy.155 When a Plain Dealer editorial misnamed the Italian Foreign
Minister, a contributor asserted in La Voce del Popolo Italiano that such mistakes were
common since he “could fill pages with the gratuitous [assertions] and incongruities of this
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well-posted editor, but, what is the use, we could not make him any wiser.”156 The Plain
Dealer’s rival, the Cleveland Press, did not escape scrutiny as Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
informed readers in 1930 that the newspaper printed “tall tales” related to Italian Fascism
and implied not to take them at face value.157 Locally, Il Cittadino dismissed rumors printed
in the Vindicator about a secret conspiracy orchestrated by the “Black Hand.” The paper
replied that such an organization did not exist, and criminality was not bound to one
particular ethnicity.158 The ethnic press asserted its role as the more trusted news source for
the Italian-American community by noting inconsistencies and possible inaccuracies.
Local ethnic newspapers played an additional gatekeeping function. They
periodically referenced stories from mainstream media sources and national ItalianAmerican publications. Since the local ethnic press had built trust within the community,
its approval of external reporting added weight to those opinions. This was especially
pertinent when English-language papers published reports dealing with critical ItalianAmerican issues or confirmed their beliefs. These references included Arthur Brisbane’s
welcoming of Italian-American contributions in the United States and a New York World
article about a Yale professor’s research presenting the Nordic race’s superiority as a
myth.159 Other local articles pointed to works in popular publications, such as Agostino de
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Biasi’s Il Carroccio, or interest-based journals, like the humorous La Follia di New York.160
Occasionally these referrals to other publications were political. For example, Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano directed readers to Edward Corsi’s Herbert Hoover article in Atlantica, a
prominent Italian-American literary magazine published in New York, which the
newspaper billed as an honest assessment of the president halfway through his term.161
The Italian-American community of western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio fit the
qualifications of a public sphere. Transportation networks weaved together neighborhoods
and towns while participants mingled and conversed in various private homes and social
clubs. Italian-language newspapers provided topics and opinions for debate and diffusion.
An Italian-American ideology developed in this milieu.

The Class and Regional Issue
Political divisions in history have often been the result of geography and social
class. While these differences existed within the immigrant population, they were
secondary because the Italian-American experience encouraged an overriding group
identification based on ethnicity. Emphasis on Italian Americanness arrested the
development of class divisions and soothed region of origin tensions within the community
and public sphere during the interwar period. Most immigrants and their children failed to
create stable, lasting class identifications that could have overridden ethnicity before the
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Second World War. Skilled and unskilled blue-collar laborers were subject to barriers –
weather, economic downturns, discrimination – outside of their control. Those with whitecollar occupations were in a precarious situation since attorneys, doctors, and grocers
depended on working-class Italian-American clientele and therefore sank and rose with
them. Discrimination caused disparate groups of people to band together. As nativists
targeted all arrivals without considering their region of origin, those who previously
classified themselves as Sicilian, Calabrian, Tuscan American, or one of the other countless
regional or local identities increasingly viewed themselves defensively as Italian
Americans.
Most Italian immigrants arrived in the United States destined for blue-collar
employment. In Cleveland, for example, only about one-tenth of Italians entered
nonmanual occupations upon arrival.162 The majority of the population understood and
empathized with the lower classes because they were either working-class themselves, had
previously performed manual labor, or had family, friends, and neighbors in such
occupations. The literate street sweeper mentioned previously received a promotion during
his career. He took care of the horses at the Pittsburgh city stables, and he later worked at
the municipal automobile garages where he checked inventory.163 Others advanced from
pick and shovel labor to plumbing, coal mining to masonry, and general labor to
contracting and food wholesale.164 Advancement to better paying and more stable jobs
never erased the experience of starting at the bottom of the occupational ladder.
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Besides empathy derived from personal experiences, continued close contact
between those at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy and those who rose within it
further muted possible divisions. For example, Louis Colussy initially found employment
as a carpenter making mine carts for coal companies. Around 1910, he founded Colussy
Brothers, a contracting company in Bridgeville, a few miles southwest of Pittsburgh, to
build houses. However, even with his growing affluence – his sons opened a Chevrolet
dealership in 1917 – the Colussy family still hosted boarders.165 As one son explained: “We
had about 8 or 10 at the table in the evenings. In fact, we always had boarders. We had 2
or 3 boarders always in the house, at least.”166 Hosting others within the household created
surrogate families and bridged class differences between the financially stable, sometimes
petite-bourgeois hosts and the working-class lodgers.
Boarding or lodging with other Italian-American families was a common
occurrence. In 1911, the Dillingham Commission reported that out of the southern Italian
families studied in Cleveland, a third hosted boarders at the time of the survey.167 The
percentage rose to half for those who had resided in the United States for less than a
decade.168 By comparison, only two out of thirty-one households headed by a native-born
white American of native-born parentage had outsiders living with them.169 A similar rate
likely existed in Pittsburgh around the same time because 38 percent of sampled ItalianAmerican households had boarders in 1900, averaging an additional 4.4 people per
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family.170 Those in the mining communities throughout the region were not exempt from
taking in lodgers because housing was scarce.171 One man claimed that his mother took
care of some eighteen men, coal miners working the fields around Punxsutawney,
Pennsylvania, a job that she continued, albeit with smaller numbers, after the family moved
to another mining town around 1909.172
Assimilation and the end of mass migration to the United States should have meant
a rapid termination of boarding practices during the First World War; however, the system
continued. As Donna Gabaccia noted in her study of New York City, the rates of
households with boarders in 1925 were comparable to those from 1905, which suggested
that boarding had become socially acceptable.173 Particular circumstances favored the
system’s persistence. Family separation caused some working men to revert to lodging for
practical reasons, such as when the wife and American-born daughter of one Pittsburgh
resident returned to Italy before the First World War. After the sinking of the Lusitania,
they decided not to return until the end of the conflict. The man boarded until he died during
the Spanish Flu pandemic in 1918.174 Although immigration restrictions slowed the flood
of newcomers during the 1920s, those who managed to come to the United States still
needed places to live and turned to the boarding system. Angelo Dozzi’s father acquired
citizenship to bring his teenage son to America in 1928. When the elder Dozzi, a lodger
himself, could not work because the coal mines went on strike, he sent his son to board
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with a relative in Pittsburgh.175 Similarly, Joseph Sodini, who was born in Pittsburgh and
returned to Italy as a child, migrated back to the city in 1928. After arrival, he boarded at a
woman’s house alongside his brothers.176 Domestic movement also sustained boarding
practices. When Joe Di Ciero left New Castle, Pennsylvania, in 1923 for work in Aliquippa,
some thirty miles to the south, he boarded because he had no family in the city.177 Another
noted that his sister kept boarders through the Great Depression, which helped some
financial hardship.178 Before the New Deal, it seemed that most Italian Americans were
boarders at one time, had hosted lodgers in the past, or at the very least knew a family
member or close relative that had.179 By bringing people of different career levels and
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sometimes regions literally under one roof, Italian Americans arrested some of the worst
effects of possible class conflict within the community.
Many people faced a precarious economic existence in the United States, even
during a booming national economy. As Il Cittadino Italo-Americano stated in 1925, “life
today in America has become difficult and unsolvable.” When asked about their conditions,
people responded that they were merely getting by. Under the surface, they harbored many
grievances. The community faced discrimination evident in the revived Ku Klux Klan and
new Prohibition laws. Italian Americans suffered financially and were unable to support
their families. Taxes on property and wages exacerbated the high costs of coal, electricity,
water, transportation, and bread.180 Average people did not feel that 1920s American
prosperity created class advancement or economic stability.
Miners in the bituminous coal region, which concentrated around Pittsburgh and
stretched south and west into Ohio and West Virginia, faced adverse conditions. In many
areas, Italian Americans were one of the dominant ethnicities in the industry. In 1907, they
accounted for almost fifteen percent of the workforce in the Pennsylvania fields, the third
most populous group.181 In certain districts, they were overrepresented. In Indiana County,
east of Pittsburgh, “Italian” was the second most common ethnicity of miners after
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“American” in 1919.182 They suffered proportionately to their numbers. Herbert Hoover, a
mining engineer and the secretary of commerce before becoming president, described
bituminous coal as one of the least efficient industries in the United States during the 1920s.
At the heart of the problem was overcapacity. The First World War had encouraged the
opening of new mines, and the postwar consumer economy relied on new fuel sources,
such as natural gas and petroleum. Mine operators cut wages and introduced more
mechanization, but these solutions hurt workers rather than fixed overproduction.183 Wages
declined even as the American economy boomed during the mid to late 1920s.184 Weekly
pay was not guaranteed. The average bituminous coal miner spent one-third of the year
idle.185 Employers often compensated for the weight of the coal produced rather than for
the time invested in mining it. If miners struck an inferior vein, then they were simply out
of luck and not paid.186 These conditions prompted some Italian-American coal miners to
seek work in other industries, such as steel.187
The shift to other blue-collar occupations did not necessarily improve financial
security and bring class advancement before the Great Depression. Although the First
World War created job opportunities when increased factory output led to a tighter labor
market, the years immediately after the conflict experienced a sharp downturn, a short
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economic revival, and finally a major recession. Weeks after the 1918 armistice, the
American government canceled war contracts, which caused reverberations across heavy
industry and forced steel mills to run at less than two-thirds capacity.188 Immediate postwar
consumer spending revived production in 1919, but not without contributing to massive
inflation that hurt workers and prompted strikes in steel and coal. Rapid inflation quickly
cooled economic expansion, and the American economy experienced a downturn, the
Recession of 1920–1921.189 For Italian-American workers, this meant layoffs and pay cuts,
such as a 1921 announcement in La Voce del Popolo Italiano that the Cleveland Railway
Company planned a twenty percent wage reduction for 1500 workers.190
People in the construction industry fared poorly. Even during the good economic
years after 1921, factors outside of a worker’s control limited his advancement. The arrival
of cold weather halted cement pouring, bricklaying, and the construction of gas lines. When
work ceased, these Italian-American men often found themselves employed temporarily in
the coal mines or living with nearby family members waiting for the work to pick up in the
spring.191 Others, who might have been skilled, still floated between construction jobs as
work became available.192 The American housing market began to contract after 1925, an

188

James Grant, The Forgotten Depression: 1921, the Crash That Cured Itself, first
Simon & Schuster trade paperback edition (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2015),
14.
189
Grant, 14–17, 69–72.
190
Meine, “The Autobiography of Joseph De Vivo,” 56; “Riduzioni di salari nella
‘Cleveland Railway Co.,’” La Voce del Popolo Italiano, 8 January 1921, 1.
191
Stephano Delmasto, interview by Tom Carroll, transcript, 21 April 1993, 4, Eight Oral
History Transcripts from the Italian American Collection, 1995, 1995.0311, Detre
Library and Archives, Senator John Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA; Emiliano
Lucente, interview by Tom Carroll, transcript, 23 April 1993, 2, Eight Oral History
Transcripts from the Italian American Collection, 1995, 1995.0311, Detre Library and
Archives, Senator John Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA.
192
Ferrari, interview, 5 November 1998, 11–13.
76

economic indicator often overlooked by historians because of the severity of the Wall
Street stock market crash of 1929. Although best illustrated by the Florida real estate
bubble, the housing construction industry across the United States slowed before the Great
Depression.193 Housing starts peaked in 1925 at 937,000 only to decline to 753,000 in 1928
and bottom out in 1933 at 93,000.194 The contraction of the housing market before 1929
hurt Italian Americans because the group predominated in the construction industry. Many
immigrants had arrived in the United States with skills such as masonry and carpentry that
they had learned as supplemental trades to agricultural work. These basic skills transferred
well to construction projects in Pittsburgh and Cleveland, but only if work was available. 195
Italian-American masons, carpenters, and bricklayers benefited from the mid-1920s
housing boom, but it was temporary.
Small businessmen and white-collar workers also faced uncertain economic
prospects. Early entrepreneurial endeavors depended heavily on the ethnic populations that
they served.196 This social group’s success and affluence relied on the fortunes of the local
Italian-American community as a whole. Class advancement was not lasting and certain.
Pittsburgh’s East Liberty neighborhood hosted dozens of Italian-American fruit stores,
grocers, tailors, and barbershops, but turnover was high, and many lasted only a few years
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before being replaced by other aspirant entrepreneurs.197 In Cleveland, Italian Americans
were one of the more likely immigrant groups in the city to attain homeownership and
advance to white-collar labor, but few fathers were able to pass middle-class success to
their sons.198 In the small coal towns throughout the region, private shopkeepers found
themselves at a disadvantage where company stores existed. Furthermore, since some
Italian-American small businessmen offered purchases on credit during strikes, they faced
the possibility of bankruptcy if workers delayed their repayments.199 Tradesmen
supplemented their profits with wage work, such as one butcher who doubled as a night
watchman for the coal mines or a barber who also did seasonal railroad and mining labor.200
Social class advancement was precarious.
Since professionals served the community, their restricted clientele kept them from
rising to native-born white Americans’ status levels. As one Pittsburgh resident recounted,
medical doctors like A. Bianco only served Italian Americans because there was a tacit
understanding that such professionals were not to work alongside native-born whites.201
The Italian Americans respected Bianco. He introduced toastmaster and noted jurist
Michael A. Musmanno during a ceremony in which the Italian government honored Dr.
Charles J. Barone. The doctor was one of a handful of ethnic leaders that University of
Pittsburgh Chancellor John G. Bowman called upon to solicit community contributions for
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the college’s Italian Room in the new Cathedral of Learning building. 202 Nevertheless,
respect within the ethnic community during the 1920s and 1930s did not translate to
eminence throughout Pittsburgh. Instead, many of these doctors became associated with
Belvedere Hospital, an institution founded by Dr. G. William Alvin in 1921 to serve Italian
Americans. Small and understaffed, Belvedere welcomed those who could not afford other
area hospitals.203
For the few who did manage to rise during the 1920s, the Great Depression
reaffirmed the impermanence of financial advancement and the elite’s interdependence on
the Italian-American middle and lower classes. One of Dr. Bianco’s clients offers a good
example. When he could not pay Bianco during the Great Depression, the doctor offered
him the same terms that he gave to other unemployed Italian Americans: take the bill and
pay when you can. Although everyone supposedly repaid his or her debts to Bianco, the
use of credit within the Italian-American community was common and, in some cases, did
not end well for other professionals and small businessmen.204 One such barber threw out
his accounting books to lessen the shame of the men who owed money and could not repay
him.205 Others were less fortunate. One butcher in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, lost his
business and was unable to collect the debts owed by his customers. His family was evicted
from their home during the Great Depression.206 Louise Kenosh (née Pace) was born in
Homer City, Pennsylvania, in 1911. Although her family was never poor, the Great
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Depression crippled her father’s furniture business. Kenosh managed to become the first
Catholic teacher in the Center Township school district, but her college education did not
translate to economic security as she and other women taught for seven months without
pay during the Great Depression. The whole community suffered, including a local ItalianAmerican homebuilder and community leader who nearly lost his own house when clients
could not pay their loans.207
Close relations between various social strata of Italian Americans produced a type
of mutual respect. As one 1934 editorial from Unione asserted, in exchange for “the rugged
individualism of a Harding-Coolidge-Hoover regime,” Americans celebrated “a New Deal
that would include in the nation’s prosperity the small entrepreneur and laboring class.” 208
The US Chamber of Commerce, a group that presented itself as speaking for the
entrepreneur, took an opposing view and denounced most of Franklin Roosevelt’s
legislation as harmful to business.209 Italian Americans believed that there was nothing
inconsistent about helping both groups, even as other entities expressed concerns that
aiding workers meant hampering businessmen. They used an extended definition of class,
one in which “worker” included blue-collar wage earners, small businessmen, and
professionals. Their overriding emphasis on ethnicity, lived experiences, and fluid social
positions lessened class divisions. This ethnic solidarity and familiarity with working-class
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issues explain why Antonio J. Palumbo, a multimillionaire mine owner who became a
significant philanthropist in western Pennsylvania, stated during an interview later in life
that while he believed “some of the union organizers were terrible,” he had no issues with
unionized workers.210 He grew up bilingual and followed his Italian-born father into the
mines to qualify to take the state examination to become a foreman.211 Palumbo certainly
felt a connection to these working-class people because he referred to himself as P.C.M.,
initials for poor coal miner.212 These life experiences, common among those born around
the turn of the twentieth century, influenced people’s perceptions of class and social
position.
When class tensions occurred within the community, they derived from
assumptions of superiority rather than actual economic status. In the memory of one
Vandergrift resident, the town had a few “cake eaters,” Italian Americans who presented
themselves as a local ethnic aristocracy. The “cake eaters” looked down on other members
of the community. According to the man, this was a farce because their affluence was a
state of mind; had they been wealthy, they would have stayed in Italy and enjoyed their
prosperity.213
The blurring of class lines is not to argue that a social hierarchy was nonexistent.
Each community had prominenti, local Italian-American leaders who were often bettereducated and wealthier than the average community member. However, a traditional
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Marxist-type class division did not exist because ethnicity served as the primary selfidentifier. Instead, as John Bodnar argued concerning the rising immigrant middle class,
“if their elevated status relied on the support of the larger immigrant community, … they
attempted not only to retain a close association to the mass of newcomers but influence
their thinking as well.”214 Conversely, some businessmen and professionals attained
success outside of the confines of the ethnic community, moved their residences to affluent
areas, and separated themselves from Italian-American institutions.215 This type of
assimilation reinforces the argument made previously; once these people changed from
Italian Americans to Americans of Italian heritage, they left the public sphere and had little
influence in it.
In addition to class identity, Italian regionalism had the potential to divide people.
However, by the 1920s, factors such as Italian nationalism, discrimination, and
Americanization strengthened, rather than divided, an Italian-American identity.
Coinciding with the First World War, Italian nationalism grew both in Italy and in the
United States. After the American entry on the Allied side in 1917, Italian immigrants had
an apt response to American discrimination against them. As a nation that sacrificed
alongside the United States in the conflict, identifying with the Italian state, rather than a
particular region, served as a counter to nativist comments about the unacceptability of the
Italian ‘race.’ The rise of Fascism brought new propaganda about Italian greatness, and
those living abroad further attached themselves to that national identity as protection
against tropes of Italian-American criminality and inferiority. Institutions like ethnic
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societies followed suit, believing that national, rather than regional, identity offered people
the best counter to discrimination.216
Ethnic slurs and prejudice further collapsed regionalism as all Italian Americans,
regardless of their origins in modern cities such as Turin or southern, rural villages in the
Mezzogiorno, felt the sting of discrimination. As one man stated forcefully, “when kids
pick on you it really strengthens your identity.”217 When other children hurled slurs such
as guinea, dago, and wop at Italian-American youth, both foreign and native born, it
produced ethnic distinctiveness and solidarity regardless of regional origins.218 One man
even remembered the irony of a conversation that he had with a young German immigrant.
After the abduction of Charles Lindbergh’s baby in 1932, the German American told him,
“oh, no doubts of Italians behind that,”219 repeating the popular stereotype of Italian
criminality.220 Coincidentally, the kidnapper was German American. Nevertheless,
stereotypes were common and transcended any previous background, such as when
Trafford, Pennsylvania, councilmen justified the unpaved street on which many Italian
Americans lived as acceptable because “they are used to walking in the mud.”221 Evidently,
no paved roads or sidewalks existed in Italy, and immigrants did not deserve such luxuries
in the United States.
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Job discrimination was common. Some men experienced slurs from employers or
coworkers.222 Others felt that prejudice kept them from succeeding. According to a story
told by one man who was denied advancement to a railroad inspector job, he discovered
later that the interviewer complained to a coworker, “listen, I [didn’t] ask you to send me
a wop up here. I asked for you to send me an American fellow with an American name.” 223
Long-term residents warned new immigrants to hide their identity when searching for
work. James Pierolo had apprenticed as a carpenter in Italy, and he eventually found his
way to Warren, Ohio, via Pittsburgh during the mid-1920s after learning about job
openings constructing furniture, doors, and windows. Some of the best advice he received
after arrival was to use the name James Pierol and claim French origins (Pierolo was born
outside of Turin and knew the French language). Pierolo felt awful about the need to hide
his ethnicity, including his status as an Italian Great War veteran.224 In some cases,
companies went to extreme lengths to place workers in positions that supposedly suited
their national origin. Pittsburgh’s Central Tube Company categorized three dozen
ethnicities concerning their adaptability to certain types of work performed at the plant in
1925. The company considered Italians as some of the best workers for pick and shovel
labor. They were less suited for positions like boilermaker’s and engineer’s helpers,
positions better fit for native-born whites, Irish, Scots, and Canadians.225
A more significant fear for many Italian Americans was the reemergence of the Ku
Klux Klan, which now targeted immigrants and Catholics alongside African Americans.
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According to Pierolo, one of the reasons he decided to hide his Italian identity publicly was
the strength of the Klan in Ohio during the 1920s.226 Rumors swirled at the time that Mayor
Charles Scheible of nearby Youngstown was a member, and although no one could prove
his affiliation due to the organization’s secrecy, the Klan publicly endorsed his victorious
1923 campaign.227 A similar Klan presence existed in Pennsylvania, and the organization
claimed at least a quarter-million members in the state during its peak from 1923 to 1925.228
Allegheny County, home of Pittsburgh, topped the list of Klan lodges in the state at thirtythree, while the surrounding counties of Westmoreland, Armstrong, Fayette, Indiana, and
Washington each hosted a minimum of ten.229 Bloodshed between Klansmen and their
Catholic opponents occurred in the Pittsburgh suburb of Carnegie, the borough of Scottdale
in coal country to the southeast, and Lilly, a small community between Johnstown and
Altoona.230 Others remembered a strong Klan presence in their towns, including a building
in Blairsville, Indiana County, emblazoned with the organization’s cross that exhibited a
physical presence to residents and open hostilities in Masontown, Fayette County.231 When
the Ku Klux Klan targeted Italian Americans, the harassment helped consolidate regional
identities into a national one; people disregarded provincial differences to respond as one
group against a more significant threat to their existence.
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Some Americanization efforts blurred the lines of regionalism. In their quest to
assimilate immigrants, settlement house programs often produced “hyphenated
Americans” because they supported cultural pluralism as a way to reach populations and
build trust between the newcomers and the Americanizing institutions. Cleveland’s Hiram
House was an example. Settlement workers initially created an integrated mothers’ group
that consisted of African Americans and ethnic Poles, Greeks, Slavs, and Italians. This
group was a failure. After Hiram House employees organized women by ethnicity,
numbers grew substantially. From the original fourteen-member integrated club,
derivatives included an eighty-member African-American mothers’ group and two ItalianAmerican organizations equaling about one hundred and fifty members.232 Since settlement
houses built success by first getting bodies into their facilities and registered for their
programs, they willingly allowed “nationality” groups that divided people by ethnicity.
Workers viewed the creation of a hyphenated identity as a necessary part of the
Americanization process. As one settlement house associate explained to an acquaintance
in a 1920 letter, “the weight of settlement experience is that when the immigrant reaches a
certain stage in assimilation, his national group organizations are sluffed off somewhat as
a chicken does his shell.”233 Before that point, the organizations needed to accommodate
and respect differences. When discussing the future of adult programs, an unidentified
Hiram House worker asserted that “there should parallel with the development of self-
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determination a spirit of co-operation, eagerness for an understanding of the virtues of other
races and individuals.”234 Instead of pressuring people toward immediate assimilation, the
settlement experience helped many linger in the transitional stage by reaffirming social
interactions with Italians from all regions while supporting the notion of cultural pluralism.
Besides the mothers’ groups, Hiram House and affiliates offered various programs
that targeted and, perhaps unintentionally, reinforced Italian-American community and
social bonds. These included home citizenship and English classes organized by
nationality, the sponsorship of around two dozen Italian-American societies, and even a
spring festival during which attendees celebrated with ethnic songs and dances, such as the
Tarantella.235 When Hiram House president George Bellamy received an analysis of
interviews conducted in 1924, the reporter concluded that “without any suggestions the
Italian boys seem to feel the effect of personal friendship much above club life.”236 The
settlement house became a location to strengthen relationships within the ethnic
community as much as it was to connect these people to mainstream American society.
Certainly, Americanization programs altered some aspects of ethnic culture, an argument
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supported in the following chapter, but by allowing pluralism over compulsory
assimilation, the settlement houses reinforced Italian-American identity.

The Temporary Sphere
There is one crucial caveat when speaking about the creation of Italian-American
political ideology: the strongest influences came from those most incorporated within the
described public sphere. Those who socialized at ethnic halls, interacted with ItalianAmerican shopkeepers and neighbors, and read Italian-American newspapers were the
most receptive and responsive. This vigorous interchange of ideas and beliefs coincided
with a stable community that peaked during the interwar period. After the New Deal,
assimilation slowly peeled away younger generations. These people, Americans of Italian
heritage, merged into the larger society and absorbed opinions from outside of their
ethnicity. The dissolution of the ethnic enclave, the disuse of the Italian language, and the
decline of social organizations brought about the end of the unique public sphere.
Immigration restriction initially aided the creation of identity, only to destroy it
over time. Limits forced community stability. Many early-twentieth-century Italians
arrived in the United States as migrant laborers (“Birds of Passage”) who worked for
months or years only to return to Italy temporarily or permanently. During some pre-First
World War years, these figures were quite significant, and in some periods, for every two
people that emigrated to the United States, another repatriated.237 Immigration restriction
forced them to choose permanent settlement in the United States or life in Italy. Migration
slowed, and repatriation numbers fell: over 400,000 in 1910–1914, around 235,000

237

Thomas Kessner, The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New
York City 1880–1915 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1977), 28–29, 167;
Donna R. Gabaccia, Italy’s Many Diasporas (London, UK: Routledge, 2003), 94.
88

between 1920–1924, and finally 95,000 between 1925–1929.238 As a result, communities
became more stable as young men married, had children, and planted roots firmly in
America.
Stability was temporary. Without the constant movement of people between the
two states and the desire to eventually return to the Italian homeland, language maintenance
declined. The children of the new immigrant groups from Southern, Central, and Eastern
Europe born before 1916 had high foreign language use rates within their childhood homes,
amounting to over three-quarters of families. This figure declined to about seventy percent
for those born between 1916 and 1930 and to under half of households for those born after
1931.239 The Second World War hastened the shift away from the Italian language. Since
Italy was an enemy state, the Federal Bureau of Investigation targeted Italian-language
newspapers, radio programs, and speakers in general as possible subversives. Many
separated themselves from their language as protection, and ethnic publications switched
to English or ended entirely.240 Ethnic societies were not immune. Pittsburgh’s Lega
Toscana began recording meetings in English as a precaution if the government needed to
inspect the books for subversion. The double effort of using Italian for correspondences
and meetings and then translating everything proved to be too much work, and the club
switched entirely to English.241
Post-Second World War housing patterns contributed to community disintegration.
Government programs created during the 1930s and 1940s, such as infrastructure spending
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on highways and low-interest home loans to military veterans, encouraged white ethnics to
seek newer dwellings in the suburbs, an opportunity available to them as white Americans
but often denied to racial minorities.242 Inner-city ethnic enclaves, whose expansion was
impossible because of limited physical space, never could have absorbed subsequent
generations, even if the younger members had consciously spurred newer housing in the
suburbs for the older residences in the enclave. Immigrant neighborhoods that remained,
like Italian-American Bloomfield in Pittsburgh, contained mostly elderly generations by
1960.243 Housing patterns did not eliminate ethnic ties for all people. In some cases,
suburban neighborhoods absorbed an ethnic identity as younger Italian Americans from
specific urban areas replicated clusters outside the city.244 Distance, however, split the
community. The ethnic club, once an accessible place to socialize in the neighborhood,
became an inconvenience. Younger generations fell away. Ethnic halls remained as
districts changed racial composition. Fears about crime kept many from venturing into the
area, especially at night.245 Paul Del Rosso theorized that a car culture contributed to the
decline of his club. Ethnic halls had long been a place to socialize over drinks, and many
covered operating costs by selling alcohol to members and associates. People limited their
contact because they did not want to drink and drive. Moreover, the younger generation
was uninterested. They became honorary members and occasionally stopped by for a drink,
but they never wanted to be more involved.246 For those now residing safely in the suburbs,
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the hassle of traveling a half hour into a perceived dangerous neighborhood to socialize
over one drink was not an attractive option.
Marriage patterns diluted ethnic influence. As Richard Alba theorized, the loss of
ethnicity was generational, a product of assimilation and acculturation. Each subsequent
generation became further removed from the immigration experience, and they passed
more easily across the boundary into mainstream America. Intermarriage rates reflected
this change.247 Italian Americans were certainly not alone. The new immigrant groups’
general pattern was to marry within their ethnicity during the first generation and often into
the second. By the third generation, ethnicity became blurred. In 1960, 58 percent of the
third generation claimed a non-Italian parent or grandparent.248 Over three-quarters of those
born after the mid-1960s had mixed ancestry.249 This shift in demographics undermined a
public sphere that immigrants and their children built on their shared background.
Ethnicity became performative rather than a lived experience. By the 1970s, the
Catholic Church was the only remaining ethnic institution comparable in strength to its
prewar predecessor. Instead of newspapers and mutual aid societies, Italian Americans
displayed their identity primarily through food purchased from ethnic markets that
remained in the old neighborhood and attending religious festivals and other yearly ethnic
celebrations.250 Those in the third generation claimed inclusion usually because of
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rediscovering their Italianness. It was a nostalgic and romanticized vision of their roots. 251
People who once grouped themselves by language, personal experiences, and club
affiliations died out and no longer existed.
The Italian-American public sphere emerged at a particular time of ethnic
development. Ethnicity pulled together otherwise diverse people and created a group with
similar political concerns. Within this milieu, three major influences – American civic
nationalism, leftism, and Italian Fascism – shaped Italian Americans’ political ideology.

251

Patricia Boscia-Mulè, Authentic Ethnicities: The Interaction of Ideology, Gender
Power, and Class in the Italian-American Experience (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1999), 127–30.
92

Chapter Two
Creating an Italian-American Civic Identity
Louis Pesci was an Italian American whose life story was typical of the community
described in the first chapter. Born in 1900 near Freeport, Pennsylvania, a small town less
than thirty miles up the Allegheny River from Pittsburgh, Pesci returned to Italy as a child
and then migrated back to the United States when he was eight years old. He was not from
southern Italy, like most Italian immigrants. His family hailed from a small mountainside
village north of Parma, and his paternal grandparents were farmers who owned a tiny piece
of property. Still, the Pesci family found living in the United States preferable, and after
they returned to Pennsylvania, they settled near Blairsville, a town midway between
Pittsburgh and Altoona, where Pesci’s father found work in the city’s glass factory as an
unskilled laborer. Pesci grew up in the Italian section of town, eventually joining the same
mutual aid society as his father, where members spent time playing cards and conversing
in Italian. Unlike his father, Louis Pesci was employed as a fireman for the railroad,
shoveling coal into the steam engine, usually along a route from Pittsburgh to Altoona.
Like other railroad workers of that period, he often stayed and passed the time at the local
YMCA in both cities while waiting for his next assignment. During the Great Depression,
he found temporary work in the area coal mines, as a farm laborer, and eventually on a
Works Progress Administration (WPA) project. His family supplemented this meager
income by taking in two boarders, skilled laborers working on a nearby state hospital.
Although his formal education did not extend beyond the eighth grade, he was literate and
93

often read the Italian-American newspapers subscribed to by his father. Except that his
wife won the first automobile ever raffled off by the local American Legion post, which
the couple immediately sold to put toward a house down payment just before the Great
Depression, Pesci was for all intents and purposes an average Italian American.1
It was Pesci’s average life experiences that made his political engagement also
typical. According to his son, Louis Pesci and his contemporaries in the Italian-American
community were very active before the Second World War: “Oh, they voted I mean … not
like today. They cherished their voting rights and of course a lot of the older ones didn’t
understand. But the first generation they voted, like my Dad’s family and all of them. They
got into it.”2 What Pesci experienced was not unique. During the interwar period, Italian
Americans across the United States increasingly developed a civic identity with a firm
understanding of their rights and liberties as Americans, the importance of politics, and
their potential power within the system.
This development was no different from a 1938 WPA assessment concerning New
York City Italian Americans. If one substitutes Pittsburgh, Cleveland, or even Pesci’s
hometown of Blairsville, then a similar pattern of civic change was evident:
The process of Americanization among the Italian settlers during the last quarter
century has been rapid in tempo as well as wide in range. It is hard to imagine the
extent of the transformation that has taken place in the social and political mentality
of the Italian immigrant. He was confronted with an entirely new political
philosophy when he reached these shores. It also should not be forgotten that the
1
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majority of New York’s Italians came from the rural districts of Italy. The peasants
of the Southern provinces and of Sicily had never possessed the franchise or the
political and civil rights they unexpectedly found within their grasp when they came
to this country. At first they manifested a complete apathy towards political affairs
and their civic obligation towards them, which was but natural under the
circumstances. Not all made efforts to become citizens of this country. But
gradually, under the moral and educational pressure exerted by the more politicalminded Italian-Americans hailing from industrial and urban centers of Italy, and
under the even more powerful pressure brought to bear upon them by the
imponderable but all-pervasive influences of the American environment, the
backward agricultural elements of New York Italians became more and more
assimilated, so that at present they compose one of the most active and politically
conscious groups among New York’s citizenry.3
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, Italians living in the United States developed a
civic identity that laid the foundation for a political culture. Unlike in Italy, where an
inherited monarchy, bureaucracy, and political elites dampened democratic participation,
immigrants and their children discovered that American citizenship and political
engagement offered them a means of advancement unavailable in their homeland. If the
rewards of political power offered positive reasons to seek citizenship, then discriminatory
laws and practices, such as new immigration restrictions and Prohibition, introduced
negative pressures to understand their rights.
Italian Americans engaged with Americanizing agents – settlement houses, public
schools, the YMCA and YWCA – to gain and appreciate citizenship. In the process, they
learned to value civic nationalism, American ideals related to participatory democracy and
the requirements of good citizenship. However, since an Italian-American identity never
conflicted with adopting democratic values, the ethnic group remained cohesive and never
assimilated the conservative, individualistic economic views associated with the old-stock,
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affluent Americans who typically ran the programs. Democratic beliefs primed them for
engagement with American government and laid a foundation onto which they grafted
compatible ideas taken from leftist and Fascist influences circulating within their ethnic
community.

A Clean Slate
Most Italian immigrants lacked a robust civic culture when they arrived in the
United States. They had an adversarial view of the government and state that they left.4
The acceleration of mass migration to the United States during the 1890s and early 1900s
coincided with a highly chaotic period in Italian history. According to scholar Giordano
Bruno Guerri, the creation of the Italian nation during this time had more to do with shared
misery and discontent than Risorgimento ideals related to “the religion of the homeland,
… loyalty to the State, or a communal hold of consciousness.”5 Political expression, and
disapproval, existed, but as Donna Gabaccia stated, “Italian workers could not be expected
to participate in politics as workers increasingly did in other nations.”6 A migratory
proletariat emerged, and it found employment in Europe and the Americas.
Disenfranchisement in Italy and abroad created an internationalist outlook. Direct
challenges to the Italian state came from the peasants who remained, but their methods
consisted of unorganized protests rather than active political parties to challenge the
government from within the system.7
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The state was a hindrance rather than a means of help. For example, in 1920, Paul
Del Rosso arrived in the greater Pittsburgh area at age nine to join his father. Among the
few things that he remembered decades later about his small village in the Abruzzo region
was the cleanliness of the surrounding forests; since the government prohibited cutting
down trees, the wooded areas were cleared of twigs and fallen branches almost
immediately by poor Italians searching for firewood.8 Additionally, no local schools
existed because they were “not where ordinary people lived.” Instead, they were in
Piedmont, the home of the Italian king.9 Schools existed in other areas of Italy besides the
northern region of Piedmont, but the idea articulated by Del Rosso is clear: the government
benefited the elite and not ordinary people.
Del Rosso’s worldview had roots dating back to the creation of a unified Italy in
1861. The Risorgimento formed the Italian state, but not necessarily one Italian nation.
Unification of the peninsula involved consolidating various regions under the Kingdom of
Piedmont-Sardinia. This process lacked popular consent as unifiers took much of the
territory by force, and the subsequent plebiscite surveyed only a narrow, elite section of
the population. Leaders encouraged people to view themselves as part of an Italian nation
to provide legitimacy to the state over the following decades, but efforts were unsuccessful,
especially concerning southern Italy.10 The peasants in the southern regions viewed the
state as an intrusion that occasionally appeared to collect taxes and conscript young men
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without leaving many tangible benefits. Unification worsened conditions for those lacking
property. The state sold large tracts of land once held in common or by the Catholic Church.
An unorganized rebellion occurred, and the state subdued the ‘brigands’ by force in a
conflict that lasted throughout the 1860s.11 The new government’s composition contributed
to the belief that those in power did not intend to serve average citizens. The Piedmontese
monarchy and parliament were the foundation for the new national government, and
conservative monarchists controlled the system.12 The wealthy and those with ties to the
aristocracy predominated the appointed senators. Elected deputies in the lower chamber
were local elites and prone to provincialism. Their indifference to national concerns, high
residency costs in the capital, and disillusionment (members of parliament passed most
legislation with little debate) created a high rate of absenteeism.13 Since the Italian state
and government formed without a popular mandate, many lower-class subjects were
skeptical about its place in their lives.
The operation of the state over the next fifty years confirmed beliefs held by
emigrants like Del Rosso that the Italian government failed to address the needs of regular
people. Government repression against ‘brigandage’ spawned an anarchist movement,
which in turn furthered state intervention. Courts condemned anarchist radicals to
ammonizione, restrictions on their movement and freedom, and domicilio coatto, internal
exile to prison or one of several Mediterranean islands. These methods succeeded at
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limiting anarchist politics to small cells by the 1880s and 1890s, but not without advancing
the narrative of state tyranny.14 The government’s response to economic issues deepened
popular criticism. By the 1880s, foreign competitors, including American grain producers
and Asian silk manufacturers, decimated sectors of the Italian economy. Resultant tariffs
meant to stabilize Italian businesses failed. A tariff war with France closed markets for
Italian products, and Italian banks faltered once foreign investors withdrew their funds. To
average Italians, late-nineteenth-century colonial endeavors in Africa appeared to drain
their country of money that politicians should have spent at home during years of economic
crisis. The government’s inability to improve the situation brought frequent riots and
protests. These culminated during the 1890s with the Sicilian Fasci, a movement that the
government put down by force in 1894 and resulted in a wave of emigration from the
island, and numerous food riots in 1898, most notably in Milan, because of the high cost
of bread.15
When the government did act to solve national problems, its methods were slow,
gradual, and moderate. Politicians relied on trasformismo, a technique in which leaders
governed by using centrist coalitions to blunt the ideological extremes that may have
challenged the status quo. Giovanni Giolitti was a notable practitioner. During his long
career, which included multiple, noncontiguous terms as prime minister between 1892 and
1921 that coincided with the height of Italian immigration to the United States, Giolitti
accommodated challenges from the ideological right and left by offering small concessions
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to subordinate the political extremes under liberal, centrist rule. As interior minister, he
responded moderately to a significant strike wave in 1901. Rather than punish striking
workers with immediate state repression, Giolitti positioned the government as neutral in
the disputes if they were peaceful, allowed strikebreakers to enter the workplace, and
maintained public services. He urged union leaders and employers to find agreement.
Giolitti requested more police funding and instructed prefects to monitor potential union
activity and have the military ready to respond if needed.16 There has been some debate
about the interpretation of trasformismo. While some scholars viewed trasformismo as a
sinister mechanism to uphold hegemony, others have argued that it was necessary to ensure
government continuance in light of challenges from radicals. Italy was a young state,
formed in 1861, and moderate politicians governed from the center to respond to the
extremes that threatened the state’s legitimacy. Whether a form of elite domination or a
necessary evil, trasformismo created an Italian government that reacted slowly to the needs
and desires of regular people.17 Immigration to the United States was a response to
government failures, and Italians arrived with a poor assessment concerning the state’s role
in ordinary people’s lives.
A lack of suffrage in Italy dampened civic engagement. Although the number of
enfranchised men increased significantly in 1881 from about 622,000 to over two million,
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this was still a fraction of the population.18 In 1913, the eligible electorate increased again
to over eight million, or about 24 percent of the population, but it was not until the 1919
elections that universal manhood suffrage took effect.19 Italian women gained the full right
to vote in June 1946.20 Most immigrants, therefore, lacked experience with participatory
democracy. Trasformismo further stifled expression. Various new parties and movements
arose with the expansion of the vote, but the political system did not feel their weight until
after the First World War. The Italian Socialist Party formed in 1892, and while it claimed
numerous members and parliamentary allies by 1913, it was a fragile organization that
lacked a large, formal base of registered supporters. Other groups, including the
Nationalists, the Catholic-oriented Popular Party, and the Fascists, arose immediately
before or after the First World War to challenge Giolitti and the centrist liberals.21
Furthermore, the expansion of the right to vote made a negligible difference before
the conflict. The 1912 reform law that expanded voting rights to masses of poor and
illiterate Italian men for the first time should have theoretically elected more reformist
politicians to the chamber of deputies. Returns instead showed little change between the
1909 and 1913 elections as a similar number of traditional elites won seats in parliament.22
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The lack of the right to vote suppressed a civic identity in many of the areas from which
Italians emigrated, and various scholars have theorized that even a Fascist emphasis on all
people being part of, controlled by, and responsive to the state did not entirely succeed in
forging a people with more modern civic views and national attachments.23
For many emigrants from Italian villages and small towns, the local power structure
was the landowner class, not the government. As Marta Petrusewicz argued in Latifundium,
Italian estates helped peasants to navigate socioeconomic changes throughout the
nineteenth century. Until the collapse of the latifondo system around 1900, the landed elites
served as the mediator between the state and the worker-peasant. Since the landownerpeasant relationship operated as a “guarantee system,” a compromise in which both
landowner and peasant had mutual responsibilities to each other, most Italians within the
system had little need to resort to outside entities, such as the government, for aid. The
latifondo system provided jobs for all able-bodied workers, operated as a moneylender,
and often supplied minor assistance to the elderly, widows, and infirm.24 Years later, when
immigrants looked back on their youth in Italy, the local moneyed elites, or as one
interviewee put it, the “big man [who] own[ed] mostly everything” in his town of Patrica,
had control.25 They were the first points of contact, rather than the state and its prefects, in
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the local power structure, especially in southern agricultural areas that sent the most
immigrants to the United States.26
This is not to say that all Italians immigrated to the United States absent of political
considerations. Some fled from the government repression described above.27 One man
claimed that his father went to western Pennsylvania precisely to escape Fascism. Michele
Ponzio, born in 1900, attended the University of Catania in Sicily and earned a reputation
of being politically outspoken. Ponzio’s father sent him to Heidelberg, a borough a few
miles southwest of Pittsburgh, after warnings that Ponzio’s anti-Fascism would endanger
himself and his family if he remained.28
The principal reason for emigration, however, was economic.29 More common was
the sentiment expressed by another that immigration was “strictly out of survival and
desperation.”30 Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano summarized the Italian position
clearly: “He that emigrates from his country does so because he has to emigrate. … [The
immigrant] comes here to ask work[,] to ask employment for those energies that special
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conditions do not permit his using in his native land.”31 While most Italian Americans
believed these and similar statements once they made comfortable lives in the United
States, this view was only partially factual. The majority of European immigrants were not
the poorest of society on the verge of starvation, but the middle-tier peasants who
experienced declining futures as a modern capitalist society penetrated once remote towns
and villages.32 Conditions did not force people to immigrate, but they highly encouraged
it. Migration was the only sensible option for those who could afford the steamship ticket.
The Italian government failed to provide solutions, and people left for opportunities abroad
rather than hope that politicians would provide answers in the future.
When arriving in the United States, most Italian immigrants lacked a history of
civic values and a sense of their place and purpose within a democracy. Although Italy
gradually expanded the franchise before the 1920s, many did not benefit because they had
already left. Those who came to the United States immediately after the First World War,
before American immigration restriction laws effectively ended the mass movement of
people, may have participated in a couple of elections. However, a few years of
enfranchisement did not automatically erase decades of distrust toward the state. The
Italian government was at best unresponsive and at worst repressive concerning their needs.
Once they understood the protections and rewards that citizenship and voting offered in the
United States, they began reevaluating their place in American democracy.
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Pressures for Citizenship
It is best to view the Italian-American shift from nonengagement to civic
participation as a process in which various entities nudged people toward politics. Those
who came of age during the 1910s and 1920s felt vast pressures from mainstream American
society and Italian-American community leaders to become politically engaged citizens.
The initial impetus was the need for protection or immediate reward. Aliens naturalized to
defend themselves from ongoing discrimination and avoid the worse penalties of the recent
immigration restriction laws and Prohibition. Newcomers acquired citizenship with the
belief that it made them more competitive in the job market. These pressures alone did not
create a group of people who suddenly viewed participatory government differently. The
process of gaining citizenship, not the physical naturalization certificate, caused them to
reevaluate their importance in the system.
American nativists anticipated that immigration restriction would arrest the
growing size and potential power of many “lesser” nationalities in the United States by
barring new arrivals from places like Italy. The plan backfired and strengthened these
“undesirable” people’s ability to have a voice in American government and society. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the end of mass migration reinforced Italian-American
communities by creating stability for the population. As fewer immigrants arrived and
repatriation to Italy became permanent, Italians created families and a new generation of
American-born children. They planted deeper roots in the United States.
Immigration restriction prompted newcomers to seek out citizenship as a means of
protection and opportunity. They came to believe that many of the reasons posited by
lawmakers for restriction were falsehoods meant to conceal the truth that certain people
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were not welcome in the United States. For example, one of the main arguments offered
by prolabor supporters was that restriction would improve the workingman’s economic
position by tightening the job market. However, as Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo
Italiano argued concerning the literacy test, a method for limiting immigration that had
been regularly raised and debated by Congress from the 1890s until passed in 1917, the
ability to read and write was not a marker of a person’s character.33 Literacy was not a
guarantee that kept people from the poor house, manual labor jobs such as ditch digging
and coal mining, and criminality, including murder.34 Specific unskilled jobs needed filling
in the United States, and Americans should have welcomed immigrants to perform them.35
Additionally, since the United States was an exporter nation, it was in the country’s interest
to receive new immigrant populations since they, especially those in the next generation,
could open new markets and facilitate transnational trade due to their bilingualism and
knowledge of both nations and cultures.36
Italian Americans disagreed with immigration restriction, but they learned that they
were not powerless. Although the ethnic group experienced discrimination and American
society cast its members as “others” or “inbetweens,” racially white but at the bottom of
the social hierarchy, they – unlike African Americans and many Asian Americans – were
never officially denied the right to citizenship and its associated protections.37 America
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offered a place to Italian immigrants through civic nationalism. They found conditional
acceptance if they became citizens and adopted American civic values related to
democratic government, liberty, and rights.38 The benefits of citizenship were too great to
reject, and the ethnic press urged longtime residents to take advantage of the offers that the
United States presented them by naturalizing.39 Some states had employment and licensing
laws that disadvantaged aliens during the 1920s, and local control over New Deal-era relief
programs sometimes illegally discriminated against noncitizens.40 Fear, rather than reward,
was an equal – if not stronger – pressure to naturalize. La Voce del Popolo Italiano urged
readers to be proactive and file for their first papers for citizenship before more restrictive
laws went into effect.41 In 1925, the ethnic press informed readers that there was a high
probability that Congress would pass new laws to register all foreigners to find and deport
illegal aliens.42 The best counter to existing and potential discriminatory laws was to gain
citizenship.
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A desire for family reunification caused some to naturalize. In 1921, Congress
passed a new immigration law that, for the first time, set a cap on new arrivals to the United
States and assigned quotas to various European nationalities. This measure was followed
in 1924 by the Johnson-Reed Act, which established more stringent allocations. Rather
than use the recent 1920 census, Congress calculated new quotas by taking two percent of
each ethnic group’s population as found in the 1890 census. The earlier version was a
specific choice; most southern and eastern Europeans arrived in the United States after
1890, and this assigned a lower quota number for less desirable groups, like the Italians.
Although discriminatory, the new laws offered a significant concession. Congress included
preferences and exceptions for family members of citizens in both statutes. The 1924 law
granted entrance to citizens’ wives and children (if they were unmarried and under the age
of eighteen) outside of the quota. Furthermore, the law prioritized family reunification
when assigning visas under the official quota cap, and it offered parents of citizens first
preference.43 Immigrants learned to operate under these new rules. The ethnic press
reported that as Congress debated whether to keep the exceptions in the Johnson-Reed Act,
some 35,000 wives and children had entered the United States from 1921–1924 outside of
official quotas.44 Although laws set Italy’s official allocation number at 3,845 people,
actual immigrations were over twice this figure for the fiscal year 1925–1926 because of
the exceptions.45 Annual Italian immigration to the United States from quota and non-quota
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sources grew from 8,000 in 1924 to 22,000 in 1930 primarily because of the family reunion
provisions,46 and many who arrived during the 1920s noted that their husbands or fathers
sought citizenship to bring them over.47
Discriminatory policies in other areas of American law and society also encouraged
Italian Americans to seek citizenship for protection. Prohibition was the most prominent
example. As noted in the previous chapter, Italian Americans prided themselves on their
community and institutions. Imbibing wine together was one foundation of their social
culture, so alcohol restrictions became viewed as a personal assault on the ethnic group. 48
In addition to a cultural issue, Prohibition became an economic dilemma because it had the
potential to upset the boarding system. Many lodgers were recent arrivals from Italy, and
they expected wine either included with their rent or for sale by the host. Some broke the
law because compliance threatened relied upon forms of supplemental income.49
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From the beginning, Italian Americans believed that the “noble experiment,” as
reformers called Prohibition, would fail. The ethnic press protested the law throughout the
1920s. It created anarchy in cities, and the act needed to be either wholly enforced or
rescinded.50 Prohibition created “the spectacle of a whole nation gone criminal”51 and
ushered in “the most hypocritical years known to the history of our country” as people
broke the law or found loopholes.52 Prohibition did not solve problems, but it did cost the
United States considerably as it necessitated increased spending on police and prisons,
robbed the government of an important revenue source, and contributed to criminality. 53
The ethnic press quantified this failure; by early 1931, Prohibition was directly responsible
for 1550 deaths,54 and some 1,000 doctors and 500 pharmacists operating as part of a New
York City “syndicate” were charged with bootlegging after they wrote and filled phony
prescriptions for whiskey.55
Reporting of arrests within the Italian-American community became common. In
January 1920, two police officers, disguised as streetcar drivers, raided Albert Fasolo’s
saloon on Mayfield Road in Cleveland’s Little Italy after asking the bartender for “a drink
with ‘kick.’”56 The report of the arrest of Bessie De Marco, who worked at New Roma

Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH; Anna Forno, interview by Cathy
Cerrone, transcript, 12 December 1995, 32, 1998.0200, Detre Library and Archives,
Senator John Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA.
50
“Prohibition and Anarchy,” La Voce del Popolo Italiano, 18 December 1920, 2. Page 2
of this source was mistakenly labeled as 17 December 1920.
51
“It Won’t Last,” La Voce del Popolo Italiano, 8 January 1921, 2.
52
“After One Year,” La Voce del Popolo Italiano, 5 February 1921, 2.
53
“Quanto costa la proibizione,” La Trinacria, 2 October 1925, 5.
54
“Un’Ecatombe Proibizionista,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 7 February 1931, 4.
55
“1500 Farmacisti Accusati di Bootlegging,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 14 March
1931, 2.
56
“Arrestati perchè [sic] vendevano liquori,” La Voce del Popolo Italiano, 10 January
1920, 1.
110

Restaurant on East Ninth Street near downtown Cleveland, began humorously as agents
discovered that she sold liquor that she hid in her stockings. Her punishment was a fourhundred-dollar fine, a large sum of money in 1921.57 Newspaper articles about raids and
arrests reminded Italian Americans about the possibility of conviction for making or
transporting liquor and how costly it could be for acts that only a few years prior were
legal.58
A constant theme in later interviews concerning Italian Americans during this
period was the ubiquity of alcohol, even in light of possible punishments. Family members
made wine and liquor, transported moonshine across state lines, and operated illegal
speakeasies out of homes and backrooms.59 One man remembered his response when
Prohibition ended. At the time, he was a student at the Carnegie Institute of Technology,
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and his professor and classmates wanted a taste of the no-longer forbidden vice after
legalization.60 The Italian American declined, and he told them half in jest, “no, we are
very familiar with beer and wine, we always have it at home.”61 Alcohol flowed freely
regardless of possible punishment.
According to Italian Americans, the problem was not that they had a drinking
culture but that an unnecessary law targeted them. Prohibition did little to stamp out any
negatives related to alcohol in the Italian-American community because they were the
exception and not the norm. As George P. Bauer, a settlement worker at Cleveland’s Hiram
House, later stated, he routinely turned a blind eye to the “gallons of ‘dago red’ wine in the
small serving room” when the institution hosted weddings. He continued that in his “16
years living in that slum, and in and out of hundreds of homes, [he] never saw a drunk
Italian, Slav, Greek, Russian, Mexican or negro.”62 A 1934 Hiram House “Liquor Control
Questionnaire” concerning Cleveland supported Bauer’s observations: “To sum up, repeal
has made little difference in poorer sections but has increased drinking in better ones.” 63
As much as teetotalers believed that Prohibition would solve society’s ills, its effect on
Italian Americans was negligible. Breaking Prohibition allowed nativists to cast the ethnic
group as “others” and unacceptable. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano mocked the evangelical
preacher Billy Sunday for his belief that “they [the ‘foreigners’] are some filthy people
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because they drink.” The paper suggested that the preacher must have been drunk himself
to propose such ideas.64 Those outside of the community were ignorant about the group
and its culture. When another minister and temperance advocate visited Italy in 1925, he
noticed the abundance of wine and spent eight weeks of his trip looking for evidence of
drunkenness. He failed to find any. As Pittsburgh’s La Trinacria concluded, American
Prohibition law, not the alcohol itself, created problems.65
If Prohibition had been only a private moral and religious issue, it would not have
elicited much of a response from the Italian-American community. However, since
Prohibition was the law of the land and infractions led to real-world repercussions, Italian
Americans quickly learned to be concerned. As one Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, resident
remembered, the police raided homes – including a neighbor’s house in which they broke
down the door – without any search warrants because people did not understand their
rights.66 Nicola Criscione of Youngstown, Ohio, agreed. Enforcement of the dry laws was
a means to target and harass certain ethnic groups. Vice squads acquired “John Doe
warrants,” which allowed them to search anyone’s home at will. When they raided
Criscione’s residence, part of a routine neighborhood canvas, the family followed the
police closely through every room. The officers supposedly planted evidence in the past,
and the policeman who arrived with a basket of liquor – presumably bottles collected
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during previous raids – refused to leave the contraband outside.67 The notion of police
abuse of power and harassment in immigrant communities was not an illusion created later
in popular memory. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano printed a disturbing event in which police
raided the Youngstown home and restaurant of Minnie Manilla in 1928. They found no
alcohol and made no arrests, and Manilla sued the police for damages. After her action, the
police arrested her and stated that they had found some 2.86 percent alcohol during the first
raid on her home. The newspaper was disgusted by what it viewed as retaliation against an
innocent woman.68
Another issue was the uneven application of the law, which made Prohibition
confusing to many in the ethnic community. As one man remembered, if a bootlegger knew
someone of importance, he received a pass from the police. Less prominent lawbreakers,
including most Italian Americans and other new immigrant groups who lacked
connections, were arrested.69 In other cases, a prescribed system for breaking the law
emerged. Guido Ferrari of Pittsburgh accidentally became involved in the liquor business.
Some organized bootleggers had convinced his future father-in-law to sell alcohol at his
home. While visiting the family, Ferrari served an undercover agent and was arrested. 70
This was not an issue, as he explained: “At the time, … they had a fellow, anybody who
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got arrested, he used to go down and put the bonds out for them. Because almost, not
everyday, but almost everybody used to sell booze, and somebody got arrested on and
off.”71 A one-hundred-dollar fee was enough to dismiss the case: fifty dollars to the lawyer
and fifty dollars to the judge.72 The problem was that leniency differed by location. In New
Castle, Pennsylvania, attorneys, judges, and policemen frequented an Italian-American
speakeasy without trouble.73 However, in Homer City, Pennsylvania, another man spent
six months in jail for the same type of action, selling wine out of a backroom.74
The discriminatory nature of the law, including the feeling of being targeted for
their culture and the unevenness of punishment, boosted interest in civics. Prohibition
dovetailed with concerns surrounding immigration law for those born in Italy because alien
bootleggers were subject to potential deportation.75 There was no large-scale expulsion for
simple liquor possession and minor bootlegging, but immigrants did not know at the time
whether Prohibition enforcement officials would have successfully lobbied Congress for
more lax deportation requirements.76 Some feared the worst if caught. In one late example,
December 1932, from the Cleveland Plain Dealer, dry enforcement agents arrested Patsy
Gliozzo, an unemployed carpenter who told authorities that he had become a bootlegger –
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all of four days’ worth – to provide for his pregnant wife. He spent his time in jail crying
because, according to a deputy marshal, “he’s scared he’s going to be deported.” His story
and fears were likely not a ruse because agents narrowly saved his life after Gliozzo
attempted to hang himself in the jail cell.77 The children of immigrants, who were citizens
by birth, did not have to fear deportation, but they still faced hefty fines and other
punishments.
The ethnic press encouraged Italian Americans to get involved in politics to fight
and eventually overturn Prohibition.78 As La Voce del Popolo Italiano told readers during
a 1920 registration drive, “the vote is our weapon,” and “he who does not register is a
deserter in the electoral fight.”79 Liquor laws, immigration restrictions, and other forms of
perceived discrimination pushed Italian aliens toward gaining citizenship and the
naturalized and native-born toward expressing their rights openly, a story described in more
detail in the context of Italian-American political clubs in chapter five.

The Americanizing Agents
In October 1925, Rev. A. Di Santo of Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania, recounted recent
comments made by a local businessman concerning his polling station experience. The
man, “one of our fellow citizens,” Di Santo began, denounced ethnic voters: “A respectable
American cannot go to the polls … without having to brush through a gang of filthy and
greasy Italian women.” Di Santo rejected the businessman’s comments and views. These
women were citizens, and they performed their “patriotic duty.” He continued by asserting
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their rights: “Does not the Constitution of the United States give equal rights to all its
citizens? And, let it be understood that these Italian women are citizens of the United States,
and any one trying to keep them away from the polls, even by a mere sneer, is disloyal to
the Constitution.” In Di Santo’s opinion, the underlying motive for these comments was
not the women’s hygiene but that “they turned out in such numbers.”80
Rev. Di Santo expressed the concept of civic nationalism, the belief that citizens’
rights and participation defined the American nation. Many immigrants arrived in the
United States without this belief. Their past experiences in Italy taught them to hold the
state and government at arm’s length, but conditions in the United States prompted a
reconsideration. Fear and concerns about nativist-led discrimination, immigration law, and
Prohibition caused them to view knowledge of the American system of law and
government as essential. Italian Americans increasingly understood the importance of
acquiring citizenship for protection and the benefits it conferred, and they turned to a
variety of entities for assistance. Organizations such as settlement houses, schools, mutual
aid societies, and the ethnic press supported them on their journey toward citizenship, voter
registration, and political participation. In the process of learning about their rights and
duties, their view of their own place in the American system changed. They adopted civic
nationalism and a belief in participatory democracy, which proved crucial during the years
of the New Deal.
There is one critical caveat concerning this period of American history. While the
act of gaining citizenship papers had long been available to most foreigners, the process to
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acquire them changed under the Naturalization Act of 1906. During the nineteenth century,
American leaders held a Jeffersonian view of American society, one in which assimilation
occurred when immigrants modeled themselves after yeoman farmers and adopted their
values. As demographics shifted to urban residences and industrial occupations by the start
of the twentieth century, the federal government sought more stringent means to create
loyal and knowledgeable citizens. Motivated by nativism and concerns about whether new
arrivals would adopt fundamental American values, Congress strengthened naturalization
to ensure that new citizens acquired essential democratic beliefs in addition to their
paperwork.81
Before 1906, the United States operated a haphazard naturalization system. Local
courts could grant citizenship, and approval was in the hands of the judge. Although some
magistrates tested applicants’ knowledge of government, law, and the Constitution, this
was not an obligation, and other judges did not bother with exams. Even the five-year
residency requirement was unevenly applied because it was difficult to verify. Political
machines in some cities took advantage of the situation, and they possibly played a role in
naturalization because rates differed significantly by location.82 For example, albeit an
unsuccessful one ultimately, in October 1902, a local Irish-American Democratic party
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leader in St. Louis, Missouri, offered members of the Italian-American community
citizenship and alcohol in exchange for their support. The political machine took men to
the courthouse and processed them en masse. The Democrats continued to work with
Giovanni Barbaglia, the leader of the North Italy American Society, who presented names
of potential voters in exchange for more than ninety forged naturalization certificates.
Barbaglia turned state’s evidence, and the court indicted and convicted the machineassociated perpetrators in 1903.83
Granting naturalization without requiring new citizens to learn about their rights,
privileges, and responsibilities created a group of people who were American on paper but
not by values. The new 1906 law forced those who wanted citizenship to learn about the
beliefs associated with it. United States circuit and district courts and other courts of record
now processed standardized application forms, and knowledge of English became
required.84 Candidates had to undergo standard procedures, including a civics test based on
knowledge of the Constitution. The exact composition was left open.85 The new Bureau of
Naturalization advocated for the view that civics included understanding the Constitution’s
language and showing an attachment to its values. In 1914, Richard K. Campbell and

83

Gary Ross Mormino, Immigrants on the Hill: Italian-Americans in St. Louis, 1882–
1982 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 174–75.
84
Michael LeMay and Elliott Robert Barkan, eds., “Document 56: Act of June 29, 1906:
Basic Naturalization Act of 1906, Providing for the Naturalization of Aliens Throughout
the United States and Establishing the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,” in
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues: A Documentary History
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 93–97.
85
Dorothee Schneider, “Naturalization and United States Citizenship in Two Periods of
Mass Migration: 1894–1930, 1965–2000,” Journal of American Ethnic History 21, no. 1
(Fall 2001): 57, 59–60, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27502779. A husband’s
naturalization granted citizenship to an immigrant wife before 1922. The Cable Act of
1922 removed this provision and required married female aliens to undergo the same
procedures as men.
119

Raymond Crist, the agency’s director and deputy, initiated a new program to provide more
guidance. Influenced by the ongoing Americanization movement, which sought to
assimilate immigrants rapidly, the pair created educational materials that instilled
attachment to American civic values in addition to knowledge of government. The Bureau
of Naturalization worked with various ethnic groups, private Americanizing organizations,
and public schools (including night programs catering to immigrants) to spread its
citizenship philosophy.86 Stricter barriers were arguably one contributing factor to the
declining rate of naturalization, which fell from 65 percent of all foreign-born males over
the age of twenty-one in 1900 to 49 percent in 1920.87 The quantity declined, but the quality
of new citizens increased. These requirements forced all potential citizens to learn about
the intricacies of federal, state, and local government, the US Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, general liberties, American beliefs in representative democracy, and a basic
understanding of US history. In sum, citizens created after the 1906 law generally learned
and adopted a civic culture to a greater extent than those who previously naturalized. This
produced a growing group of Italian Americans who believed in civic nationalism and their
rights and duties as citizens.
The settlement house is perhaps the clearest nexus for the creation of an ItalianAmerican civic identity. Many attributes for shaping a civic culture developed at that
location. The settlements provided English and citizenship classes, hosted lectures and
talks about American government and politics, and provided meeting spaces for many
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ethnic societies. In addition to engaging new arrivals, these organizations also sought to
include children and youth, many of whom were American born and already citizens on
paper. Realizing that alien parents with no knowledge of civics or a natural desire for
political participation raised many of these children, settlement houses and other entities
developed programs to indoctrinate young, often second-generation, Italian Americans to
believe in the superiority of democratic governance. In sum, these entities worked to shape
both young and old, alien and natural-born, toward becoming productive citizens.
Cleveland’s Hiram House, founded in 1896 by George Bellamy, was one notable
example. Originally it catered to Jewish immigrants, but it became predominantly Italian
by the First World War until African Americans began replacing the group in the postwar
period. It served the enclave known as Big Italy.88 By 1910, Cleveland was the home of
four additional settlements besides Hiram House, and Pittsburgh hosted another four. 89
During the height of the movement, Cleveland contained a dozen settlements of various
sizes, but Italian Americans chiefly utilized Hiram House and Alta House in Little Italy.90
Hiram House was one of the most notable settlements in the United States; however, many
other cities and towns in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio contained similar
organizations.
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Smaller entities dotted cities and towns throughout the region and served people
beyond these metropolises. Community leaders founded the Akron Settlement House
association in 1912 after a campaign by the Akron Beacon Journal newspaper climaxed
with a local talk by famed New York City social reformer Jacob Riis. His departing words,
“money cannot buy good citizens,”91 were quickly turned into action as the association
enrolled over four hundred foreigners in educational classes during its first year in
operation.92 The Woman’s Home Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church
ran city missions in Altoona (the Italian Mission), Youngstown (the Pearl Street
Community House), and Warren, Ohio (Rebecca Williams Community House), along with
three associated programs in Pittsburgh.93 The Young Men’s and Young Women’s
Christian Associations were involved in the movement. For example, the YWCA opened
Neilson House in Youngstown’s Brier Hill neighborhood, an Italian-American enclave, in
1915.94
Regardless of the settlement house’s name or affiliation, these institutions
conditioned immigrants and their children to embrace a Protestant-type view of morality
and civic responsibility. The settlement house was a product of its time. Progressive
reformers, often advocates of Social Christianity, believed that the revitalization of the
United States required a culture of sacrifice and reform. They urged people to condition
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their personal, private behaviors to conform to the public good.95 Settlement house workers
often consisted of Christian, affluent, college-educated men and women trying to save
souls while improving the United States.96 In tandem with Social Christianity, the
settlement house movement operated under the guise of civic nationalism. New European
immigrants, such as those from Italy, were offered a position in the American polity if they
shed old identities and accepted American values.97 Cleveland’s Alta House provided an
excellent example of this concern. According to the settlement’s namesake, Alta
Rockefeller, the organization’s goal was to create “more liberally educated men and
women; a purer home life; a better class of citizens and a higher regard for the government
under which we live and the country of which we are all proud to be citizens.”98
Hiram House, and other settlement projects, accomplished this by conditioning
attendees to accept and value democratic ideals as the pinnacle of American identity, but
they often began by enticing converts less overtly. As Jane Addams and some progressives
believed, their work imparting American civic values was compatible with most forms of
multiculturalism. To reach new immigrants, settlement workers needed to accommodate
some of the newcomers’ culture. It was a pragmatic approach. 99 George Bauer repeated
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this idea decades later when he stated that Hiram House fulfilled its goal, which was to
“help the immigrant to adjust to America and be a good citizen, but not sacrifice the cultural
values of the old country.”100 The settlement houses found success by appealing to ethnic
groups by their separate communities, and this catering to specific cultures continued
throughout their existence.101 For example, Hiram House used music to lure first-time
visitors. Settlement workers had scheduled lectures and film showings to draw new
audiences, but the language barrier proved too great. In 1914, the organization found more
success with Sunday concerts, which included folk songs, classical music, and selections
from well-known operas.102 The community response was strong, and “Italian men came
in increasing numbers and formed a rather critical but highly-appreciative musical
audience.”103
Settlement house workers also utilized ethnic plays and dances, believing that
participation by second-generation children would strengthen ties with their immigrant
parents, thus reinforcing family stability.104 Nationality nights and cultural events gave
Italian Americans, many of whom would have rejected attending lectures from unknown
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figures, an entertaining reason to visit the settlements. For example, Cleveland-area
settlement houses hosted “A Spring Festival” at Friendly Inn in 1925, during which an
Italian-American group performed the Tarantella alongside folk dances by other ethnic
populations.105 Other examples during the 1920s included the performances of “Drill of the
Neapolitan Clowns” by the Dante Dramatic Club, the operetta Gino e Mimi by the
Giuseppe Verdi Singing Club, Magia Nera (or Black Magic), a drama written by Hiram
House worker F. Gasbarra (better known as Frank Casper) for the group Circolo
Meridionale, and the famous Italian opera Cavalleria Rusticana.106 These cultural activities
remained prominent throughout this period to the point that Casper, who was the head of
the adult department, called for the continuation and promotion of many of these groups,
including the Giuseppe Verdi Singing Club, in a 1931 evaluation.107
If culture helped Hiram House gain new visitors, other forms of aid spread its reach,
consolidated trust in the institution, and encouraged more participation with
Americanization programs. For example, in 1924, George Bellamy described the encounter
between Gaetano Gemelli and a staffer. Gemelli came to Hiram House one morning to
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inquire why his young son, Salvatore, spent so much time there. The staffer reassured him
that his son was safe at the settlement, participated with other boys in various clubs, and
was a star basketball player. She encouraged Gemelli to come one night and watch
Salvatore play.108 In some cases, the institution built trust even before people arrived in
Cleveland, such as one Italian woman who swore that a letter of introduction from Hiram
House expedited her processing at Ellis Island.109 In time, this level of trust reached the
point that some Italian Americans sought settlement house workers to mediate personal
disputes.110
The settlements also offered meeting spaces to ethnic societies, and Casper
included this in his 1931 evaluation of activities to promote.111 Some of these groups were
large, such as the two-hundred-member Calabrese Lodge of the Sons of Italy and the
ninety-member Bruno Chimirri mutual aid society.112 During the winter of 1932–1933, two
dozen social organizations, with a total enrollment of 2355 members, met at Hiram
House.113 Offering meeting space to ethnic organizations was typical. Around the same
time, Little Italy’s Alta House hosted twenty-one societies and associations totaling almost
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two thousand people.114 The settlement house workers conditioned immigrants and their
children to trust their organizations by offering the group concessions, such as preferable
activities and meeting space for ethnic associations. This mutual respect aided the success
of the settlements’ Americanization efforts.
Progress City was a Hiram House program that encouraged youth civic engagement
from its 1906 creation into the New Deal era.115 Asserting “that the welfare of a democratic
nation depends upon an intelligent citizenship,” the objective of Progress City was to create
a model town operated and governed by local children and teenagers.116 Concerned about
the annual dumping of “a million peasant immigrants from the most backward countries of
Europe” into American cities, Hiram House sought to discourage vices amplified by
poverty and overcrowding to ensure the future of the American polity.117 The solution was
youth civic education. Progress City assembled people from ages eight to eighteen during
the summer. They created a city modeled after Cleveland, complete with a mayor, city
clerk, city judge, and prosecuting attorney, among other positions. All participants
belonged to “Industrial Departments,” each encompassing activities offered at the
settlement house, such as carpentry, printing, or cooking. The workers earned Progress
City money, out of which they owed a ten-percent income tax. They could purchase the
goods created by the various departments or donated from local department stores with
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their pay. The Industrial Departments served two purposes. First, occupational positions
reinforced the notion of citizenship as a contributor to industry, society, and government.
Those involved in printing, for example, published a weekly newsletter that included
information about court proceedings, laws, and athletics. Second, the Industrial
Departments acted as wards for electing city council members. Although participants held
weekly elections for government positions, Progress City also included a General
Assembly modeled after the democratic town halls held in colonial New England. During
this democratic procedure, the citizens listened to addresses, received petitions, and created
new laws in conjunction with the mayor and city council. The Progress City court handled
minor infractions and arguments between participants, and punishments ranged from fines
(in Progress City money) to temporary revocation of settlement house privileges, such as
using the playground.118
In time, Progress City became more refined and an important Hiram House
program. Participants received tags to document their activities and printed ballots,
courtesy of the Hiram House printery, to mark their choices for elected officials. 119 The
program began with a vague “several hundred” mostly Russian, Jewish, and Italian
children.120 The 1915 event attracted between 250 and 300 youths per week, with a total

“Progress City: An Answer to the Demand for a Civic Education,” 1–8.
“Citizen Tag,” memorabilia, n.d., box 60, folder 4, Hiram House Social Settlement
Records, MS 3319, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH; “Progress City
Official Ballot,” memorabilia, 29 July 1912, box 60, folder 4, Hiram House Social
Settlement Records, MS 3319, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH;
“Progress City Official Ballot,” memorabilia, 27 July 1917, box 60, folder 4, Hiram
House Social Settlement Records, MS 3319, Western Reserve Historical Society,
Cleveland, OH.
120
“Progress City: An Answer to the Demand for a Civic Education,” 4.
118
119

128

enrollment of about 650.121 This number grew to over 800 in 1921, including 330 Italian
boys and girls, the largest ethnic group involved.122 Organizers sought to bring government
alive to young participants. The 1915 program included a field trip to the local
courthouse.123 In 1921, Progress City brought in numerous outside speakers, including the
mayor of Cleveland.124 The newswriting class stressed the importance of the press, studied
the Cleveland Plain Dealer for style and form, and included assigned topics such as
“Citizenship,” “An American Citizen,” and “A Progress City Citizen.”125
Hiram House offered additional activities for youth civic development beyond the
summer Progress City program. In 1914, the settlement created a junior juvenile court to
build respect for the law. With the blessing of George S. Addams, the actual municipal
juvenile court’s judge, the Hiram House derivative enforced rules based on the Ohio
juvenile code and Cleveland city ordinances, such as concerning petty theft, gambling, and
truancy. Boys over the age of fourteen applied to be probation officers by handing in a
written request explaining the position’s duties while a local attorney sat as judge. Failure
to follow a summons meant an appearance before Judge Addams’s court.126
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Youth groups sought to replicate participatory democracy and teach the
fundamentals of government. Hiram House credited the boys’ clubs for bringing concerns
about local housing conditions to the Cleveland city council’s attention.127 Boys
programming leader P. D. Graham noted in his 1922–1923 report that as a child became a
teenager and learned “to play as a member of a team[,] … there [was] an opportunity for
the development of self government among the classes through the Junior Congress of
Clubs.”128 Some took this to heart. The Utopian Club aspired “to teach [members] the
principles of honest and intelligent self-government” as one of its purposes.129 Similarly,
the Viton Club, organized by Italian-American boys in 1925 at the associated Anthony
Wayne Community Center, included the “study of parliamentary law” as one of its
attributes.130
Active participation created an atmosphere in which youth learned the importance
of voting and staying informed concerning politics, law, and government, a trait that they
carried with them into adulthood. The Progress City newsletter displayed supportive
testimony from participants about the importance of citizenship.131 Hiram House Life,
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another student-printed monthly publication, echoed these sentiments: “We want fair
judges; we want reasonable laws; we want an upright council; we want loyal, enthusiastic
citizens.”132 As George Bellamy proclaimed in his 1927 address for the summer program,
“a number of boys and girls who have held official positions and worked at Progress City
in earlier years today hold important positions, working for the city government, public
schools, and private industries. … They tell me, especially those working for the
government, that what they learned in Progress City helped to prepare them for their special
work.”133 These comments were more than hype pushed by settlement house employees to
justify their efforts. As one newspaper article reported, in preparation for upcoming mock
elections at the Anthony Wayne branch, which ran a similar program to Progress City
called Merryburg, visitors overheard children discussing candidates on the playground. A
few days later, the youth voted for their preferred councilmen and city manager using
authentic ballot boxes supplied by the Cleveland election board.134 One Italian-language
newspaper concurred with Bellamy. The crosstown Alta House settlement helped produce
several local Italian-American government officials, including councilman Alessandro
DeMaioribus, assistant county prosecutor Michael A. Picciano, and assistant police
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prosecutor D. H. Lorienzo.135 The settlement houses conditioned youth to accept and
express their civic duties.
Americanization efforts targeted adults in addition to children. The rise of adult
Americanization programming at Hiram House coincided with the implementation of the
more stringent naturalization standards in 1906, and it served as a model for a citywide
effort. Judge Manuel Levine, a Russian-Jewish immigrant who arrived in the United States
as a young man in 1896 and immediately made use of Hiram House, taught the first
citizenship class at the settlement in 1908 to a group of fifty people representing twelve
nationalities.136 The municipal Immigration Bureau and private Cleveland Immigration
League, which Levine helped organize and served as chairman, standardized assimilation
and Americanization efforts by partnering with the local board of education, the YMCA
and YWCA, nationalization courts, public libraries, and settlement houses.137 The
Americanization Information Bureau (later the Citizens’ Bureau), created in 1917 to
conduct citizenship lessons and offer help with naturalization paperwork and procedures,
cooperated with Hiram House.138 These entities used points of contact within the immigrant
communities to promote classes. The night programs were particularly successful –
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including a 44 percent increase in night school enrollment in one term – because they
offered lessons during times convenient to the working class.139 The Cleveland
Immigration Bureau also circulated a booklet, “The Immigrant’s Guide,” through its
various partners. The guide offered advice about how to adjust to the American city and
information on helpful institutions. Translated into eight or nine foreign languages, seventy
thousand copies were printed by 1915.140
The “Citizenship Manual for Cleveland, Ohio” was one outcome of this
standardization effort. Spurred by the Cleveland Immigration League, the city Immigration
Bureau published the booklet for students enrolled in citizenship classes offered at
settlement houses, public schools, and libraries.141 This forty-page document provided the
fundamentals that aliens needed to learn to gain citizenship and American values. These
included the following: a summary of the naturalization process along with sample forms;
descriptions and graphs of the three branches of government; the composition of state and
local government; the Constitution; traditional patriotic songs and oaths; a question-andanswer section; and, a list of laws pertaining to immigrants, such as codes about minors
and tenant rental rights.142 One of the first lessons dealt with the meaning of citizenship.
This included the advantages and the responsibilities of being an American: “You have the
right to vote and help make the laws which govern our nation,” and new citizens had the
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duty “to take an interest in American Government … [and] to vote intelligently and for the
welfare of all the people.”143
Trained teachers highlighted the meaning of civic nationalism in their lessons. R.
E. Cole, the Cleveland Immigration League secretary,144 stated that citizenship classes had
three areas of inquiry: “1. Organization and machinery of our government with emphasis
upon its operations and functions. 2. Method of becoming a citizen. 3. Duties and
responsibilities of citizenship compared with rights and privileges, setting forth the
reciprocal and coöperative relationship of the principles of democracy.”145 To make classes
civically engaging, Cole also encouraged teachers to make Americanization a lived
experience by including patriotic stories, mock trials and city council meetings, speeches
by public officials, and trips to public institutions.146 Adult education, in this sense, did not
differ much from youth Americanization programming. It did, however, redefine the
meaning of American citizenship to new arrivals. For the masses of Italian Americans who
lacked a history with participatory democracy, naturalization classes encouraged them to
view citizenship in terms of their rights and responsibilities concerning self-governance.
Boards of education and the public schools worked alongside Hiram House and
other settlements to foster Americanization and citizenship. Across the United States,
immigrants advocated for evening school classes. Italian residents petitioned the Cleveland
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Board of Education in 1910 for night school courses, including English.147 An in-home
program for women began at the urging of Hiram House staff. Cultural practices and
familial responsibility kept many immigrant wives from leaving the house, so settlement
workers organized English-language classes in kitchens and living rooms for homemakers
and their neighbors. Participants’ enthusiasm for the program led the board of education to
agree to supply teachers for in-home classes of fifteen or more enrollees.148 Although
period commentator Professor John J. Mahoney of Boston University criticized Ohio for
not granting state funding aid for immigrant education programs, he praised its training
policy – which built from the experiences in Cleveland – for preparing qualified
instructors.149

Similar

programs

existed

in

Pennsylvania.

Pittsburgh

offered

Americanization coursework for Italians through schools such as Westinghouse,
Woolslair, Schenley, and Peabody.150
American-born youth were also susceptible to similar efforts from the local schools,
especially as lawmakers revised and better enforced compulsory attendance laws.151 The
Pennsylvania legislature amended its statute in 1907 to require attendance until age
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fourteen and authorized the searching of factories and mines to find truant child laborers
to ensure compliance.152 After 1913, Ohio required all males between ages eight and fifteen
and all females between ages eight and sixteen to attend public or private school.153 Unlike
other ethnicities, Italian-American immigrants, at least in Cleveland, rejected sending their
children to parochial schools, the only private institution that would have been financially
feasible for most. Instead, Italian-American children attended public schools, complete
with all of their Americanizing influences.154
Other organizations served those whom the settlement houses and public schools
failed to reach. The International Institute operated under the YWCA umbrella to provide
classes and assistance to foreign-born women. These included English courses and
multilingual pamphlets such as “Why Foreign-Born Women Should Learn English,”
“What America Has for You,” and “Courts of Law and Their Use.”155 During one 1928
enrollment drive in Youngstown, the International Institute targeted prospective applicants
in the local ethnic press and noted that the previous year netted two hundred students. 156
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For convenience, the organization offered nine different class times for English courses to
prepare women for citizenship. Beginning the first week of October, participants had the
option of choosing the location most convenient for them, including the main International
Institute office in Youngstown, a community center, Neilson House (a settlement), a local
school, and two factory sites, United States Steel’s Ohio Works and Truscon Steel
Company.157 Concurrently, the YMCA advertised its Americanization classes for men. 158
These efforts likely drew large numbers of ethnic Italians. According to the Pittsburgh
International Institute, which prided itself on having served over two thousand individuals
and families in 1930, “the Italian immigrants have been and are the most frequent visitors
at the International Institute; more aid has been supplied to this group than to any other.”159
Hiram House and other entities successfully conditioned immigrants and their
children to become attentive American citizens. As one 1921 letter concerning those
attending English and civics classes asserted, “I was surprised to see how quickly they had
gotten the spirit of America, how interested they were in our country, and how much they
knew about our government. The fact is, I think they would pass a better examination than
a lot of American born citizens.”160 George Bellamy further illustrated the immigrants’
adoption of an American mentality in a letter a year later concerning a speech given by
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Judge Manuel Levine at the Italian American Citizens’ Club.161 Levine, who was
responsible for early Americanization efforts in Cleveland and was “beloved by the
Italians” and other white ethnics, presented a story about his civics class in 1908.162 At the
start of the first lesson, he asked his students, “What is an American?” One nineteen-yearold replied, “a man who has a lot of money.” When Levine pressed for elaboration, the
man explained that while “in Europe a man is called a great man when he is a great lawyer,
a great doctor, [or] a great scientist,” Americans readily used the term “great American” to
describe millionaires and the wealthy. When the course ended six months later, the young
man revised his outlook: “In Europe, to be a citizen you have to die for a king; in America,
you have to live for a great republic, not for yourself but for your country.” From
advancements such as this made through club and class activities at Hiram House, Bellamy
concluded that “the Settlement can help to make democracy real.”163 Citizenship class
enrollments increased weekly, a trend that Bellamy noted with much satisfaction to a
benefactor.164
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It is best to think about this time from the late 1910s into the 1930s as an
accelerating movement toward civic engagement as pressures from family and friends to
attain citizenship and become politically involved reached a critical mass of people. Each
successful naturalization class added new Italian-American citizens to the neighborhood,
ethnic club, and family. They, in turn, induced others to attend classes and adopt civic,
democratic values. Peer pressure and pride motivated many. After one man gained
citizenship, his father, feeling “humiliated,” appeared “at Hiram House and very
emphatically stated that he was going to show up his son; that not only he would become
a citizen, but he could learn, by heart[,] the whole Constitution of the United States.”165 As
citizenship and naturalization became normative, the expression of American values and
political participation grew.
Perhaps the most significant inducement was due to the second generation.
American-born children unconsciously brought foreign-born parents into the American
system. The new generation – American citizens by birth and firmly rooted in the United
States – encouraged the immigrant group to remain, adapt, and assimilate. For example,
while Salvatore Gemelli’s father was concerned in 1924 about his son’s attendance at
Hiram House, as described earlier in this chapter, the son’s engagement likely sparked an
interest in the elder Gemelli to gain citizenship. Three years later, in 1927, after having
lived in Cleveland for fourteen years, Gaetano Gemelli finally naturalized at age forty. 166
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Much of the willingness to acquire American citizenship and express civic values was
because of the second generation.
The wider Italian-American community pushed the same message. The ethnic press
played a role in Americanizing immigrants.167 Newspapers published recurrent questionand-answer guides for the naturalization test, summaries of American rights, voting and
registration notices, and even an Italian translation of the Declaration of Independence.168
Numbers and lists of people completing naturalization classes and receiving citizenship
served as civic achievement celebrations that gently pushed aliens toward the same goal. 169
Ethnic societies complemented the newspapers. The Sons of Italy provided information
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about citizenship classes and hosted some courses as well.170 The Italian Sons and
Daughters of America and the Sons of Columbus, two other umbrella organizations,
professed the same desire for Americanization and civic engagement.171 Additionally, the
governance of these organizations was democratic in nature. The constitution for
Youngstown’s Colombo lodge, formed in 1895, set clear parameters for involvement. The
rules followed parliamentary procedure, and “every member ha[d] the right to speak in the
General Meetings.”172 The only restrictions dealt with decorum. Comments were to be brief
and direct, required being given the floor by the president, and no one member was allowed
to dominate a discussion about a single topic. To hold office, elected candidates needed to
have been a member in good standing for a year and be literate.173
The result of all these Americanizing influences was a community that viewed itself
as a part of the nation. As one letter accompanying a banquet donation stated: “Whether
we [the members of the San Benedetto mutual aid society] contribute twenty-five or a
thousand dollars, we know that the service rendered by Hiram House cannot be paid with
money. We as a part of this community feel that our indebtedness to Hiram House can only
be paid by thanks and loyalty to America and to you.”174 Although most Italians arrived in
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the United States with uncertain intentions, they made America their adopted nation. In the
process, they also learned to appreciate and celebrate the democratic values at the heart of
the American ideal.

Civic Identity and the Influence of Italian Americanism
Americanization succeeded in convincing many Italian Americans to seek
citizenship and become politically engaged, but those efforts did not bequeath the
community a political ideology beyond the adoption of civic nationalism. While Italian
immigrants and their children experienced de facto discrimination, the United States was
still a pluralist country by law. Citizenship meant accepting democratic values, and it did
not require the complete rejection of a person’s previous culture. To express themselves as
Americans, the ethnic group merged its history and values into the American narrative to
claim a place in society. By rejecting a type of assimilation that would have erased their
past, they doubled down on an Italian-American identity. It was through this lens that they
interpreted political issues and built an ideology. Americanizing agents, such as the
settlement house workers, sympathized with the new immigrants; however, their diverse
lived experiences and daily personal contacts meant that the two groups had different
outlooks. In sum, Italian Americans learned civic values as they Americanized, but their
political ideas – beyond civic nationalism – came from their public sphere, not from the
settlement houses or other organizations.
American history was a core element of civic education, and Italian Americans
discovered that some patriotic narratives easily merged with a celebration of italianità
(Italianness). They read stories about the American Revolutionary War and the lives of
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George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.175 They emphasized the cases in which
American and Italian histories became intertwined. For example, they noted with pride that
Lincoln was a friend to the Italians and had offered a military post to their hero Giuseppe
Garibaldi, a man who held the same character strengths as Washington and Thomas
Jefferson.176 Italian Americans learned that their ancestors had a long history of assisting
the development of the United States. Colonel Francis Vigo provided money and aid to
George Rogers Clark during the Revolutionary War’s northwest campaign. Filippo Mazzei
communicated with and influenced the political thoughts of Jefferson. Generals Edoardo
Ferrero and Luigi Palma di Cesnola fought with distinction during the American Civil War,
including Ferrero’s command at such noted battles as Antietam and Vicksburg.177 They
claimed Christopher Columbus as the first immigrant, and Columbus Day rose as a
birthright defense for Italians’ place in America.178
Italian Americans benefitted from the friendly relationship between the United
States and Italy before the Second World War. Unlike other ethnicities that had to shield
themselves from association with their home nations because of the First World War or the
rise of communism, those of Italian origin pointed to Italy as an American ally. The fact
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that Americans and Italians fought the First World War against the same enemies meant
that the conflict’s commemoration became a celebration of American and Italian
patriotism, reinforcing Italian-American nationalism. Italian commander-in-chief General
Armando Diaz’s 1921 tour of the United States offers a good example. As the Cleveland
Plain Dealer wrote, “not only the 50,000 residents of Cleveland who are of Italian birth or
ancestry, but the entire city will honor one of the most striking figures of the World War.” 179
Diaz’s visit to the city was significant because the US 332nd infantry regiment, which
served on the Italian front during the war, consisted mainly of Ohioans. Chief Judge John
P. Dempsey of the municipal court, who served as an army captain under Diaz, was a
speaker.180 There was also no issue when Italian Commander Zopito Valentini gave a
speech at a packed Park Theater in Youngstown about the history of the First World War
and concluded with the belief that Italian Americans fit comfortably in both nations. 181 It
helped that the United States government sought favorable relations between the two
countries. The foreign policy directions of both states were primarily aligned. Even after
Fascist Italy’s aggressions in Ethiopia and Spain during the mid to late 1930s, the Roosevelt
administration continued to reach out to Benito Mussolini’s government as a possible
ally.182
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What those outside the community derided as dual patriotism, Italian Americans
embraced as entirely consistent with Americanization. Those interviewed years later
remembered the pride that their fathers had for both the United States and Italy. 183 Hiram
House worker George Bauer remarked that the Italian ethnic clubs proudly displayed both
flags during the interwar period. Their approach stood in stark contrast to a communist
meeting that he witnessed during the 1930s in which participants stood under a solitary,
giant Soviet banner.184 When these societies hosted events, they included both countries’
national songs, the “Italian Royal March,” “Giovinezza,” and the American national
anthem.185 A 1920 Columbia records advertisement showed a clear sign of this patriotic
merger when it offered renditions of “America (My Country, ‘Tis of Thee)” and the “StarSpangled Banner” in Italian.186 If Italian Americans viewed Italy as the motherland, they
interpreted the United States as an adoptive fatherland. Love for both parents was not
mutually exclusive, and a passion for their European homeland never undermined their
newly learned civic values as they became adopted offspring of the United States. This
worldview served to reinforce their identity as Italian Americans, but it also laid a
foundation for acceptance of Italian Fascist ideology, an influence detailed in chapter four.
Settlement house workers were allies to the immigrant communities, but most were
not part of them.187 The typical settlement resident was college educated and came from an
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old-stock, middle-class family. Many felt a religious calling to help the less fortunate. Most
concurrently viewed their time at the settlement as a temporary position; college students
and recent graduates gained experience and firsthand evidence for research projects before
advancing to other careers.188 In 1921, Hiram House employed ten college students to assist
Progress City. These volunteers received room and board in exchange for their work, and
they earned college credit upon completing the assignment.189 Indeed, they wanted to uplift
the individual, but in a Gospel of Wealth or progressive-style model. This meant providing
programs to strike down barriers to individual success and advancement, such as
educational opportunities and alternatives to vices like drinking. The goal was to have
immigrants and their children function within society’s parameters, not to offer
fundamental changes to America’s economic and hierarchal status quo.
As the leader of Hiram House, George Bellamy’s beliefs loomed large over the
whole institution. By the 1920s and 1930s, after years of ingratiating himself into the
philanthropic social circle of Cleveland’s elite business class that funded his project and
salary, Bellamy was more conservative than when he founded Hiram House in 1896. 190
Certainly, the settlement remained committed to a progressive idea of fairness, such as
striking down prejudicial barriers against minority groups. In conjunction with a 1935
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People anti-lynching meeting
featuring the organization’s secretary, Walter White, and the bishop of the Catholic
Diocese of Cleveland, Joseph Schrembs, the Cleveland Settlement Union voted to lobby
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Congress. The association asked member organizations, including Hiram House and Alta
House, to write to local congressmen to support anti-lynching legislation, which Hiram
House did a few days after the event.191 However, Bellamy and his settlement house were
less open to challenging the economic order, a political issue that resonated with
immigrants and their children who were overwhelmingly working class. Even before the
Great Depression, Bellamy was skeptical of collectivist change. After one 1924 talk, an
attendee wrote to Bellamy in support of the Hiram House leader’s position: “I was
particularly well pleased to learn that individual rather than the mass effort was your
objective, and that your belief is that this is an individualistic world rather than a mass
world.” The political implication was clear to the listener, and he continued his remarks by
discussing the “close connection between the ideas of one God and an individualistic
society” as the antithesis of communist Russia.192
Changes driven by the Great Depression and the New Deal crystalized Bellamy’s
views and Hiram House’s aversion to collective political action. In an August 1932 report,
a Hiram House committee noted that Clevelanders needed jobs, and employment would
have solved many problems. However, the report also recommended an individualistic
approach, concluding that Hiram House “must not create dependent people, feeling that
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the world owes them a living.”193 Since the New Deal relied on collective responses and
government intervention to solve problems, Bellamy and Hiram House viewed Franklin
Roosevelt’s reforms as a clear threat. Bellamy hated the National Recovery Administration
(NRA) and asserted that its codes “may retard progress for a generation.”194 When
Congress sought to regulate public utilities for the common good, Hiram House dispatched
disapproval letters arguing that the proposed Wheeler-Rayburn Bill sought to punish honest
businessmen and investors.195 The Federal Power Commission responded with
reassurances that the proposed law would not harm average investors. The reorganization
of utility holding companies would help most shareholders because regulation would
prohibit granting large bonuses and salaries to the corporations’ officers. These savings
would be added to the companies’ legitimate profits, thereby increasing the payout to
investors. The explanation did not sit well with Bellamy, or whoever received the Federal
Power Commission’s response, because scribbled on the back of the letter is a tirade about
the loss of constitutional rights and the new “socialistic communistic” leanings of the
governmental agencies.196
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In this atmosphere of extreme contempt, the Hiram House Christmas play of 1935,
a scathing satire of New Deal ideas and programs, becomes comprehensible. At the annual
Hiram House staff Christmas parties, workers performed amateur plays for Bellamy and
other attendees. The composition of the performances was nominally up to the staff.
George Bauer often wrote the script, and the actors practiced at his residence; however,
Bellamy still retained some control over the content. For example, during one skit, Frank
Casper played a Hawaiian dressed in a grass skirt. Unable to locate a large enough costume
during their rehearsals, the actors instead dressed Casper in a bedsheet that ended up
looking like a diaper. When notified of this, Bellamy intervened and proclaimed that he
would not allow any such indecency to occur at a play attended by guests that included his
teenage daughter. However, Bellamy’s notions of indecency were selective. Although
Bauer clearly remembered this incident of disapproval – which he claimed was the only
time they pushed Bellamy too far – decades later, the absence of the 1935 play from
Bauer’s memory meant that Bellamy and others had no qualms with the political satire, no
matter how morbid it became at times.197
Titled “’Friendly Townsend Tunes’ or Check and Double Check” with music by
“Iva Grievance” and lyrics by “Heeza Grafter,” the 1935 Hiram House Christmas play –
billed as an operetta – mocked and ridiculed the Townsend Plan for old-age pensions,
politician Huey Long, and perceived socialist influences in the United States. The prologue
introduced the audience to “Iban A. Washoutsky,” a character exiled from Russia that rose
to the United States presidency.198 Washoutsky adopted Townsend’s idea to send two-
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hundred-dollar checks to citizens, as he sang: “This is where our tax bill goes / Buy your
baby some needed shoes / Spend it if you like on booze / … Life’s just one check after
another.”199 In an apparent reference to Franklin Roosevelt, the second scene included a
parody of his 1932 election song, “Happy Days Are Here Again”: “Townsend brought our
checks again / And sorrow ne’er will vex again / Just spend your dough and you will know
/ Happy Days are here again.”200 By contrast, the taxpayer was overbilled, overworked, and
broke in lyrics set to the tune “How Dry I Am.” Continuing a critique of old-age pensions,
“Friendly Townsend Tunes” explained via song how the Townsendites admitted that they
were wrong. They no longer celebrated their two-hundred-dollar pensions because
inflation crippled their ability to enjoy the good life on the taxpayer’s dime.201
The second half of the play took place in hell, a strange choice for an audience of
settlement house workers whose mission was helping to redeem the less fortunate. The act
opened with the Townsendites singing, “Hell, Hell, the gang’s all here! / … To the Devil
we have gone!!,” after which the Devil himself ruminated on his recent misfortune. 202 All
had been well, the Devil explained, until Huey Long arrived and usurped his realm. The
fictional Long arrived in hell and organized the imps to fight the Devil for power.203 As the
Devil lamented: “Old Huey’s robbed me of my power / … The De’il himself can not
compete / With Kingfish Huey Long!!”204 After a scene in which Long explained that he
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would reshape hell using the political machine and vote-buying methods that he learned
while alive, the play ended with the Townsendites in the underworld offering a warning
that their program would only create theft and graft, deprive the elderly of respect, and
burden the honest taxpayer.205 These scenes were remarkable, and quite disrespectful, as
political satire because an assassin had killed the real Senator Huey Long of Louisiana only
a few months prior. A parody of “’Twas the Night Before Christmas,” written the previous
year, was gentle by comparison. The Hiram House author teased that people could remain
in the dreamland of “St. Roosevelt” and his advisors if they continued to vote for him. 206
The point that Bellamy and the settlement workers, who were concerned with issues of
vice, morality, and behavior in the surrounding neighborhood, had no objections to casting
left-wing leaders and supporters into hell illustrates the general anti-New Deal sentiments
of the organization during the mid-1930s.
Many settlement house workers were vehemently against the New Deal, but not all
those engaged in Americanization efforts felt similarly. While Bellamy disapproved of the
NRA, his subordinate Frank Casper organized a rally of six thousand Clevelanders to
support the program.207 These people had different life experiences and social networks
that brought them to interpret political developments differently. Casper was not a typical
settlement house worker of white Protestant, middle-class origin. He was an Italian
American, sharing the same background as those he served. Born Francesco Gasbarra in
Ferentino, a town southeast of Rome, in 1883, Casper studied for the Catholic priesthood
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but fled Italy as a young man to avoid conscription since he did not believe in violence. He
arrived in the United States in 1907 and gained citizenship in 1921. He worked as a
machine operator for a steel company in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1918. After having lived
at some point in Michigan and New York in addition to Pennsylvania, Casper became
Hiram House’s director of adult programming in 1923.208 Since he knew multiple
languages and dialects, as well as various European customs and cultures, the immigrants
and their children who frequented Hiram House viewed him as a fair mediator.209 Unlike
Bellamy, who, according to Bauer, had “the haughty attitude of the English landlord” and
never would have connected with people on a personal level,210 Casper was well-liked and
trusted by the community, and “his tiny office was busier than a priest’s or clergyman’s
office” as individuals sought help and advice.211 He seldom attended staff meetings and ran
night and weekend programming for adults, times when Bellamy was usually at his home
in neighboring Chagrin Falls, so the Hiram House director “didn’t know what the hell was
going on in Franky’s Dept.”212 Casper operated as a supervisor to many self-led groups,

Bauer to Grabowski, “Hiram House,” 26 February 1976, 3–4; “Francesco Gasbarra,
Serial Number 2135, Order Number A504” (draft registration card, Local Draft Board for
Division No. 1, City of Chester, PA, 12 September 1918), ancestrylibrary.com;
“Francesco Gasbarra, Certificate 510328,” in United States Passport Applications, 1795–
1925, NARA, roll 2703, Washington, DC: National Archives and Records
Administration (United States District Court, Cleveland, OH, 1925),
https://www.ancestrylibrary.com; “Francesco Gasbarra, Serial Number U 1469” (draft
registration card, Local Draft Board No. 9, Cuyahoga County, OH, 27 April 1942),
ancestrylibrary.com; “News of the Day as Told by the Camera: Frank Casper,” Cleveland
Plain Dealer, 27 April 1923, 9.
209
Bauer to Grabowski, “Hiram House,” 26 February 1976, 4–5.
210
Bauer to Grabowski, 5.
211
George P. Bauer to John J. Grabowski, “Western Reserve Hist. Soc., Att: John J.
Grabowski,” letter, 8 February 1976, 2, George P. Bauer Correspondence, MS 4325,
Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.
212
Bauer to Grabowski, “Hiram House,” 26 February 1976, 23.
208

152

such as Russo’s Band or various ethnic societies and organizations.213 Frank Casper was
the most vital point of contact for many Italian immigrants who used the settlement house.
Casper operated as an ideological buffer between more conservative elements
within the settlement house and the Italian-American community. He supported
Americanization; Bauer noted the pride they both felt at annual naturalization ceremonies,
which almost brought Casper to tears.214 Bauer adamantly believed that his coworker “was
the most skilled citizen maker of Cleveland,” and Casper worked tirelessly to help
immigrants become Americans.215 However, while Hiram House workers agreed about
civic nationalism and Americanization, the Italian’s political views differed from the
consensus even before the NRA. In June 1928, an unidentified group penned a farewell
song for Casper and his wife’s pending trip to Italy that showed the ideological divisions
that existed under the settlement house’s surface. At one point, the lyrics highlighted
Casper’s affiliation: “But what on earth will Al Smith do / For votes while you’re away /
Our talks on Hoover we expect / The residents to sway.”216 Although written lightheartedly,
the song raised the issue that Casper was the lone voice that spoke in support of Democrat
Al Smith in the upcoming presidential election, while the rest of the Hiram House staff
steered attendees toward a favorable view of the Republican Herbert Hoover. Frank Casper
served as a broker for Italian Americans; he impressed native-born desires for
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Americanization, but he was also part of the Italian-American community and drew some
political ideology from the group’s public sphere.
Similar mediators existed within other Americanizing entities, such as in the
YWCA’s International Institute. Clara Grillo (née Corica), the daughter of an illiterate
immigrant gardener, earned a bachelor’s degree in education from Ohio State University
before returning to Cleveland to serve as a nationality secretary for the city’s organization
in 1926. Grillo worked at Hiram House and Friendly Inn (another settlement in Cleveland’s
Big Italy), teaching English and assisting in citizenship efforts. She also organized dances
for older Italians at Alta House and youth clubs sponsored by the YWCA for ItalianAmerican girls. According to her recollection, she was the point of contact for one hundred
agencies when they needed an Italian-American interpreter.217 In Pittsburgh, this broker
figure included Maria Chianelli, Aidee Lisotto, and Rena MiConi at various times.218 Other
cities and towns also employed similar mediators. The International Institute established
an office in New Castle, Pennsylvania, in 1923 and employed Polish and Italian secretaries,
including Antoinette Barbanti, who served from January 1925 until 1930 when she returned
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to her hometown of Boston.219 Her replacement, Espedita Marie Abruzzini, was educated
in Italy and came to New Castle from Akron, Ohio, and remained until December 1932. 220
Akron’s International Institute had Josephine Cataldi Emley, a graduate of the Collegio del
Sacro Cuore in Florence, Italy.221 Frank Casper was not alone; numerous cities throughout
the region employed Italian Americans to assist in Americanization. Cultural pluralism and
the availability of ethnic mediators ensured that Americanization did not require the
shedding of an Italian-American identity.

Conclusion
Italian immigrants arrived in the United States lacking a solid background in civic
engagement. Their history reinforced a general distrust of government. However,
developments in the United States pressured them toward naturalization and a
reinterpretation of the role of government in their lives. They sought citizenship as a
protection against perceived discrimination, and in the process, they came to adopt civic
nationalism. Through the help of Americanization agents, such as settlement houses, Italian
Americans accepted their new place in the body politic. They professed their rights and
duties: freedom of speech and ideas, equality under the law, participation in elections. Yet,
civic nationalism never meant a repudiation of ethnic identity. They approached partisan
politics not as fully assimilated Americans but as Italian Americans whose public sphere
influenced their opinions about contemporary issues. As shown in the following chapters,
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they absorbed additional ideological influences that shaped their outlook before the New
Deal.
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Chapter Three
Sacco and Vanzetti, Causes Célèbres
The Penetration of Leftist Ideology
On 31 July 1927, supporters of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti met in
Lyceum Hall, Kingsley House, a social settlement which stood on the corner of Auburn
Street and Larimer Avenue at the heart of an Italian-American enclave in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, to hear speeches in support of the two convicted men destined for execution.1
Their case had shocked and animated the Italian-American community for the better part
of a decade. On 5 May 1920, authorities had arrested Sacco and Vanzetti in connection
with the robbery and murder of a company paymaster and his guard in South Braintree,
Massachusetts, the previous month. Both were working-class Italian immigrants. Sacco
labored in a shoe factory, while Vanzetti was a fish peddler. They were, however,
anarchists who socialized in political circles of like-minded individuals and had fled to
Mexico during the First World War in hopes of joining a revolution in Italy that they
anticipated erupting after the conflict. They returned to the United States disappointed, but
neither man had a criminal record when authorities arrested them.2
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The evidence of their involvement was unclear. Police initially picked up Sacco
and Vanzetti, who were armed when arrested, as part of a trap set for another radical, Mario
Buda. The pair subsequently lied when questioned; police told neither man about the
murder and robbery charges, and both assumed that authorities wanted admissions about
their political beliefs as evidence for prosecution and deportation of themselves and their
compatriots. Evidence was primarily circumstantial. The prosecution asserted that a cap
found at the scene belonged to Sacco and that his gun was the murder weapon. However,
the police failed to recover the stolen money, and Sacco and Vanzetti offered alibis. Rather
than address these reasonable doubts, the prosecution played upon prejudices against the
two men, which Judge Webster Thayer, who was himself biased against anarchists and
other radicals, happily allowed. To many observers, the guilty verdict appeared predicated
on the men’s foreign and anarchist backgrounds rather than a confirmation of their
involvement in the crime. Later evidence seemed to confirm this. Thayer rejected seven
appeals, including the last in 1926, which sought to enter as evidence testimony from a
prisoner who confessed to being involved in the murder. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
refused two appeals. When executed by the electric chair on 23 August 1927, the two men
became a representation of the failures of justice and equality under the law.3
The question of whether the pair were truly guilty of murder is inconsequential
compared to their symbolism as wronged working-class immigrants. As historian Paul
Avrich concluded, “the case against them remains unproved. Nor, on the other hand, can
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their innocence be established beyond any shadow of doubt.”4 Instead, the pair became
causes célèbres because they personified the effects of ethnic and class prejudices in the
eyes of subaltern peoples in the United States and around the world.5 To Italian Americans,
there was nothing inconsistent about using space provided by Kingsley House, an
Americanizing entity, to rally in support of two political radicals. One could still be a good
American citizen and support Sacco and Vanzetti because their conviction conflicted with
American values of freedom of expression and equality regardless of a person’s
background, class status, or personal beliefs.
The previous chapter documented how Italian Americans came to adopt civic
nationalism. Spurred by perceived discrimination and a rise in nativism, the community
increasingly naturalized and expressed their rights as American citizens to secure a place
in the body politic. However, as Italian Americans’ belief in civic participation deepened,
they simultaneously absorbed ideology from the political left. They felt no inconsistency
because they defined Americanism by its democratic norms and values rather than an
economic philosophy.
The Red Scare threatened to end the spread of ideas from the political left. Radical
ideology had circulated in the United States before the First World War, but the 1917
communist Bolshevik Revolution in Russia prompted a massive reactionary movement
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against “red” ideology. Fear of a potential revolution in America caused the government
and its attendant apparatuses to target all forms of leftist ideology – communism, socialism,
anarchism, syndicalism – by surveilling, jailing, and deporting leaders and adherents. The
Red Scare arrested the spread of the most radical and potentially revolutionary groups, such
as the Galleanists, the followers of Luigi Galleani, who advocated bombings and other
methods of violent insurrection. However, repression of these movements failed to
eliminate the conditions they sought to address, such as working-class grievances against
perceived American exploiters. A receptive audience still existed, and dissemination of
ideas occurred under an altered form during the 1920s.
The murder trial and conviction of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti provided
a cover under which certain leftists kept ideology circulating after the Red Scare shifted
the national political environment toward the right during the 1920s. The pair were political
radicals, but they also suffered from the prejudice that many old-stock, white Americans
cast upon working-class immigrants. In a nation that theoretically promised political
freedom and equality under the law for all people, Sacco and Vanzetti became archetypes
for the unfair treatment that Italian Americans experienced in their own lives. Leftists
harnessed this rage to reach a receptive audience. Noted radical Carlo Tresca, his associate
Luigi Quintiliano, and others used the Sacco and Vanzetti case to arrange talks and lectures
throughout western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. By advertising fundraisers in support
of the two condemned men, Tresca and other leftists drew crowds for proselytization.
Italian Americans who might have rejected leftist political events out of fear of retaliation
by employers or the police instead justified their attendance as supporting two condemned
men wronged by the legal system.
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Sacco and Vanzetti offered leftists the opportunity to discuss the issues innately
tied to the legal case and most Italian Americans’ personal lives. In halls, theaters, and
homes throughout the region, meetings supporting the condemned men segued into related
themes. First, the events reinforced the need to uphold American civic ideals. They
highlighted the discrepancy between stated American principles and reality; American
society prided itself on supporting free speech and equality while the government targeted
and punished nonconformists. Second, these leftists disseminated economic arguments
related to workers’ rights. The ability to unionize was supreme, but they confirmed many
grievances held by workers. They reiterated opinions about a moral economy, one in which
workers received fair wages, acceptable hours, and safe conditions. The meetings
reinforced civic nationalism while merging leftist economic ideas into the Italian-American
public sphere.
Few Italian Americans became fanatical, subversive leftists. They agreed with
many issues espoused by the speakers, and they desired an economy that served working
people. However, they would not defend violent revolution. While some radicals desired
to tear down the government to accomplish their goals, most Italian Americans were not
dismissive of the state. They had been, and were still being, conditioned by American
civics, and they were cautiously optimistic about the potential value of gaining the state as
an ally. The rise of Fascism in Italy further arrested any actual radicalization. If new civic
ideals cautioned Italian Americans from turning away from government, then Fascism
showed the potential power that the state could provide concerning a change in people’s
lives. As individuals searched for a way to turn ideological beliefs into political action,
Fascism appeared to offer real-world successes that helped regular people.
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Remembrance and Radicalism
The proliferation of leftist radicalism into ethnic communities was a forgotten
chapter in the Italian-American experience. As historians Philip V. Cannistraro and Gerald
Meyer noted, “few [Italian Americans] have ventured to remember or ask about that part
of their history that deviated from the norms of the dominant society.”6 An apt example
was the story of Cammella Teoli’s testimony to Congress during the 1912 Bread and Roses
strike, a protest of predominantly female, white-ethnic textile workers in Lawrence,
Massachusetts. Speaking about poor labor conditions in the factories, the teenage Teoli
described being scalped by a machine and her months-long recuperation. Newspapers
across the United States carried Teoli’s story, and her narrative helped prompt a federal
investigation into the industry. Her daughter learned about the testimony only years after
Cammella Teoli’s death. The unwillingness of participants to pass such stories to the next
generation created a historical gap.7 Police raids against radical clubs and organizations
contributed to historical amnesia since they often meant the destruction of texts –
newspapers, pamphlets, handbills, internal records – on which historians rely.8 Since early
sociological research described Italian immigrants and their children as conservative,
family-oriented, inward-looking people prone to regionalism, there was little reason to
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search for popular radicalism since it was assumed not to have existed or was negligible in
size.9 Some approaches have perpetuated the narrow historiographical scope. During the
1920s, many leftist leaders and organizations became consumed in the fight against
Fascism. This gave the impression that leftist radicalism was the antithesis of other politics
rather than its own inquiry area.10
More recent histories have shown that Italian-American radicalism existed across
the United States, and it had numerous networks of advocates. Paul Avrich’s Anarchist
Voices highlighted those who worked on a local level, such as Guy Liberti, a committed
Galleanist who operated in Cleveland from the 1910s until the 1930s.11 Gary Mormino and
George Pozzetta noted that leftism existed outside the metropolises, such as in Ybor City,
Florida, where “radicals formed debating clubs and political groups, published newspapers,
participated in strikes, led unions, and in many other ways attempted to spread their
message.”12 According to Jennifer Guglielmo, Italian-American women in the New York
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organizationalists, those who rejected the individualist, violent approach of the Galleanists
and advocated for organized responses such as general strikes and industrial unionism.
They entered the unionization movement during the 1910s and eventually formed their
own sections, such as the Italian Dressmakers Local 89, by the end of the decade. The
previous belief that these women were apolitical was due to invisibility rather than apathy.
Italian Americans operated independent organizations because they distrusted mainstream
unions and had difficulty uniting with other ethnic groups who spoke their own languages,
such as Jewish Americans. This separateness caused the group to be less noticed and
documented.13 As Marcella Bencivenni argued, culture, rather than class alone, formed the
foundation for radicalism. The sovversivi (subversives, or Italian-American radicals)
operated as examples of Antonio Gramsci’s “organic” intellectuals to disseminate ideas
into Little Italies. People imbibed political ideology through clubs, the radical press,
lectures, and artistic expressions, including theater and literature.14 In Transnational
Radicals, Travis Tomchuk furthered the argument that historians need to view leftism as a
mass phenomenon. He asserted that a vast network of personal contacts and publications
sustained radical communities across national boundaries.15 The historiographical trend
has been to recognize anarchism, syndicalism, and their variants as pervasive and
influential ideological currents within Italian-American communities.
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This chapter builds from this approach and shows how the widespread diffusion of
leftism during the 1920s offered another influence, after civic nationalism, that informed
regular people’s politics. Most Italian Americans never became devoted adherents to
radical ideology. They did not attend weekly meetings, nor did they own home libraries
stocked with writings by theorists such as Karl Marx, Errico Malatesta, or Mikhail
Bakunin. However, rudimentary philosophy crept into the community through local talks
by radicals and other events. The majority of Italian Americans never learned the
theoretical approaches to anarchism or socialism; instead, they took away general concepts
and ideas related to working-class rights and unionization. Since they were not ideologues,
their nondogmatic approach to economic and social issues allowed them to be ideologically
flexible, an essential trait once Fascism entered the community and offered a competing
vision.

The Spreading of Ideology
There is some historiographical disagreement concerning Italian emigrants’
ideological background before they arrived in the United States, but the consensus is that
ideologues fought for converts within the new American environment.16 Italian anarchist
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165

groups first appeared in the United States during the 1880s and spread to most major
immigration centers by the end of the century. The arrival of various anarchist lecturers
and writers aided the proliferation. Some, such as Francesco Saverio Merlino, Errico
Malatesta, and Pietro Gori, stayed only briefly during the 1890s and early 1900s before
returning to Europe. Gori, in particular, had been a vital preacher for anarchist ideology as
he traveled from coast to coast, holding, at his height, more than two hundred meetings per
year.17
By the 1910s, Luigi Galleani was the preeminent Italian anarchist in the United
States. While a student at the University of Turin, Galleani became a committed anarchist
and militant anti-capitalist. His radicalism earned him exile from France and Switzerland
and a prison sentence in Italy, which he escaped after serving five years and eventually
found his way to the United States in 1901. His oratory skills and newspaper, Cronaca
Sovversiva (Subversive Chronicle), gained him devotees. Galleani’s ideology, a type of
communist anarchism, rejected both the state and private property. He preached the
importance of action as a catalyst to a revolution, and he justified the use of violence,
including bombings and assassinations, in overthrowing government and capitalism.18
His followers, the Galleanists, turned his ideas into reality. They escalated the Red
Scare with a wave of bombings, including most famously against Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer’s Washington, DC residence in June 1919 and later the New York City
Wall Street Bombing, which killed over thirty people, in September 1920 as retaliation for
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Sacco and Vanzetti’s arrest. Galleanists also existed beyond the east coast. In Pittsburgh,
they bombed the homes of United States District Court Judge W. H. S. Thompson and
Bureau of Immigration Inspector W. W. Sibray, both of whom worked legal cases against
radicals. Cleveland Mayor Harry L. Davis became a target for his role in suppressing
radicalism, including the city’s May Day celebration of 1919. The explosions killed no
one, but the homes of all three men suffered damage. The Galleanists predominantly
clustered in a few centers of radicalism, such as Paterson, New Jersey, and Barre, Vermont,
the publishing site of Cronaca Sovversiva. However, associated cells existed throughout
the United States, including in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.19
Radicals formed circoli di studi sociali (discussion groups, literally circles of social
studies) to learn anarchist doctrine, reinforce and widen networks of supporters, and debate
ideology. To Americans outside of the circoli, these groups appeared subversive,
threatening, and dangerous. Philip M. Rose, a pastor at an Italian Congregational church in
Hartford, Connecticut, described his experience with a local circolo consisting of “young
men of which represented a number of brands of socialism, anarchism, and atheism.” Rose
dismissed the group and concluded that “the noticeable thing about them was the
defectiveness of their logic, the violence of their prejudice, and the onesidedness of their
reading.”20 Historians have treated these groups more objectively. According to Mormino
and Pozzetta, organized circoli, alongside debating clubs and speaking societies, offered
radicals in and around Ybor City, Florida, a sense of community with other like-minded
people. Organizations provided education. As one member claimed after arriving in 1902,
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he passed his time at the club “read[ing] pamphlets, newspapers, books, and all kinds of
sociological literature” and occasionally attending lectures and debates.21 If Cronaca
Sovversiva’s book list offers insight into a typical circoli di studi sociali library, Rose was
correct in asserting a “onesidedness” of their readings. However, the focus on leftist
political ideology certainly did not undermine the breadth of their ideological acquisitions.
Book offerings from 1915, for example, included not only Galleani’s pamphlet “La Salute
è in Voi!” (“The Health is in You!”), a bomb-making guide that contributed to the wave of
anarchist terror that later occurred, but also standard leftist texts still studied by scholars
today, such as Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto and works by Peter Kropotkin. Other
selections included Malatesta and Gori’s writings and publications by leading theorists in
various European states, such as Spaniard Francisco Ferrer and Georgian-Russian
Warlaam Tcherkesoff.22
Similar clubs with the same purpose existed in various Italian-American
communities throughout western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. For example,
Cleveland’s Little Italy hosted a group in 1910 that met at 1981 or 1983 Coltman Road, a
few lots down from Holy Rosary Church, the settlement’s primary religious institution.
The circolo advertised itself as having a library for use by members and lessons on
Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 7:30 to 9:30 in the evening.23 This initial
schedule may have been too rigorous because, in 1911, the group’s contact, F. G.
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Trivisonno, welcomed readers of Cronaca Sovversiva to attend the radicals’ weekly
meetings every Thursday evening.24 Cleveland also hosted a group named after Pietro Gori,
and its contact, Arturo Caruso, lived in the Big Italy enclave at 2483 East Ninth Street, not
too far from Hiram House.25 Pittsburgh had two organizations, Gruppo SocialistaAnarchico 29 Luglio di Pittsburgh and Gruppo Socialista-Anarchico di Bloomfield, that
met and discussed a merger with regular meetings to be held on the first and third Sundays
of the month at three o’clock in the afternoon.26 Other clusters existed in the area around
Pittsburgh, such as in Monongahela and Fredericktown, and in Ohio, especially in towns
and cities along the Ohio River, like Steubenville and Bellaire, and in the adjacent mining
communities, such as Glencoe and Dillonvale.27
Like the Tampa circles described by Mormino and Pozzetta, the circoli di studi
sociali in Pennsylvania and Ohio tried to spread their influence and stay connected to other
organizations by offering events meant to draw in allies from nearby communities and
perhaps convert new adherents to anarchist philosophy. Luigi Galleani spoke in
Cleveland’s Little Italy in November 1910. His stay involved two events, one talk
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presented at the circolo named earlier and a second appearance at Garibaldi Hall.28 The
location was important. Garibaldi Hall was a neighborhood institution promoted and
partially financed by local prominente (Italian-American community leader) Joseph
Carabelli, founder of the Lakeview Granite & Monumental Works and Cleveland’s first
Italian mutual aid society. He was involved in the campaign to fund Alta House and served
as a Republican in the Ohio House of Representatives.29 Carabelli and others envisioned
Garibaldi Hall as a multipurpose community site complete with a theater designed for five
hundred patrons and rooms for business and social gatherings. The February 1907 opening
ceremony included a speech by Cleveland Mayor Tom L. Johnson.30
Galleani’s appearance at the location speaks to the Italian-American community’s
tolerance for various political ideologies. The anarchist radical’s presence was not a oneoff mistake and oversight by the hall booking agent. Edmondo Rossoni, a revolutionarysyndicalist leader who later merged his trade unionist movement into Benito Mussolini’s
Fascism after 1921, spoke there in 1911.31 The following year, the hall hosted a talk on the
theme “who we are and what we want” by Umberto Postiglione, a young anarchist who
became a contributor to Galleani’s Cronaca Sovversiva in 1912 until he, like many radicals,
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fled the United States for South America during the First World War.32 Although large
cities regularly drew noted speakers, the diffusion of ideology reached smaller towns
throughout the region through a web of contacts. For example, Calogero Speziale, a
member of the Cleveland Little Italy circolo who published the radical newspaper
L’Appello (The Appeal) with U. Balzano, advertised a speaking tour for eastern Ohio in
1916 in support of striking Minnesota workers.33
The problem for the Galleani-inspired sovversivi was that they were unable to reach
most of the workers. The anarchists distrusted large, formal organizations by temperament,
so they typically operated as close-knit clubs with few members.34 The prohibitive
frequency at which some circoli di studi sociali met, such as the Cleveland Little Italy
circolo’s thrice-weekly gatherings, attests to the exhausting and unrealistic scheduling
maintained by some of the most committed anarchists. Members noted the lukewarm
reception they received within the wider Italian-American community. In 1911, F. G.
Trivisonno of the Cleveland group remarked that “it is very discouraging to notice that in
this city and [its] surroundings there are many sovversivi,” but these Italian Americans
lived “isolatedly[,] and therefore their energy goes uselessly wasted.” The radical asserted
that many in the area shared the same concerns, but because they were prone to pettiness,
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most chose to remain idle and uninvolved, so their exploitation continued.35 A conversation
between two men that supposedly occurred in Dillonvale, Ohio, reinforced this idea. One
man from the country, likely a mine worker, given the episode’s location, entered the town
of Dillonvale to find some newspapers when he met an acquaintance. Their conversation
turned to the local circolo di studi sociali, and the visitor confirmed his reasoning for not
joining. He noted that some sought to pick fights with others, and there was a lack of
toleration that resembled the exploitation that workers experienced under their bosses. The
acquaintance assured the man that things had changed over the past few years and offered
him the next group meeting time.36 The visitor was not antagonistic to leftist ideology, but
he found some members’ views restricting. The Galleanists made a few converts before
the 1920s, but their emphasis on doctrine failed to motivate regular people who agreed
about the problems but lacked time to attend weekly meetings and felt uncomfortable with
the rigidity of beliefs.
Furthermore, while Trivisonno may have been correct that many sympathized with
the anarchists, most people did not want to be officially involved with these groups because
local authorities and the United States government targeted them. In October 1910, radicals
met at Union Temple in Pittsburgh to commemorate anarchist Francisco Ferrer, whom the
Spanish had executed the previous year.37 Known for his Escuela Moderna (Modern
School) movement, Ferrer was a freethinker who believed in separating religious doctrine
and political influence from education. His beliefs and popularity made him a target for the
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Spanish authorities. They branded him the orchestrator of the Spanish popular uprising
known as Tragic Week in 1909, which led to his arrest. The mock trial, lack of evidence
by the state, and Ferrer’s execution by firing squad made him a martyr to others around the
world.38 D. Nucera Abenavoli praised the Pittsburgh meeting because it enticed
wageworkers, intellectuals, and miners from the surrounding area to hear speeches by
radicals Carlo Tresca and Arturo Giovannitti. Numbers and enthusiasm were large enough
to scare away possible police harassment, and the writer celebrated that “not even the
shadow of a club” was visible during the daylong event.39 However, fears of such
harassment frightened possible allies and kept the less committed from attending similar
events.
The uncompromising positions of the more radical sovversivi, who took Galleani’s
recommendation of violence to heart, did not help the cause. Returning to the unnamed
visitor to Dillonvale described previously, his conversation about intolerance might have
been an allusion to Emilio Coda, a coal miner and extremist from the area. The year after
the visitor’s purported comments, police arrested Coda for causing a riot. When a company
store and two coal tipples burned during a strike, accusations immediately fell on the
radical. Although Coda’s connections to Galleani brought the latter to Dillonvale in
November 1916, many, such as the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) leadership
that Coda physically threatened, were pleased when he fled to Mexico the following year.40
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While Coda was one of the prominent figures that fled the United States during the
crackdown on suspected subversives that escalated during the First World War, the federal
government targeted the circoli and networks of associates across the country. In a prelude
to the Red Scare, federal agents arrested one hundred Pacific Northwest Italian Americans
in November 1917 who were part of “un Circolo di Studi sociali” and linked to Cronaca
Sovversiva, a clear message to radicals across the United States that persecution would go
beyond the movement’s national leadership.41 Federal agents went to great lengths to find
Galleanists. Carlo Valdinoci, a publisher of Cronaca Sovversiva that later became
infamous for blowing himself up during the bombing of A. Mitchell Palmer’s home in
1919, was a target since 1917. When the Bureau of Investigation discovered in early 1918
that he lived at one point in Youngstown, the Cleveland office sent agent Rayme W. Finch
to find him. The hunt took Finch through Youngstown to Steubenville, Dillonvale, and the
surrounding mining communities. Valdinoci failed to surface, but home searches and
questioning discovered other associates for arrest, including Emilio Coda, who had
returned to the area.42 For many Italian Americans, the risks of being associated with the
Galleanists were too significant.
Rival ideological movements also failed once First World War nationalism and the
subsequent Red Scare painted all radical groups as un-American. The Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW), founded in 1905 as a revolutionary-syndicalist organization, made
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numerous attempts during the same period to recruit and organize Italian Americans.43
These included textile workers in the aforementioned Bread and Roses strike in Lawrence,
Massachusetts, those employed in the canneries and bakeries around the San Francisco
Bay, and silk industry laborers in Paterson, New Jersey.44 General IWW activities also
occurred in this project’s area of investigation. In eastern Ohio, local groups existed in
Canton, Cleveland, Conneaut, Elyria, Glencoe, Lorain, Massillon, Martins Ferry, Niles,
and Youngstown by 1912. Organizers from Cleveland and elsewhere aided a notable but
ultimately failed strike in the Akron rubber industry in 1913.45 The IWW was also involved
in organizing steel mills in Youngstown and Campbell (then East Youngstown), the latter
of which experienced a significant strike in 1916.46 Although the extent of ItalianAmerican involvement in local IWW activity is unclear because of mixed membership,
evidence suggests that areas with prominent ethnic communities had some contact with, or
at least knowledge of, the Industrial Workers of the World and its brand of syndicalism. In
the coal mines around Bellaire, Ohio, Italian-American laborers broke from the United
Mine Workers during a strike to ally with the IWW. Prominent IWW leader Joseph J. Ettor,
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an Italian American, arrived in early 1915 to assist the effort.47 Revolutionary syndicalism
was a strong competitor for the Galleanists as both sought to influence the same workers.
Nevertheless, the Industrial Workers of the World also failed. High turnover
hampered the organization, and the leadership split over supporting or condemning
American involvement in the First World War. A public belief that the group sought to
undermine American war efforts prompted a massive raid on forty-eight IWW halls in
September 1917, and the subsequent indictment of one hundred and one leaders crippled
the movement.48 The American Protection League, a citizens’ group that solicited
information about un-American activities to pass to government authorities, made 1,529
investigations in Cleveland and 183 in Youngstown related to the IWW and radical
activities.49
The campaign of intimidation worked and left a lasting impression. During an
interview conducted with Bert Iacobucci concerning conditions in Aliquippa,
Pennsylvania, sixty years after the events, he described the repression campaign that
peaked in 1919–1920 as those caught with radical literature were fired or forced to leave.
In one instance, a suspected Bolshevik and his family disappeared after being picked up by
authorities. There was no distinction made between radicals. During Iacobucci’s statement,
the interviewer asked explicitly whether those targeted were anarchists, socialists, or
communists, but Bert Iacobucci never offered a clear division.50 Like most who lived
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through the Red Scare, he conflated all forms of the extreme left into one creature targeted
by the state. By 1920, leftists of any stripe were on the defensive.

Sacco and Vanzetti
The campaign to free Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti is the key to
understanding how leftist political ideology continued to flow from the ideologues to the
masses after the Red Scare. As Moshik Temkin argued, Sacco and Vanzetti’s historical
importance derives from the episode’s “dramatic transformation from criminal case to
public affair.”51 The controversy caught the public’s attention, and leftists used the pair to
reach an audience. As the Red Scare deepened, the question remained if any leftists could
survive the onslaught. The Galleanists were easy targets for being too revolutionary,
violent, and single-minded, and the state’s anti-radical dragnet trapped other extreme left
movements with them. The campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti offered a veil under which
leftist intellectuals and organizers entered local Italian-American communities in an
unthreatening manner. Abstract ideas about anarchism and syndicalism gave way to
assertions of American rights and values: a fair trial, innocence until conviction, the burden
of evidence on the state, and equality under the law regardless of class or national origin.
Regular people justified supporting Sacco and Vanzetti not because the two were anarchists
but despite their politics. The crackdown on groups like the Galleanists and the IWW failed
to eliminate the roots of their radicalism, such as poor labor conditions and notions of
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exploitation. Sacco and Vanzetti offered men like Carlo Tresca a suitable reason to
organize talks during which speakers veered into these grievances and built a foundation
for leftist ideology regarding social and economic rights.
Sacco and Vanzetti became relatable figures in the quest to proselytize listeners.
The radical’s loner image gave way to portraying a family man as Sacco’s devoted wife
Rosina witnessed the trial while holding “a very pretty little girl” in her arms.52 The trial
projected familiar themes of discrimination faced by many immigrants on the two men.
The prosecutor badgered Sacco about whether he loved or hated America.53 Proponents
raised concerns about the state’s evidence. One witness, Carlos Goodridge, identified
Sacco as the armed man who drove past him the day of the crime. He, however, was
unreliable, and it was later revealed that he had a criminal record and was a bigamist.54 In
addition to this background, Italian Americans learned in 1922 about Goodridge’s hatred
toward certain immigrants. According to one of his wives, the man once remarked that “all
the Italians that come to America should be drowned in the harbors.”55 Vanzetti
summarized the feelings of many of his fellow ethnics when he thanked his supporters but
admitted to being pessimistic throughout the trial: “Italian and sovversivo, judged by twelve
[100 percent] American citizens.”56 The outcome was predetermined; the guilty verdict
handed down by native-born white Americans against a foreign-born worker adhering to
unorthodox political ideas had already been decided before the trial began.
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Sacco and Vanzetti became causes célèbres, not because of their political beliefs
but because they represented the consequences of discrimination experienced by many
Italian Americans. While native-born, old-stock Americans fixated on the pair’s anarchist
background, the campaign to free Sacco and Vanzetti within the Italian-American
community dealt with the notions of class and ethnic exploitation that many endured.57 As
Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano explained in the summer of 1922 concerning
the heightened feeling of prejudice in America, “the hunting of the Italian, driven by
fanaticism more than by other causes, does not show signs of ending.”58
Sacco and Vanzetti became the standard to compare regional cases of prejudicial
court decisions, including Sam Purpera’s sentencing, the murder charges against Dominick
Venturato and Dan Agosti, and acquittals in the Beaverdale, Pennsylvania, riot.59 Purpera,
a Cleveland gang member, was involved in the murder of two men during a payroll robbery
on 31 December 1920. When arrested months later in Los Angeles, California, the
seventeen-year-old suspect initially maintained his innocence before confessing to the
crime after police convinced him that they had ample evidence to charge him with
murder.60 Sentenced to death, his attorney sought an appeal arguing that Purpera was
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involved in the robbery, but others were the triggermen.61 Unfair application of justice
spurred many, including the Ohio Sons of Italy and its leader, Giovanni A. Barricelli, to
defend the youth. It was not just, in their view, that Purpera received a sentence to the
electric chair because he was a minor who was not directly responsible for the shootings.
Advocates accepted the teenager’s explanation that he had no prior knowledge that the
robbery would have ended in murder.62 Purpera’s execution remained a cited injustice two
years after the failed appeal.63
In the Venturato and Agosti trials, juries sentenced the two men to life in prison for
the murder of a mine strikebreaker during a fight in New Lafferty, Ohio. Advocates noted
that the men did not receive a fair trial and were part of a more extensive campaign against
workers and foreigners in the region. Mine owners disliked Venturato because he was
president of a UMW local. The judge and special prosecutor previously worked as lawyers
for the miners, but they had a falling-out which contributed to a grudge. The judge stacked
the jury against the defendants. After Venturato and Agosti’s convictions to life in prison,
the courts denied an appeal.64
The Beaverdale case confirmed that Italian Americans faced unfair application of
the law even when they were the harmed party. In July 1921, simmering tensions related
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to purported Black Hand (organized crime) activity by the Italian Americans erupted into
a riot when a mob of four to five thousand Americans stormed the Italian-American section
of Beaverdale, a mining community east of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The men in the
crowd, “all armed with Winchester rifles and revolvers, carrying [an] abundance of
ammunition,” rushed into the community discharging their weapons. Some Italians
returned fire with their own guns before the entire group fled to the hills, after which the
mob destroyed five Italian-American businesses. Only the intervention of the state police
prevented a massacre.65 State law enforcement, however, was unable to stop the rioters.
Locals hosted a mass meeting the following day and drew up a list of twenty-five to thirty
“undesirable Italians” for eviction.66 The state police officer at the meeting pleaded for time
and a proper investigation,67 but the response from the group’s spokesman about their
demands was not encouraging: “you policemen may stay here and protect them, but we
will get them sooner or later, perhaps tonight, even against your opposition.”68 Over four
hundred Italian Americans fled,69 some at the urging of police.70 The episode prompted
immediate denunciations from Italian Americans.71 The final verdict in the subsequent
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June 1922 trial acquitted all defendants for the crimes.72 The decision prompted further
outrage as the justice system failed to condemn a violent act of prejudice.73 Sacco and
Vanzetti came to represent a pattern of inequality under the law. They served as national
stand-ins for many local causes, including these trial events and the constant discrimination
and targeting related to Prohibition and nativism that masses of people experienced, as
described in the previous chapter.
The ethnic aspect of the case drew in diverse organizations and individuals who
would not have supported parts of leftist radicalism by principle. Speakers made use of
ethnic affinity, such as in one 1922 meeting advertisement for a talk in Youngstown at the
Duca degli Abruzzi hall, which appealed to people’s sense of justice and identity by noting
that “Italian blood flows in [their] veins.”74 Il Cittadino Italo-Americano editor Angelo Di
Renzo defended the pair “in the name of justice, of humanity, and of italianità.”75 Even
Benito Mussolini, certainly no ally of the radical left, sympathized with their plight.76
Italian-American affinity explains why people and organizations that generally rejected
radical-leftist politics supported the two men. Defenders used the argument that they were
“victims of racial prejudice and misunderstanding” to enlist national Italian-American
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leaders in the cause,77 including Giovanni Di Silvestro, the Supreme Venerable of the Sons
of Italy, a friend of Fascism, and certainly not an ideological ally of Sacco and Vanzetti.78
Di Silvestro made this stance known in clear terms in his appeal for the two men at a Sons
of Italy Supreme Convention. He disapproved of their ideology but unequivocally stated
that “the sentence of Sacco and Vanzetti [was] a monstrosity” and the condemned deserved
justice.79 Before their execution, the pair received support from numerous mainstream
Italian-American organizations, including three important Youngstown entities: the Italian
American Political Association, the Napoleone Colaianni lodge, and the Duca degli
Abruzzi society.80 This backing was significant because, as explained in chapter five,
groups like the Italian American Political Association contained an ideologically diverse
membership concerning views on leftist radicalism.
In addition to ethnic anxieties, the campaign to liberate the condemned radicals
revived the debate about working-class issues that the Red Scare had stifled. The
government suppression of radical groups and strikes failed to eliminate the causes that
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motivated their beliefs and actions. Mainstream organizations encountered by Italian
Americans, such as the settlement houses that aided so many in Americanizing and
acquiring citizenship, offered few tangible solutions. Settlement workers were not blind to
these issues.81 For instance, Hiram House reported appalling conditions in local
establishments, such as in the needle trades and at the Cuyahoga Bottling Works. At the
Cleveland Chocolate & Cocoa Company, all employees worked fifty-nine hours a week,
including eight children under eighteen, which the report noted broke laws prohibiting
excessive working hours for minors. At a local cigar factory, workers bit off the products’
ends to finish them and then spat the remnants and saliva onto the floor.82 The monotony
of the work coupled with poor ventilation depersonalized employees in the eyes of the
investigator: “Every face wore the same blank expression. They looked and acted like
machines. Did not notice a single person smile in the place.”83 Nevertheless, Hiram House
also acknowledged that it failed to solve employment issues. As one private 1920 letter
attested, while Hiram House had been sympathetic to unionization and concerned about
workers’ problems, it could not be involved much more because no settlement could
adequately solve all the people’s problems.84
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While the settlement houses deferred, most American labor unions failed ItalianAmerican workers. Many trade unions represented by the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) were leery of foreigners because mass immigration had oversaturated the labor pool
and depressed wages. Furthermore, the AFL’s model concentrated on craft unionism – the
organization of skilled laborers by trade – at the expense of industrial unionism, the
organization of all workers, regardless of skill, within a factory into one entity. In other
cases, the division of workers by department or craft into multiple groups undermined
collective action, one reason why the AFL-led 1919 Steel Strike failed.85 The Industrial
Workers of the World offered an alternative vision, but the First World War and Red Scare
destroyed its potential by the 1920s.
All the while, terrible and discriminatory labor conditions continued. In late 1918,
an employee’s improper discharge prompted a Department of Labor investigation into the
Jones and Laughlin Steel mill in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania.86 The investigator reported that
“many Italians who have been at the plant for several years are discharged for apparently
no cause and replaced by others, without consideration for their skill and experience.” For
those who remained, company foremen demoted some Italian Americans to lower-wage
positions without reason, while others demanded kickbacks to retain employment.
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Coworkers made “continuous threats in vile and abusive language to ‘chase all of the
Italians away from the plant’ and ‘to send them to Germany and have them shot,’” even
though the head of the local draft exemption board asserted that the group was “the most
patriotic of all [the] foreigners.”87 As one interviewee declared decades later, Italian
Americans and other white ethnics eventually succeeded in unionizing the Aliquippa mill
during the 1930s because the years of discrimination caused them to band together,
determined to right previous wrongs.88
Problems were not confined to the Jones and Laughlin mill as personal
remembrances and newspaper reports show a web of grievances throughout the region.
Work conditions in the coalfields were incredibly unsafe. In Heilwood, Pennsylvania, a
local mining company used the shaft depth at which workers began to pass out from lack
of oxygen as a sign to stop digging deeper and open a new mine.89 Unsafe conditions and
practices led to excessive numbers of people killed or injured on the job. As one ItalianAmerican woman recounted with broken English in an interview decades later: “Everyday,
everyday, come, come home, somebody get killed.”90 Numerous Italian Americans lost
friends and family, including one man who lost his brother in 1909 and his father in 1922
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to mine cave-ins.91 Others barely escaped death, with some losing appendages or being
crippled.92 Children remembered the accidents that almost killed their family members,
such as one man whose father returned home burnt after a mine explosion that killed other
men.93 Another recounted a story about how a coworker dragged his unconscious father
out of a mine. After a mine fire started, the company ordered the man to hang a piece of
canvas to starve it of air. He passed out from the fumes.94 Italian-American press accounts
and statistics reinforced personal experiences.95 In 1919, for example, there were twelve
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killed and forty-seven injured in Indiana County, Pennsylvania’s seventy-six coal mines.
Since Italian Americans constituted the second-largest ethnic group (1023 workers)
employed in the industry after generic “Americans” (1257 people), they likely suffered
proportionally high numbers killed and hurt on the job.96 Men did not easily forget that
they sometimes earned their positions because they replaced those who previously died in
the mines.97
Those employed outside of the coal mines did not fare much better. Ethnic papers
carried the news of men hurt and killed in industrial accidents. Angelo Sorcano of
Cleveland died in St. Alexis Hospital after being burned while working at the Ohio Clay
Company.98 Boiler vapor scalded Tony Cinquini and Antonio Canatti at Youngstown’s
Republic Rubber Works, leaving the men seriously injured.99 A week later, members of
the Youngstown community attended a ceremony for Richard Ricardo, whose body was
being sent by railroad to family in Waynesburg, Ohio, for burial. A young laborer at
Carnegie Steel, a red-hot rod pierced Ricardo’s leg. Complications from the resulting
amputation caused his death.100 Like Ricardo, Frank Picciochi died at the hospital “after a
week of horrible agonies” caused by a workplace incident at Republic Iron & Steel
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Company, which fractured his skull.101 One interviewee described the death of a relative,
Paolo Lucente, years after a fatal accident in Pittsburgh. Lucente worked on a construction
project when a cement cart hit him. He lost his legs and subsequently died in the hospital.102
These workplace incidents reinforced a belief based on real-world experiences that
companies exploited workers. Speaking about Paolo Lucente’s death, his relative
concluded dryly: “He laid there for two hours … [before they picked] him up and took him
to the hospital. For 7 dollars a week. Treated like dogs.”103 Workers understood the
probability that many of them would one day experience a workplace accident as
participants or observers. However, they were angry that business owners, managers, and
other elites refused to compensate them appropriately for their risks and stonewalled
workers’ attempts to air grievances. For example, Angela Baccelli recounted a story about
her grandfather, who worked in a Pittsburgh candy factory. An elevator broke, killing one
man and injuring her relative. Unfortunately, her grandfather was illiterate, and the
manager at the factory “made him sign a paper with an ‘X’ forfeiting all his rights for any
salary or recompensation at all for his hospital bills and for his injuries,” which destroyed
his life savings.104 The feeling of dual exploitation for being immigrants and working class
was familiar. As Lucia Borgna explained in an interview concerning her husband, who
arrived from Italy in 1922 with no knowledge of English, “they just put you there [in the
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coal mines,] and you work like a jackass.”105 The ethnic press reinforced these feelings at
the time, such as reporting about the “sad conditions” in Hillsville, Pennsylvania, along the
Ohio border, where Italian-American miners worked ten- to twelve-hour days in all types
of weather for poor pay. Their conditions were further proof, La Trinacria of Pittsburgh
stated, that their lives were “certainly worse than the serfs of the Middle Ages.” 106 The
prejudice was so prevalent at the time that they felt as though they were almost at the very
bottom of the social hierarchy. As Borgna continued, Italian Americans and other new
immigrant groups “were almost treated like colored [people]. We always used to say, we
was [sic] the second, the next one after the colored.”107
In other cases, Italian-American workers noted how employers maintained the
minimum required by law or utilized loopholes to harass employees and their families,
gambling that many would simply fall into line rather than fight. As coal miner Florie
Gaston explained, the law required paying employees at least one dollar in cash every two
weeks. Companies followed that minimum and doled out the remainder in credit only
valuable at the company-owned store.108 In some towns, patronizing the company store
was an unwritten requirement for keeping one’s job.109 In other cases, according to miner
Richard Furgiuele, employees purchased food from farms run by the mine bosses “because
you didn’t know if you were going to have a job if you didn’t.”110
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Furgiuele’s comment illustrates the more significant problem concerning how the
local power structure marginalized workers. As one 1922 letter to Il Martello, Carlo
Tresca’s radical labor newspaper, lamented, “spies, lackeys, State guards, all this social
filth seems to had found in Colver[, Pennsylvania,] and the surrounding area, favorable
terrain.”111 One form of “social filth” that the writer had in mind was the dreaded Coal and
Iron Police. Authorized by the Pennsylvania State Legislature in 1865, the Coal and Iron
Police supplemented county sheriffs in maintaining order for the railroad and mining
businesses that operated in sparsely populated areas. The organization became a private
police force for companies akin to, and initially trained by, the better-known Pinkerton
Detective Agency. Although the Pennsylvania Legislature charted the State Police in 1905
to have more control and oversight, the Coal and Iron Police continued to intimidate
workers until Governor Gifford Pinchot ended the organization in 1931.112
Italian Americans recalled terrible stories about the Coal and Iron Police harassing
workers on businesses’ behalf. The organization utilized fear as a means of control. The
companies and police encouraged and rewarded workers for spying on each other, and they
threatened noncitizens with deportation. When miners claimed to be sick and failed to show
up for work, the Coal and Iron Police put them in jail under the pretext that the worker was
drunk or hungover.113 In order to arrest unionization efforts in mining communities, the
police restricted travel between towns, forbid any assembly of men over two in number
during strikes, evicted tenants from company housing, and in Heilwood, Pennsylvania,
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adopted a 9:00 p.m. curfew.114 In some cases, the conflict between employer and employee
followed a scorched earth policy, such as when a group of strikers blew up the company
trucks used by the Coal and Iron Police to import “scabs,” or nonunion strikebreakers115
These feelings of exploitation crossed gender lines. While some asserted that the
Italian-American community favored a traditional domestic role for women, this notion is
misleading.116 Indeed, women did not consider themselves wageworkers, but many still
performed work within the home that contributed to the family income, an attribute that
separated these ethnic women from the middle-class ideal. Census records about women’s
employment underrepresented female laborers because many operated in an informal
economy performing work that few wanted to admit, given the culture at the time.117 For
example, one 1913 study of lower Manhattan families found that over half of ItalianAmerican mothers contributed to the family income, with many performing piecemeal
work at home or keeping boarders.118 Italian-American women toiled in higher numbers
than other groups because many husbands performed manual labor occupations that slowed
or halted during the winter, and there was an overwhelming desire for families to save
money.119 In one extreme example, a woman recalled her mother taking in boarders in
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Donora, Pennsylvania, south of Pittsburgh, after her father died in a 1914 mining accident.
They hosted fourteen men – the first half working days and the second half working nights
– for three dollars each per month.120 In other cases, wives and daughters labored in family
stores, especially when a husband or father worked another job in the mines or mills.121
The more affluent aided husbands and fathers with bookkeeping and timecards.122 While
seldom identifying themselves as wage laborers, many Italian-American women were
nevertheless workers.
During the 1920s, an Italian-American audience existed that shared class
grievances. The Red Scare may have stopped the most extreme manifestations of workers’
movements, but failure to address the roots of that working-class anger left masses of
people searching for ideas that would solve their problems. Sacco and Vanzetti provided
the cover to present economic arguments under the guise of ethnicity.
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The Tours
The Red Scare’s success and the deportation of Luigi Galleani opened the door to
Carlo Tresca and his softer, more malleable form of leftist radicalism. As historian Nunzio
Pernicone stated bluntly, “there is no question that during the period of the Sacco-Vanzetti
case, Tresca was the most important and best-known Italian radical in the United States.”123
As explained previously, the Galleanists followed a strict doctrine and were known as the
anti-organizzatori because they disliked organizations and were committed to
individualism. Tresca was an anarcho-syndicalist once associated with the IWW, which
allowed him to have a foot in the unionization movement. Additionally, he had connections
with Americans outside of the radical left, including lawyers and politicians. While the
Galleanists never accepted the idea of Tresca as a leader because of their political
temperament, there was little that they could do to challenge him, especially after the US
government drove them underground. This allowed Carlo Tresca to assume the mantle of
the two men’s defense.124 As Pernicone concluded, Tresca, through his newspaper Il
Martello and public speaking events, “was thus instrumental in raising desperately needed
funds and in keeping the case a live issue within the Italian and American communities.”125
Importantly, although Tresca was nominally an anarcho-syndicalist, he never
bound himself to a specific ideology. According to Guy Liberti, the pseudonym of an
anarchist active in Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio who eventually joined a
Cleveland group that published the newspaper L’Appello, Tresca was “an opportunist, a
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jumping jack” and certainly not an anarchist by Liberti’s standards.126 Historians have
generally agreed with this assessment. John P. Diggins described the radical as “neither a
callous apparatchik nor a doctrinaire ideologue,” and he was instead a man willing to fit
the needs of his times.127 Pernicone believed that Tresca “was too eclectic and unorthodox
to be classified according to standard typology,” and he and his newspaper’s “primary
mission was not to engage in evangelical propaganda on behalf of the ‘Movement’ or the
‘Idea,’ but to fight the battles of the working class.”128 Tresca’s skill was his oratory and
personality. He was an excellent speaker in Italian, and although his mastery of English
was limited, he was still able to project ideas sufficiently, if not as eloquently, in the
language.129 His open personality gained him friends within and outside of various radical
circles.130 Tresca’s flexibility encouraged a broad definition of leftism and allowed it to
operate as a big-tent movement.
Tresca and his associates reached average Italian Americans through lecture and
fundraising tours across the United States. By the time of Sacco and Vanzetti’s indictment
in 1920, Italian Americans increasingly searched for a political ideology that would provide
solutions to their ethnic, working-class grievances while being compatible with
Americanization and their newly adopted civic values. Even before the Red Scare, it was
difficult to dismiss the radical-leftist label once one committed, and arrest and conviction
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brought harsh penalties.131 Defending Sacco and Vanzetti as two wronged ItalianAmerican workers rather than anarchists presented a more palatable means to reach people.
In the process, Tresca and others used the opportunity to continue their fight on behalf of
the working class.
Two main associations provided financial assistance and media relations for Sacco
and Vanzetti. The first was the Comitato Italiano Pro-Vittime Politiche (Italian Committee
for Political Victims), which Tresca initially created in 1919 to provide aid and assistance
to persecuted Italian-American political radicals during the Red Scare.132 The organization
was innately linked to Tresca, who served as its chairman.133 The next most important
member was the group’s secretary, Luigi Quintiliano, who served as the point of contact
for the group and Il Martello concerning Sacco and Vanzetti and any matters arising from
the case.134 The Italian Committee for Political Victims was a catchall that went far beyond
Sacco and Vanzetti, and in subsequent years, it expanded to include relief to victims of
Fascism.135 After the pair’s indictment, radicals established the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense
Committee, another organization. The Defense Committee’s core consisted of Galleanists,
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devout ideological anarchists. Secretary Amleto Fabbri had operated a shoemaking
business with noted radical Mario Buda in Italy before returning to the United States.136 In
1924, Emilio Coda, who had been living in Paris and writing in support of Sacco and
Vanzetti, returned from self-exile. He assumed the secretary role of the Defense
Committee. Coda personally hated Tresca and worked to separate him from having any
role in the Defense Committee while repeatedly attacking the man in the anarchist press;
however, Tresca remained the predominant figure on the Italian-American left regardless
of Coda’s animosities.137
While personal issues may have hampered a deep friendship between the two
entities’ men, the organizations appeared to have a good working relationship during the
early 1920s. In December 1920, as the movement to defend Sacco and Vanzetti began to
grow, members of the Italian Committee for Political Victims and the Defense Committee
met in person “to put [themselves] completely in agreement,” likely concerning the role
each organization would play.138 A few days later, Quintiliano, writing on behalf of the
Italian Committee for Political Victims, responded to Frank Lopez and Aldino Felicani of
the Defense Committee, stating that they had cleared up “all the misunderstandings” and
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planned to “work with more energy” for the cause.139 Over the following months, the two
organizations exchanged information regarding financial collections, transfers of money,
and upcoming programming.140 However, these were separate organizations, and that
allowed Tresca, Quintiliano, and other associates to speak freely about the trial,
discrimination,

and

political

ideology

in

a

manner

they

viewed

fit.

The establishment of a Tresca-backed speaking and fundraising tour came at the
optimal time to fend off the loss of potential audiences. As the Red Scare deepened,
attending political events became more dangerous, and there was the possibility that many
Italian Americans would choose to stay home out of fear of being involved. For example,
a lecture tour in December 1919 took Tresca through Pennsylvania and Ohio to Detroit,
Michigan, before returning east via Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania.141 On 21 December 1919,
Tresca was scheduled to speak at the Cristoforo Colombo Hall in Beaver Falls on “the labor
movement in America and in England” at five o’clock. Police waited for Tresca’s arrival
at the train station, but they missed the radical because he arrived late. He immediately
went to the hall “where the crowd still waited anxious[ly]” to hear his talk, but the police
banned the event and refused to allow him to enter the building. Tresca and others then
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went to the home of a man named Di Cicco. At this point, eight officers, “armed to the
teeth” and headed by Police Chief Michael Coyne, illegally entered Di Cicco’s home to
harass Tresca and force him to leave town at gunpoint. While waving his revolver at the
group, it discharged, causing terror. Tresca identified himself as the man that the police
sought, and they escorted Tresca and his companion, Domenico Ciotti, to the local train
station to ensure that the two men left town immediately. It was at this point, when Tresca
and Ciotti left the house for the station, that associates informed the pair that James Terracio
went to the hospital, bleeding from the abdomen, apparently shot.142 According to Terracio,
Coyne shot him in the back. Coyne and the other officers claimed that they heard a small
explosion while questioning the Italian Americans, but all denied shooting Terracio.143
For James Terracio, being involved with the talk proved fatal; he died on Christmas
Day, 1919, from his wounds. By all accounts, Terracio was not a radical. He was a
stonework contractor and prominent Italian American in the community, having
naturalized and resided in Beaver Falls for twenty-five years with his wife and children.
He served as president of the Cristoforo Colombo club, Tresca’s intended meeting venue,
and he supported the Allied cause during the First World War. Terracio was with Tresca
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because he had known the man during his early career in Italy, and he wanted to convince
Tresca to leave behind the life of a radical.144 Coyne was tried and acquitted of the murder
after the jury accepted the argument that Terracio was shot using “a gun in the hands of a
party or parties unknown.”145 As the English-language press noted each time, the shooting
occurred during a meeting of alleged anarchists, “reds,” or radicals. 146 With men like
Coyne on a “crusade” against Italian-American radicals, attendees were not safe to frequent
meetings no matter their political philosophy.147 Many would have agreed with Tresca’s
statement about Pennsylvania after the murder: “The black land of the Cossacks. Here
every liberty is dead.”148
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If Tresca and his associates could open the door to speaking in a community, then
they easily held the public’s attention with their ideas. During the tour that ended with the
Beaver Falls murder, some attendees at earlier events wrote feedback to Il Martello about
the meaning of Tresca’s visit. In Detroit, where he spoke for two hours, including on “the
pressing truths about the European conflict,” a participant noted the significance of the
visit. Many knew of Tresca’s reputation as a leader because of his involvement in the
unionization movement in the Minnesota iron range and elsewhere. The Detroit lecture was
the first time that most met him personally, and those that did not attend regretted the
decision.149 He received a similarly enthusiastic reception during a Cleveland lecture in the
summer of 1920. Speaking “about the Italian situation,” which most likely meant
describing the post-First World War leftist turmoil across the country in a favorable light,
the packed room “followed the orator with the liveliest attention.” His logic was simple
and convincing, and it allowed for “the good sowing of our ideas.” The conference
organizers recalled the meeting’s success at rousing the community: “All [of the attendees]
ask us: when will he return, Tresca? And we respond: soon.”150 Tresca’s ideas held the
public’s attention because class and ethnic discrimination had primed them to follow such
arguments with an open mind. Considering some of the topics from the latter part of his
tour in western Pennsylvania (“The Italian Situation” in New Derry, “From Slavery to
Freedom” in Iselin, “Capital and Labor” in Ernest), attendees heard opinions steeped in
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working-class resentment.151 If Tresca and his associates could arrange a lecture, Italian
Americans were willing to listen and consider their ideas.
The key was providing a cover for people to attend. As had been shown in Tresca’s
December 1919 tour, miners in eastern Pennsylvania who once flocked to such meetings
were now afraid, and they only appeared once it was clear that police would not harass
them.152 As Sacco and Vanzetti became causes célèbres and people like Sons of Italy leader
Giovanni Di Silvestro defended the pair, it became easier for Tresca and others to enter
communities. Lectures and fundraisers held to benefit the two men were ostensibly about
ethnic and class discrimination rather than revolution. The mass sensation of the cause
célèbre made it more difficult for police or other agents of the state to disrupt meetings
organized under the pretext of supporting American values rather than subversive rhetoric.
As the meeting and fundraising tour began in earnest during the winter of 1920–
1921, leftist ideology reached wider and larger circles of Italian Americans throughout the
region. Shortly after Luigi Quintiliano penned responses to the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense
Committee about having cleared up “all the misunderstandings” concerning the role of the
Italian Committee for Political Victims, the Tresca associate embarked on a lecture circuit.
He was uniquely qualified to serve as a stand-in for the better-known radical. The Abruzzoborn Italian arrived in the United States in 1910. A tailor by trade, he was a lifelong leftist.
Quintiliano’s collaboration with Carlo Tresca began in 1915. He was an original member
of Il Martello’s editorial board, sometimes writing under the pseudonym “Lucifero”
(Lucifer), and his association with the radical paper lasted two decades. During the 1930s,
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he became an organizer for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU)
and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (a precursor to the United Steelworkers of
America). He remained associated with the ILGWU after the Second World War.153
Quintiliano’s position on the Italian Committee for Political Victims and his role as an
editor-writer for Il Martello kept him informed on many current Italian and working-class
issues. He occasionally wrote articles about the Red Scare, events with other radicals, cases
of discrimination and police abuse against Italian Americans, and Italian politicians and
politics, including the advent of Fascism and its influence in the United States.154 He later
served alongside Tresca on the Anti-Fascist Alliance of North America’s executive
committee.155 Quintiliano was well-versed in current events and developments, and he had
an extensive repertoire of topics that he could have interpreted and diffused from a leftist
position during his travels.
After some events in Utica and Rochester, New York, Quintiliano began his monthlong speaking tour of western Pennsylvania in mid-January 1921. In addition to Pittsburgh,
Quintiliano scheduled visits to another two dozen cities, towns, and mining communities,
including South Fork, Beaverdale, Johnstown, Heilwood, Emeigh, Ernest, Homer City,
New Derry, Latrobe, Mount Pleasant, Irwin, Freeport, Russellton, Curtisville, Bentleyville,
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Marianna, Newell, Rillton, Uniontown, McIntyre, Aultman, and Rossiter.156 There was
some trouble – Quintiliano arrived too late in Uniontown to address the assembled group
in that city, and organizers failed to find meeting spaces in Johnstown and Heilwood – but
the tour was generally successful. The speaker added other destinations to his circuit,
including Greensburg and Monongahela. Quintiliano would have visited a crowd in
Coraopolis if not for the lack of transportation.157

Figure 3.1 Quintiliano’s January–February 1921 Speaking Tour of Western Pennsylvania
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Importantly, these were open events, not confined to small groups of radicals in
each area, and they appeared to have had community support in many places. In Rossiter,
local Luigi Del Grande noted that after Quintiliano’s first visit, they expected the leftist to
return, this time in conjunction with the opening of a Sons of Italy lodge.158 Instead of
blocking the radical speaker from presenting, many ethnic societies opened their doors and
wallets to his lecture and fundraising tour on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti. In
Monongahela, Quintiliano spoke under the auspices of the Loggia Amilcare Cipriani in
cooperation with other local societies, including Società Cesare Battisti, Società
Bersaglieri, and Società Pre Alpina. Loggia Amilcare Cipriani’s leader, Vincenzo
Bartolotta, opened the assembly. Quintiliano spoke alongside Domenico Ciotti, Tresca’s
associate from the Beaver Falls incident, at the Società Unite C. Colombo-Grande Italia
hall in Greensburg. Other entities provided group contributions in support of the cause,
including the following: Loggia Nuova Piave of McKeesport; Loggia Conte di Torino of
Braddock; Loggia Nuova Giovane Italia of New Kensington; Loggia Provincia Caserta,
Trento e Trieste, Loggia Terza Italia, Loggia 24 Maggio, Loggia Cooperativa Calzolai,
Società Reggia Marina, Loggia Pittsburgh, and Loggia Nuova Vittorio Emmanuele, all of
Pittsburgh.159
Comments sent to Il Martello showed attendees’ enthusiasm and the breadth of
Quintiliano’s remarks. L. Fiorentini noted that the audience in South Fork was “strongly
impressed,” and Domenico Ciotti commented that the ideas conveyed during the Latrobe
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presentation were “clear, convincing.”160 In Beaverdale, G. Mainetti wrote that even with
the cold and snowy Pennsylvania winter, “a strong number of workers rushed to hear the
word of our young comrade.” The details of the trial captivated the audience, such as L.
Borgognoni of Freeport, who noted that Quintiliano’s speech included “a vivid explanation
of the inquisitorial methods used by [Attorney General A. Mitchell] Palmer against free
thinkers.” As F. Temporelli of Bakerton, who probably attended the conference in nearby
Emeigh, wrote, Quintiliano’s talk alone lasted for an hour and a half. In other cases, such
as in Pittsburgh and Greensburg, Quintiliano shared the stage with local speakers who
espoused leftist ideology, including in the latter town Domenico Ciotti and C. Pitocchi,
who spoke about workers’ rights. The inclusion of Pitocchi, the director of Greensburg’s
La Stella d’Italia newspaper, was a clear example of how the Sacco-Vanzetti cause célèbre
brought in prominenti, local community leaders, as allies. In at least one town, Homer City,
Quintiliano “closed with a strong appeal for the working class’s solidarity,” only to remain
for another hour to discuss current events in Italy.161
As time passed and Quintiliano began to address Italian-American listeners who
already had a basic understanding of the Sacco and Vanzetti case, his conferences
increasingly delved into leftist ideology. For example, during a celebration coinciding with
May Day, Quintiliano went to Swatara Station, near Harrisburg, to fundraise for the
condemned men. His talk, which for the better part of “two hours held all of us [in the
audience] under the allure of his word,” went beyond calling for solidarity and support for
the two condemned radicals. He spoke “heated words for Italian social-democracy.”
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Domestically, the United States was a “bourgeois republic,” and the Sacco-Vanzetti trial
was part of a more significant wave of “infamous organized persecutions against Italian
free thinkers in America.” Keeping with May Day’s theme, the meeting ended with a hymn
in honor of “red Russia” and the Russian people.162 Sacco and Vanzetti made a useful
cover.
Luigi Quintiliano and others made subsequent speaking tours throughout western
Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. During the summer of 1921, Quintiliano embarked on an
extended trip across the industrial Midwest with plans to pass through Ohio, Michigan,
Illinois, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.163 In late June, he visited Canton, Bedford, and
Lorain, Ohio, before continuing to Detroit and numerous small towns throughout
Illinois.164 Unfortunately for those wanting to hear the radical, the Sacco-Vanzetti trial in
Dedham, Massachusetts, forced the speaker to end his tour short. Once in St. Louis,
Missouri, he received a telegram asking for his return to aid Vanzetti’s defense.165
The Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee funded additional tours for several leftist
speakers. From August 1921 through March 1922, the organization disbursed travel funds
each month for Constantino Zonchello to advocate for the condemned men.166 Zonchello,
who fled Italy after a 1908 conviction for embezzlement, was a Galleanist who had been
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publicly speaking about leftist ideology since at least the mid-1910s. He directed the
newspaper L’Adunata dei Refrattari, founded by Galleanists in 1922 as a successor to
Cronaca Sovversiva, and he briefly collaborated with Tresca, Quintiliano, and others as
part of an American anti-Fascist front.167 In Bellaire, Ohio, he gave an Italian-language
address on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti and their ideals alongside Jacob Margolis’s
presentation in English and an unnamed Russian speaker.168 More importantly, the
Galleanist-dominated Defense Committee also paid the traveling expenses for radicals
such as Arturo Calvani (first for August through November 1921 and again from February
to March 1922) and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (February through June 1922). They were
more ideologically aligned with Tresca than with the Galleanists.169 While the pair operated
a joint tour of New England beginning in October 1921, both speakers also presented
independently at times.170
Flynn was the better-known orator. She was a leader in the Industrial Workers of
the World, a critical figure in the 1912 Lawrence textile strike, and a founding member of
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Besides these organizational memberships
that brought her to Sacco and Vanzetti’s defense, Flynn was in a decade-long professional
and personal relationship with Carlo Tresca until 1925. She joined the Communist Party in

167

Tomchuk, Transnational Radicals, 72, 81, 100, 148, 152; Pernicone, Carlo Tresca,
145. There is some discrepancy about the spelling of Zonchello’s first name. Tomchuk
called him Constantino while Pernicone wrote Costantino.
168
J. Sbroglio, “Bellaire, Ohio,” Il Martello, 15 October 1921, 2.
169
Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, Financial Report, 29, 32, 35, 37, 43–47, 49.
Throughout this source, Calvani is referred to as A. Galvani. This was a typographical
error because donation entries from this financial report match within days of newspaper
accounts of Calvani’s visits to those places.
170
Eugene Lyons, “Fair Play Demanded for N. Sacco and B. Vanzetti,” Labor Journal,
21 October 1921, 1.
208

1936.171 Calvani was associated with the United Mine Workers, and he contributed to Il
Martello in that capacity.172 His visits included stops in Rayland, Ohio, and Avella,
Pennsylvania, in August, and in Masontown and Monessen, Pennsylvania, where he spoke
at the Nord Italia Hall, in September, before starting his joint work with Flynn in New
England in October.173 Calvani recrossed western Pennsylvania in November to fundraise
in Monessen (again returning to Nord Italia Hall for a two-hour-long presentation) and
Gallatin.174 Beyond their paired tours, Flynn spoke in several larger cities around the Great
Lakes, including Cleveland, Akron, and Erie, Pennsylvania.175 If these conferences
followed a similar script to the one held in Minneapolis as part of the same lecture circuit,
Flynn immersed the audience in class resentment. The Minnesota Daily Star’s Herbert E.
Gaston opined that locals needed not to fear Flynn, who was fighting for justice and
American-style equality for two working-class immigrants that did not receive either.176
The Minneapolis Morning Tribune was more explicit about Flynn’s class agitation. She
denounced “New England class hatred” and described Vanzetti as a “marked man” by
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capitalist interests because of his previous support for striking workers.177 After Flynn and
Calvani’s paired presentations throughout Illinois in February and March 1922, Calvani
returned to Ohio and raised money in Cleveland, Youngstown, and Lorain.178 He held
subsequent talks in Monongahela and Gallatin, the latter of which he spoke during a benefit
dance.179
Additional associates contributed to keeping the message alive and circulating.
Guido Mascio, who would be arrested in 1925 and later cleared for supposed-anarchist
sedition in Pittsburgh alongside two fellow Italian-American machinists from Detroit,
planned a mining camp tour throughout eastern Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia
during the summer of 1921.180 F. Di Stefano gained responsibility for Il Martello’s outreach
in Pennsylvania.181 Erasmo Abate, a Philadelphia-based radical that the government
deported in early 1922, spoke to a large gathering in Renton, a mining town about twenty
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miles east of downtown Pittsburgh, on 19 November 1921.182 Local friends worked to
spread information to nearby communities. Vincenzo Palmieri, who had presided over
Quintiliano’s January 1921 meeting hosted by the group Giordano Bruno in Pittsburgh’s
East Liberty neighborhood, noted that while unemployment was still high in the city, he
was working hard to collect funds.183 Domenico Ciotti of Latrobe, Tresca’s companion
during the Beaver Falls incident who had opened the February 1921 meeting for
Quintiliano in Greensburg, made a brief tour south of the Pennsylvania state line to
Fairmont, Wyatt, and Owings, West Virginia.184 Although Tresca was the most famous
touring radical leftist, many others filled the void when he and national figures were busy
elsewhere.
Perhaps more importantly, additional funds and messages about solidarity with
Sacco and Vanzetti came from Italian-American organizations and groups throughout the
region separate from the numerous tours. Taking even a small sample, the last quarter of
1921, it is clear that Sacco and Vanzetti enjoyed popular support throughout the region,
and their trial was on the minds of ordinary people.
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Table 3.1 October Collections and Support (Location and Collector of Funds)185
Morgan (PA), Antonio Placido186
Pittsburgh, Vincenzo Palmieri 187
Russellton (PA), F. Cappello188
Belle Vernon (PA), M. Nardi
Dunlevy (PA), Garibaldi Association by Nardi
Dubois (PA), P.D.S. Sec. and the Roma dei Cesari Lodge
Bridgeport (OH), J. Anselmo
Bellaire (OH), Carlo Zaccagnini from proceeds from a benefit play
New Kensington (PA), S.O.M.S. Umbria
Allison (PA), G. Vignali
Pittsburgh, S.M.S. G. Marconi
Renton (PA), A. Bianchi
Marstellar (PA), P. Causa
Rayland (OH), F. Gianotto
Piney Fork (OH), L. Modolo
McKeesport (PA), W. Midakes and friends
Bridgeville (PA), Daniel Lupi
Gallatin (PA), Periccinoli
Sutersville (PA), Andrew Sciaviarin and friends
McKeesport, P. Hoffer and friends
Pittsburgh, Hirsh Book Store
Emeigh (PA), F. Temporelli
Monessen (PA), Emil Thermes
United Mine Workers (UMW) locals in Finleyville (PA), Wyano (PA),189 Avonmore
(PA), Large (PA), Dillonvale (OH), Marstellar (PA), Stewartsville (OH), Neffs190
(OH), Bannock (OH), Bellaire (OH), Adena (OH), Willock (PA), Farmington
(WV),191 Cambridge (OH), and Piney Fork (OH)
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From Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, Financial Report, 32–34, unless otherwise
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Table 3.2 November Collections and Support (Location and Collector of Funds)192
Homer City (PA), Fedele D’Amico193
Pittsburgh, Regia Marina Mutual Aid Society, Nuova Vittorio Emanuele Lodge, and
Giordano Bruno Lodge.194
Iselin (PA), benefit dance proceeds by Tony Leone195
Rillton (PA), benefit dance proceeds via Luigi Negro196
Youngstown, N. Colaianni Lodge
Youngstown, Casa Savoia Lodge
Girard (OH), V. E. Lodge
Struthers (OH), S.O. di M.S.197
Youngstown, S. di M.S. Colombo
Dunlo (PA), A. Casca
Pittsburgh, Irene Kaufman Settlement
Avella (PA), Biagio Fanchini and friends
Latrobe, F. Currado
Connorville (OH), P. Dolfi
Cleveland, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers (B. of P.D.&P.),
Local 867
UMW Locals in Bellaire, Connorville (OH), and Avella (PA)

192
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Table 3.3 December Collections and Support (Location and Collector of Funds)198
Bellaire, American Alliance meeting199
Tiltonsville (OH), play proceeds via A. Algeri200
Steubenville (OH), G. Simone
Charleroi (PA), S. Barzilai Lodge, number 468, Sons of Italy
Warren (OH), Ferrisi
Monarch (PA), F. Alfonso
Masontown (PA), dance proceeds
Avella, F. Giordano
Rayland, F. Gianotto for pamphlets
Pittsburgh, E. Gusberti and friends
Wilmerding (PA), Indo Paggetti
Yorkville (OH), Gianotto
Cleveland, Pistillo
Bellaire, C. Di Nobile
Bellaire, UMW Sub-District 5
Cleveland, Bakers and Confectioners, Local 56
Tiltonsville, play proceeds via Algieri201

Figure 3.2 Map of Collections, October to December 1921
198

From Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, Financial Report, 38–39, unless otherwise
noted.
199
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The Sacco-Vanzetti cause célèbre kept the fire of leftist ideology burning for Carlo
Tresca’s return to the region in 1922. On 6 May, Tresca spoke at Miners Hall in
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, in support of the two condemned men. During his hour-and-ahalf-long speech, he covered topics including the trial, workers, and the American police.
The following day, he headlined another meeting at the Italica Unita hall in Charleroi,
where “the room was full of workers [who] rushed from the nearby towns.” An estimated
five hundred people, including many women, heard about “the corruption of justice”
concerning the Sacco-Vanzetti trial in Dedham. He ended with some words about unions
and worker solidarity during strikes.202 The large crowd attests to the popularity of Tresca’s
message, even in light of continued harassment by the state. During a tour set to take the
speaker to Chicago and Detroit, Tresca arranged for a week-long detour to present in West
Virginia mining towns south of the Pennsylvania border.203 While speaking at a Labor Day
event in Fairmont, police entered the home of Tresca’s host to search through his guest’s
books, most likely seeking to find subversive materials on which to charge the radical.204
In nearby Monongah, “the police’s brutal intervention” stopped locals from holding
meetings, and “Tresca was forced to leave the camp.”205
During the fall of 1922, Tresca embarked on an extensive lecture tour to Ohio,
Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, and New York. His potential speech
topics touched on numerous leftist ideas: “The origin of capital,” “The class struggle in
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America,” “Why I do not believe in god,” “State, Homeland and religion,” “Fascism and
Italy,” and “The Russian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.” 206 By the end
of November, Tresca had paid visits to Russellton (where he spoke about “State, Homeland
and Religion”207), Renton, McIntyre, Aultman, Homer City, Bridgeville, Ellsworth, and
Sharon, Pennsylvania, and Lowellville and Canton, Ohio.208 During Tresca’s 15 November
presentation in Lowellville, E. Innocenzi recounted the speaker’s denunciation of the
“parasitic class,” a reference to capitalist elites who possessed “all the joys and all the
pleasures” of life while unloading work and suffering onto others. Even more critical for
continuing the diffusion of leftist ideology, a few attendees purchased newspaper
subscriptions to Il Martello and available radical literature.209
Besides this continued diffusion of leftist ideology after Tresca’s departure, the
radical’s conferences were also notable for drawing an audience from across the immigrant
class spectrum. According to Vincenzo Novelli, who documented Tresca’s 12 November
1922 speech in Bridgeville, a city ten miles southwest of downtown Pittsburgh, the crowd
included more than nameless working-class Italian Americans. While laborers from
Morgan and other neighboring towns flocked to hear the famed speaker’s talk about “The
Class Struggle,” several prominent local Italian Americans also attended. Even after
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Tresca’s presentation shifted to a denunciation of Fascism and Benito Mussolini, these
prominenti, implied by Novelli to have been open if not favorable to the system, listened
quietly and did not contradict Tresca’s words.210
The Sacco-Vanzetti cause célèbre served as a protective shield for leftist speakers.
They hid behind it to weather the worst effects of the Red Scare’s assault on left-wing
ideology. As Tresca, Quintiliano, and others toured western Pennsylvania and eastern
Ohio, the masses turned out not to support anarchism but to defend two wronged ItalianAmerican workers that experienced discrimination commonly felt by many immigrants and
their children. However, leftist ideology was inseparable from the Sacco and Vanzetti case.
Defense of the two men meant condemning a superstructure of laws, courts, and
government built upon an exploitive capitalist base. Sacco and Vanzetti touring lectures
were as much about pushing leftist ideas as supporting the convicted men. Furthermore, as
Tresca and associates dispersed ideas into communities throughout the region, their efforts
also prompted grassroots discussion, as evidenced by the numerous donations collected
beyond their talks. Sacco and Vanzetti kept ideas circulating and ensured that leftist
ideology continued to permeate the Italian-American community.

Leftist Ideas
A one- to two-hour-long talk persuaded people to adopt leftist ideas, but it did not
indoctrinate the audience. The lectures presented by Tresca and associates spread broad
leftist views within communities; they did not create a mass of committed, revolutionary
theorists. Most attendees did not experience a political awakening, purchase writings by
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Marx, Malatesta, or Kropotkin, and organize themselves into radical cells. Instead, lectures
and subsequent discussions disseminated concepts related to two themes innately linked to
Sacco and Vanzetti: labor rights and free expression. Ethnic working-class resentment
reinforced ideas about mass unionism. Free expression entailed holding the United States
accountable for its promise of free speech and assembly.
Lecture attendees returned home imbued with new ideas about unionization. This
ideology derived from the IWW’s emphasis on “one big union” rather than the AFL’s
concentration on craft unions. Consider, for example, Tresca’s previously mentioned talk
to a crowd of five hundred people in Charleroi in May 1922. While billed as a meeting in
support of Sacco and Vanzetti, Tresca also spoke about the recent miners’ strike in the
area.211 Much of his oral comments likely matched his written arguments printed only
weeks later in Il Martello.212 The radical condemned the usual enemies, including the
“violence of the Cossacks” (a reference to the Coal and Iron Police and other prejudicial
law enforcement agencies) and the “bestial repressions” by the mine owners. However, he
also denounced nonunion laborers and the United Mine Workers organization. The “scab”
labor undermined union workers by producing five million tons of coal per week. The
UMW bureaucracy set up the striking workers for failure. It did not provide enough
direction and strength from the top, offering workers only uncertainty. Its methods
undermined the union’s source of strength: “And it is here that lies the greater danger[.]
The U. M. W. of A., like all the unions faithful to the A. F. of L.[,] does not believe in the

G. Mastrangioli, “Nostre Corrispondenze: Charleroi, Pa.,” Il Martello, 19 August
1922, 3.
212
Carlo Tresca, “Nel Buio,” Il Martello, 3 June 1922, 1. In the article, Tresca
specifically noted developments in Westmoreland, Fayette, and Somerset Counties. The
first two are located across the Monongahela River from Charleroi.
211

218

general strike. It has always … divided the organized mass with partial contracts.” Each
district had different agreements.213 An unattributed article printed a few weeks later
explained the problem with the UMW model in detail. An incident occurred in Oklahoma
in which women sought to heckle and denounce union coal miners who were still working.
The local UMW official sent the women away, saying that the union needed to respect the
contract, even as others went on strike. The women’s belief, shared by Il Martello, was that
partial contracts undermined collective bargaining power because they allowed continued
production, thereby blunting a strike’s effects. Additionally, the newspaper was critical of
UMW officials who sought to negotiate fairly with owners because mine bosses never
followed agreements. Operators disregarded a previous contract provision that required the
parties to reach new terms before April. The owners instead spent the time stockpiling coal
to dampen any effect of the anticipated strike.214
This model of labor organizing could never succeed because it allowed capitalism
to subjugate the workers. As Tresca commented in September: “Who won the strike? Wall
Street.” The temporary decline in coal production caused increased prices. The conclusion
of the strike reopened mines, but it did not bring a comparable pay raise for workers.
Failures would continue as long as labor organizations divided membership. For example,
during a meeting to discuss a sympathy strike for the railroad workers, the AFL leadership
held back the maintenance workers who wanted to walk out. This type of weak, divided
unionism only favored capitalist interests.215
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Attendees to Tresca’s lectures left with a particular vision of unionization, the same
one supported in his writings: the IWW’s concept of “one big union.”216 Rather than
organize themselves by craft or skill, Tresca encouraged worker solidarity and the creation
of industrial unions. His idea of solidarity filtered down and sustained the workers’ plight,
which is why many oral histories specifically noted a solid attachment to the union and
resistance to scabbing during the 1920s and 1930s.217 In one example, Nino Colonna, a
child at the time, remembered being evicted from company housing after his father refused
to scab during a 1921 miners’ strike in Westmoreland County, southeast of Pittsburgh. The
family spent over a year living on a farm before the father returned to work.218 As explained
in subsequent chapters, Italian-American approval of Tresca’s industrial-union model
informed their approach to Fascism and the New Deal.
Coinciding with these ideas about unionization was the conviction that people had
the guaranteed right to free thought, speech, and assembly. The fight for these values was
at the core of the Sacco-Vanzetti case; Italian Americans believed that the court convicted
the pair because of their anarchist ideas. Tresca’s actions and newspaper Il Martello put
that issue at the forefront. By doing so, they too became victims of the coercive forces. For
years he had attracted the attention of the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation.
After Mussolini gained power in Italy, the Fascist government directed its clout against the
radical. Ambassador Gelasio Caetani found a willing partner in J. Edgar Hoover and others
at the Justice Department, and the federal government increased its efforts to entrap Tresca
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in 1923 and force his deportation. An article denouncing the Italian monarchy led to
Tresca’s initial arrest in August, but his actual conviction rested not on disseminating
radical ideology through the mail but on an advertisement in his newspaper for a book
concerning birth control. His harsh sentence, one year and one day at the Atlanta Federal
Penitentiary (later commuted to four months), served in early 1925, created public
sympathy for the man. Like Sacco and Vanzetti, Tresca gained supporters from people who
might otherwise not have openly backed the radical, such as then-congressman Fiorello La
Guardia.219
These actions aided another Luigi Quintiliano tour in spring 1924, billed explicitly
for Tresca’s defense. He passed through many towns in western Pennsylvania, then spoke
in Youngstown and Lowellville, Ohio, before touring Illinois and returning to Pittsburgh.
Similar to Sacco and Vanzetti, Tresca’s plight became a cover to spread ideology,
specifically anti-Fascism.220 The core critique was the unfulfilled promise of free thought
and open conversation. As Quintiliano wrote in December 1923, before his tour, the Italian
government’s efforts to silence the radical aligned with the American government’s plan.
Quintiliano described Ambassador Caetani’s role and the spy, Giuseppe Sposa, that
American investigators had planted at Il Martello’s offices to gather evidence. The
significance of these actions was greater than one man: “But it is not Tresca that they want,
it is not the man that makes [a] shadow on the government[s] of Coolidge and of Mussolini;
but it is Il Martello, and it is not Il Martello in itself, that produces fear[,] … but it is the
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truth that shines through from Il Martello.”221 These same ideas carried over to his talks.
During the Pittsburgh event, Quintiliano explained that Carlo Tresca condemned the
Fascists and their allies during his rallies and in his newspaper, and the trial was a Fascist
plot to silence a man. At the core was the promise of liberty: “Quintiliano closed paying
tribute to freedom that has not died and will not die, in spite of all the Mussolinis of this
world.”222
The message was always in support of civil liberties. Leftist speakers certainly
delved into Fascist brutality, but the critique about the “Mussolinis of this world” pointed
to a global problem: the infringement of rights occurred even in supposedly free nations.223
Americans failed to uphold their values and ideals. When authorities deported the radicals
Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman to Russia, Quintiliano argued hypocrisy,
suggesting that perhaps the Statue of Liberty should be holding a club instead of a torch.224
Tresca invoked the names of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln when he argued that
America punished free thinkers rather than advanced their needs.225 Other condemnations
related to the dissonance between rhetoric and reality. Woodrow Wilson proclaimed
democracy abroad, but the United States failed to uphold freedom at home.226 Americans
asserted the supremacy of their democracy and freedoms while political prisoners remained
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confined to jail cells for their ideals.227 A graphic piece about lynchings ended with a desire
to destroy this type of inhumane society in the name of justice.228
Contributors also noted this dissonance between American civic values and
everyday life. Writing from the small community of Chestnut Ridge, Pennsylvania,
Candido Mucciante described the harassment that workers faced in Fayette County. Miners
responded to poor pay and company exploitation by going on strike. While marching on a
public street in a nearby town, “without giving disturbance to anyone,” they were attacked
by “the Cossacks of the republic,” state police on horseback. Police suppressed a group in
another community as they marched on Labor Day under the American flag. These assaults
on basic American privileges provoked a strong denunciation by Mucciante: “We do not
doubt it anymore. [In] … the United States of America … the proletariat [is] praised …
[and] flattered in the hours of the electoral carnival, [but] is, in all other days of the year[,]
considered a simple beast of burden, without rights, without [a] brain.”229
Leftist support for American values like free thought, speech, and assembly went
beyond talk. Tresca, Quintiliano, and others desired open meetings because they believed
in the persuasiveness of their message. During the early part of Quintiliano’s fundraising
tour for Tresca, the radical was supposed to speak in Mount Carmel, Pennsylvania, in the
state’s eastern anthracite coal region, but several prominenti convinced local authorities to
block the rally.230 The action was notable enough to draw condemnation from the American
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Civil Liberties Union.231 The heart of the issue was free speech. As Quintiliano himself
wrote about the episode, “none of these great men had the civic courage to confront me …
[from the public floor of the theater], to counter ideas with ideas, arguments with
arguments.”232 The leftists reveled in the opportunity to answer critics, and they advertised
free events with open debates.233 Those with differing political views attended. At
Quintiliano’s Altoona event, an observer claimed that a local pro-Fascist lawyer attended
specifically “to oppose our speaker’s speech [but,] in the face of the arguments of our
speaker, he did not know what to reply and had to be silent.” The critic instead ripped down
some wall posters on his departure.234 A similar response happened when pro-Fascists
confronted Quintiliano at his Youngstown lecture: “Citing facts, he made be quiet the usual
followers of the rotten Mussolini,” who then left the event.235 These talks were open to all,
and leftists such as Quintiliano favored the opportunity to address those with opposing
views directly.
The leftists contributed two main concepts to the Italian-American public sphere
for the creation of a mass ideology. First, they argued for and supported unionization. Their
particular vision was not the trade unionism of the past concentrated on skilled workers,
but mass industrial unionism in which all employees, regardless of job status, supported
each other to attain better wages and working conditions. Second, even as the leftists
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criticized the American government, they praised the civic values it was supposed to
support. Free thought, expression, and debate were worthy principles, and the leftists
denounced Americans whenever they failed to uphold their standards. In this way, the
leftists unintentionally reinforced American civic nationalism.

Red Colony Arrested
Carlo Tresca, Luigi Quintiliano, and other leftist radicals were popular within
working-class-dominated Italian-American communities, but most ordinary people did not
become committed anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, or other shades of “red.” The radicals
had a healthy, stable network. Il Martello circulated 6,500 copies weekly in 1923, 10,500
in 1924, and 8,000 in 1929.236 The newspaper penetrated mining towns and small
communities across the United States, and these far-flung connections made Tresca and
others’ tours possible. However, the leftists were not the only sources of news and ideas,
and they contended with the mainstream Italian-American press that had higher circulation
numbers and was open to Fascism.237
Ideological competition stopped the creation of a mass-revolutionary ItalianAmerican population. Leftist grievances denounced rapacious capitalist exploitation, but
the continued Americanization efforts described in the previous chapter tempered radical
solutions – such as revolution and Galleanist-style bombings – to solve those problems.
Increasing acceptance of civic nationalism and participation in American democracy
moderated the antipathy toward the state found in anarchism and its derivatives. A cautious
optimism developed about the government’s potential role in working people’s lives. The
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state was, at times, a hindrance to the political left, but Americanization also taught the
naturalized and their children that the government could theoretically be responsive to their
needs. Furthermore, as will be described in the following chapter, Fascism provided
another counter to leftism. As Mussolini consolidated power, Fascist propaganda presented
an image of a nation that reformed its broken political system. Fascist Italy became an
example worthy of replicating.238 In sum, Italian Americans accepted the left’s ideas of
mass unionism and civil liberties but increasingly searched for a means to accomplish them
within the extant political system.
Few Italian immigrants by the 1920s had a desire to carry out a revolution to
establish a classless society. Their goal was to foster a fairer economic system, not
eliminate wealth entirely. As Rudolph Vecoli pointed out in his critique of Oscar Handlin’s
The Uprooted, the contadini – the Italian peasants who formed the bulk of emigrants –
were ambitious, and many sought careers as artisans and shopkeepers. Immigration to the
United States was an alternative method of socioeconomic advancement.239 As mentioned
in the previous chapter, economics drove immigration. Italian Americans desired wealth
and affluence, or at the very least, to shore up their declining class status in Italy by finding
work in the United States.240 Anthony Panza, who followed his father to the Youngstown
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area at age sixteen, was succinct when asked why they left the Abruzzi region for the
United States: “He came here for money. … That is why I came here too.”241 However,
emigration costs – the steamship ticket alone totaled months’ worth of labor for a contadino
– limited the types of American arrivals.242 Those at the very bottom of the hierarchy, the
poorest and therefore most susceptible to completely overturning the economic order,
could not afford to leave Italy.
New challenges forced demographic changes. Some of the most radical leftists
viewed themselves as part of a diasporic, working-class community. The Red Scare and
American immigration restriction ended migration and produced a new demarcation in
identities. Residency in the United States was no longer temporary, and people had to
choose whether to remain and conform or leave. A few returned to Italy, but most stayed
and embraced a permanent life in America. No longer migratory, male workers sent for
wives and children to live with them in the United States, and community ties deepened.243
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Italian Americans were moderate leftists, and only a minority were inflexible
radicals who refused to see the potential of gaining allies within government. As one 1922
mocking response from Il Martello began: “Wait, wait! We [will] fix our bosses next
November when we will vote for our candidates.” According to the article, the adherents
of “yellow unionism” – a reference to the conformist American Federation of Labor –
pushed this sentiment. While they sought to organize new workplaces, they simultaneously
squelched any tangible improvements by transferring the burden of revolutionary action
from themselves as potential leaders to the ballot box. The belief that new political
representatives in Washington would have provided workers everything that they deserved
was a fanciful wish, nothing short of a miracle, and the article ended sarcastically, “and we
wait!”244
Italian Americans may have shared the leftist ideologues’ belief that revolutionary
change via political engagement was questionable, but they refused to believe it to be
impossible. This attribute separated them from men like Tresca, who later denounced the
New Deal as a counter-revolutionary measure meant to shore up the old order.245 As
exemplified in an article printed in Il Cittadino Italo-Americano a month before Il
Martello’s critique of politics, both camps generally agreed about working-class problems,
but they differed significantly in approach. Titled Scioperomania (Strikemania), the
editorial opined about recent strikes in the railroad industry. The piece began bluntly: “We
are not communists” and do not identify with the extreme parties and their obsession with
strikes, but “we sympathize with the workers of any type, because we believe not in the
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absolute dominance of capital on … the workers,” but in collaboration. It was a nuanced
interpretation. The writer agreed with the critique about craft unionism and asserted that
Samuel Gompers and other labor officials pushed workers into unnecessary strikes. They
acted not as concerned leaders but as bosses who wrongly exploited the rank and file for
self-profit. The article raised the issue of fairness; the railroad workers were not wrong to
want improved conditions, but a strike by one sector of the economy hurt workers in other
industries that already suffered pay cuts and layoffs. Moreover, a worker’s revolution was
unrealistic as the community lacked the necessary “conscience,” an allusion to Marxist
theory. The majority of those associated with the revolutionary political movements were
“passive,” primarily because the most dissatisfied were free to return home. Instead, voting
was the most feasible means for community and worker advancement. The solution was
for laws to raise the worker to create a balance between capital and labor. Increased
political participation was necessary, and future success meant engagement with the state
rather than rejecting it.246
The editorial was not a one-off interpretation, and even those committed to
revolutionary ideals noted that civic nationalism and democratic principles stifled
radicalism. In 1921, ll Martello printed a letter from “A. D.” of Monongahela,
Pennsylvania, that recounted a memorial for a fallen soldier.247 Given the timing, A. D.
was most likely referring to services for Antonio Fiorentino, a recipient of the
Distinguished Service Cross who was killed in France on 25 August 1918 at age twenty.
Anticipated as the largest military funeral seen in Rankin, Fiorentino’s memorial included
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a high Catholic mass followed by a procession comprised of the American Legion and
other organizations from Rankin, Homestead, Swissvale, Wilmerding, and Wilkinsburg to
nearby Braddock Catholic Cemetery for burial.248 A. D. watched those in the procession
who “were the members of the Circolo Pietro Gori” leftist organization as they walked
under the American flag, “hat in hand, the new devotees of the patriotic religion.” Only a
few years prior, this flag represented the “enemy of every liberty.” Now the “red camp” of
revolutionaries was “a true cemetery” as adherents strayed from the ideology. These people
instead “all crouched in societies of mutual ruin” (a derogatory reference to the perceived
reactionary mutual aid societies) and proclaimed, “we emancipated ourselves.”249 Guy
Liberti, the anarchist leader from Cleveland, directly commented in a later interview about
the ability of Americanization to temper radicalism. When speaking about Galleani’s son,
Liberti remarked that “the children were drawn away from anarchism because the influence
of the school and the street is more powerful than any other.”250 If Americanizing
influences and the street’s public sphere turned the son of the most notable ItalianAmerican anarchist away from the ideology, few people could resist moderating effects.
Steeped in civic nationalism, Italian Americans realized that only their involvement
with government and the state would bring systemic and lasting change. They never lost a
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sense of working-class grievance and the need for mass unionization as bequeathed from
the leftists, but they found alternate means to attain their goals. The advent of Fascism in
Italy presented the community with a real-world inspiration. Benito Mussolini offered a
third way between capitalism and socialism that benefited the working class, and Italian
Americans consumed this additional influence to inform their political ideology before the
New Deal.
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Chapter Four
An Alternative Vision
Fascist Influence and Ideological Moderation
In the final episode of the previous chapter, writer “A. D.” chastised fellow leftist
radicals from around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for turning “a red camp” into a “true
cemetery.” During a June 1921 memorial service for a fallen Italian-American soldier,
whose body had been returned from France for burial in Braddock, roughly ten miles up
the Monongahela River from downtown Pittsburgh, A. D. watched in disbelief as
revolutionary idealists suddenly changed opinions. The people who had previously referred
to the United States as “the enemy of every liberty” for the government’s role in
suppressing dissent now paraded “hat in hand” under the American flag. In disgust at this
perceived betrayal, A. D. proclaimed, “if people go forward at this rate[,] … Fascism will
gain a foothold even in this unfortunate continent.”1 A. D.’s remarks provide an eerie
foreshadowing concerning the Italian-American community’s ideological shift during the
1920s: Fascism became extremely popular, including within circles of people who only a
few years prior expressed support for leftist radicalism.
Fascism was the last significant influence of the ideological triad – alongside civic
nationalism and leftism – that reshaped Italian Americans’ political beliefs before the New

A. D., “Corrispondenze: Monongahela, Pa.,” Il Martello (New York, NY), 9 July 1921,
4.
1

232

Deal. To the dismay of leftist radicals, Fascism became extremely popular within ItalianAmerican communities because it appeared to improve conditions in their homeland and
therefore offered an apt counter to American nativists that looked down on the ethnic group
as a lesser people. However, most Italian Americans never became committed Blackshirts.2
As John P. Diggins remarked in Mussolini and Fascism, when “put to the ultimate test,
Italian-American Fascism proved more gesture than substance.”3 Even after a decade of
influence, Italian Americans responded with performative support for Benito Mussolini’s
imperialist war in Ethiopia in 1935; few answered the Fascist call to fight. Once the United
States entered the Second World War in 1941, the Italian-American community repudiated
its past allegiance.4 Certainly, committed Fascists existed in the United States, but most
Italian Americans were philo-Fascists, open and friendly to Mussolini’s regime but not
consumed by the ideology. 5
Unlike radical leftism, Fascism disseminated vigorously into Italian-American
communities. While Carlo Tresca and other leftists fought an uphill battle for acceptance
even before the Red Scare, Fascism used state apparatuses and local prominenti (prominent
Italian-American community leaders) as carriers. The ethnic group had long accepted local
and regional consular agents, and their respectability made the diffusion of Fascism
palatable. Personal support from local notables, such as Cleveland physician and Ohio Sons

2

John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1972), 106–10.
3
Diggins, 108.
4
Diggins, 106–8.
5
Philo-, rather than pro-, Fascist is specific here. This distinction is borrowed from
Nunzio Pernicone, who used the term philo-Fascist to identity Italian Americans who
were favorable to Fascism but did not join Fascist organizations and become devout
followers. Nunzio Pernicone, Carlo Tresca: Portrait of a Rebel (New York, NY:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 127–34.
233

of Italy state lodge Grand Venerable Dr. Giovanni A. Barricelli, added weight to
ideological acceptance. Finally, the ethnic press played a considerable role. Since their
inception, Italian-American newspapers had carved out a niche in the media market by
providing immigrants stories that concerned their lives and families. This included
extensive coverage of Italian events. As Fascism unfolded and grew, Italian-American
editors documented and interpreted the developments. Fascism diffused into the ItalianAmerican public sphere because it utilized all these bridges to reach ordinary people.
Ideological dispersion was wide and generally accepted. Fascism caught on in
Italian-American communities for three main reasons. First, there was media inaccuracy.
People formed opinions based not on historical reality but on the day-to-day information
they read in the newspapers and heard from friends and family. The deepening of Fascist
state repression in Italy sanitized information regarding the regime. The “cleansed” version
of Fascism became acceptable as criticisms of the system related to violence and repression
appeared to give way toward consensual approval in Italy. Second, Fascism caught on
because it worked. Within only a decade of the regime’s creation, it appeared to have
implemented solutions related to Italian economic instability and class tensions that had
plagued the nation for decades. Although much of this perceived progress was propaganda
and the result of media misinformation, average Italian Americans believed reports about
Fascist functionality. Finally, as Benito Mussolini revived Italy’s status as a preeminent
world power, Italian advancement reflected positively on the ethnic population in the
United States. Italian Americans adopted Italian nationalism to claim these victories as
their own, and they used these successes to defend themselves from American nativists’
arguments of ethnic-Italian inferiority.
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As an ideological consideration, Fascism acted similarly to the leftist influence
described in the previous chapter. It penetrated communities via the work of its most devout
followers. However, average Italian Americans were not bound to every aspect of Fascist
doctrine. They approached the system with a background in leftist ideas, and this
foundation affected their views of the new system. Areas of overlap, such as concerning
syndicalism, which formed the basis of Fascist corporatism (a system in which industry
and worker trade unions negotiated labor policy under state mediation), deepened
commitment to organizational attributes first learned from the leftists. Civic nationalism
also influenced ideological amalgamation. As seen in the previous chapter, Italian
Americans rejected the radical leftists’ hatred of government; instead, they viewed the state
as a possible partner in their quest for working-class rights. Fascism provided examples of
a government intervening in the economy on behalf of ordinary citizens. Italian Americans
celebrated the attributes that worked in Italy: corporatism, public works programs that
provided employment to the people and improved the nation, and a strong central leader
willing to act quickly to solve crises. Fascism presented Italian Americans with examples
that influenced their thinking about political issues at home. As will be explained in chapter
six, they invoked these ideas borrowed from Mussolini’s Italy when America experienced
its economic crisis during the late 1920s.
However, this moderation of ideological influences was always a two-way street,
which explains why the vast majority of Italian Americans did not become outright
Fascists. They purged the Fascist attributes that were irreconcilable with the other
influences. This was most noticeable concerning the Blackshirts (the paramilitary squads)
and state repression. After years of learning about American free speech and democratic
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values, along with the leftist denunciations of the American state when it failed to live up
to those tenets, Fascists never convinced Italian Americans that political intiOhioation was
an idea worth replicating in the United States. By Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932,
the vast majority of Italian Americans were not Fascists that desired the complete
replication of the Italian model in the United States; they were philo-Fascists that had
absorbed the best attributes of Mussolini’s system to inform and shape their beliefs about
an ideal American domestic policy.

A Philo-Fascist Community
Fascism was popular during the 1920s and 1930s, but the Second World War and
the disastrous collapse of Fascism in Italy created historical amnesia in which few scholars
wanted to discuss the ideology in the United States during the immediate postwar period.
Initial investigations of the topic derived from transnational works on Italy, notably how
Mussolini’s foreign policy affected the United States and its people. The academic
acceptance of ethnic history during the 1960s prompted a surge of new works beginning in
the 1970s that treated Fascism in the United States as an appropriate inquiry area.6
John P. Diggins’s 1972 book, Mussolini and Fascism, opened the field by arguing
that the Italian system was popular across a wide range of American demographics.7 Others
followed suit concerning narrower topics about the acceptance of Fascism, all while
increasing the evidence that it was a mass phenomenon. According to Philip V.
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Cannistraro, an early, independent form of Fascism began in Italian-American
communities before the October 1922 March on Rome, the event that put Mussolini in
power.8 Peter R. D’Agostino exposed how Mussolini’s détente with the Vatican increased
the prestige of Fascism for Catholics in the United States.9 The American government
favored Mussolini’s regime because it offered political stability and was more amenable to
American goals than the communist alternative.10 Others noted that Fascism found
popularity with Italian Americans because its nationalistic rhetoric forged a new identity
and cast a better image of the Italian people.11 Fascism was undoubtedly popular in the
United States, peaking during the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Popularity did not automatically translate to servile loyalty. As Diggins suggested,
much of the period debate about affiliation derived from misinterpretations by the political
extremes: “Too often anti-Fascists regarded the Italian-Americans’ devotion to the home
country as unqualified allegiance to Fascism and Mussolini, just as pro-Fascists assumed
that any criticism of Mussolini and his regime bespoke a slander on Italy itself.”12
Historians typically document significant figures and organizations, entities that left the
most extensive written records. However, these people and groups were frequently proFascist and on the ideological spectrum’s fringes. Scholars presented their subjects’ views,
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thereby creating a narrative in which all people who favored Fascism, including the philoFascists, were always opposed to leftism.13 While undoubtedly true for the most devoted
adherents who viewed Fascism from the same perspective as their anarchist and socialist
enemies, a type of all or nothing ideology, ordinary people were not bound by dogmatic
purity. Instead, regular Italian Americans, who did not live under the shadow of totalitarian
Fascism like their relatives in Italy, were free to accept or reject facets of Mussolini’s
system to inform their political ideology in the United States.
This oppositional narrative draws from the reality that as Fascism spread, it
provoked a vocal anti-Fascist reaction.14 The two camps became mutually exclusive in that
any favorability toward one received condemnation from the other; there was no gray area
between them. Some of this is a legacy from period anti-Fascist intellectuals who left some
of the earliest in-depth analyses and investigations into Italian-American Fascism but
whose own political beliefs and activism colored their perceptions.15 As Diggins remarked,
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many on the political left forced Fascism into a Marxist class interpretation and failed to
see any of the “progressive features” in the system, such as Edmondo Rossoni and
Giuseppe Bottai’s syndicalism. The workers became lumpenproletariat (those that utterly
lacked class consciousness) because these intellectuals could not comprehend workingclass support for Fascist labor programs.16 However, as seen in the previous chapter, most
Italian Americans liked parts of leftist ideology, but they scoffed at revolution and wished
to work within the extant political system. An oppositional narrative was also a product of
the Fascist origin story, in which Mussolini and his party declared themselves the enemies
of Bolshevism.17 Il Duce confirmed this in My Autobiography, a work written for an
American audience in 1928, when he described his early political career in 1919: “But to
the eyes of the glowing crowd I was a patriot, a preacher of resistance, he who succeeded,
through the violent articles written from day to day in the Popolo d’Italia [Mussolini’s
newspaper], in beginning the smashing of Bolshevism.”18
Fascists and leftists were admittedly the sworn enemies of each other, but those
committed to either side accounted for only a fraction of the population. According to its
leader, Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel, the Italian government-sponsored Fascist League of
North America (FLNA) contained 7,000 members in 1926, which doubled to 14,000 the
following year. The exiled anti-Fascist intellectual Gaetano Salvemini believed that some
five percent of Italian Americans were “out and out Fascists.”19 Estimates from testimony
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presented to the Dies Committee on un-American activities placed the number of
committed pro-Fascists at around 10,000. This figure was a fraction of an Italian-American
population estimated at four and a half million people in 1940.20 By comparison, as noted
in the previous chapter, Carlo Tresca’s radical-leftist newspaper, Il Martello, circulated
10,500 copies weekly in 1924 and 8,000 in 1929, forming a community numerically similar
to the FLNA.21 However, just as the leftists reached and influenced thousands beyond their
tight-knit groups, so did the Fascists. The result was a large number of philo-Fascists.
Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel estimated that seventy percent of Italian Americans admired
Mussolini.22 Salvemini asserted that around the five percent core of true Fascists, another
thirty-five percent leaned in its direction.23 He continued that fifty percent of Italian
Americans “tend[ed] to be concerned only with their own affairs” and had not put much
thought into it.24 Most people were not Fascist advocates or adherents; instead, they laid
somewhere in the middle as Fascist sympathizers to varying degrees.
When discussing Fascism as it concerned most average Italian Americans,
Mussolini’s system was an influence, not a raison d’être. The majority did not harbor a
deep partisan commitment. They were willing to identify with Fascism during celebrations,
but they were not loyal defenders of the regime. They were philo-Fascists whose beliefs
were influenced by Mussolini’s system but not bound to it.
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Fascist Popularity
In 1923, Francesco Biamonte, publisher of the Italian-American newspaper Il
Patriota, wrote a letter to the editor of the Indiana Evening Gazette to explain some of the
ideological cleavages within the Italian-American community to an English-language
audience. While seeking to calm anxious Americans about rumors of a local Fascist
organization, he documented three types of Italian-American views related to Mussolini’s
movement. The first group consisted of long-term residents so thoroughly Americanized
that members considered Fascism an Italian institution only and had little more to say about
it. The second cohort contained the younger generations, including First World War
veterans and “many moderate socialists,” along with some older Italian Americans, who
wanted to see Italy’s improvement. The final group, which was anti-Fascist, consisted of
“the extreme socialistic type, which [did] not share [viewpoints], opinion or sympathy with
anything not its own.”25 Biamonte’s assessment is an excellent interpretational framework
to explain the Italian-American situation. While fringe groups either dissociated
themselves from Fascism or were so radicalized by extremism that they refused to hear
anything that would question their dogmatic beliefs, a larger, more ideologically flexible
group contained nationalists and moderate leftists.
As described in the previous chapter, leftist ideology was prevalent, even in light
of the numerous obstacles to its spread. This raises the question of why so many Italian
Americans became philo-Fascists if leftist ideologues viewed Mussolini and his party as
an antithesis. Popular reception occurred because Fascism provided solutions to problems
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in the Italian-American community. As Biamonte suggested, these were along two
avenues. First, Fascism satisfied a sense of nationalism. By stabilizing and improving Italy,
Mussolini provided Italian Americans a sense of self-respect and an example that they
could use to defend themselves from American nativists’ declarations of Italian inferiority.
Second, Fascism appealed to those “moderate socialists,” those with flexible leftist beliefs,
because Mussolini incorporated parts of leftist ideology from the syndicalists into his
system. Underlying all this growing acceptance was propaganda; the Fascism that Italian
Americans came to appreciate was not a historical reality. Censorship in Italy shaped
perceptions in the United States. Whether or not Mussolini made the trains run on time, as
the old adage claimed, is irrelevant; the importance is that Italian Americans believed
statements of Fascist propaganda because the totalitarian state allowed no competing
narrative. Italian Americans did not live under the Fascist regime, and they did not see the
successes and failures of the system firsthand. As Mussolini’s government silenced critics,
banned publications, and pressured regular citizens to conform at home, Italian Americans
received misinformation, rather than facts, about Fascist successes to shape their opinions.
For these reasons, Fascism became popular in Italian-American communities.
Fascism as a story of nationalistic triumph provided a counter to American
discrimination. As Diggins pointed out, Italian-American acceptance of Fascism was a
logical response to American nativism. Residing in a society dominated by white AngloSaxon Protestants, Italian Americans developed an inferiority complex. Alienation pushed
them toward Mussolini.26 Cannistraro continued Diggins’s thesis: “Politically and
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ideologically most Italian Americans were not fascists. Rather, for many of them, fascism
was a means through which they could achieve stature and adjustment within the context
of American society.”27 The attributes that Fascism offered fit the needs of the community
at the time. As mentioned in chapter one, Italian-American identity was in a transitionary
period during the 1920s and 1930s. Prominenti, who pushed the idea of a single Italian
community rather than regional identities, found an ally in Mussolini and his party’s
celebration of the Italian nation and a modern “New Italy.”28 Mussolini’s attempts to
elevate Italy’s status to preeminent world power became akin to defending Italians in the
United States from ethnic prejudice and perceived inferiority. However, Cannistraro was
correct that most were not outright Fascists; instead, as philo-Fascists, they used
Mussolini’s Italy, borrowing to support their ideas and beliefs when necessary.
Prejudice against Italian Americans was rampant by the 1920s. As described in
detail in chapter two, this discrimination drove many Italian Americans to seek citizenship
to secure their civil rights. The growing second, American-born generation made
repatriation unlikely. People increasingly felt the need to defend themselves now that the
United States was their permanent residence rather than a temporary sojourn. This
prejudice also caused many to look for a national savior to improve their homeland because
they understood that events and actions abroad reflected positively or poorly on those in
the United States. For example, in February 1920, Senator John K. Shields of Tennessee
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commented on Italian territorial claims around the Adriatic Sea. During a speech about the
United States’ future role in Europe, Shields interjected: “How far should the United States
enter a controversy concerning a few ‘Dagoes’ over on the Adriatic?” 29 This slur by a
sitting senator against the Italian people, which officials struck from the Congressional
Record, drew condemnation from the community. Representative William S. Vare of
Pennsylvania, responding to outrage from prominente C. C. A. Baldi and other ItalianAmerican constituents in Philadelphia, denounced Shields’s comments.30 New York State
Senator Salvatore A. Cotillo, one of the few Italian-American politicians above a local
level at the time, filed a resolution in the New York Legislature that called for Shields’s
censure.31 The slur resonated not because it was about a “few Dagoes” in Europe; rather,
these views about Italians colored perceptions of those who no longer resided in Italy.
Italian Americans understood that they suffered from dual criteria for judgment. They
could not wholly shed an Italian identity despite their stated commitment to American
principles or military service to the United States during the First World War.32
Italian Americans adopted civic nationalism, but American judgments predicated
on foreign issues in which those living outside of Italy had no control stifled ethnic
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advancement and full acceptance into American society. Writing “We Protest!” in Il
Patriota from his home in Lucerne Mines, Pennsylvania, Donato Stabile asserted, “we
cannot … remain indifferent and silent” about such slurs and Italy, which “was the cradle
of civilization, of the arts and of science.” Although Stabile claimed the Battle of Vittorio
Veneto – the Italian breakthrough that collapsed the Austro-Hungarian lines and
contributed to the end of the First World War – as a recent point of national pride, the fact
that Italy “was the cradle” of societal advances proved to be an issue for the community.
Whether conscious or not, Stabile admitted that the height of Italian political, artistic, and
scientific power was in the past.33 Historical superiority was an inadequate reply to
accusations of modern inferiority.
However, some living in the United States were hopeful about the future. Around
the same time as Shields’s comments, Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano printed a
piece titled “The Bright Economic Outlook of Italy.” Paolo De Vecchi, an Italian-American
prominente from San Francisco, described his recent visit to the peninsula to reassure those
in the United States about Italian potential. Contrary to American news reports, which
described Italy as on the verge of collapse or a Bolshevik-style revolution, the Italian
people were uniformly optimistic about their nation’s future. De Vecchi noted that the
economy was well on the road to recovery, or as La Voce del Popolo Italiano summarized
it, “Italy is resuming her march upon the path of progress and civilization to glory and
prosperity.”34
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De Vecchi was a good salesman but not a prophet. Italy continued to experience
upheaval throughout 1920 and 1921. The post-First World War recession that affected the
United States also harmed Italy. Inflation crippled the value of the lira. Thousands of
industrial workers occupied factories and shipyards in the fall of 1920. Ansaldo and Ilva,
two of the largest companies in Italy, went bankrupt the following year. Concurrently,
peasants claimed and occupied lands in the rural areas. While De Vecchi was correct about
a Bolshevik-style revolution’s improbability, the Italian government provided few
solutions to these national problems. The inclusion of new voters and parties, including the
Socialists and Catholic-oriented Popolari, created a divided parliament and unstable
government leadership.35
Italian Americans became open to Fascism for the same reason as other Americans:
it offered to elevate Italy’s status and create stability without significant upheaval. The
period context is essential. As noted in the previous chapter, the ongoing Red Scare
frightened many Americans from association with leftist radicals; this is why the SaccoVanzetti case and other causes célèbres were necessary for the continued diffusion of
ideology. Italian Americans did not want their homeland painted red, which would have
reflected badly on them. Some news reports, such as a summer 1921 series by the
Cleveland Plain Dealer’s European correspondent, W. C. Howells, offered fair, balanced,
and accurate commentary of the Italian situation, but others played into red hysteria.36 Six
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months after Stabile’s defense of the Italian people, his local English-language paper
commented about the “crisis” in Italy. The Indiana Evening Gazette began with a
disclaimer that most Italians were not communists. However, it asserted forcefully “the
peril is real and imminent” and doubted whether the government could enforce law and
order because the military and police were “honeycombed with Bolshevism.”37 After King
Victor Emmanuel III appointed Mussolini prime minister in response to Fascist threats to
march on Rome, assume control of the government, and bring order in October 1922, the
American press responded with relief. In a worldwide fight against Bolshevism,
newspapers willingly overlooked Fascist violence as a small price to pay for Italian stability
against communist encroachment.38 This pattern was evident in one Associated Press
report shortly after the March on Rome under the subheading “nation saved from
Bolshevism”: “The triumphant entry of Fascisti troops into Rome today was the apotheosis
of Italy’s bloodless revolution. … [The day] will forever mark a great epoch in Italy’s
national life. For, in 1870, they [the old Romans] said, Italy was born; today she has been
saved from Bolshevism.”39
The American government and diplomatic corps operated in tandem with the press
to create an acceptable view of Fascism. Many American diplomats had initially painted
the Fascists as violent thugs who contributed to postwar political chaos as much as the
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communists. In the summer of 1922, the Warren Harding administration reversed policy
and accepted that working with the Fascists offered Americans the best chance of creating
stability in Italy. The American government and business leaders – who wanted stable
markets – accepted Fascism as an appropriate compromise for a friendly, capitalist ally.40
These actions by the American press and government presented a green light for Italian
Americans to embrace Mussolini’s regime.
Once allowed by American society to favor Fascism, Italian Americans were open
to Mussolini’s system because they were not revolutionary anti-statists by disposition, as
mentioned in the previous chapter. According to Charles Edward Merriam and Harold
Foote Gosnell’s study of nonvoters in Chicago during the early 1920s, less than one percent
of Italian Americans listed “disbelief in all political action” as a reason for not participating
in elections.41 In this light, many would have disagreed with the assessment made by Luigi
De Cecco in Il Martello concerning Professor Bertelli’s December 1922 talk in Pittsburgh
that preceded a radical drama written by Pietro Gori. After condemning Fascism, Bertelli
offered his opinion that the working class would only succeed by organizing itself and
replicating the corporate trusts used by capitalist businessmen. De Cecco, who supported
his argument by noting that he and his kind had three decades of experience, remarked that
Bertelli and other parliamentarian socialists were wrong. The state supported the capitalist
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interests, and direct action by the people was the only solution.42 The problem with De
Cecco’s argument was that his thirty years of experience had not brought tangible success.
While Professor Bertelli argued for mass organization, many Italian Americans
disfavored one possible end to collective action: communism. Italians emigrated primarily
for economic reasons.43 Sociologist Robert F. Foerster came to this conclusion in 1919
when he stated, “the causes which have sustained an emigration of millions of persons for
half a century do in truth constitute a defect or an inadequacy of great magnitude in the
Italian economic system.”44 Nevertheless, the solution was never to overturn that system
entirely. One commonality in many family histories was the assertion that immigration to
the United States happened because of the need for money, often with the intention of
returning home to buy land in Italy because jobs there were limited.45 Full communism,
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complete with common ownership of businesses and land confiscation, was not what most
people sought.46 Italian Americans wanted to reform the system, not eradicate it. When
Italian socialists met in Livorno in January 1921 to discuss their movement’s future,
Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano stood firmly with the gradual-reformist wing led
by Italian parliamentarian Filippo Turati. Those who wanted to follow Vladimir Lenin’s
Bolshevik Revolution and communism had lost their minds.47 This stance was similar to
that made a few weeks prior: “It is necessary to work in the interest of the collective good.
The relations between capital and labor must be improved – the class hatred, in a word the
hatred that pushes man against man, brother against brother, must cease.”48 The “collective
good” required class cooperation, but it did not mean accepting the current system that
exploited workers for the benefit of the wealthy.
Fascism was the logical evolution of leftism, a more workable solution to the left’s
economic critique. Many Fascist leaders and theorists began their political journeys from
the ideological left. They viewed problems through a Marxist lens, but they had concluded
that a proletarian revolution was not an appropriate solution to the problems produced by
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industrialization and modernity.49 Benito Mussolini had been an outspoken member of the
Italian Socialist Party, and his revolutionary stances often put him in conflict with the
group’s reformist wing. He was the editor of its newspaper, Avanti!, before splitting from
the party in 1914 because of his interventionist stance during the First World War. 50
Edmondo Rossoni, who later became an important theorist for the Fascist-syndicalist wing
of Mussolini’s party, was a revolutionary syndicalist associated with the Industrial Workers
of the World. During his time in the United States from 1910 until he left for Italy in
January 1913, he wrote for the radical newspaper Il Proletario, organized workers, and
went on speaking tours, including a talk in Cleveland in 1911.51 Other leaders who became
Fascists after beginning their careers as leftists included Alfredo Rocco (a significant
contributor to corporatist economic theory), Michele Bianchi, and Massimo Rocca.52
The argument that Fascism evolved from leftist ideology assisted Italian-American
acceptance. According to Steubenville, Ohio’s Messaggero, there was a clear connection
between the two doctrines because Fascism was simply Bolshevism in action. As the writer
theorized, “anarchism and dictatorship, in their necessary dialectic, … intertwine
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themselves together: the tumult of the most disparate tendencies always finishes with the
ending in one whirlpool. This whirlpool is fascism.” Committed leftists dismissed such a
notion. As Il Martello responded, “a beautiful minestrone, in fact: anarchism and
dictatorship that intertwine themselves together. Unbelievable[!]”53 The evolution of
anarchism, Bolshevism, or any other left-wing radicalism into Fascism appeared
inconceivable to many theorists, but this progression was what some analysts told average
Italian Americans to believe. Giuseppe Prezzolini, who later disseminated Fascism from
his position as head of Columbia University’s Casa Italiana, argued in his article, “The
Fascisti and the Class Struggle,” that the movement usurped syndicalism. The working
class would benefit as much from Fascism as from socialism or communism.54
High-profile conversions after the March on Rome in 1922 fed the narrative. Enrico
Ferri, a socialist and expert on criminology, evolved politically and, before his death,
accepted a senate position from Mussolini.55 In early 1927, Italian Americans learned that
a group of socialist leaders, including Lodovico D’Aragona, the former secretary of the
Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (a powerful Italian labor organization), converted to
Fascism. Corporatist class cooperation, rather than class struggle, was a more practical
approach to syndicalism, they admitted.56 Count Ilya Tolstoy, the son of famed writer Leo
Tolstoy, argued that even Soviet Russia was destined to evolve into Fascism. 57 Italian
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Americans came to view Fascism as the next ideological progression concerning economic
theory.
Media inaccuracy contributed to acceptance. Italian Americans formed opinions
based on available information, not on absolute truth. Some of this inaccuracy was due to
the nature of Fascism as an ideology. As Diggins noted, “Italy’s strange revolution from
the Right wrapped itself in a tissue of synthetic ideologies, a deliberate exercise in
obscurantism enabling Mussolini to exploit the ambiguity of his movement and present to
Americans a many-sided image.”58 Fascism was a fluid ideology and not easily defined.59
Carlo Tresca’s Il Martello noted this vagueness in 1921, quoting Mussolini as having
defined himself and his followers as “monarchists and antimonarchists, … republicans and
antirepublicans,

socialists

and

antisocialists,

[and]

revolutionaries

and

antirevolutionaries.”60 Mussolini’s unwillingness, or inability, to define Fascism as a
doctrine during the first half of his regime left people to interpret his conflicting statements.
Il Duce approved a definition around 1931 to appear in the Enciclopedia italiana, but the
entry, penned by men such as philosopher Giovanni Gentile, was enigmatic beyond its
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emphasis on state supremacy.61 The passage admitted that Fascism began with no doctrine,
but it came to define itself in opposition to liberalism, socialism, and democracy;
nonetheless, Fascism also borrowed from the successful aspects of these ideologies.62 In
Mussolini’s mind, there was nothing incompatible about denouncing the mechanisms of
democracy (“Fascism denies that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can
direct human society.”) while also supporting its aims (“Fascism desires the State to be a
strong and organic body, at the same time reposing upon broad and popular support.”).63
Conflicting statements throughout the 1920s and early 1930s provided ammunition for
sources like Il Martello to attack Fascism, but they also allowed editors within the
mainstream Italian-American press to tailor their reporting in a more positive light if
desired.
Developments in Italy aided presentation in the United States. As Fascists repressed
dissent at home, Italians abroad received an increasingly sterilized, more acceptable image
of Fascism. Initially, during the early 1920s, many Italian Americans had a wait-and-see
mentality concerning the new political system.64 Disparate elements existed within the
Fascist Party, but it was unclear if Mussolini and his moderate allies would suppress the
violent Blackshirts and their local leaders in the provinces. Moreover, the Fascists were
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one of many Italian political parties during Mussolini’s first years as prime minister. He
had hoped to consolidate his rule during the April 1924 elections. Intimidation ensured
good Fascist returns, but irregularities prompted Giacomo Matteotti of the Unitary Socialist
Party to denounce the elections on the floor of parliament on 30 May 1924. Matteotti’s
disappearance and murder prompted a crisis during the summer of 1924, which Mussolini
used to consolidate his power and establish a true dictatorship beginning in 1925.65
Local media presented Italian Americans with a different story than the reality
documented by historians. In September 1924, Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
reprinted a letter sent to Alberto Di Tommaso from a cousin who had returned to Italy two
years prior after living in the US for almost a decade. The letter told readers that “the
Matteotti affair concerns only the hotheaded enemies of the present government[, an
administration] that was able to restore order and put [an] end to the strike mania of the
socialist times.” Most Italians found the murder deplorable, but they also felt that the
“idealists,” assumably the radical socialists and communists, wanted to use the crisis for
their benefit.66 Underlying the letter was a narrative that Matteotti’s killing only involved
militant elements that did not represent the majority of Fascists. In this explanation, the
Fascists were right to suppress their party’s violent extremists, and their “normalization”
appeared to bring stability to Italian politics.67
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The reality was that the Fascists achieved the end of dissent by using totalitarian
methods, including press censorship. Italians in the United States did not see this process,
and they relied only on news reports and letters filled with propaganda and inaccuracies.
The great public works projects lauded by the Fascists are concrete examples of this
dissonance.68 Much of Italy remained untouched and in poverty when the regime fell after
two decades in power.69 Messina serves as a useful illustration. After the 1908 earthquake
destroyed much of the Sicilian city, which had been the fourth-largest trading port in Italy,
the government began rebuilding structures. Upon taking power, the Fascists accused the
ruling Liberals of lagging to the extent that it would have taken eighty years to rebuild and
recover fully. However, the Fascist government was also unsuccessful in turning the
temporary wooden structures into permanent edifices, which Mussolini noted privately in
his conversation with the Minister of Public Works in 1937. Fifty years after the
earthquake, many of the ‘temporary’ structures remained.70 As is discussed later in this
chapter, public works became celebrated in the Italian-American press. Those in the United
States were unable to see the reported progress in person, especially after American
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immigration restrictions slowed people’s movement to and from Italy. Most people
accepted inaccurate information because they had little evidence on which to question its
validity.
As the Fascist police state imprisoned or harassed opponents to the point of silence,
seeking refuge abroad, or acquiescing to Mussolini’s regime, counter-narratives to the
propaganda became less common and perceived as less reliable. The lack of debate
convinced those abroad that Fascism was being refined, perfected, and more widely
accepted. One of the biggest potential threats to Fascist rule during the early 1920s was the
Catholic Church and the related Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI, or the Italian Popular
Party). Founded in 1919 by Don Luigi Sturzo, a Sicilian priest, as a Christian democracy
alternative and counter to the entrenched Liberals and revolutionary Marxists that vied for
power immediately after the First World War, the PPI quickly became the second-largest
party in the nation.71 Nevertheless, as David I. Kertzer concluded in The Pope and
Mussolini, “the Vatican played a central role both in making the Fascist regime possible
and in keeping it in power.”72 Pope Pius XI and Mussolini came to a mutual understanding
about the role of the PPI. In exchange for Mussolini restoring Catholic influence in Italian
life and promising to suppress the Fascist Party’s anticlericalism, Pius XI agreed to
disempower the PPI and pressure Sturzo’s removal.73 Sturzo fled Italy, and by 1924 the
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PPI was in decline.74 The Catholic Church could have challenged the Fascists but did not
do so publicly. While Pius XI and Mussolini fumed about each other in private, the public
only saw a concordance between the two men and their institutions, best exemplified by
the landmark Lateran Accords of 1929 that ended formal hostilities between the Catholic
Church and the Italian state.75 Mussolini became a celebrated statesman, and the
conciliation made front-page news in the Italian-American press.76 By appeasing the
Catholic Church, the Fascists removed their strongest political opponent.
They forcibly silenced other critics of the regime from public debate. This was
especially true after Matteotti’s murder in June 1924, an event that Mussolini used to
establish a true dictatorship by the following year. Italian Fascism always had violent
elements within it, but state institutions became mechanisms for political repression as the
party formally merged with the state. A new police code, which went into effect on 6
November 1926, allowed Arturo Bocchini, Mussolini’s chief of police from 1926 until
1940, to target, harass, and jail critics of the regime, many of whom the Fascists had been
surveilling for years.77 The state imprisoned the worst offenders in what Michael R. Ebner
termed the “Fascist archipelago,” internal confinement camps on the various
Mediterranean islands and in southern Italy.78 A special tribunal prosecuted Italian
Communist Party leaders beginning in February 1927, including parliamentary deputy and
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party secretary Antonio Gramsci who received a twenty-year prison sentence.79 Others
fled. Matteotti associate and socialist leader Filippo Turati escaped to Paris, where he and
other exiles, such as Carlo Rosselli, formed an anti-Fascist network.80 The historian and
politician Gaetano Salvemini left Italy in August 1925 after six weeks in jail for his
involvement with an anti-Fascist underground newspaper. He joined the Paris network and
later immigrated to the United States to continue his political activities and teach at Harvard
University.81 In total, the Fascists sentenced about fifteen thousand opponents to political
confinement.82 More impactful was the fear created by the regime’s violence, intimidation,
and punishment.83
As the Fascist government silenced critics or forced their exile, the media
increasingly presented Italian Americans with a sterilized image of the situation in Italy,
one in which Fascism became easier to accept. In addition to purging rival politicians, state
repression separated anti-Fascists from Italian organizations that gave them legitimacy and
authority. In December 1927, Italian Americans learned that authorities expelled ex-Prime
Minister Francesco Nitti and Arturo Labriola, a prominent syndicalist politician, from the
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati, essentially disbarring them.84 As critics of the regime
became separated from Italy and Italian organizations, their credibility to comment on
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current events declined. New associations created by dissidents as counters to their old
ones did not carry the same authority. Instead, the Italian-American press repeated
warnings from the Fascists to not trust those connected to new entities, such as Il Corriere
degli Italiani, an anti-Fascist newspaper published by the fuoriusciti (the anti-Fascist
exiles) in France. Il Corriere degli Italiani was “the center of pitfalls and conspiracies and
of an ignoble libel to the harm of our Country.” The newspaper was likely responsible for
inciting an assassination attempt against Benito Mussolini.85 In time, editorial-styled
articles independently offered similar condemnations. In January 1929, for example, Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano printed a rant titled “Idiota!” (“Idiot!”), which attacked a piece
published the previous month in La Libertà, another anti-Fascist paper from Paris. The
source criticized General Luigi Cadorna, who had died recently. In response, Il Cittadino
asked: “But it is an Italian that writes like this? We do not believe [it].”86 The implication
was clear; the fuoriusciti were so outside the mainstream of Italian opinions that those in
the United States needed to reject their writings altogether.
Harsh press laws in Italy compounded the problem of misinformation about the
regime. Italian Americans questioned the legitimacy of arguments from those who fled
Italy, but the remaining news sources in the country, which theoretically presented
firsthand accounts of Fascist rule, became inaccurate and full of propaganda. This was no
accident. Benito Mussolini understood the role of the press in creating consensus. He had
first gained an audience as editor of Avanti! The creation of his newspaper, Il Popolo
d’Italia, served to disseminate his political philosophy and build Fascist followers. Media
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was not to inform people but to shape views and opinions.87 Prominent American journalist
George Seldes commented on the Fascist leader’s obsession with the press: “But almost
every one who has ever interviewed Mussolini … will remember the colored pencil
scanning the columns of the local or foreign papers. These great men seem to care so much
for public opinion!”88
The Fascists understood that ‘public opinion’ of the regime was moldable. As Frank
Rosengarten argued in The Italian Anti-Fascist Press, the successful creation of
Mussolini’s dictatorship from 1922 to 1927 relied on the “incorporation of the Italian press
into a totalitarian state apparatus.”89 The free press’s incremental destruction began in the
summer of 1923 when Mussolini, Luigi Federzoni, and Alfredo Rocco convinced King
Victor Emmanuel III to approve new press laws that updated an edict from 1848. The new
decree actively targeted editors and newspapers that hurt “national prestige within Italy or
abroad or … cause[d] a disturbance of public order,” which included provoking class
tensions.90 A more consequential law followed in December 1925 and went into full effect
by the end of 1926. The new code required listing journalists and editors in a professional
directory. Since the Fascist Party controlled registration, the obligation barred those
deemed disloyal to the regime from publishing.91 Radio, as a new medium, quickly fell
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under state control by the end of 1928. A commission screened and censored all
programming, and Agenzia Stefani, the Fascist-aligned news agency, provided broadcast
reporting.92 The eventual direct transmission of programming from Rome to cities such as
Pittsburgh included news reports in English and Italian.93 A final act in May 1929
completed the profession’s subjugation to state control when Alfredo Rocco established
the High Commission for the Press under Mussolini’s brother, Arnaldo, to provide
discipline and centralization.94 These laws ultimately ensured that the state vetted editors
while providing a veil of autonomy because the organization’s members consisted of
influential journalists.95
These laws sterilized reporting in the Italian-American news media. Living across
the ocean, Italian-American editors relied on external sources to explain current events in
Italy. For example, during November 1922, the month following the March on Rome, the
Fascist seizure of power, Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano cited political
information, either verbatim or summarized and digested, from Gazzetta del Popolo
(Turin), La Stampa (Turin), Giornale di Roma, and Rivista Popolare.96 These articles had
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to compete with reports from the new Fascist-led government during the same period,
including reprints or summaries of Mussolini’s speeches and comments now that he was
the prime minister.97 Selections from Mussolini carried the authority associated with his
new office. However, the breadth of sources offered competing views about Fascism, such
as Filippo Turati’s denunciations of Mussolini.98 Subsequent press laws purged the
independence of these sources. For instance, the Fascists temporarily suspended the
publication of La Stampa, one of the most influential Italian national papers, in September
1925 for printing articles critical of the army. La Stampa reopened, but over the next few
years, the Fascists forced the resignations of chief editorialist Luigi Salvatorelli and
director Alfredo Frassati and the appointment of Fascist deputy Andrea Torre as managing
editor to guarantee ideological compliance.99
The American ‘free press’ offered little counterweight to this trend. American news
media generally supported the Fascists after their route to power succeeded without
revolution and bloodshed. Some, such as the Cleveland Plain Dealer, viewed Fascism as
the savior of Italian democracy. A few events raised condemnation in the American press,
such as the Matteotti murder, but criticism was generally minor. The media mostly
overlooked the negatives of Fascism until Mussolini’s aggression in Ethiopia in 1935.
Foreign correspondents contributed to the whitewashing. The Associated Press and Reuters
representative in Rome, Salvatore Cortesi, was friendly to Fascism. So too was his son,
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Arnaldo, a correspondent for the New York Times. American journalists stationed in Italy
benefited from perks such as free wire service, better housing, and tax benefits if they
refrained from writing negative stories and joined the press syndicate’s foreign branch. The
Fascists expelled nonconforming reporters, such as George Seldes.100 When the ItalianAmerican press sought English-language reports, those articles presented the same tone
concerning Fascism as their Italian sources.101
Italian Americans were open to Fascism because it fit their needs and appeared
popular. Early in the regime’s founding, American policymakers and media concluded that
Fascism was an acceptable alternative to Italian instability. In searching for a savior to
improve their homeland’s image to better reflect on their ethnicity, Italian Americans found
a helpful tool in Mussolini. As totalitarianism took hold, the media portrayal of Fascism
benefited. These attributes created a mass of people open and willing to support a novel
ideology.

Fascist Diffusion, Bridges to the People
Fascism diffused widely across the Italian-American community. As seen in the
previous chapter, leftists faced numerous obstacles to reach audiences. Fascism did not
have this problem. As historians Stefano Luconi and Matteo Pretelli showed, the Italian
state and its associated apparatuses aided the spread of Fascism to emigrants. In particular,
Mussolini wanted to create a political lobby to pressure the American government to enact
economic and diplomatic policy favorable to Italy.102 To achieve this, the Fascists
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developed a soft power campaign, often appealing to identity.103 Mussolini’s regime
regularly used everything from commercial ties and Italian-educational programming to
ethnic newspapers and radio shows to connect to Italians abroad.104 Many in the United
States were happy to cooperate. The prominenti especially took an interest in Mussolini’s
system. They had been at the forefront of the movement described in chapter one to forge
an ethnic community based on nationality. The nationalist aspects of Fascism fit their
needs. Additionally, the Fascist promise to solve problems without overturning the class
structure appealed to this group of professionals. Proponents of the ideology used the ethnic
institutions, such as newspapers and fraternal societies, which were already integral to the
community, to imbue respectability onto Fascism. Few ordinary Italian Americans escaped
its embrace.
Notable community leaders served as bridges for ideological diffusion to regular
people. Unlike the padroni, the “bosses,” who established power bases within communities
by providing jobs and thereby forming patron-client relationships, the prominenti earned
respect because they promoted and defended the Italian-American population as a whole
rather than their self-interests. By the 1920s, the prominenti had replaced the padroni as
the community leaders.105 The earned respect aided the prominenti when many of them
pushed their communities and local organizations toward favoring Fascism.
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One of these notables was Giovanni A. Barricelli of Cleveland. Born in
Benevenuto, Italy, in 1873, Barricelli immigrated to New York City at sixteen. Having
completed some coursework at the University of Naples, the young man continued his
medical studies in the United States at St. Francis College of New York and the University
of Illinois at Chicago. He completed additional work at New York’s Long Island Medical
College and had an office on Woodland Avenue in Cleveland’s Big Italy neighborhood.
Before his death in 1934, Barricelli became a noted cardiopulmonary specialist and a
translator for other medical works, such as Leonardo Bianchi’s Foundations of Mental
Health.106
By the advent of Fascism in Italy, Barricelli had already become a recognized
Italian-American leader in Cleveland and eventually Ohio.107 During his early years as a
doctor, Barricelli was interested in ethnic uplift, seeking the dual goals of Americanization
and group respect. In 1907, after local “Black Hand” criminals threatened Barricelli and an
associate, the men utilized the American solution, turning over the extortion letters to the
police.108 During the 1910 Columbus Day celebration, described as “the most pretentious
undertaking in which they [the Italian Americans of Cleveland] have ever participated as a
unit,” Barricelli stood as a representative and official speaker (in Italian) for the ethnic
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group.109 His reputation spread further because of his association with the Sons of Italy. In
May 1915, six fraternal societies organized the Ohio Grand Lodge and chose Alfredo
Militello as Grand Venerable. Francesco Zammataro replaced Militello only a few months
later, but during the 1917 leadership elections, Zammataro was happy to have Barricelli as
his successor.110
Barricelli’s tenure as leader of Ohio’s Sons of Italy coincided with the rise of
Fascism, and while he was not the most sycophantic advocate, the doctor certainly favored
the ideology and was a partner to entities that wished to spread it. He was an attendee at a
February 1924 dinner concerning the development of the Institute of Italian Culture, an
educational organization founded the previous year by noteworthy-Fascist adherents
Giuseppe Prezzolini and Henry J. Burchell, who was also secretary of the pro-Fascist ItalyAmerica Society and received a knighthood from Mussolini in 1923.111 In spring 1925,
Barricelli raised funds for Columbia University’s Casa Italiana, which developed into a
center for Fascist intellectualism under Prezzolini.112 He was a participant in the Fascist
League of North America. On 3 August 1926, members of a local Fascist section gathered
at the Hotel Statler in Cleveland to formalize their administration. After the provisional
secretary read a circular, which a news report called “a program of vibrant faith and …
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constructive fascist action,” from E. Citriolo, the national secretary, the attendees elected
leaders for the organization, including Barricelli as the “political secretary.” 113 His
friendliness to Fascism went beyond organizational affiliation. In a 1932 open letter
honoring the thirtieth anniversary of Il Cittadino Italo-Americano’s creation, he praised the
newspaper for elevating the Italian people in tandem and similar to Mussolini’s successful
efforts in Italy. As a measure of solidarity with il Duce’s revived Italy, he closed with the
Fascist battle cry alalà.114 Barricelli’s position as Grand Venerable until 1925, and
thereafter as ceremonial ex-Grand Venerable, facilitated the spread of Fascism and lent
respectability to it.115 As part of his duties, he traveled throughout Ohio, engaging with
membership as a guest and sometimes as a noted speaker. Some of his visits included to
the Loggia Gabriele D’Annunzio in Bedford, the men’s Colombo and women’s Benevento
societies in Alliance, a Sons of Italy celebration in Girard, Cleveland’s Loggia Fraterna,
Loggia Sinagra, Loggia Guglielmo Marconi, and Loggia La Giovane Italia, a Columbus
Day celebration in Steubenville, and Youngstown’s Loggia Giuseppe Garibaldi and Loggia
Napoleone Colaianni.116 Pro-Fascists like Barricelli, who was highly regarded within
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various Italian-American communities, helped make Mussolini’s government acceptable
and aided the inclusion of philo-Fascist programming, rhetoric, and comments.
One example of such an event involved Zopito Valentini, billed as a “special envoy
of His Excellency Benito Mussolini.”117 He toured Ohio in 1924, speaking about Italy and
raising money for a “building … in Pescara[, in the Abruzzo region,] for facilitating the
Arts and Industries in the Mezzogiorno of Italy.”118 Barricelli encouraged attendance,
which included visiting multiple lodges to build enthusiasm and ticket sales.119 He was the
chairman for Valentini’s Cleveland appearance, where he introduced the Italian visitor,
national Sons of Italy leader Giovanni Di Silvestro, and Countess Irene di Robilant, the
manager of the Italy-America Society who was known for her pro-Fascist lectures.120
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Cleveland was one of many Ohio cities that hosted Valentini, and the speaker held similar
events in Akron, Canton, Ashtabula, Steubenville, Niles, Youngstown, and Bellaire.121
Billed as a “Commemoration of the Italian Victory” coinciding with the anniversary of
Italy’s entry into the First World War, Valentini’s program linked the success of Fascism
and Mussolini to the country’s rebirth.122 The speech, which included comments
concerning the First World War and Italian nationalism, ended with Fascist rhetoric:
“I can affirm to you[,] friends, that Italy’s current life is rich in work and in
conscious discipline. The financial reports of the State are almost in balance, the
work of the workshops is continuous, the workers are fully aware of their sacrosanct
rights and of no less sacrosanct duties… Not one strike, not one turmoil[,] all is
magnificently serene and balanced in a perfect way. While the other European
Nations are engulfed [… by various problems,] Italy is the only nation that… struck
up trade treaties with neighboring peoples… overtook the financial crisis…
preventing any danger of bolshevik revolution… marches with certain faith toward
a bright future. The credit for this rebirth, of this great spring, goes […] to BENITO
MUSSOLINI…!”123
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Barricelli was not the only person who facilitated the spread of Fascism. Giovanni
Di Silvestro’s position alongside Valentini and di Robilant was no accident. An attorney
and Philadelphia prominente, Di Silvestro became Supreme Venerable of the entire Sons
of Italy in 1922.124 One of his early acts as national leader was to telegram Benito Mussolini
on 11 November 1922, only weeks after the Fascists gained power, to pledge his
organization’s support to the new regime. Some members expressed concerns about the
action, and Di Silvestro temporarily moderated any immediate subservience to the Fascists.
However, only a few years later, in October 1925, the organization’s supreme executive
council endorsed the general message of the telegram, and the Sons of Italy went on to
serve as an unofficial “transmission belt” for the Fascist government.125 In addition, many
local lodge leaders were amenable to Fascism, such as Cesare Amadio, venerable of Loggia
Operaia N. 1122 in Struthers, Ohio, and Ciro Saulino, head of the Loggia Napoleone
Colaianni in Youngstown.126
Valentini was a “special envoy” who temporarily spread positive views about
Fascism in the United States, but local diplomats played the same role with more
permanence. Cleveland Consul Nicola Cerri, who was part of Valentini’s 1924 event, had
reassured Americans only months after Mussolini assumed power that the growing Fascist
movement among Italian Americans in Cleveland and other cities was harmless.127 The
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Cleveland Fascist organization, which restricted membership to military veterans, wanted
to help ex-soldiers readjust, aid Americanization efforts, and “oppose any organization
which [was] not law abiding.”128 Cerri and his wife hosted the visiting Princess Santa
Borghese when she came to speak about Fascism, including presentations at Hiram House
and Alta House settlements.129 Subsequent representatives Valerio Valeriani and Count
Cesare Pier Alberto Buzzi Gradenigo continued the message.130 Pittsburgh’s vice-consuls
facilitated the same propaganda. In 1926, the Fascist government appointed Giuseppe
Castruccio. He had previous leadership roles in the New York Fascio, the Federation of the
Italian War Veterans in the United States, and the Fascist League of North America.131
Castruccio fulfilled the requirement of presenting a positive image of Italy and Fascism,
such as during a banquet celebrating the March on Rome’s anniversary. He proclaimed,
“Premier Mussolini has restored order, discipline, production, finance, religion and
prestige in the country.”132 His successors, Giovanni Giurato and Leone Sircana, offered
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similar positive public portrayals of Fascism.133 For consuls and vice-consuls down to local
consular representatives, presenting a positive image of Mussolini’s Italy was necessary. Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano expressed this community role clearly when it noted that such
agents’ functions included defending the Italian race and informing people of Italy’s true
political and financial conditions.134
Other people associated with entities beyond the mutual aid societies and consular
corps contributed to the spread. Il Fascio XXVIII Ottobre, an early pro-Fascist organization
based in Pittsburgh, contained numerous prominenti as members.135 Charles F. Schisano,
one of the proponents for the group’s creation, was a decorated, four-times-wounded Italian
Great War veteran who had once served as an escort for General John J. Pershing. After
immigrating to Pittsburgh, Schisano became a figure in ethnic society. He managed the
local Bank of America’s foreign department, taught Italian literature and language classes,
and headed the campaign to fund the Italian Room in the University of Pittsburgh’s
Cathedral of Learning building.136 By 1933, he was a regular contributor to Unione, a
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Pittsburgh Italian-American newspaper.137 Other members included Rev. Ercole
Dominicis, one-time editor of Pittsburgh’s La Trinacria and the main speaker for a 1926
Fascist League of North America meeting in the city, and Drs. Antonio E. Abbate and G.
Alvino, notable members of the Sons of Italy.138
Fascism reached out from the metropolis to include smaller cities and towns. Il
Fascio XXVIII Ottobre included members from Ambridge, Farrell, McKeesport, Beaver,
Uniontown, Homer City, Hillsville, Braddock, Rankin, and Canonsburg, Pennsylvania.139
The town of Indiana had Francesco Biamonte, owner-editor of Il Patriota, who harbored
Fascist sympathies and even served as an interpreter for famed Italian airman Italo Balbo
during his 1933 flight from Italy to Chicago’s Century of Progress Exposition.140 In Ohio,
early groups existed in Youngstown and Niles in addition to Cleveland.141 Fascism had
local advocates in almost every town with a sizable Italian-American population, which
aided diffusion and acceptance.
Mainstream Italian-American newspapers were friendly toward Fascism. As
Diggins stated, “it was the Italian-American press that provided Mussolini his most
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important vehicle of propaganda in the United States.”142 Many prominenti favored
Fascism, and because they controlled the local-commercial presses, their views
predominated.143 Furthermore, the Italian press censorship described earlier found its way
to the United States. As the Fascists tightened their control on the spread of information in
Italy, they also sanitized the reporting sent to Italian Americans.144 They meddled when
possible to ensure favorable coverage. In spring 1927, New York’s Il Progresso ItaloAmericano went up for sale after founder Carlo Barsotti’s death. The Fascist government
worked secretly to ensure that it found an appropriate owner. As one of the preeminent
Italian-language newspapers in the country, numerous entities, including the Hearst
syndicate, were interested in purchasing it. Italian diplomats worked behind closed doors
to arrange its sale to Generoso Pope in 1928 for over two million dollars.145 Pope met with
Mussolini in Italy the following year to discuss purchasing Luigi Barzini’s Il Corriere
d’America, another prominent Italian-American newspaper. Mussolini gave his blessing
after Pope’s assurance of a pro-Fascist editorial policy.146 While Il Progresso ItaloAmericano was headquartered in New York City, distribution still reached Pennsylvania
and Ohio.147
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Newspapers specific to western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio were generally
philo-Fascist. These included La Stella di Pittsburgh and Cleveland’s L’Araldo.
Pittsburgh’s Unione remained friendly to Fascism until 1938, when Mussolini moved
closer to Adolf Hitler and war.148 Similarly, Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano was
favorable to Mussolini until 1940, when Columbus Melaragno published an editorial
denouncing Italy’s entry into the Second World War.149
Fascism diffused easily throughout the Italian-American community. The work of
the prominenti, Italian government, and ethnic institutions, like fraternal societies and
newspapers, provided an aura of credibility. These entities, which already had some
influence in the community before the March on Rome, reassured Italian Americans about
the new ideology. They passed information, which often verged on propaganda, to the
people. Fascism, therefore, entered the Italian-American ideological cauldron alongside
civic nationalism and leftism to inform people’s opinions.

A Mediated Fascism
As Fascism diffused across the United States, Italian Americans learned not the
philosophical debates about the doctrine but the practical application of Mussolini’s
system. Unlike the American government that insisted on returning to normalcy and a
conservative, laissez-faire approach during the 1920s, Fascism presented an example of a
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working government responsive to the masses’ needs. Italian-American appreciation for
this alternative approach was a logical evolution in the formation of the group’s ideology.
As Italian immigrants and their children Americanized, acquiring citizenship and a sense
of civic identity and responsibility, they increasingly looked toward the abstract state not
as an enemy but as a potential mechanism for help. The leftists during the early 1920s
amplified working-class grievances with calls for mass unionization. Fascism, especially
once Mussolini adopted corporatism, provided an example of the state solving the
economic problems that plagued the lower classes. Fascist Italy showed the possibilities
offered by a robust and responsive government to solve the problems noted by the left, and
Italian Americans increasingly paid attention to the aspects of Fascism that worked and
could be replicated in some form in the United States. These included the government
meddling in the economy when necessary, the appearance of new laws, syndicalist
organizations, and public works to help the laboring masses, and less apprehension about
a strong national leader. As shown in chapter six, Italian Americans referred explicitly to
these ideas when the domestic economic crisis began in 1929 and people debated solutions.
The transition toward accepting Fascism as an influence was a process. In tandem
with deepening censorship that presented a positive image of Mussolini’s Italy, Italian
Fascism gradually shed most of its negative attributes that caused Italian Americans to
hesitate in favoring the system. These were notably the associated violence and the Party’s
initial acceptance of laissez-faire economics. An early issue for Mussolini was the
decentralized nature of the Fascist political movement.150 While he was ostensibly il Duce,

150

It is more historically accurate to speak of fascisms during the early history of the
movement, including conservative and innovative currents. See Emilio Gentile, The
277

the leader, he had minimal control of his party’s elements during the early 1920s.151 There
was high turnover throughout 1921 and 1922. One of the few unifying factors in terms of
a Fascist “constituency” was that a large proportion, over half of the party in late 1921,
were military veterans, and many took no issue with introducing the violence that they
learned at the front into national politics.152
Some organized themselves into paramilitary squads that terrorized leftists.
Squadrismo, as the phenomenon became known, was especially prominent in the agrarian
regions in northern and central Italy, where it was a reactionary response to workers’
uprisings. From bases of power in provincial cities, local ras (Fascist chiefs) organized
lower-middle-class urbanites with rural landowners, farm managers, and rising peasants to
threaten, divide, and terrorize agricultural workers.153 By condoning violence as an
appropriate means to arrest possible revolution, ras such as Roberto Farinacci in Cremona,
Italo Balbo in Ferrara, and Dino Grandi in Bologna encouraged the spread of terror.
Amerigo Dumini, the head of the group that murdered Giacomo Matteotti in 1924, got his
start in Florence, leading paramilitary units on raids throughout the region. During one
event in Arezzo in April 1921, Dumini kidnapped a local socialist member of parliament,
beat him, and paraded the man through the town’s working-class sections as a warning. He
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and his associates then raided a local leftist organization and burned their records in the
town square.154
While it is debatable how informed Italian Americans were about specific acts of
brutality in Italy, they certainly understood that violence appeared innately connected to
Fascism from the beginning. Those associated with leftist circles heard specifics about
terror, including, for example, Matteotti’s denunciations of Fascist aggression reprinted in
Il Martello only a month following the Arezzo incident.155 Violence was the main critique
repeated by people like Carlo Tresca and entities such as his newspaper. 156 The brutality
struck a chord with those in the United States, and it was probably not an overstatement
that “many [wept]” after hearing about the terror unleashed by Mussolini’s people during
a sizeable anti-Fascist meeting with Tresca and Luigi Quintiliano in Pittsburgh in late
1922.157 The mainstream Italian-American press also carried news of Fascist aggression,
albeit while also placing some blame on leftist extremists. Il Patriota documented one such
incident in Florence, a bombing and reprisals that killed eleven and wounded over one
hundred. Although the article noted that reports included contradictory evidence and that
extremists existed on both sides, it blatantly admitted that “the fascists have, after the
provocation [the bombing], acted with extraordinary violence,” including the murder of a
local union leader “with a revolver shot to the head.”158
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This violence was irreconcilable with American civic values, specifically to the
freedoms of assembly. It was possible to dismiss the turmoil in the provinces as the actions
of a few extremists, but the March on Rome brought the issue of intimidation and illegality
to the forefront. Italian-American newspapers documented conflicting opinions about the
event. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano was optimistic about the potential of a new
government, but it and La Trinacria condemned the intimidation and violence associated
with the seizure of power. The question was whether the new government could purge
those attributes.159 The mechanism for the Fascist seizure of power aided their
interpretation. As Emilio Gentile argued, the March on Rome was not revolutionary.
Mussolini grafted Fascism and his new ministry onto the old liberal order, thereby rejecting
the party’s extreme idealists, who favored the government’s complete transformation.160
This unique ascension to power allowed Italian Americans to present cautious optimism
that reformatory, not revolutionary, policy would prevail. The murder of Giacomo
Matteotti upset this interpretation and showed that the provincial violence had indeed
reached the top echelons of government. Nevertheless, Italian-American editors
continuously noted the possibility, and hope, that Mussolini and the reformists could purge
the violent revolutionaries. As La Trinacria informed readers, there were certain
undesirable Fascists, “those of the worst breed and of the worst type, that believe that the
only law is violence and [the] only right force.”161 However, although Fascism was born
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the “son of violence,” the product of turbulent times in Italian history, violence was not
necessarily the product of Fascism.162 It was unclear whether Fascist leaders could separate
violence and illegality from their party. However, as Il Cittadino Italo-Americano told
readers, Mussolini and the state had the responsibility to uphold the law and suppress
Fascist violence by force if necessary.163
Indeed, there was a crackdown. In time, the consolidation of one-party rule, Fascist
control of repressive state apparatuses, and the imprisonment or exile of political opponents
contributed to a subsiding of turmoil in Italy.164 Since Fascist actions were no longer
extralegal, the interpretation of their processes and outcomes depended solely on the
individual’s view of the state and whether to trust the bureaucracy and legal system.
Concerning the Matteotti murder, the ethnic press informed Italian Americans that
Attorney General Vincenzo Crisafulli reviewed the evidence and made recommendations
in late 1925.165 The court found most of the perpetrators guilty of manslaughter – they had
murdered Matteotti but not intentionally – in March 1926. Amerigo Dumini received an
almost six-year prison sentence, although a previous amnesty law and the subtraction of
time served left only a few months remaining.166 Later histories showed that the Fascists
rigged the trial by substituting homicide charges with involuntary murder and creating the
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new amnesty law specifically for Dumini and company, but the public knew nothing of
this at the time.167 To philo-Fascists in the United States, the trial confirmed that the violent
elements were subject to Italian law.
After the perceived reduction of violence and illegality associated with Fascism, a
conservative economic policy was the second element that changed to enable widespread
Italian-American acceptance. Economic conditions in Italy improved from 1920 to 1925,
but they remained fragile. When the Fascists assumed power in late 1922, they followed
conservative economic policies with the goal of financial stabilization. Alberto De’ Stefani,
Mussolini’s Minister of Finance, preferred classical-liberal economics, including free trade
over protectionism, the denationalization of state-owned industries, and a balanced
budget.168 He enacted public spending cuts to solve the government tax deficit, eventually
lowering the gross domestic product’s debt ratio from 167 percent to 57 percent between
1922 and 1926, a decline of over eighty billion lire.169 Italian Americans, however, also
understood that absolute statistics about economic health hid other problems, similar to
how American prosperity during the 1920s did not necessarily mean that all citizens and
sectors shared in its benefits. Public debt stabilized and decreased, but the agricultural
industry lacked modern methods and could not supply Italian needs. The country required
the vast importation of grain, thereby draining the national economy.170 Furthermore, they
were informed by early 1925 that the anti-Fascist press in Italy reported doubts that the
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government could meet its wartime loan payment obligations to the United States fully,
even though Mussolini and others refuted this interpretation.171
Political, rather than economic, considerations changed Mussolini’s financial
policy and set Italy on a different path. Matteotti’s murder deepened the schism within the
Fascist movement related to labor and business. Il Duce had checked the rise of left-leaning
Fascist syndicalists, such as Edmondo Rossoni, throughout 1923 and early 1924, but the
crisis caused many Fascist-allied unionists to reconsider their support for the movement.
Meanwhile, conservative industrialists, repulsed by the murder, turned against Fascism.
Mussolini harnessed more state power and used his position to weather the crisis. He
allowed Fascist-backed strikes in 1925 to pressure the industrialists. He then incorporated
the Fascist-syndicalist wing more firmly into his party to purge potential rivals, like
Rossoni. Giuseppe Volpi replaced De’ Stefani in July 1925, and Mussolini gambled that
more widespread state intervention would set a new tone for his regime. 172 Had he opted
to continue a classical-liberal approach to the economy, then Italian Americans would not
have been offered an alternative to their government in the United States. However, the
move toward a new economic model presented them with a real-world test of something
innovative.
The Battle for Grain, or the Fascist government’s push for increased agricultural
production, was the first large-scale intervention noticed by Italian Americans. Citing
Mussolini’s newspaper, Il Popolo d’Italia, the ethnic press told readers in February 1925
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that the Fascists planned to solve the grain issue. Although initially vague about how the
government would accomplish higher production, the plan broke with the historical
precedent of price controls.173 Mussolini declared his program’s intention to “liberat[e] the
Country from the slavery of foreign wheat,”174 and his government promptly allotted
millions of lire for agricultural modernization and land reclamation.175 By October, those
in the United States learned that the solution included a standing committee of
representatives comprised of government officials, agricultural specialists, and labor
leaders to draw on their combined expertise.176 This state intervention worked. In June
1926, the government declared victory in the Battle for Grain, citing an annual harvest of
sixty million tons, which was almost enough to satisfy national needs.177 Italian Americans
noted the success. Although the battle needed to continue for the foreseeable future, the
government’s plan resulted in a higher agricultural yield than expected. Government
intervention in agriculture was part of a “wise program” that put Italy on the path to solving
its economic issues.178
The Battle for the Lira, or currency manipulation, was the other half of the “wise
program” of state intervention that appeared successful.179 Although De’ Stefani had
solved many financial concerns during his tenure, he failed to rectify the lira’s poor
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exchange rate with other world currencies. Mussolini, driven by these real economic
concerns and the psychological desire not to lose ground to other nations, made solving the
currency crisis a new goal of his regime.180 Italian Americans recognized the problem from
abroad, so it was a pleasant surprise when readers of Il Cittadino Italo-Americano received
their 4 September 1926 copy of the newspaper with a large headline in no uncertain terms:
“The First Successes of the Battle of the Lira.”181 The victory concerned war loan
repayment modifications. Through efforts by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon and
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Governor Benjamin Strong, the United States intended
to offer European allies, such as Italy, reduced payments if the debt created an undue
burden on their domestic finances. This reevaluation was logical since these countries, a
third of the world, could not realistically be in debt for a century, but this move also brought
optimism since it would benefit Italian currency.182 Agenzia Stefani, the Italian news wire
service, informed those abroad that through loans secured via J. P. Morgan bank, the Italian
treasury transferred immediate payments to the Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy), which
allowed the cancellation of two and a half billion lire in credit. The consequences of this
move reduced state circulations and increased the reserves of the Banca d’Italia, causing
an increase in the lira’s value.183
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Mussolini famously declared that he would set the exchange rate at ninety lire for
one pound sterling (Quota 90, as it became known), further encouraging Fascist
intervention in the economy.184 Throughout the fall of 1926, Italian Americans learned
more specifically about the goals and methods of the Battle for the Lira and the
government’s role in it. According to Mussolini and Volpi, reform meant centralizing the
Italian financial system through the Banca d’Italia, which included guaranteeing its
autonomy, giving the entity control of the exchange markets, and extending monitoring
power over other banks. The Morgan loan and money transfer succeeded in shoring up the
currency, leaving no doubt in the minds of those living in the United States that the plan
succeeded. Furthermore, while the Italian people and residents abroad had a role in
collaboration, much of the policy’s accomplishments resulted from “the precise and
brilliant will of the Head of Government [Mussolini], who interprets the deepest needs of
our people, destined to repeat, under His guidance, the [past] glories.”185 Naysayers
commented that Italy likely could not balance its imports and exports, but this was a false
argument because as long as the deficit lessened, then other sources of income – emigrant
remittances, tourist spending, profits from Italian-owned industries abroad, and colonial
revenues – had the potential to offset the losses. More importantly, the Battle for the Lira
was “a principally psychological phenomenon” premised on the Italian people’s spirit
rather than any abstract economic theory.186 A study by the commercial attaché for the
Italian Ambassador in Washington reinforced the importance of the Italian government’s

184

Zamagni, The Economic History of Italy, 251.
“Le Caratteristiche della Riforma Monetaria Italiana,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano,
23 October 1926, 1.
186
“Perche’ l’Itaila [sic] Vincera’ la Battaglia della Lira,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano,
23 October 1926, 1.
185

286

intervention, noting the Italian Treasury’s policy stabilized and corrected the economy
more than otherwise possible.187 The Italian government doubled down on the success of
its economic meddling by announcing the Prestito del Littorio, a new loan named for the
symbol of the Fascist Party.188 Fascists asserted that the loan campaign guaranteed a
successful conclusion to the Battle of the Lira.189 The rejection of laissez-faire capitalism,
the economic style most familiar to Italian Americans living in the mid-1920s United
States, presented an example of a new model worthy of consideration.
Outside approval of Fascist economic policy contributed to Italian-American
acceptance. In November 1925, early in the Battle for the Lira, Treasury Secretary Mellon
contended that “the courageous and strong policy inaugurated by President Mussolini has
radically reduced governmental expenditures, increased revenue and balanced the financial
budget of Italy.” He claimed that if Italy “continu[ed] its political stability and present
economy,” then the state would rise to the status of a great nation.190 Many Italian
Americans were open to Fascism for nationalistic reasons, so Mellon’s praise certainly
struck a chord. When Youngstown’s consular agent, Attilio Rosapepe, told his countrymen
the following year that “a future of prosperity and greatness for Italy is assured,” he
specifically cited Mellon’s positive observations about the economy from a recent visit to
Europe.191
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Privately, Mellon had little confidence in Fascist methods becoming the new norm.
When appointed Treasury Secretary in 1921, he was already one of the richest men in the
United States. Like De’ Stefani’s laissez-faire policy, Mellon advocated for government
spending cuts, a balanced budget, and deregulation. When the Wall Street stock market
crashed in 1929, he did not look toward the Fascist economic policy that he publicly
supported as an example but instead advised President Herbert Hoover to continue a handsoff approach.192 As historian Gian Giacomo Migone noted, “Mellon and the House of
Morgan had faith in Mussolini because he guaranteed precisely that social stability and
cooperative attitude toward their plans for systematizing the international economy in order
to secure the best conditions for American expansion that they needed for long-term
success.”193 American policymakers viewed Mussolini as a tool to be used rather than a
model for economic theory. News media presented a different image to Italian Americans.
When National City Bank of New York began underwriting the Prestito del Littorio in late
1926, this only added more evidence that Mussolini’s economic interventionism gained
approval from those most knowledgeable about the issue.194 The old factions of ex-Prime
Ministers Giovanni Giolitti and Antonio Salandra endorsed the Prestito del Littorio and
Fascist plans, which further supported the belief of a consensus concerning Fascist
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methods.195 The economic intervention appeared successful to Italian Americans, and such
approaches were a model worthy of replicating.
Personal involvement in the program increased Italian-American approval and kept
the theme of interventionism in public discussion. Italian-American newspapers repeated
Fascist Italy’s nationalist propaganda and told readers to buy Italian currency to force
change and bring total economic victory.196 Youngstown-area residents pledged around
half-million lire to the Prestito del Littorio, and those in the Cleveland consular district,
which included Akron, surpassed that amount. As a sign of popular institutional support,
numerous mutual aid societies invested, including Youngstown’s Napoleone Colaianni and
Duca degli Abruzzi and Cleveland’s Casa Savoia.197 Revised lists with more subscriptions
from individuals and fraternal organizations came in the following weeks.198 ItalianAmerican participation in the loan drive encouraged their ideological incorporation into
Fascist interventionist theory. The tactic increased interest in the regime’s novel economic
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approach and allowed regular people to feel as though they could make a difference in
government when allowed to participate.
While Italian Americans learned a new, seemingly successful model for dealing
with currency and macroeconomics, the Fascists also presented an innovative means to
integrate the needs of labor into the state. Corporatism accomplished this integration, which
in the minds of Italian-American readers before the New Deal became less a theoreticaleconomic idea and more a catchall for government mediation and working-class advances,
a notion discussed in more detail in chapter six. Fascist corporatism, an alternative
economic theory that rejected laissez-faire capitalism and communism, sought to subjugate
labor and business to the state and impose class harmony. The Fascists organized both
groups into a series of corporations (twenty-two of them after 1934), each corresponding
with a particular industry, such as textiles, chemicals, and agricultural cereals. Each
corporation included an equal number of representatives from labor and capital, three
appointed Fascist Party members, and optional industry specialists and technicians. Since
these were organs of the Italian state, they could set wages and mediate labor disputes.199
Actual corporatism failed to develop. As period political scientist H. Arthur Steiner
commented in 1938, although corporatism first launched during the mid-1920s, “in
practice, the corporations did not come to life until 1934–1935.”200 Steiner’s assessment
was kinder than that offered by historians, such as Denis Mack Smith, who noted that “the
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corporations were more an aspiration than an actuality.”201 For informing Italian-American
ideology before the New Deal, the ultimate corporatist failures are irrelevant. Before
reorganization in 1934, Italian corporatism did not use mixed corporations; instead,
separate syndicates for labor and capital existed under state mediation.202 This feature, the
collection of workers into a mass Fascist union to negotiate rights, influenced Italian
Americans. Furthermore, propaganda mitigated any policy failures. Economic efficiency,
including corporatism, was a dominant theme for marketing Fascism to those abroad, and
even American liberals showed partiality for the novel theory as a more democratic,
alternative form of state intervention than repressive Soviet policies.203
Italian Americans understood corporatism not as bureaucratic restructuring, which
was dry, complicated, and difficult for the layperson to comprehend, but rather as a new
activist government policy that cared about workers and offered positive, tangible results.
Italian Americans learned that the Fascists sought to merge syndicalism, the unionization
cause commonly associated with the left, into their system.204 For example, the Palazzo
Vidoni Pact (October 1925) was an early step toward corporatism. Under the terms of the
agreement, the Confindustria (the General Confederation of Italian Industry) and the
Fascist syndicates agreed to become the sole negotiating entities for business and labor.
The arrangement theoretically strengthened Edmondo Rossoni’s Fascist trade unions
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because it eliminated organizing competition from other entities, allowing one body to
speak on workers’ behalf. In practice, the Vidoni Pact gave more power to capital than
labor, and the lack of an alternative union hurt their cause.205 Committed Italian-American
leftists at the time recognized these negative long-term implications as Il Martello printed
an in-depth article stating the improbability of impartial industry-labor collaboration and
deriding what amounted to forced enrollment in the Fascist unions.206
Outside of the left, reporting was more nuanced and optimistic. The fluid nature of
corporatism in practice gave Italian Americans only a superficial understanding of its
structure while allowing for a prolabor interpretation. They understood that initial Fascist
efforts sought to organize workers and businesses into approved corporations to mediate
future labor-industry conflicts and end unrest.207 Reporting from Rome explained that the
Italian government had two approaches in mind: “the obligatoriness of arbitration, and the
compulsory union that will resolve in a tangible way the complicated question of the
[employers’ and workers’] organizations.”208 Corso Bovio, a deputy expelled from the
socialist party, commented about the potential of Fascist labor policies, especially those
pushed by Rossoni. “Do not forget,” he counseled, “that the Honorable Mussolini is on the
way to achieving a union program of exceptional importance and that will definitively
move fascism nearer the proletariat.”209 As stated by editor V. Galliano of Pittsburgh’s La
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Trinacria, the Catholic view concluded a similar merger stating that “the original socialist
mentality of the honorable Mussolini, despite his evolutions, reveals itself completely in
the fascist monopoly of the corporatist movement.” Galliano favored the idea of replacing
the Italian Senate with representatives from the corporations. The critique from the
Catholic perspective was more partisan than ideological. Workers had the right to unionize,
and the state had the right to regulate unionization, similar to how it policed other liberties.
The Fascist plan to merge syndicalism into a corporatist state went too far in that it would
destroy independent labor groups, such as the Catholic-aligned trade unions.210 Whether
readers viewed the loss of an independent-Catholic labor movement as a threat did not
matter; the importance was that Fascism accepted syndicalism and sought to incorporate
unionization and labor rights into state policy via corporatism.
As it developed, Fascist syndicalism and the corporatist state appeared to offer more
concessions to help average Italians. Galliano used Rerum Novarum as the foundation for
his criticism. This 1891 papal encyclical outlined the Catholic Church’s position
concerning labor issues by supporting the rights of workers to unionize and receive fair
wages while also reaffirming the Church’s stance against communism by endorsing private
property rights.211 The problem in 1925 was that Fascist methods appeared to stifle the
workers’ rights because the Vidoni Pact was a de facto ban on non-Fascist unions. Italian
Americans learned two years later that the Fascists mitigated these concerns with the new
Carta del Lavoro (Labor Charter). Augusto Turati, the General Secretary of the Fascist
Party, proclaimed that it was a document second only to Rerum Novarum for addressing
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the relationship between capital and labor.212 Through United Press correspondent Thomas
B. Morgan, the Pittsburgh Press reported all thirty declarations of the document. Much of
it was consistent with the modern welfare state and guaranteed concessions to workers,
including minimum wages, paid vacation after a year on the job, and insurance for work
accidents, sickness, and unemployment. Employers could fine or discharge workers for
disciplinary reasons, ensuring that Italy would not return to its earlier strike waves. In
return, the state had the power to intervene in cases of controversy regarding negotiated
contracts.213
Like the Vidoni Pact, Italian Americans probably did not internalize every specific
provision; however, they understood it as part of the grander Fascist effort to protect
syndicalism and help workers. According to Giuseppe Bottai, the undersecretary for the
Ministry of Corporations, the Labor Charter brought collaboration, discipline, and a path
for those who feared the end of private initiative but were also concerned about “the fate
of the Italian worker[,] capitalism’s slave.”214 Of course, historians have pointed out that it
ultimately benefited businesses rather than workers, but this was unknown to the masses at
the time.215 Just as the Labor Charter became symbolic in Italy for reimagining the state
and society, it became another believed myth about Fascism’s prolabor position in the
United States.216 By early 1929, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano reported Bottai’s assertion
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that “Fascism … has not destroyed the socialist social program, but preserved and perfected
it[,] integrating it into new syndicalist laws.”217
To Italian Americans viewing developments from abroad, this vague Fascist
corporatism became synonymous with an activist government ensuring working-class
concessions. Their ethnic press reported the successes. Labor and business negotiated work
hours.218 Journalists finalized a pension program.219 The Great Depression showed that the
Fascists were committed to addressing economic issues. The Italian government
encouraged the nation to lower the cost of living.220 The media told Italian Americans that
“the organizations of the Fascist Party transformed themselves into relief committees.”221
Unemployment insurance was available to many workers, the government allocated winter
job funds to help the idled, and Italian mothers gained new maternity benefits.222 To those
viewing the situation from abroad, workers in Italy reaped many advantages from Fascist
economic policy, thus making government intercession preferable to free-market solutions.
Public works projects provided tangible results of state intervention. When
interviewed decades later concerning the Italian-American opinion of Mussolini in the East
Liberty neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Angelo Dozzi offered a defense of il Duce because of
his work helping average Italians. “Mussolini, what he did for Italy, it’s unbelievable,”
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Dozzi recounted. “He put the southern Italian people down there on their feet because they
were desperate down there. He built roads and everything.”223 Dozzi and his neighbors
likely drew from period newspaper accounts in Pittsburgh’s La Trinacria about this
southern-Italian emphasis, such as in one August 1925 article in which the Minister of
Public Works specifically called for projects in the Mezzogiorno to create a rebirth in the
region.224 In January 1925, around the same time that Fascist concerns about future
economic issues grew, the Italian government announced an extensive public works
program to reduce unemployment.225 Planners prioritized projects in Naples, the symbolic
capital of the Mezzogiorno, including a major road tunnel connecting to the Chiaia
neighborhood and a new hospital in Capodimonte.226 Other projects included approval for
aqueducts to the Sicilian towns of San Pier Niceto and Augusta, plans for modernizing over
a thousand kilometers of road to handle current traffic in Calabria and Basilicata, the
creation of hydroelectric dams in Calabria’s Ampollino and Arvo valleys, and public
housing projects in the province of Reggio Calabria.227
Public works were not a new concept, but the national government allocating vast
resources to projects spoke to new priorities. Italian Americans celebrated the
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achievements because they provided jobs and an increased standard of living to ordinary
people. The aforementioned individual projects were just a tiny portion of a more
significant fifteen-billion-lire public works plan to modernize Italy with funds dispersed
throughout the country for roads, water lines, port improvements, land reclamation, and
new government buildings.228 Completed works became part of Fascism’s success and a
point of pride for allies in the United States. Fascio XXVIII Ottobre, the Pittsburgh-based
pro-Fascist organization, acknowledged public works as part of its celebration of Italian
progress, and the group lauded the number of projects completed in only five years of
Fascist rule. These included “twenty-eight central hydroelectric stations, six railway lines,
eighty-five streets, sixty new bridges, seventy-two aqueducts, fifty irrigation systems,
seven telegraph and telephone installations, one hundred and twenty schools, one hundred
and twenty-four sports centers, … thirty-nine public buildings for government offices,
municipal offices and military establishments, fourteen retirement homes for workers,
twenty-one hospitals, orphanages and shelters for the poor,” along with new theaters,
repaired historical buildings, and war memorials.229
The Fascist economic approach appeared to work. As Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
editor Angelo Di Renzo commented in December 1927, the anti-Fascists had called
Mussolini’s actions a “bluff,” but il Duce proved them wrong. Citing a Boston Post piece,
Di Renzo asserted that Fascist methods succeeded to the point that “no other European
nation surpassed Italy in political and economic progress.”230 Financial improvements were
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so effective that Italy ceased to be an emigrant nation by 1929. Plentiful job opportunities
caused more Italians to return from the United States than to immigrate to America.231 The
conclusion was clear: “This phenomenon alone is enough to convince of the well-being
brought to Italy by Mussolini’s regime.”232
Fascist corporatism took on additional meaning after the Wall Street stock market
crash of 1929 because Italy appeared to be solving unemployment while advancing as a
nation. Newspapers reminded Italian Americans that while everyone suffered the
consequences of the Great Depression, Fascist measures insulated Italians from the
downturn’s worst effects, and they kept unemployment lower than in other industrialized
nations.233 In the spring of 1931, Italian Americans learned that Mussolini’s government
was completing massive, world-class public projects, including a 130,000-seat stadium in
Rome, numerous hydroelectric plants, and the longest electric rail line in Europe, which
stretched from Modane on the Franco-Italian border to Livorno.234 The following spring,
il Duce promised that his government would go further to ensure “more work and more
help for the people of our Italy” during the slow winter months.235 Italy compared favorably
to America’s continuously declining economy in 1931 and 1932.
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Successful economic interventionism required a new type of activist leadership. As
mentioned in chapter two, when Mussolini and the Fascists ascended to power in 1922,
Italian Americans held a conflicted view of the state. While they increasingly learned to
admire government as part of their civic conditioning in the United States, their personal
experiences with state apparatuses advised them to be highly cautious about concentrated
power in the hands of officials such as A. Mitchell Palmer or even the president. 236 After
Mussolini successfully used the Matteotti Crisis in 1924 as an impetus for the foundation
of a totalitarian state after 1925, Fascism offered a competing view about the powers
invested in the national leader and the state’s role in people’s lives. As Italian Americans
increasingly learned the value and perceived success of Fascist economic and labor
policies, they adopted a favorable view of a powerful leader willing to enact such plans.
Many in the United States did not begin as devotees of Mussolini, but their views
changed with reported successes. Until the Matteotti murder, Italian-American opinion was
cautiously hopeful but not beholden to il Duce. Fascism served a purpose, it stopped unrest
and provided stability, but it was unclear whether people could justify its emerging
totalitarian tendencies. The debate about the future of Fascism and the place of Mussolini
spilled into the press. The media reported derisively about Italian Parliament passing two
thousand new laws “without discussion,”237 while concurrently proclaiming, “we are not
fascists, but admirers … of strength when” such force and energy were to benefit the
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nation.238 One October 1925 article alluded to opinions espoused by Innocenzo Vagnozzi,
a notable left-leaning community leader in Youngstown, concerning fears about
Mussolini’s dominance. The critique was that il Duce worked to limit the influence of
Parliament, putting Italy on the road to dictatorship. The philo-Fascist rebuttal, however,
justified some expansion of power. First, unlike Napoleon Bonaparte, who was nominated
consul for life, Italian changes empowered not the man but the office. If Mussolini retired
from his position, the powers did not follow him into private life but transferred to his
successor. Second, the system needed to be judged by its outcome, whether the means
justified the ends. The writer predicted that while Mussolini’s new regime “will appear
aggressive and autocratic[,] it will bring major relief and benefits” to Italy, potentially a
worthwhile trade.239 Indeed, this was the debate during the mid-1920s. Mussolini openly
called for a purge of his opponents while promising new reforms and a regime responsive
to people’s needs.240 Throughout the second half of the 1920s, the Fascists delivered relief
and benefits – the growth of Italian agriculture, the stabilization of the lira, corporatism
and new laws to help the working class, public works that provided jobs and raised the
standard of living – in the minds of Italian Americans. Mussolini may have disempowered
his opposition by questionable means, but this also allowed him to act and make significant
changes.
As with corporatism and public works, sterilized media and Italian propaganda
aided the acceptance of Mussolini’s totalitarian tendencies. To unite Fascists after the
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Matteotti Crisis, party leaders promoted the “cult” of il Duce, and it quickly consumed
Italian culture and society.241 Mussolini underwent “deification,” and his asserted
omnipotence and stamina went hand-in-hand with reports that he worked long hours to
better Italy and obsessed with the minor details in the everyday operations of
government.242 This reinterpreted form of leader also spread to the United States.243
According to reporting in the ethnic press, Mussolini was “the man of the moment” and a
“superman.”244 He took on the connotations of Caesar with the rebirth of Rome, and
“Providence” protected him in light of assassination attempts.245 Il Duce even gave a
mother with her children at the beach money because of his paternalistic instincts. 246 The
propaganda became more pertinent by the early 1930s, including the belief that Mussolini
worked vigorously to lead the nation. He had learned long before not to have extra seats in
his office because it encouraged visitors and idle conversation. While others loafed,
Mussolini labored.247
Various Italian national events, such as a seven-hundredth-year commemoration of
the death of Saint Francis of Assisi in 1926, became opportunities to praise il Duce in
Italian-American communities. At Eagle’s Hall in Youngstown, newspaper editor Angelo
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Di Renzo applauded the new Italy and asserted that “Religion and State form[ed] the
essence of Benito Mussolini’s politics.”248 Another commemoration in Cleveland included
similar remarks.249 Bishop Joseph Schrembs proclaimed that France, the United Kingdom,
and other nations wanted a leader like il Duce: “They are looking for a Mussolini, but they
cannot find another Mussolini.”250 The devotion deepened in time because, in 1935, Italian
Americans in Pittsburgh dedicated a plaque in honor of Saint Francis, which also featured
Mussolini and a fasces, on the grounds of Help of Christians Church in the East Liberty
neighborhood. At the associated ceremony for Cherubino Viola, the parish’s priest,
speakers included the aforementioned pro-Fascists Charles F. Schisano and Dr. A. E.
Abbate, the Pittsburgh vice-consul, and local politicians Micheal A. Musmanno and Frank
J. Zappala.251
In the process, Mussolini became inseparable from Italian successes, as though he
alone created change. When Angelo Di Renzo penned an article celebrating the economic
advances of Italy, he titled the piece “Impronta Mussoliniana,” meaning “Mussolinian
Mark,” and gave credit for the descriptor of “Mussoliniana” to famed Italian journalist
Luigi Barzini.252 Citing Mussolini’s personal influence became common, and this is why
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Italian Americans interviewed in later years equated il Duce with Italian advances, such as
public works and schooling.253
By the time of the Great Depression, Italian Americans had absorbed new ideas
about the place and function of government. Mussolini’s Fascist state showed the benefits
of government involvement in the economy to secure a better standard of living for
ordinary workers. Financial regulations, corporatism, and public works, underlined by a
decisive leader who was willing to enact change, presented an alternative model to solve
modern economic problems. As American politicians failed to address the depression in its
early years, Italian Americans turned toward ideas borrowed from Fascist Italy to argue a
new path toward economic revitalization.

Moderated Fascism
Most Italian Americans did not become devout Fascists because other influences
moderated their commitment to the ideology. Returning to Francesco Biamonte’s letter to
the editor discussed earlier in this chapter concerning American fears about Fascism in the
United States, the observer asserted that the average Italian-American citizen “naturally
still cherishes due regard for his motherland, but his loyalty is to the American constitution
and to the American government and flag.”254 Italian Americans would not discard
democracy for repressive authoritarianism. Like leftism described in chapter three, Fascism
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was not an all-or-nothing proposal. Angela Baccelli of Pittsburgh alluded to this during an
interview about the period concerning her ethnic society: “Well there was pro and cons.
Everyone had their little thing to say. Ones would say oh Mussolini did lots for Italy …
[he] made beautiful schools, and beautiful autostrada [highways] and the railroads have
never been as wonderful as they are now. And the other ones would say this and that, you
know.”255 Italian Americans celebrated certain aspects as described above. Economic
interventionism, corporatism, public works, and a strong leader became constant themes in
Italian-American discourse after the Wall Street crash of 1929, a story explained in more
detail in chapter six. Most people were philo-Fascist, friendly but not devout. Some points
of disagreement restricted their unconditional acceptance and kept them from becoming
outright Fascists. While Fascist economic policy traits that appeared to address the
working-class issues raised by the leftist took hold, lingering questions regarding the
regime’s violence and subversion of values such as free speech and democratic
representation cautioned full acceptance of Mussolini’s system.
Youngstown’s Il Cittadino Italo-Americano put this sentiment into words in July
1926 during an attempt to describe its stance toward Fascism: “We are not, nor were we
ever, cardholding fascists, but we do not cease however to be philo-fascists, as we have
always been [philo-fascist] …, recognizing as a whole the reforms generated by fascism in
the institutions of the State, all the efficiency of them and all the benefits caused to the
Nation.” However, the newspaper also condemned the regime’s repressive actions,
including the new restrictive press laws and the suspension of elections under the pretext
of addressing an economic emergency. While the article ended with a line about the
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newspaper’s “favorable dispositions toward fascism,” it was clear to readers in the United
States that some aspects of the movement were better rejected than adopted.256 Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano’s response confirms the estimates presented earlier in this chapter by
Gaetano Salvemini and Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel. Perhaps five to ten percent of people
were committed, unwavering Fascists, but the vast majority remained somewhere in the
middle, friendly to Fascism but certainly not beholden to it when Mussolini’s government
crossed other beliefs.
The American civic values of representative government and freedom of speech
moderated the adoption of Fascism. The belief stated above that Mussolini was a
“superman” came from Frederico Santi, the maître d’hôtel of Cleveland’s Hotel Statler.
During that same speech, he also wished that the United States could restrict communists
from speaking, like in Mussolini’s Italy.257 Santi was part of a committed American proFascist minority. His dedication eventually led to the federal government seeking to revoke
his American citizenship during the Second World War. Evidence included Santi’s position
as trustee in the Fascist League of North America during the late 1920s, his involvement
in the Fascist-aligned Dante Alighieri Society, his numerous pro-Fascist speeches and
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distribution of literature, and his 1939 reception of the title of Cavaliere from King Victor
Emmanuel III per the recommendation of Mussolini.258
By contrast, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, more reflective of the community as a
whole, argued in a 1931 article that communists had the right to speak. 259 The editorial
came as a response to an actual event. On Memorial Day 1931, communists assembled in
Youngstown and planned to march even after the city denied them a permit. When mounted
police tried to dissolve the group, thrown paving bricks hit one of the officers. The standoff
turned into a melee between police armed with blackjacks and communists with knives.
Authorities restored order, arresting seventy people, but a dozen on each side were
wounded.260 While Il Cittadino Italo-Americano argued that the government had the right
to regulate public events and communist organizers made a poor decision in choosing
Memorial Day for a rally, the paper also refused to fault either party. Instead, it noted that
the skirmish was avoidable. The newspaper rejected painting all participants as radicals
and claimed that most were merely upset about the economic crisis. These people had “the
right to make their complaints heard, therefore the freedom of speech must not be
prohibited.” As evidence, the paper noted that the same group arranged with authorities to
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hold a public meeting days later, and this rally drew about four thousand people and spurred
no incidents.261
This openness to freedom of expression, press, and debate allowed leftist ideology
to continue to circulate within the community, which constantly blunted the worst excesses
of Fascism. Carlo Tresca was never silenced and did not stop proselytizing. For example,
in June and July 1929, he toured western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. These coincided
with one of Fascism’s most celebrated accomplishments, the Lateran Accords and the
normalization of diplomatic relations between Italy and the Catholic Church, which
became one of Tresca’s topics.262 He spoke at Pittsburgh’s Kingsley Settlement House in
East Liberty as part of a commemoration for Matteotti. A meeting at Braddock’s Moose
Temple Hall had the theme “’Fascism, Monarchy, Papacy,’ the three cancers of Italy.” His
talk at Canonsburg’s Labor Temple Hall was likely similar given the topic: “The return of
the Pope-king.”263 Other Pennsylvania stops, most of which addressed comparable
subjects, occurred in Ambridge, Charleroi, Erie, Masontown, Uniontown, and
Greensburg.264 His Ohio tour included two events in Cleveland (one of which was at the
Italian American Brotherhood Club in Little Italy) to speak about “Monarchy, Fascism and
Clericalism,” along with visits to Akron and Youngstown.265 Ideas still circulated in
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Tresca’s absence. During his tour, Il Martello received and printed short commentary and
notes of solidarity from readers in Cleveland, Bedford, Ohio, Carnegie, Pennsylvania,
Weirton, West Virginia, and Pittsburgh, showing that engaged subscribers still existed by
the end of the decade.266 Additionally, just like earlier in the 1920s, Tresca was not alone
in his efforts. In August, Felice Guadagni scheduled events in Cheswick, Braddock,
Ambridge, and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.267 Guadagni was a syndicalist who had been part
of the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee, authored Il Martello’s articles about the pair’s
trial, and worked with Tresca and other radicals.268
The previous adoption of civic values and prolabor ideas from the political left
caused most Italian Americans to refuse wholehearted acceptance of Fascism; instead,
these influences colored the parts of Mussolini’s system that people found valuable and
worth adopting. Areas of alignment deepened people’s commitment to a synthesis which,
at its core, can be summarized as an activist government working on behalf of regular
citizens. Most people rejected sections that appeared as antitheses, such as violence and
repression of civil liberties. As the following chapter shows, it was within this milieu that
Italian Americans began meeting to discuss domestic politics during the 1920s, a process
that forced an ideological moderation and built a popular consensus in time for the New
Deal.
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Chapter Five
The Italian American Political Association and Grassroots Politics
In October 1928, the Youngstown Municipal Railway Company published an
advertisement for its weekly pass in Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, the Ohio city’s local
Italian-American newspaper. By offering quick, comfortable transportation at a low cost,
the service targeted ethnic patrons using the Italian language and listing destinations
common for immigrants and their children. These included stores, theaters, and churches,
the usual stops for streetcar clientele. However, the advertisement also added locations or
events that were specific to the Italian-American community, including night school (a
reference to English-language and citizenship classes), the gymnasium at the YMCA, and
“conferenze politiche” (political conferences or lectures).1 Community outsiders, like the
Youngstown Municipal Railway managers, understood the popularity of Italian-American
political meetings enough to incorporate them in company advertising. Their observations
were correct. The streetcar advertisement printed weeks before the 1928 general election
highlighted a noticeable trend to period observers from outside the ethnic community:
Italian Americans increasingly participated in American politics and grassroots political
organizations.
The political club served as a nexus for the ideological currents described in the
previous chapters, and it was within that space that Italian Americans forged collective
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political beliefs. As documented in chapter two, the community increasingly turned toward
civic engagement and citizenship. The dual forces of systemic prejudice and immigration
restriction provided negative pressures to become politically engaged, while the positive
influence of Americanization efforts encouraged voting as a requirement for good
citizenship. However, as also seen in chapter two, these white ethnics had little in common
with the Americanizers. Settlement house workers were primarily college-educated white
Anglo-Saxon Protestants seeking to aid immigrants through self-improvement while
maintaining the social order. By contrast, Italian Americans desired systemic change to
address their ethnic, working-class concerns.
They self-identified first and foremost by ethnicity, so Italian Americans founded
their own political clubs. Provoked by the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan and other nativist
impulses, they organized to have a voice in the political decisions that affected their lives.
These groups’ goal was to provide a unified collective of voters, and they welcomed all
Italian Americans regardless of background or previous views. Those who had experienced
the two outside ideological influences described in chapters three and four, leftism and
Fascism, mingled freely within these associations, aiding the moderation and synthesis of
both currents into a new group ideology.
The local political club was the most overt manifestation of this intersection
between political beliefs and action. While some historians have minimized these groups
or presented them as insidious mechanisms of machine politics, these organizations
actually played an essential community role for grassroots political engagement between
the First World War and the start of the New Deal. Participants compared them to their
mutual aid societies. Political clubs protected and advanced Italian-American interests by
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providing strength in numbers. Members believed that by promoting the Italian-American
vote as a bloc, they could elect representatives whose platforms fit their needs. Whenever
possible, this meant supporting a member of their ethnicity. In the absence of such a
candidate, backing went to those who had the ethnic community’s interests in mind, usually
those who rejected nativist bigotry and appeared as allies to the new immigrants. The
creation of the local bloc necessitated the merger of various political beliefs into one core
ideology as members debated candidate platforms and offered endorsements.
The Italian American Political Association of Youngstown, Ohio, was one example
of these clubs. As will be documented, dozens of grassroots political organizations existed
throughout the region; the use of the Political Association is a practical decision and not an
argument about its uniqueness. Celestino Petrarca, a member and occasional officer in the
club, owned the local Italian-American newspaper, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano. While
most other political clubs received passing mentions of their significant events in the press,
Il Cittadino Italo-Americano ran regular notices and updates – events, meeting summaries,
and candidate endorsements – from the Italian American Political Association to increase
participation and membership.2 Unlike other grassroots clubs, the Political Association left
a written record. It also fits the very definition of the public sphere at work, being that
political debate from within the club affected reporting in the newspaper. Additionally,
many club officers were notable leaders in the local ethnic fraternal societies. The Italian
American Political Association was a link that drew together two important ethnic
institutions, the newspaper and the mutual aid societies, to disperse political thought.
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Youngstown residents created their club in 1924 as a response to ethnic
discrimination. The group had two primary purposes that worked in tandem: political
education and the formation of a voting bloc to hold politicians accountable. Members
feared deception, so they invited local politicians for speeches and then debated various
candidates’ merits. The Political Association endorsed whoever appeared to have the
community’s best interests in mind, and the group published slates that cut across party
lines. To have more power to enact change, the Political Association sponsored outreach
and public meetings. Unlike party organizations that operated under a noted personality,
such as an ethnic ward boss, the Youngstown group adhered to democratic norms,
including yearly elections that rotated in new leaders.
The Political Association and other clubs formed around ethnicity, not a party or
previous ideology, and this allowed them to bridge divisions within the community. As
explained in chapters three and four, historians have generally treated leftism (which
assumed an anti-Fascist tinge during the 1920s) and Fascism as antithetical and mutually
exclusive to each other. While this may have been true for the adherents, it was not for the
influenced. The goal of ethnic uplift bound people into one deliberative body. Innocenzo
Vagnozzi, for example, was a professed anti-Fascist and leftist who fought openly with
other members of the Political Association. He often drew the ire of Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano editor Carlo Caselli, who supported Fascist Italy and painted Vagnozzi as a
communist. The debate, however, moderated both men. Vagnozzi praised Benito
Mussolini’s personality and leadership, even while condemning Fascist repression. For all
his denunciations of the left, Caselli repeatedly deplored working-class conditions and
called for solutions. While neither man would have adopted the other’s label, they found

312

agreement in some areas. Within such settings, the disparate ideological influences within
the community merged into one expression for domestic politics. Debate and consensus
ground the edges and excesses of leftism and Fascism, and the moderated views came to
inform Italian-American ideology.

Italian-American Political Clubs
As Italian Americans adopted the civic values described in chapter two, they
increasingly focused on collective political action. Historians have noted this shared
participation, but usually in the context of local political clubs mentioned in passing or
linked to machine politics. This approach unintentionally diminishes the agency and power
of this Italian-American engagement. In actuality, political clubs served important
purposes and were not always entities beholden to local political bosses. They stood at the
intersection of grassroots mobilization and political catering by politicians. As Italian
Americans increased their knowledge of civics, gained citizenship, and registered to vote,
community leaders fantasized about the possibility and potential of an Italian-American
voting bloc. Rather than the products of machines, they were practical organizations that
accepted party alliances to extract concessions seen as beneficial to the community and
simpatico to its collective ideology concerning significant issues.
Political clubs were popular, but numerous scholars have only mentioned them in
passing rather than ascribed more profound importance to the organizations. In this sense,
they were merely one of many local institutions within the ethnic enclave. However, their
geographical and numerical breadth suggests that they played a significant role in shaping
Italian-American political ideology. Late nineteenth-century examples existed in
Baltimore, Maryland, the Central Italian American Democratic Club, and Providence,
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Rhode Island, the Italian Political Club, which catered primarily to middle-class, northernItalian immigrants.3 A multitude of organizations appeared during the first three decades
of the twentieth century in the following diverse cities: Baltimore, which hosted the Italian
Democratic Association of the fourth ward, the Carraresa Democratic Club, the Italian
American Republican Club, and the third ward’s Exeter Democratic Club; Portland,
Oregon, which had the Italian-American Republican Club; San Francisco, California;
Hudson, New York; Chicago, Illinois; Providence, which contained the Italian Protective
Club and the Roosevelt Republican Club; New London, Connecticut, which saw the
creation of the Italian American Citizens Association in 1931 to serve as an umbrella
organization for previously founded political clubs; and New York City, where Italian
Americans instituted new organizations and took over extant groups.4
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These clubs became historically significant in some evaluations because they
operated as political bases for local power brokers, therefore slotting them into machine
politics. The Amerita Club of Pittsburgh was one example. Operated by John Verona, third
ward alderman and later magistrate, the organization was part of the local Republican
political machine. Italian Americans redeemed the assistance promised by Republican
committeemen at the club until the Great Depression, which ended such activity because
of insufficient funds.5 Chartered political clubs aided Il Progresso Italo-Americano owner
Generoso Pope’s influence in New York City. Beginning in 1929, he and Paul P. Rao
organized numerous Democratic clubs in Italian-American enclaves. Two years later, Pope
and Rao regrouped the principal organizations under a new banner, the Italian American
Democratic Clubs of Manhattan, and the following year, 1932, Pope and another associate,
Jack Ingegnieros, founded the Federation of the Italian American Democratic
Organizations of the State of New York to widen influence beyond the city.6
There is a need to reevaluate the role of these political clubs. Instead of interpreting
them as having political agency usurped by the local machine, the clubs and their leaders
should be viewed as partners rather than the implied patron-client relationship. According
to J. Joseph Huthmacher’s study of new immigrant groups’ politics during the interwar
period, Italian Americans in Massachusetts sought “recognition,” a term the author used to
mean new desires for ethnic political inclusion alongside previous party loyalty built
through patronage. Dispensing jobs was not enough; white ethnics during the 1920s
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demanded that political parties put members of their communities on the ticket. They
believed that inclusion in the political process brought respect and proved their capacity
and worth as American citizens. When Massachusetts Republicans failed to offer
recognition, many white ethnics turned to the Democrats.7
New York provided another example of political revolt. While Pope certainly had
an outsized influence over Italian-American voters, club members retained the opportunity
to break when a favored front-runner emerged that offered recognition. Many ItalianAmerican voters dismissed Pope’s endorsement of Democrat James J. Walker and instead
backed Republican Fiorello La Guardia’s failed bid for mayor in 1929. Even though Pope
consolidated his ethnic political machine during the early 1930s, the Italian-American
electorate’s energy for La Guardia’s victorious 1933 mayoral run forced Pope to remain
silent in the race.8 Where interests were similar, power brokers and political clubs
cooperated toward the same goals, but the latter was not beholden to the former.
This is not to claim that machine politics were inconsequential. Both Bruce M.
Stave and Stefano Luconi have argued that the ability of the Democratic Party to provide
patronage in 1930s Pittsburgh was a reason for its victory over the entrenched Republican
establishment.9 However, machine politics were not inconsistent with Italian-American
ideological preferences. As will be described in more detail in the next chapter, ItalianAmerican voters desired an activist government that could improve their lives, one facet of
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which included the ability to provide jobs through public works. In this sense, governmentfunded work was not a bribe or reward for votes but a responsibility of all political leaders
as long as jobs were open to Italian Americans, employed those in need, and resulted in
projects beneficial to society.
It is best to think about these various political associations as symbiotic to the party
system rather than solely exploited by politicians. Period sociological studies support the
notion that these clubs had more agency and individualism than usually implied by
historians, lending weight to a grassroots political movement. In Giovanni E. Schiavo’s
1928 assessment The Italians in Chicago, the ethnic group had two primary sources for
“political education”: the Italian-American newspaper and local political clubs. These latter
organizations numbered at least twenty, and while both Republican and Democratic clubs
catering to Chicago’s Italian Americans existed, Schiavo also saw an unfolding evolution
in political mentality from individualism to a group emphasis. In his opinion, there were
signs of Italian Americans breaking away from ward bosses by the late 1920s. As people
Americanized and learned English, they became “independent of the politician.” Without
needing the local ward boss’s expertise for navigating needs, such as a pushcart license
from the city, Italian Americans found themselves free to engage with politics less for
personal benefits and more for the betterment of their ethnic community.10
Roy V. Peel’s 1935 work, The Political Clubs of New York, further suggested a
grassroots political autonomy. In 1930, Italian Americans formed the largest number – 130
out of the 302 studied – of what Peel termed “nationality clubs,” which were political
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groups organized by ethnicity or race.11 He dismissed the common interpretation that the
ward captain, usually an Irish American, managed other ethnicities via an unthinking gobetween who prided himself on his ability to deliver a party-line vote.12 Actual workings
were more complex:
After having visited scores of nationality clubs, the writer must confess not to have
seen much of this dumb loyalty on the faces of nationality party workers. Most of
them are cynical and skeptical, at least in conversation with impartial observers.
But the men who undertake to organize their compatriots into separate subsidiary
clubs have no intention of publicly disavowing their expressions of devotion to
party principles. They have learned to play the game in the American way–with a
few added refinements of their own.13
Peel’s analysis that neighborhood organizers and groups adhered to party discipline only
when beneficial to their ethnicity explains why Italian Americans were prominent in revolts
across numerous assembly districts. These often occurred when the leader, usually
someone backed by the Irish or German bloc that had de facto control, failed to represent
the new ethnic community’s needs. Revolts of Italian Americans occurred in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Hoboken, New Jersey. Turnovers were the result of community
awakenings that created political instability concerning the old order.14
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Political clubs appeared in William Foote Whyte’s Street Corner Society, which
documented life in the Italian-American enclave of “Cornerville,” the North End of Boston,
during the late 1930s. The “corner boys,” Whyte’s term for the young men at the bottom
of the class hierarchy who mingled on street corners and in the associated establishments,
such as clubrooms, poolhalls, and barbershops, accounted for the bulk of the political club
membership. Typically, each association formed under a club boss, someone a step higher
in the socioeconomic hierarchy, who juggled appeasing various corner boy cliques to build
a base. The political clubs operated as a quid pro quo in which members supported the club
boss or another figure to advance the cliques’ interests.15 The membership retained much
power and autonomy, and Whyte concluded that “unless the boss takes pains to tie the
cliques in closely with the nucleus of the club through consulting their leaders on matters
of policy and giving recognition to the informal clique organization in prestige and favors,
the club may break up.”16
These sociologists observed how Italian Americans carved out a place in politics
through collective responses. This point was made evident in an Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano article titled “Politics: The Great American Game.” The author admitted that
voters operated within an arena erected by the parties, one in which the bosses picked the
choices offered to the electorate. As the piece continued, “it is taken for granted by the
bosses of all parties that you are too absorbed in your laborious daily trials … to give any
serious attention as to what goes on inside and outside of the political lines, and … they
feel that by nature most of you are extremely gullible.” The solution was to educate oneself
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about the candidates, stay informed, and not be tricked by a few kind words the day before
the election.17 Yet, they had an ambivalent, rather than a purely denunciatory, view of the
party system. As expressed by J. R. Napoleon in Pittsburgh’s Unione newspaper in August
1933:
By “party” is meant nothing more than a political machine. Some time ago a famous
statesman proclaimed a government as being a necessary evil. Political parties or
machines fall into the same category, for even though there may be some corruption
and graft connected with them, … they manage to bring out the best qualified men
for candidates in order to be able to draw the votes of the people.18
Napoleon argued that a properly working American system required the interdependence
of political parties or machines and grassroots mobilization. Apathy created corruption.
When only a minority of voters participated, parties elected poor candidates. When the
masses turned out, parties ran qualified and capable people to better compete for votes.19
The proliferation of political clubs before the New Deal was the natural
consequence of this interpretation of machine politics. As “Politics: The Great American
Game” concluded at one point: “Your vote alone is insignificant. But your vote added to
the vote of the other voters at once becomes a crushing force, a dominant factor, and a
driving power.”20 To have political influence, Italian Americans understood that they
needed to organize voting blocs to stay informed and gain enough sway to extract
concessions from the party bosses. Rather than view political clubs as creations by elites
meant to control voters, most were grassroots formations to gain more agency for the
community. One Bridgeport, Connecticut, resident’s story about creating his local political
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association was likely common. Members of his ethnic club talked about politics while
playing cards, which led them to establish a political organization.21 These political clubs
operated as counterweights to local bosses by keeping ordinary people informed, creating
consensus for a voting bloc, and extracting small concessions from political machines
through alliances.
Cleveland’s La Voce del Popolo Italiano was clear about this point in 1920. After
gaining citizenship, which was the prerequisite for any political action, Italian Americans
needed an organized bloc of voters unaffiliated with either political party. Strength in
numbers could provide results.22 The desire for Italian Americans to engage as a unified
community rather than a mess of individuals continued throughout the decade as
newspapers reinforced the need for a voting bloc.23 Individuals also sought to group voting
behaviors to receive recognition. When Maria Vitantonio, a secretary for Italian Consul
Nicola Cerri, became the first female Italian-American notary public in Cleveland, one of
only nine women in 1920, she told the judge at the ceremony that she planned to use her
new status “to talk with all the Italian women in Cleveland … and help them to reason out
for whom they shall vote at the coming election.”24 The community as a whole sought to
unify its voters to have a voice in politics.
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It is necessary to look back at the political clubs that existed before the Great
Depression to understand the Italian-American response to the New Deal. Rather than
minor entities or symptoms of machine politics, these organizations allowed grassroots
political growth, which primed the community to respond quickly and positively to a
political realignment. Local ethnic leaders obsessed with forming and retaining a voting
bloc as the only means to gain power in the American party system. This resulted in the
proliferation of political clubs in the majority of towns with Italian-American residents.
Bloc formation encouraged ideological consensus. The political club sought as many
members as possible and, in the process, forged those with differing ideologies into one
group. These organizations became the primary physical locations in which the public
sphere shaped a New Deal-style ideology.

The Italian American Political Association
The Italian American Political Association of Youngstown, Ohio, provides an
excellent example of the independent political club model that proliferated during the
1920s to form consensus and hold together a bloc of voters.25 Community leaders organized
the Political Association as a response to ethnic concerns, especially discrimination. The
rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan and its power to influence laws were impetuses for creating a
political club as a rival and a possible check on nativist power. The Political Association
members favored a collective approach to politics, and they sought consensus through
debate and conversation. The organization consistently maintained the idea of strength in
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numbers to offer a swing-voting bloc to any local politician that promised to support
Italian-American interests.
Formed in 1924, the Italian American Political Association likely took inspiration
from the older Italian American Citizen Club. Created in 1914 and named for its
naturalization requirement for all admitted members, the Citizen Club may have followed
the model set by other groups that concentrated on civic education and engagement rather
than influencing voters’ decisions.26 Cleveland’s Hiram House, for example, hosted a
similarly named group, the Italian American Citizenship Club, “organized for the study of
political problems and altho [sic] there [was] some dissension in the club as to
endorsements etc. still they stud[ied] for principles rather than personalities.”27 Other
citizen clubs followed suit, concentrating on “principles rather than personalities,” civics
rather than endorsements. The Hiram House group spawned two similar clubs in
Cleveland, one at the Alta House settlement and another on the West Side.28 In
Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, the 1911 charter for the Italian-American Citizens Club of
Jefferson County claimed that the group aimed “to furnish information to the members of
said corporation concerning current political issues, and concerning public men and
officials.”29 Other Italians formed the Center Township Italian-American Citizen Club of
Indiana County, Pennsylvania, in 1921 to serve Homer City and surrounding communities.
Its expressed goals were “to teach those who are already citizens how to use their ballots
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properly … [and] to study political questions of the day to the end that Italian-American
citizens may become versed in our [American] institutions and useful in our body politic.”30
These clubs more aptly fit the civics education model described in chapter two. However,
their intention to increase political engagement laid the foundation for subsequent clubs
with more extensive and overt electoral aims.
Youngstown’s Italian American Citizen Club may have experienced a similar
“dissension” to that which occurred in Hiram House’s Italian American Citizenship Club.
In 1921, old members of the Youngstown group called a special meeting to reorganize and
restart its work.31 The club continued operating over the next few years, including an effort
to widen its influence by offering free admittance for the upcoming 1922 elections.32 It had
some success, including the enrollment of twenty-five new members in January 1923.33
The organization held meetings that spring at Gaglione’s hall in the heart of the ItalianAmerican enclave of Smoky Hollow, suggesting that enough members regularly attended
to necessitate the need for ample space.34 It is not clear whether the Italian American
Citizen Club offered endorsements or remained confined to a civic orientation, but it
certainly had many of the same goals as later political clubs.35 Members wanted unity to
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secure rights and respect from elected leaders proportionate to the amount of taxes paid by
the community.36 This group eventually gave way to the Italian American Political
Association during the mid-1920s.37
When those in Youngstown created their Political Association in July 1924, they
envisioned a larger, more active organization than past groups. Assembling at the Duca
degli Abruzzi Hall, only a few blocks from Gaglione’s, the first meeting included “talented
speakers … [who gave a] report on our current political situation in America.” Organizers
expressed the desire to elevate an Italian-American voice to achieve victory in the coming
elections.38 This dual value of education and political action was evident in the group’s
temporary name, the Italian American Citizen Political Club, which implied a merger of
the percolating civic values held by older organizations with the desire for an ItalianAmerican “colonial movement” to enact change.39
Upon inauguration, the Political Association had two aims: to fight discrimination
and correct misinformation. The initial impetus for political participation in 1924 was
defensive. The club’s supreme objective was to fight “Klanism,” a catchall term that
included not only the Ku Klux Klan but any individuals, organizations, or laws that
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appeared to target Italian Americans because of their ethnicity.40 Provisional committee
member Alberto Di Tommaso pointed to disunion as the cause of their problems. Division
allowed for the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act, or the “Klan Bill,” as Di Tommaso called
it, that closed American borders to Italian immigrants. He claimed that they would not
forget similar acts of injustice, including Sacco and Vanzetti, the execution of Sam Purpera
of Cleveland, and those killed in Louisiana.41 The last example likely referred to the spring
1924 state executions of six Italian Americans in Amite, an event denounced on the front
page of the local ethnic newspaper.42 The successes of their perceived enemies against them
required Italian Americans to gain citizenship and to vote in every election because, as Di
Tommaso reminded the community, “for us it is [a] question of life, or of death, morally
speaking.”43
Since ethnic unity was the key to fighting discrimination, the organization sought
to mitigate any possible disinformation that could have divided the Italian-American vote.
An example arose shortly after the Political Association’s creation when a circular signed
by an unknown “Italian Committee” endorsing James G. Hartwell for prosecuting attorney
spread throughout the community. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano condemned the act as a
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sham and reiterated the community’s need to stay vigilant and engaged. No ItalianAmerican political club would have endorsed the “Klanista” Hartwell, who was associated
with the same laws that painted Italian Americans as inferior people.44 This was not an
overreaction; the local Ku Klux Klan had endorsed Hartwell only a few months before.45
The first mass meetings of the Italian American Political Association were
successful. The group advertised heavily in Il Cittadino Italo-Americano and reminded
readers about the importance of the organization for ethnic solidarity.46 Some two hundred
people registered as members for the first large, open meeting on 21 September 1924. The
organization encouraged grassroots growth as “hundreds of admission applications were
distributed among those present who promised to bring them back, duly filled.”47
Membership doubled during the next meeting the following week. While ninety of the
admitted were unable to attend because of bad weather, the organization welcomed in
person one hundred and twelve new members, and those in attendance voted for officers. 48
Within a few weeks, the Political Association claimed more than a thousand registered
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members, with others on the verge of inclusion.49 The group certainly tapped into a growing
mass enthusiasm for political participation.
The club endorsed a slate that crossed party lines for the 1924 general election,
thereby living up to its purpose of supporting the best candidate for Italian-American
interests.50 For the presidency, members chose third-party Progressive Robert M. La
Follette, thereby rejecting the pro-business, conservative candidacies of Republican Calvin
Coolidge and Democrat John W. Davis. In place of the Klan-associated Hartwell for
prosecuting attorney was Thomas J. Thomas, a Republican running on his experience as
city solicitor and assistant prosecutor.51 For state senators, the Political Association
endorsed a member from each party, Democrat William L. Sause and Republican J. Eugene
Roberts, to fill the two seats allotted to Ohio’s twenty-third district.52 A similar ticket-
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splitting occurred for state-level representatives as Republican Mrs. C. J. Ott, Democrat H.
P. Beckenback, and third-party candidate Joseph Gottlieb won the club’s backing.53 The
trend continued on a local level as the group endorsed several diverse county candidates.
Henry Young, a Democratic contender for county commissioner, ran on his experience as
a four-times-elected township trustee and familiarity with public works projects,
specifically roads. He promised a dollar worth of construction for every tax dollar spent, a
clear repudiation of graft.54 John McNally, another Democrat for county commissioner,
reminded Italian Americans of his grocery business and his relationships with many
prominent members of their ethnic community. For good measure, he added that he was
not a “member of any secret organization,” a coded reference to the Klan.55 Paul E. Lyden,
candidate for sheriff, and Frank H. Vogan, who ran for county treasurer, were both
Republicans.56 Peter J. Flynn, a probate judge candidate, received a glowing endorsement
in Il Cittadino Italo-Americano with specific reasoning for support. Described as a man of
character and friend to the foreign born, Flynn was nonpartisan, harbored no prejudices,
and viewed “black, yellow[, and] white” men no different from each other. In short, as a
judge, he would have been the antithesis of the Ku Klux Klan and other types of
discrimination.57 The Italian American Political Association’s criteria for endorsement

53

Thad H. Brown, Annual Report of the Secretary of State to the Governor and General
Assembly of the State of Ohio for the Year Ending June 30, 1925 (Springfield, OH: KellySpringfield Printing, 1925), 287.
54
Advertisement, “Henry Young,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 1 November 1924, 2.
55
Advertisement, “John P. McNally,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 1 November 1924, 6.
56
Advertisement, “Volete Voi Lavoro Stabile e Stabile Paga?,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 1 November 1924, 8.
57
“Facciamo i conti,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 1 November 1924, 1.
329

were ideology and platform, rather than a political party, which encouraged debate about
merits and qualifications.
The results of the 1924 elections solidified the need for more organization. Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano blamed La Follette’s defeat on an American attraction to
“political machines” and a fear of “possible surprises … [if] too daring programs” were
enacted. Italian Americans had voted Republican in the past, but the party’s inability to
separate itself from discriminatory acts, such as immigration restriction, left the ethnic
group unaffiliated and more willing to judge local candidates on merits alone. While the
loss on a national level encouraged negative reinforcement about needing the Political
Association, some local victories, such as the elections of Thomas J. Thomas and Paul E.
Lyden, offered a glimpse of future possibilities if the bloc remained united.58
The Political Association’s underlying message was unity to secure ItalianAmerican rights. As evidence, the group reminded potential allies of specific places where
fellow Italian Americans had lost their rights because of disunion, such as in Herrin,
Illinois, Niles and Steubenville, Ohio, and Follansbee, West Virginia.59 The Herrin
reference was a notorious example of class and ethnic conflict in the coalfields of southern
Illinois. After deadly confrontations between the United Mine Workers of America and
company men in 1922, Protestant ministers and businessmen defused the class conflict by
stoking fears about foreigners and calling for law and order. Italian Americans provided
easy scapegoats and targets for simmering hostilities. In early 1924, Prohibition agents
bolstered by deputized locals, many of whom were Klansmen, raided private homes
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searching for alcohol. They harassed Italian-American residents, and victims reported
cases of planted evidence and theft of personal property. The raiders were likely
responsible for a wave of arsons.60 The other conflicts were closer to home. In Steubenville,
Klansmen murdered two Sons of Italy members, and anti-Klan forces responded with their
own violence.61 In Follansbee, across the Ohio River from Steubenville, there was a
standoff between the Klan and the local Sons of Italy that ended peacefully thanks to a
heavy police presence.62
Niles was a different story. Minor confrontations between Klan members and
Italian- and Irish-American protesters occurred throughout 1924. When the Klan proposed
a parade on 1 November, Mayor Harvey Kistler permitted it and swore in scores of
Klansmen as municipal police. Anti-Klan forces blockaded roads to stop the march, and
both sides resorted to armed intimidation, beatings, and exchanging gunfire. Governor A.
Victor Donahey ended the riot by declaring martial law and dispatching the Ohio National
Guard.63 It was in this context that the Political Association urged ethnic unity and set a
goal of having a five-thousand vote bloc to have “ten-thousand arms ready to refute

60

Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2016), 142–51.
61
Linda Gordon, The Second Coming of the KKK: The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s and the
American Political Tradition (New York, NY: Liveright, 2017), 101; David J. Goldberg,
“Unmasking the Ku Klux Klan: The Northern Movement against the KKK, 1920–1925,”
Journal of American Ethnic History 15, no. 4 (Summer 1996): 42–43,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27502105.
62
“Armed Police Prevent Klan-Italian Clash,” Akron Beacon Journal (Akron, OH), 27
September 1924, 11.
63
William D. Jenkins, Steel Valley Klan: The Ku Klux Klan in Ohio’s Mahoning Valley
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1990), 117–39.
331

offenses and … affirm our rights.”64 Creating a solid voting bloc was necessary to contest
the Klan’s dominance over local politicians like Mayor Kistler.
Immediately after elections, political organizations typically assume a slower pace
until the next round of primaries. However, the Political Association’s core members spent
the months after the 1924 elections formalizing the group’s existence to create stability and
permanence. They battled a lack of enthusiasm by some members. In February 1925, there
were complaints about how some professionals, many of them lawyers, had wanted
leadership positions, and after the club elections, they fell aside, “or they retired themselves
on Youngstown’s Aventine, waiting for the events.”65 There were, however, some
members willing to push the Political Association forward, notably Alberto Di Tommaso.66
Notwithstanding this criticism, the group continued to advance. There were
monthly meetings in December 1924 and January 1925, from which new plans for
permanence and expansion came.67 Most important for the organization’s stability, the
Political Association filed for incorporation with the state of Ohio on 9 January 1925.68 The
club distributed rule books in May.69 To better integrate the dispersed ethnic enclaves in
Youngstown, the group discussed holding future meetings across town in the Brier Hill
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neighborhood.70 Il Cittadino Italo-Americano offered additional suggestions, and since
Celestino Petrarca was the newspaper’s proprietor and a vital member of the Political
Association, the proposals carried extra weight. Above all, the idea that the organization
would grow automatically was an “illusion.” Only by having active leaders willing to reach
out to potential members would the Political Association succeed. Ideally, the group would
have representatives for outreach in each of the seven city wards. The Political Association
needed to work with local mutual aid societies, churches, and Catholic organizations in
addition to the prominenti (the Italian-American community leaders). Finally, the club
needed to invite Congressman Fiorello La Guardia to speak before it about “the necessity
of the union of all the Italians in only one political group.”71 Members took some of these
suggestions to heart. The Political Association sent an invitation to La Guardia.72 In July,
the group hosted a summer picnic celebration at Brier Hill Park, complete with music and
speeches. Giovanni Passarelli, the club’s president, opened the event, and prosecutor
Thomas J. Thomas spoke about Americanization. Enrico Di Iorio’s Italian-language
discourse summarized the community’s progress over the previous twenty years and urged
unity to reach aspirations.73 Thomas was not the first public official to address the group.
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Local judges George H. Gessner and J. H. C. Lyons presented at Political Association
meetings in March and April.74
Between the Political Association’s formalization in 1925 and the midterm
elections of 1926, its members met regularly to discuss concerns. Using the analogy that
“to have a weapon in [your] hands without making use of it is the same as not having it,”
the group encouraged the use of citizenship rights, voting in primaries and general
elections, along with debate about endorsements.75 In June 1926, members met to discuss
the Republican slate for the August primaries with a follow-up meeting in July.76 The
Political Association held a final meeting on 8 August, two days before the primaries, that
was open and free for any Italian-American citizen. The group distributed its lists of
endorsed candidates, and club officials had information regarding registration and voting
procedures. “Eminent Italian and American orators” spoke about the Italian-American
vote.77 Meetings and efforts to strengthen Italian-American political solidarity and turnout
continued into the general election.78
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The Political Association served a gatekeeping function for the community. It
encouraged younger people to become involved and for membership to talk about
candidates rather than take them at their word.79 Associates sought to vet people and find
consensus on a final choice. When Guido Bernardi ran for second ward councilman in
1927, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano informed readers of his intentions but ended the article
by asking: “What does the Italian Political Association say about this?”80 The implication
was that success in attaining a local position depended on swinging the entire community’s
weight behind a candidate, an act facilitated by an endorsement from the organization.81
The Political Association took endorsements seriously. During the 1927 mayoral
race, the organization created a five-person committee to research the candidates and
suggest a favorite. The group split; three backed Judge Joseph Heffernan, and two
recommended Arthur Williams, the city finance director. Attendees at the open meeting
engaged in a vigorous debate about the candidates. At the suggestion of Enrico Di Iorio,
the Political Association agreed to postpone an endorsement until the next meeting. The
deferral gave members time to consider both men and gather additional information. They
also justified their decision under the pretext that a closed session of members, rather than
an event open to the entire community as before, aided consensus.82 Heffernan earned the
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endorsement, which was crucial for his victory. He defeated Williams by 343 votes,
undoubtedly helped by the Political Association’s claimed seven hundred members.83
Previous Political Association leaders were not immune from a debate. When
Thomas Antonelli, the group’s inaugural assistant secretary, and Vincent Buonpane both
sought a judgeship on the municipal court in 1929, the organization proposed an
accommodation between the two men, such as a straw vote, to present one candidate for
the community. Buonpane accepted while Antonelli refused, an act that Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano editor Carlo Caselli believed would haunt him on election day. 84 The pressure
to choose one candidate was too great, so the club organized a vote during its annual
festival.85 Buonpane surpassed Antonelli with 194 votes to 115.86
The 1928 election deepened a commitment toward engagement. That summer, Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano editor Angelo Di Renzo justified its place with the analogy that
its relationship to the ethnic community was like “the lungs are to a human organism.”87
The Sunday before the election, the group partnered with the Italian Al Smith Club to host
a mass meeting of around a thousand people at the Duca degli Abruzzi Hall. The sponsors
opened the floor to the court of appeals and state supreme court candidates Joseph Cook
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and Dennis Dunlavy, and lawyer Edward Crudele of Cleveland spoke in Italian. 88 While
Al Smith’s significant defeat disappointed the community and the Political Association
experienced some discord, members continued their work.89
Once more, the Political Association remained committed between elections.
Notably, this activism and desire for growth and engagement occurred before the Wall
Street stock market crash of 1929, proving that a community desire for political
involvement existed before the impetus of the Great Depression. From a core of about
seventy dues-paying associates, the group pushed for growth.90 As Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano stated in January 1929, the organization was “more necessary than ever.”91 The
group sought to reach a growing number of Italian-American citizens, which the paper
estimated to be around nine thousand throughout the county.92 The club held a membership
drive, and the newspaper commented that the February meeting surpassed any in recent
memory as “the Duca degli Abruzzi Hall was filled with old members and new”
subscribers.93 The organization awarded bricklayer Domenico Gamberale a box of cigars
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for bringing in the most enrollees.94 By the following year, the organization had grown to
a healthy three hundred members.95
Between Al Smith’s defeat and Franklin Roosevelt’s election, the Political
Association continued its functions as it had over the previous four years. It reaffirmed its
place by reminding residents that it stood not for the individual but the “collective benefit”
of the community.96 The 1930 anniversary celebration took place at Idora Park and drew
an estimated seven thousand people. It was a festive atmosphere, complete with a band,
sports games, and a queen’s crowning. More importantly, the event presented twenty
candidates on stage and allowed them the opportunity to mingle and shake hands with
attendees throughout the day.97 However, as Carlo Caselli wrote during a summary of the
event, “all the candidates promise seas and mountains,” but after the election, the ambitious
forget their pledges.98 The organization took words at face value. The Political Association
continued to give the meeting floor to candidates, but vetting persisted as debate led to
consensus for endorsements.99
Changes in club leadership support the argument that these endorsements were
genuine and fair. They were reflections of community sentiment. Unlike machine politics
that operated under a ward boss, administration changes meant that members never
intended their group to serve as a partisan political base for a couple of men. Initial
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elections in October 1924 put the following people into leadership roles: Giovanni
Passarelli, president; Innocenzo Vagnozzi, first vice president; Cesare Amadio, second
vice president; Alberto Di Tommaso, secretary; Thomas Antonelli, assistant secretary; Ciro
Saulino, treasurer; and trustees A. Marino, Vincenzo Casciato, Alessandro Rossi, Michele
Labbruzzo, Celestino Petrarca, Carlo Stella, and Nicola Colla.100 The club held new
elections in December 1925 for the 1926 administrative year, which brought in several new
people. Passarelli, Amadio, Antonelli, Saulino, Marino, Casciato, Rossi, Petrarca, and
Stella all relinquished positions. Vagnozzi moved up to become president, Labbruzzo
became first vice president, and Di Tommaso went from secretary to assistant secretary.
Besides Colla’s return to his old position, new elects filled the remainder of the posts as
follows: C. Crosetto, second vice president; A. Pompili, secretary; Filippo Carosella,
treasurer; and trustees R. Marcovecchio, L. Conti, F. Zacconi, J. Masi, P. Candido, and G.
Romano.101 Elections for 1927 saw similar changes as membership reelected Vagnozzi,
Labbruzzo, Carosella, and Zacconi to their posts, returned Di Tommaso to secretary,
demoted Crosetto to assistant secretary, brought back some old leaders from 1925 (trustees
Amadio and Petrarca), and added new figures (trustees Vincenzo Chianese, Pellegrino
Velardo, Nick Ferreri, and Pasquale Pietroniro).102
Subsequent elections followed similar patterns as members brought in new
leadership and reaffirmed that the club was not beholden to one personality. For 1928,
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newcomer Andrea Infante won the presidency, with G. Valentini serving as first vice
president. Infante had not gone unchallenged. Celestino Petrarca sought the position and
lost, but he congratulated Infante and remained involved.103 Petrarca was victorious for the
1929 administrative year, replacing Infante as president, who then became a trustee.
Previous leaders gained new positions, such as Michele Labbruzzo as assistant secretary,
while newcomer David Vergallito became first vice president.104 For 1930, Petrarca served
as treasurer while Ralph Vitullo and Carlo Crosetto became president and first vice
president.105 These three remained in their positions in 1931 while the second vice president
and some trustees changed.106 Vitullo continued as president for 1932.107
These men were prominenti who used their positions within the community for
prestige and networking.108 While a few gained government occupations beginning in the
1930s, this club was not an apparatus for machine politics in which the leaders had political
positions from which to build support by doling out patronage to Political Association
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members before the New Deal. Giovanni Passarelli was a local banker who had previously
worked as a reporter in Rome, an editor for Cleveland’s Italian-language newspaper, a
night school teacher, and a consular agent in Indianapolis, Indiana – where he also trained
as a lawyer – before settling in Youngstown in 1909.109 Innocenzo Vagnozzi was a notary
public, insurance salesman, and real estate agent.110 In 1931, the Ohio Grand Lodge of the
Sons of Italy elected him Grand Orator, and he served alongside two other Political
Association members, Ohio Grand Venerable Ciro Saulino and delegate Alberto Di
Tommaso.111 Saulino worked as the Italian-American department head for the Sigmund
Engel Steam Ship Ticket Agency, which offered numerous services, including travel ticket
bookings, postal money orders, and assistance with immigration paperwork.112 Di
Tommaso worked for Dollar Bank and provided help with travel documents and other
paperwork.113 He was the point of contact for those investing in the Fascist loan program
described in the previous chapter, and after 1937 he served as an acting Italian consular
agent.114 Others were also bankers. Cesare Amadio worked at Dollar Bank in Struthers,
Ohio, before becoming the Italian-American liaison for the L. B. Burger Travel Service in
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Youngstown.115 He served as venerable of the Loggia Operaia in Struthers.116 Filippo
Carosella rose to become president of Union Savings Bank in 1926, an Italian-American
institution, where he worked alongside Adolfo Pompili.117 Thomas Antonelli was a lawyer.
He graduated from Yale University in 1916, studied Constitutional Law under former
President William Howard Taft, and was a member of the Loggia Napoleone Colaianni.118
Celestino Petrarca, who arrived in Youngstown from New Kensington, a city northeast of
Pittsburgh, just before the First World War, was the owner-director of the newspaper Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano from 1920 until 1934. After that time, he operated the Eagle
Printing Company until retirement.119 Andrea Infante was the son of immigrants who grew
up speaking Italian at home and worked as a pressman at a printing company while serving
as Political Association president in 1928. He later became a life insurance agent by the
mid-1930s.120 Vincenzo Casciato was a tailor during the 1920s who then added a dry
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cleaning and pressing business.121 Michele Labbruzzo was a cobbler.122 Ralph Vitullo was
a stock exchange clerk in 1930.123 Carlo Crosetto worked as a salesman, first for a macaroni
company, then for an oil business, and later in grocery and wine retail and wholesale. 124
Some of the minor figures held industrial or blue-collar jobs, including as a foundry laborer
(Pasquale Pietroniro), a truck driver (Pellegrino Velardo), and a house painter (Carlo
Stella).125
Those who initially entered government employment were not in positions that
aided the Italian-American community beyond the respect that the group gained for finally
breaking into the political sphere. Ralph Vitullo was an example. If the Political
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Association membership expected patronage from its leaders, Vitullo was a terrible choice
for president in 1930. He stood for second ward councilman in the 1929 city elections and
lost.126 In 1931, he became a claims investigator for the state’s Division of Workmen’s
Compensation, one of three men assigned from Youngstown.127 Given his background as
a clerk, he was qualified for the job. To Italian Americans, Vitullo’s appointment, along
with the nomination of two other community members to positions, was a sign of political
parity, not reward. The Political Association’s efforts to keep voters unified as a bloc
finally paid dividends and spawned optimism that qualified group members could have
equal opportunity for government employment.128 It was a celebration of ethnic
advancement toward social and political equity.
The few who rose to elected positions did so in typical progressions and not always
obligated to their declared party. William B. Spagnola, a member of the Political
Association but not an officer, was also a rising star within the community.129 He became
mayor of Youngstown as a Democrat in 1939.130 A 1922 graduate of the University of
Cincinnati Law School, Spagnola began his public career as the third assistant city law
director under Mayor Joseph Heffernan, an official opposed to graft, before Heffernan
appointed him city police prosecutor in 1928. Italian Americans celebrated the decision as
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an honor and acknowledgment that their ethnic community contained qualified individuals.
Spagnola continued in the police prosecutor position under the next mayor, Mark Moore,
before his own failed mayoral run in 1935.131
Most importantly, Spagnola appeared unbeholden to a political party. Although a
Democrat, he spoke at a local Italian-American fraternal society in favor of D. F.
Rendinell’s 1932 Republican primary run for county prosecutor.132 Spagnola stood as a true
independent during his 1935 attempt at the mayor’s office. The lack of an official
endorsement by the local Democratic Party establishment clearly showed that he was not
aligned to its partisan interests. Spagnola finished second to the eventual winner, and he
garnered three times the number of votes as the Democratic-endorsed candidate who placed
third.133 In his concession remarks, Spagnola denounced the local Democratic political
bosses by name and viewed his second-place finish as a “moral victory,” a sign that the
people wanted an end to machine politics and the reorganization of the local Democratic
Party.134 In 1937, Spagnola won a campaign for municipal judge, a sign that voters favored
his independence.135

“Il Gabinetto della Nuova Amministrazione Municipale,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 18 December 1927, 6; William D. Jenkins, “Moral Reform After the Klan:
Joseph Heffernan as Mayor of Youngstown, 1928–1931,” Old Northwest 9, no. 2 (1983):
146; “Il Nuovo Police Prosecutor della citta’ Avv. Wm. B. Spagnola,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 14 January 1928, 1. This issue was mistakenly printed as 14 January 1927;
“Atty. Spagnola Dies; Former Mayor, Judge,” Youngstown Vindicator, 17 March 1969,
city edition 1, 8.
132
“Parla un Democratico,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 16 April 1932, 1.
133
Ernest N. Nemenyi, “Lionel Evans Is Elected by 6,506,” Youngstown Vindicator, 6
November 1935, city edition, 1, 7; “Mr. Spagnola’s Campaign,” Youngstown Vindicator,
6 November 1935, city edition, 8.
134
Thomas DeCola, “Spagnola Concedes Defeat But ‘Won a Moral Victory,’”
Youngstown Vindicator, 6 November 1935, city edition, 1, 9.
135
“Atty. Spagnola Dies; Former Mayor, Judge,” Youngstown Vindicator, 17 March
1969, city edition 1, 8.
131

345

Innocenzo Vagnozzi, Political Association president in 1926 and 1927, served as
water commissioner under Mayor Spagnola, but he gained community prominence in his
own right. Vagnozzi arrived in the United States with his widowed mother in 1904. At
thirteen, he began working at his stepfather’s hotel in Latrobe, Pennsylvania, and he took
English classes at the nearby Christ Mission settlement house. He gained working-class
credentials, having been employed as a teenager in a steel mill and for the Pennsylvania
Railroad before settling in Akron, where he worked in a clothing store and then operated a
hotel. To aid his new career in real estate and insurance after arriving in Youngstown,
Vagnozzi attended night school at the YMCA. He later studied finance, bookkeeping, and
economics. Constituents in Youngstown’s second ward elected him to the city council in
1935 and 1937. Vagnozzi’s platform during those campaigns called for more equitable
public utilities between the city wards and the fair treatment of customers, concerns that
corresponded to his later appointment as water commissioner.136
The Italian American Political Association was not a product of machine politics
but a grassroots organization of members who sought consensus to operate within the
American party system. Devised initially to fight nativist-backed public figures who
sponsored ethnic discrimination, the club never wavered from its goal of holding together
a bloc of voters to swing elections and present one Italian-American voice. In the process,
the Political Association primed an electorate to hear and consider various politicians and
their viewpoints. Invitations to candidates and debates about club endorsements created a
rational body politic willing to support individual ideas and platforms rather than party
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alone. Organized around ethnicity, the Political Association contained a cross-section of
the Italian-American community. The club was the physical place in which an ItalianAmerican ideology formed.

A Network of Political Clubs
The Italian American Political Association of Youngstown was not unique, and
dozens of similar clubs existed throughout the region before the start of the New Deal.
Historians will never know the exact extent of partisanship with certainty for all these
organizations. Some specified a nonpartisan nature, while others proudly allied themselves
to the Democrats or Republicans. More important is the point that Italian Americans
established political groups organized by ethnicity, which attests to a mass transition
toward political engagement and the creation of political ideology from the bottom up and
within the community. Organizing around ethnicity forced these groups to cut across
socioeconomic and previous ideological lines. Even groups allied to a particular party by
name willingly heard opposing politicians, especially if the guests’ platforms aided ItalianAmerican rights.
Given the history of the Italian American Political Association, the proliferation of
similar organizations is not a surprise as participants thought of political clubs as part of an
interconnected network. As noted above, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano had suggested in
early 1925 that the Political Association needed outreach efforts to grow and prosper. The
newspaper repeated similar recommendations in 1927. These included expanding the
geographical reach of the club to neighboring Trumbull County, nominating ward leaders
to serve as liaisons for specific districts of Youngstown, and holding occasional meetings
in the surrounding communities of Girard, Hubbard, Campbell, Struthers, and Lowellville.
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The newspaper proposed creating a committee and school to facilitate citizenship,
appointing a press agent to write releases for the English-language newspapers, and
chartering a paired organization for the associates’ female family members. A final
recommendation was to increase outreach to other nationalities to create a broad
coalition.137
Political Association members implemented some of these suggestions, especially
the desire to expand influence and encourage others. When Italian Americans in Niles
elected Joseph Campana to head their political club in May 1931, Innocenzo Vagnozzi was
a guest speaker with the theme “Americanization and Citizenship.”138 People in
neighboring Girard formed a political organization in July 1931 and succeeded in electing
M. Del Bene as an at-large councilman. In December, Ciro Saulino spoke to the Girard
group about the “absolute need and the necessity of these Political Clubs.”139 Within
Youngstown proper, the Political Association worked alongside ward-level organizations,
such as the Third Ward Italian American Political Club, which claimed two hundred
members and offered an open floor to candidates in 1932.140 William B. Spagnola was one
of four speakers at a New Castle, Pennsylvania, Italian American Citizens League meeting
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in 1933. They promoted “the benefits to be derived in such an organization, that all Italians
should be citizens and as such should take an active part in the political life of the
country.”141
Other Italian Americans throughout the region also deemed political clubs
necessary because scores of organizations proliferated before Franklin Roosevelt’s
inauguration. Cleveland boasted around two dozen clubs formally incorporated with the
state of Ohio between 1917 and 1932.142 Some included party markers that corresponded
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with their affiliation, such as the Warren G. Harding Italian Republican Club (1921) and
the Italo-American Democratic Club (1931).143 Other organizations were nonaligned and
likely served civic and political purposes similar to Youngstown’s Political Association,
such as the Progressive Italian Citizens Club (1921) and the Italian Political & Civic Club
of Cleveland, Ohio (1923).144 In either case, partisan or nonpartisan, these local
organizations encouraged Italian Americans to engage in the political process.
In some instances, founders of social groups intended their organizations to serve a
political role. These clubs offered audiences for candidates during election season. This
crossover explains why some groups listed their purposes as social and political when they
incorporated, such as Società S. Angelo-Licata in 1917.145 Perhaps the best example of this
trend in Cleveland was the Italian American Brotherhood (IAB) Club. Incorporated in early
1928 and numbering 1,100 members the following year, the IAB Club was primarily for
social purposes, but it also welcomed local politicians.146 It sponsored a mass meeting
supporting Al Smith in 1928 with guests ex-Senator Atlee Pomerene and Peter Witt, a
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former independent Cleveland city councilman.147 In early 1932, Democrat Ray T. Miller
was a guest at an IAB Club dance.148 The group invited all three mayoral candidates – Ray
T. Miller, independent Democrat Martin L. Sweeney, and Republican Harry L. Davis – to
speak at its annual picnic in 1933.149 The 1935 picnic, estimated at 37,500 people, included
comments by Alessandro L. DeMaioribus, a Republican from Little Italy and the president
of Cleveland City Council, and short speeches by many other local government figures,
including five judges, the chief and assistant police prosecutors, State Representative
Marzel Levan, and the assistant city law director.150 The IAB Club also opened its facilities
to groups from both political parties. The 1931 inaugural meeting of the 330-member
Cuyahoga Italian Democratic Club occurred at the main IAB hall on Mayfield Road.151 The
club’s auxiliary location in Richmond Heights was the site of an 800-person banquet to
celebrate Republican Michael A. Picciano, the new chief police prosecutor.152 Social clubs
intertwined themselves with politics.
Civic and political groups in Ohio existed beyond Cleveland and Youngstown, and
Italian Americans organized clubs in other cities and towns. After the First World War,
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Italian Americans formally incorporated groups in Canton, Steubenville, Akron,
Wellsville, Lorain, Alliance, Girard, Cuyahoga Falls, Bellaire, and Warren. 153 Beyond
these state-recognized groups, numerous other organizations existed. For example, the
incorporated Italian American Ladies Citizens Political Club in Campbell formed as a
counterpart to an existing men’s club that had succeeded in electing Joseph E. Julius and
John B. Rossi as town mayor and treasurer.154 People in Niles formed a political club, the
Italian American Citizens’ League, in 1931, which quickly grew to three hundred members
and met with and endorsed candidates in 1931, 1932, and 1933.155 This organization
accepted female attendees and speakers, and it built connections to other area political
clubs, including ones from Girard, Warren, Hubbard, and Youngstown.156 For example,
William B. Spagnola addressed the organization in 1934.157

153

Harvey C. Smith, Annual Report of the Secretary of State to the Governor and General
Assembly of the State of Ohio for the Year Ending June 30, 1919 (Springfield, OH:
Springfield Printing, 1919), 43; Smith, Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1922,
44–45; Brown, Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1924, 39–40, 42, 45; Brown,
Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30, 1925, 10; Brown, Annual Report for the
Year Ending June 30, 1927, 10; Brown, Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30,
1928, 15; Clarence J. Brown, Annual Report of the Secretary of State to the Governor
and General Assembly of the State of Ohio for the Year Ending December 31, 1930, and
Includes the Election Statistics for 1930 (Cleveland, OH: Consolidated Press & Printing,
1931), 13, 15, 17; Brown, Annual Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1931, 12;
Myers, Annual Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1932, 13, 15.
154
“Campbell, Ohio,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 16 January 1932, 1; Myers, Annual
Report for the Year Ending December 31, 1932, 15. Called the Italian American Ladies
Citizen Political Club in the newspaper article.
155
“To Organize League Sunday,” Niles Daily Times, 24 April 1931, 12; “Citizens Group
Picks Ferguson,” Niles Daily Times, 10 August 1931, 1; “Invite Candidates to Meeting
Tuesday,” Niles Daily Times, 11 April 1932, 1; “News of the Week: Sunday,” Niles
Standard (Niles, OH), 28 October 1932, 1; “Italian American League Has Meeting,”
Niles Daily Times, 5 November 1932, 1; “Candidates Invited to Speak at Meeting of
I.A.C.L. Monday,” Niles Daily Times, 5 July 1933, 1.
156
“Citizens’ League to Meet Sunday,” Niles Daily Times, 24 October 1931, 1; “Italian
Groups Will Be Merged,” Niles Daily Times, 27 May 1932, 1.
157
“Italian Citizen’s [sic] League to Meet,” Niles Daily Times, 20 July 1934, 1.
352

A similar network of civic and political associations existed in Pittsburgh before
Roosevelt’s inauguration. The Italian Republican Club began in 1915 with about sixty
members.158 The less-overtly partisan Italo-American Political Club of Allegheny County,
described as “the first of its kind in this section,” began in 1918 when three hundred people
organized with the purpose “to array the Italian vote behind the best candidate and also to
educate the Italian citizenry of this section in matters pertaining to politics.”159 Others
formed the Italian Citizens’ National Association in 1919, intending to establish district
branches from a central downtown Pittsburgh location. Membership requirements included
citizenship, or at least filed first papers for citizenship, and good standing in the
community. As former assistant district attorney Peter M. Cancelliere, one of the
organizers, stated, “no Italian voter who qualifies as a member … will be led to the polls
by the nose on election days. … He will vote according to his own judgment.”160 Notable
Pittsburgh residents, such as Ercole Dominicis, the Fascist-friendly editor of La Trinacria,
formed the Italian Voters’ League of Allegheny County, which admitted women as well as
men, after a meeting in the McGeagh building on Webster Avenue in 1921.161
A patchwork of neighborhood-specific clubs dotted the city. There was the
Fifteenth Ward Italian Political Club with President Joseph Abbate.162 The Twentieth Ward
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Italian Civic Club met at the corner of Chartiers Avenue and Allendale Street in the western
part of the city.163 Based in the twenty-seventh ward on the city’s northside, the Italian
Women’s Political Club reached one hundred members before changing its name to the
Italian Women’s Republican Club.164
Other groups sought to extend across neighborhoods. The United Italian League of
the Northside began as an organization to promote Americanization and citizenship to
undermine Black Hand criminality in the community. Its goal was to spread throughout
Pittsburgh.165 The group progressed from having local politicians address members, such
as State Senator Morris Einstein and Police Magistrate Edward Hough in 1921, to a
candidate endorsement meeting in 1931 that claimed thousands in attendance. 166 The
Roosevelt Civic Legion, a predominantly Italian-American organization of three hundred
founded in 1931 and formalized the following year, was headquartered in the nineteenth
ward but also included “district delegates” for the nearby town of Swissvale and
Pittsburgh’s

Beechview,

Brookline,

Oakland,

South

Side,

and

North

Side

neighborhoods.167
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Italian Americans in smaller towns and cities throughout western Pennsylvania
founded additional organizations. Residents of Butler instituted an early group, the Italian
Political Club of Butler, in 1915.168 Those living in McKees Rocks created the ItalianAmerican Citizens’ Republican Club of McKees Rocks and Stowe Township in 1915 “to
wage an aggressive campaign for the Republican candidates at the coming primaries and
general election.”169 The Italo-American Political Club of Bridgeville, established in 1916,
and Monessen’s North Italian Political Club promoted American citizenship.170
Connellsville was home to the Lincoln Club, a predominantly Italian-American Republican
organization.171 Those living in and around Homer City instituted the Center Township
Italian-American Citizen Club of Indiana County to teach voting and “study political
questions of the day.”172 The communities of New Kensington and Arnold sponsored the
Italian-American Mutual Educational Society, which denounced Philadelphia-based, state
political leader William S. Vare for trying “to tighten monopolistic bossism” in
Pennsylvania.173 The Italian Political Club of Coraopolis hosted a 1928 dinner with guests
Congressman Guy E. Campbell and State Senator Frank J. Harris.174 About ninety-five
residents of Derry organized the Italian Civic Association in time to endorse candidates for
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the 1931 elections.175 By August 1932, the Italian-American Citizens Political Club of
Monongahela was hosting notable politicians. The group’s bicentennial celebration for
George Washington’s birthday, held at the Italian Citizens Club building on Main Street,
included two county judges and numerous other politicians and candidates such as
Congressman Henry W. Temple and his Democratic rival.176 Other political clubs existed
in Swissvale, Canonsburg, Clearfield, Brockway, and Turtle Creek.177
A vibrant network of Italian-American political clubs flourished throughout
western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. Not every organization operated in the exact mold
of Youngstown’s Italian American Political Association, but a significant number adopted
similar methods and procedures. They invited and vetted candidates, and members
discussed the advantages and qualifications of each person. Organizations sought to reach
as many neighbors as possible. Using Italian-American identity as the criterion for
membership, the groups mixed people of various classes, community status, and previous
political beliefs. Clubs created relationships between each other, putting their leadership in
direct contact and encouraging unity across multiple enclaves. The inclusion of all these
Italian Americans and their commitment to candidates who professed ideas beneficial to
the whole community necessitated adopting a mass ideology.
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Bridging the Ideological Divide
An overarching Italian-American identity, along with a belief in American
democratic values, helped bridge the leftist-Fascist divide to create a new ideological
synthesis. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano reaffirmed the importance of ethnic solidarity when
it responded to conversations about creating a local Fascist organization in 1925. The
newspaper reminded readers about the role that the mutual aid societies and the new Italian
American Political Association played in advancing their interests. Squabbles regarding
Fascism needed to remain in Italy. Instead, those now residing in the United States “should
not be fascists, nor antifascists, nor monarchists, nor socialists, at least in public, but only
Italians, squeezed together in only one pact of brotherhood and of solidarity, aimed only at
the gradual rising of our communities and of our race in general.”178 The primacy of ItalianAmerican advancement allowed people from across the political spectrum concerning
leftism and Fascism to mingle and create a new domestic synthesis of ideas applicable to
problems in their own lives.
Nowhere was this clearer than in the Italian American Political Association. Rather
than restrict membership, the club welcomed those with diverse backgrounds, including
participants who openly expressed leftist and Fascist thoughts. The process of merging
these disparate people, who stretched across the ideological spectrum between the two
extremes, into one bloc willing to support a particular slate of candidates moderated
members. Public debate forced them closer to consensus. Those identified by their
ideological rivals as antithetical to their own beliefs often found common cause, such as
when anti-Fascists agreed that Mussolini was a strong leader and a man of action, and the

178

“Un po’ di buon senso…,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 4 April 1925, 1.
357

Fascists saw some benefits of leftist economic ideas. These were outspoken people who
wrote their opinions in the community press for all to see, so they were not afraid to raise
their voices in closed meetings and private conversations. Importantly, these debates,
which sometimes turned nasty, did not lead to ostracism. People who disagreed and argued
profusely about Fascism and leftism later found themselves together as notable speakers
and guests at events, and they concurrently held elected offices in various Italian-American
organizations. Those with vastly different views about Mussolini and his system
occasionally agreed with their ideological rivals, a clear indication that mixed-group
engagement blunted some of the most divergent parts of their opinions.
Innocenzo Vagnozzi, who served as Political Association president in 1926 and
1927, and later as second ward councilman in 1935 and Mayor William B. Spagnola’s
water commissioner, was an anti-Fascist leftist. Before his leadership in the Political
Association, Vagnozzi was already a notable personality within the local community. He
was an official in the Ohio Grand Lodge of the Sons of Italy for the administrative period
1921–1923, and the members of the Loggia Napoleone Colaianni elected him grand
delegate for their organization in 1925.179 His popularity in the community was partly due
to his willingness to denounce prejudice and discrimination, such as in a 1924 open letter
in which he announced a desire to debate the Ku Klux Klan about its principles regarding
American values.180
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Vagnozzi made no secret where he stood on the Fascism issue, and the members of
the Political Association certainly knew his ideology before electing him their leader.
When Nicolangelo D’Orsi, another member of the Political Association, announced the
creation of a new local fascio (Fascist group) in Youngstown in late 1924,181 Vagnozzi
responded with a tongue-in-cheek question – “I ask the concerned parties to tell me at least
a reason, for which the formation of such association is useful and necessary” 182 – clearly
trying to goad D’Orsi into a public debate.183 During a talk before the Girard Kiwanis club
about the history of Italy and the Roman Empire, Vagnozzi argued that “physical force and
brutality can never bring about a permanent good and if this world’s problems are to be
solved it will be through a theory of union and the practice of universal brotherhood,” a
likely allusion, given the timing of the statement, to the Matteotti Crisis in Italy. 184 One
1925 article defending Mussolini specifically targeted Vagnozzi. Arguing that Mussolini’s
ascension to power was similar to Napoleon Bonaparte’s in that “the end justifies the
means” in the context of saving a nation as a whole, the opinion’s author denounced
Vagnozzi’s alternative views. The writer contended that Vagnozzi “was not an exact
chronicler” and instead interpreted events through his own prism of ideas.185 Vagnozzi
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responded to the unsigned article that he could not in good conscience dismiss the brutality
that accompanied Fascism.186
While Vagnozzi was certainly an anti-Fascist, he did not lack leftist credentials.
When Arturo Calvani visited Youngstown in March 1922 to lecture about Sacco and
Vanzetti, an event mentioned in chapter three, the fundraising effort involved Vagnozzi. 187
In 1929, he responded to a local pastor’s speech denouncing Bolshevism by commenting
in an open letter: “Inasmuch as most of us are under the impression that Bolshevism has
no ideals, I should like to have the Reverend give us a clear idea of that doctrine.”188 It was
an attempt to show the fearmongering by those who used such terms but were ignorant
about their meaning. By 1930, some of his adversaries in the Italian-American community
were implying that he was a communist.189 This slander may have been a stretch, but he
indeed found commonality with the left. In June 1935, for example, Vagnozzi spoke at a
Youth Congress symposium at Youngstown’s Central Auditorium. The group hosted
addresses from all sides, including Republican, Democratic, communist, and socialist,
which Vagnozzi represented. During his talk, he opposed the profit motive and “urged
complete socialization, or public ownership,” based on Christian principles, using the
analogy of government-owned city streets being in the public’s interest compared to the
alternative of forcing toll payments for usage.190 Two months later, he spoke in Niles during
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an event titled “The Truth About Russia,” appearing alongside union leader C. H. McCarty,
who had just returned from a tour of the Soviet Union. The topics covered: “Trade Unions,
Social Insurance, Old Age Pensions, Vacations with Pay, Workers Homes and Mothers in
Industry.”191 This perceived radicalism earned him a reputation. A copy of the 1935 Youth
Congress speaker list purportedly showing the attitudes of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Company annotated Vagnozzi’s name with the penciled remark, “one of the most
dangerous radicals in Youngstown.”192
Innocenzo Vagnozzi’s combative nature concerning Fascism and his open leftist
leanings did not stop him from retaining a position of respect within the Italian-American
community. Even as he debated others in the ethnic press about Fascism, Vagnozzi served
alongside and attended events with more Fascist-friendly individuals, such as fellow
Political Association members Ciro Saulino and Alberto Di Tommaso. 193 At times, his
activism caused friction. When he remained seated for the Fascist anthem during a 1932
event, Vagnozzi brushed aside criticism about his actions and refused to see them as
misconduct.194 Others questioned whether it was appropriate for a Sons of Italy official
(Vagnozzi was Grand Orator) to snub the Italian government. Nevertheless, membership
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knew that he was an anti-Fascist, and it had tolerated similar behaviors in past years. When
Grand Venerable Saulino asked for Vagnozzi’s resignation, the Grand Orator refused.
State-level leaders did not find consensus for his removal.195 Tacit acceptance of Vagnozzi
did not change over the years, and in 1940 he spoke alongside the Italian consular
representative at a Sons of Italy event.196 The same was true for local politics. Even though
he won the position of second ward councilman as a Democrat in 1935, Mayor Lionel
Evans, a Republican-endorsed candidate who gained his office in the same election by
winning every ward except for Vagnozzi’s second, still allowed the Italian American to
serve on the mayor’s 1937 committee on city charter amendments.197 Vagnozzi’s politics
never precluded him from operating within the Italian-American community or the
American body politic.
Vagnozzi was not an inflexible ideologue. While he occasionally debated some
Italian Americans who viewed him as a radical, his engagement with others in the Political
Association and ethnic organizations moderated his politics. For example, the point made
previously about Vagnozzi being a potential communist came from a response to a speech
that he made about Benito Mussolini at the local YMCA in 1930. An open letter signed by
over a dozen notable men from the community, including fellow Political Association
leader Vincenzo Chianese, denounced the talk and the articles printed about it in the
English-language newspapers. Believing that Vagnozzi “discredit[ed] the Italian name,”
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they rejected the newspapers’ references to the man as an Italian-American leader because
“99 percent [of Italian Americans in Youngstown] are not communists,” and Vagnozzi,
therefore, did not speak for them. Signatory Carlo Caselli, editor of Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, offered additional criticism. Vagnozzi espoused “subversive and anti-Catholic
doctrines” and undermined the goals of the Sons of Italy to uphold patriotism and Italian
brotherhood. Vagnozzi’s actual words, however, were much less inflammatory. While the
speaker predicted the eventual fall of Mussolini’s regime because it was “built on false
foundations,” he also “admitted the strong qualities of the Italian leader, speaking of him
as being the son of a blacksmith, but having the most brilliant mind, fascinating, a
penetrating speaker, a magnetic person and irresistible.”198
Had Vagnozzi only operated within smaller circles of like-minded individuals, he
likely would have developed into an all-out partisan condemning every aspect of Fascism.
Instead, his experiences with ethnic organizations, such as the Political Association, filled
with diverse views about circulating ideologies, dulled extremes. In this sense, the antiFascist, leftist Vagnozzi had learned to appreciate some of Mussolini’s leadership qualities
from fellow community members, even as he disagreed with other parts of the regime, such
as its brutality.
Nevertheless, for every individual who approached the Political Association from
the ideological left, another joined with more friendly perceptions of Fascism. Cesare
Amadio, who served as the inaugural second vice president in 1924, was similarly popular
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amongst his peers for his poetry condemning nativism.199 However, while Vagnozzi fought
against Fascism, Amadio defended the regime. He attended Tresca-associate Luigi
Quintiliano’s 1924 lecture in Youngstown. Afterward, he publicly denounced the speaker
and most of the attendees – whom he viewed as subversives, anarchists, and socialists –
for their negative views about the Fascist state.200
Ciro Saulino, the Political Association’s first treasurer and later Grand Venerable
for the Ohio Sons of Italy, had a similar acceptance of Fascism. In 1929, for example,
Saulino was one of the guests of honor at a Cleveland Armistice Day celebration alongside
Vincenzo Vedovi, president of the Italian War Veterans, and G. T. Romano, the secretary
of the Cleveland Fascist organization.201 The War Veterans, including the local Cleveland
organization and national leader Vedovi in particular, had a long history of working handin-hand with Fascists, both domestically and in Rome.202 Saulino’s willingness to join such
circles of people becomes more apparent in the context of a joke printed in Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano the previous autumn. Answering the question of why a consular agent had
not appeared at the local Columbus Day banquet, the paper responded in jest: “They have
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little fondness for Fascism … [and] they feared that Mr. Saulino attending as Venerable of
the Loggia [Napoleone] Colaianni and then consular representative, would have had the
right to double portions – They avoided this for fear of abdominal cramping.”203 Local
readers knew that Attilio Rosapepe, not Saulino, was their local consular representative,
but in Rosapepe’s absence, Saulino was the next logical person to represent Fascist Italy. 204
His position as Grand Venerable further endeared him to Fascist circles, and Saulino was
one of the speakers at the 1931 ceremony during which the Italian government conferred a
knighthood on Dr. Giovanni A. Barricelli.205 Saulino received the same honor shortly
before his death in October 1932, an indication that Italian Fascists deemed his work in the
United States acceptable to the regime.206
While many Italian Americans were favorable to Fascism, most were not
particularly devout or fanatical. Affinity appeared more nationalistic than purely
ideological, making those who entered the Political Association as philo-Fascists as
flexible at times as the leftist Vagnozzi. Alberto Di Tommaso, the Political Association’s
secretary or vice secretary at various times, offers a good example. As mentioned in chapter
four, Di Tommaso passed a Fascist-friendly letter sent from a cousin in Italy to the local
Italian-American newspaper in 1924.207 Di Tommaso’s own path followed Saulino’s rise
in the Sons of Italy closely, first taking over the latter’s position as head of the Loggia
Napoleone Colaianni and then achieving a leadership position within the Ohio Grand
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Lodge as assistant grand venerable.208 His commitment to Fascist Italy was sincere enough
to obtain him the role of acting consular agent for Youngstown during the late 1930s.209
Di Tommaso was not a fanatical Blackshirt supporter. After Ciro Saulino won the
position of Ohio Grand Venerable, Di Tommaso and other Political Association members,
including Vagnozzi, Stella, Colla, Petrarca, and Labbruzzo, formed an event committee to
celebrate the occasion.210 During this December 1929 banquet, which included ex-Grand
Venerable Barricelli and Youngstown Mayor Joseph Heffernan among the five hundred
guests, an argument erupted concerning the playing of the Fascist anthem.211 Di Tommaso,
as toastmaster, dismissed calls from a few rowdy, pro-Fascist guests demanding the song.
Although his action caused some resentment and accusations of anti-patriotism, he justified
his decision by arguing that playing the Fascist hymn was out of place and unacceptable.
The band had performed the Royal March, the authentic Italian national anthem, and they
had not scheduled the Fascist alternative as part of the program. Rather than concede to a
few unruly individuals, he stuck to the purpose of the banquet and respected the ideological
diversity of those present.212 Di Tommaso’s promotion of Fascism apparently had limits.213
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Fellow Political Association member Raffaele Marcovecchio defended Di
Tommaso, and he lent his own nuanced critique of Fascism to those who attacked the
toastmaster.214 True devotees of Mussolini knew that il Duce “imposed silence … [on
Italians] for the collective good of our homeland.” Marcovecchio reasoned that if Mussolini
resorted to such methods to discipline his people, then his followers in the United States
should have had no complaints about Di Tommaso demanding silence at an event.215
Di Tommaso was not unique, and Carlo Caselli, the editor of Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, also benefited from the moderating effects of community interaction. Although
Caselli was not a Political Association leader, he attended its events, was a notable local
personality, and interacted with the people described previously.216 Unlike many Italian
immigrants, Caselli arrived in the United States with a formal education in civil
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engineering from the University of Naples.217 He was more interested in literature and
journalism than in numbers, and he found employment at Matilde Serao’s Il Giorno from
1907 to 1910. Additionally, from 1908 to 1910, he worked for a humor publication through
which he befriended many notable Neapolitan artists, such as Libero Bovio. After a stint
in the civil engineering department of the Ministry of Public Works in Calabria, Caselli
immigrated to the United States for personal reasons, or in his words, because of “some
errors of [the] female type.”218
Caselli initially worked as a New York City journalist before going to
Youngstown.219 He was associated with Il Cittadino Italo-Americano as an editor and
humor columnist off-and-on from at least 1920 until October 1931, when the paper
removed his name from the masthead.220 Financial trouble due to the Great Depression was
the most likely reason for his exit. Staff had reduced the paper to four pages by this time,
and no new editor appeared alongside owner-publisher Celestino Petrarca’s name.221 The
editor’s departure was likely a mutual decision because he contributed a poem and a letter
that expressed positive sentiments toward Petrarca the following year for the newspaper’s
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thirtieth anniversary.222 Caselli was also a representative for Cleveland’s La Voce del
Popolo, servicing the Youngstown area and parts of Pennsylvania and West Virginia when
the paper became a daily.223 The Italian government honored his work as a high school
Italian-language teacher in 1935.224
Like other Political Association members, Caselli ingratiated himself with the
Italian-American community. He became an officer in the Duca degli Abruzzi society
during the mid-1920s.225 Caselli served as the banquet master of ceremonies when the
organization merged with the Cristoforo Colombo lodge in December 1930, and he was
elected president of the combined Duca degli Abruzzi-Colombo society in 1932 and
1933.226 In 1932, he chaired the speeches portion of the local Columbus Day celebration,
and he was elected an honorary chairman of the local Italian veterans organization’s parade
alongside his sometimes rivals William B. Spagnola and Innocenzo Vagnozzi.227
Ideologically, Carlo Caselli presented himself as a pro-Fascist. In fact, it was
Caselli who often targeted and denounced Vagnozzi’s anti-Fascist views in the newspaper.

C. Caselli, “O’ Cittadino,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 20 August 1932, 2; C.
Caselli, letter to C. Petrarca, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 20 August 1932, 3. Page 2 was
misprinted as 13 August 1932.
223
“La Voce del Popolo di Cleveland Ohio,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 16 September
1922, 6. This was most likely La Voce del Popolo Italiano.
224
“Carlo Caselli, East High Teacher of Italian, Dies,” Youngstown Vindicator, 10
November 1937, 6.
225
“Societa’ Duca degli Abruzzi,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 2 January 1926, 3.
226
“La Festa di Domani Domenice [sic] alla Duca d’Arbuzzi [sic] Colombo,” Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano, 13 December 1930, 1; “Le Elezioni Sociali della Societa’ Maschile
Duca degli Abruzzi Colombo,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 10 December 1932, 1;
“Carlo Caselli, East High Teacher of Italian, Dies,” Youngstown Vindicator, 10
November 1937, 6.
227
“Grande Celebrazione Ufficiale della Scoperta D’America,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 15 October 1932, 1; “Sezione Ex Combattenti Italiani – Youngstown, O,” Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano, 3 December 1932, 1.
222

369

When Vagnozzi questioned the above-described unsigned 1925 pro-Mussolini article that
attacked him, Caselli took credit. He derisively responded that it was him – a forty-threeyear-old short Neapolitan with graying hair and a big nose – and reminded readers that
Vagnozzi forgot to list the good aspects of Fascism, including the growing prestige of the
nation.228 Caselli was also a signatory to the letter slandering Vagnozzi as a communist
after the latter’s 1930 YMCA speech criticizing Mussolini. He included an additional selfpenned denunciation of Vagnozzi’s “subversive and anti-Catholic doctrines.”229 Others
also faced the editor’s wrath. Caselli forcefully denounced Di Tommaso for rejecting the
impromptu playing of the Fascist hymn during the 1929 banquet controversy.230 Enrico Di
Iorio, a physician and Political Association member, suggested that the editor was too
excitable. He believed that Caselli lacked professionalism and should have been “impartial
and calm in his comments” for the good of the community.231
Notwithstanding such critique, Caselli moderated his commitment to Fascism,
similar to others. While defending Mussolini in 1925, Caselli followed a similar
interpretational trend, as noted in the previous chapter. He refused to offer any excuse for
the violent elements of the Fascist Party that assassinated Giacomo Matteotti, calling them
“fanatics” and “maniacs.” However, Mussolini and his strong leadership were necessary to
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solve Italian problems.232 Furthermore, the editor talked like a leftist at times. He conveyed
notions of working-class grievances about capitalists wrongfully exploiting honest
laborers.233 He even defended the Soviet Union for its industrialization program, remarking
that the communist government benefited workers and Russian economic successes
impressed even Wall Street capitalists.234
Differing allegiances concerning Fascism and leftism did not stop these people
from working together on domestic political issues and supporting consensus candidates.
During the 1925 newspaper tussle between Caselli and Vagnozzi concerning Fascism,
William B. Spagnola entered the fray to defend Vagnozzi and declare that Caselli and other
Italian-American newspaper editors were too defensive and reverent of Mussolini.235
Nevertheless, Caselli praised Spagnola’s legal work only months later concerning Antonio
Martini, a sixteen-year-old from Girard whom Earl Stambaugh had shot for stealing
cherries from his garden. Caselli condemned Stambaugh’s actions as “summary justice”
unwarranted against a hungry boy who had meant no harm. When the jury acquitted
Stambaugh, which according to Caselli was because of prejudice, the editor asked the
community to provide financial support to Spagnola and fellow lawyer J. Julius to continue
their work on Martini’s behalf.236 Likewise, Caselli was the Italian-language speaker when
Spagnola chaired a pro-Al Smith meeting in October 1928 for Italian Americans living in
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the Brier Hill neighborhood.237 Those who found themselves disagreeing about Fascism
put aside differences to cooperate on mutual Italian-American domestic interests.
A political club was a nexus for the creation of a popular ideology. Members who
held vastly different beliefs about developments in Italy and leftist politics joined one
organization and remained active in that group despite their disagreements. They valued
ethnic advancement in the United States, and they overlooked each other’s personal
opinions. The nature of debate and discussion about candidates and domestic politics
created a merger of disparate beliefs. Where they found commonality, ideas strengthened
each other to form a new Italian-American ideology. From this foundation, the community
awaited a leader willing to break the conservative paradigm and offer an alternative vision
for the United States that aligned with the new ideological synthesis.
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Chapter Six
The Coalescence of the Coalition
Italian Americans Discover Democratic Allies
In December 1933, the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Italian-American newspaper
Unione made its partisan position clear to readers: “We align ourselves politically on the
side of the new democracy, the party of [Franklin] Roosevelt and the ‘New Deal.’” The
announcement was optimistic about the place of Unione “as crusaders” for this cause
because the news staff had “confidence in the sincerity of this leader and his party.”
However, the paper also made it clear that this support was conditional: “If we lose that
confidence, we shall abandon our loyalty.”1 About a month later, Unione reaffirmed its
commitment to the New Deal. Proclaiming that “President Roosevelt has risen to the
expectations of the people,” the newspaper remarked that while so much had been
accomplished in only ten months of the new administration, there was still much work
remaining. Congress needed to put aside “politics, personal ambitions, [and] animosities”
to continue relief plans for Americans. For its role, Unione sought to spread Roosevelt’s
New Deal ideology, a “philosophy … of economic cooperation … [in which] industry,

“A New Deal for ‘Unione,’” Unione (Pittsburgh, PA), 1 December 1933, 1. See also
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business, capital, labor, cease to be independent branches of human endeavor, and they
become sectors in a coordinated whole.”2
Unione’s shift toward supporting the New Deal marked a significant political
realignment based on the emergence and triumph of a new ideology that reshaped the
paradigm. After a decade of pro-business, conservative presidential administrations and
Congresses, the New Deal reinterpreted the place of government in the economy and
people’s lives. It revived and enlarged the Progressive era’s fervor for business and
financial regulations. It then continued by widening the scope of government to include
massive employment programs, federal investments in public works, social safety net
provisions, and protections for workers.
From a partisan party perspective, Unione’s endorsement was a clean break from
past allegiances. The newspaper had been Republican, and it even supported Herbert
Hoover for reelection in 1932.3 However, this commitment is ideologically misleading. A
deeper look at Unione’s positions foreshadowed realignment. The newspaper justified its
pro-Hoover stance not by defending laissez-faire capitalism; instead, the Republican leader
was the victim of an economic depression that would have ruined any president and
“Hoover recognized … that there is much to perfect and change in the mechanisms of the
economic, legislative and financial systems of the country.” Unione repeated remarks from
Italian-American newspapers in Boston and New York state that the Republican Party’s
new platform coupled with Hoover’s reelection would revive the economy.4 The Pittsburgh
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source included those party planks as evidence, many of which – protecting bank deposits,
more funding for public works projects, aid to the states for their unemployment programs,
and allowing individual states to decide their Prohibition laws – later became hallmarks of
the New Deal.5 As the newspaper explained after Hoover’s resounding defeat, the 1932
presidential election was a protest vote against a Republican Party that had failed over the
previous decade.6 In this sense, Unione and its readers were searching for a party with a
program that resembled the New Deal, not conservative economics and limited
government. What people did not realize in 1932 was that Franklin Roosevelt would
champion Italian-American political desires throughout his presidency.
Italian Americans became New Deal Democrats because Franklin Roosevelt and
his party appropriated the ethnic group’s political ideology that it had developed over the
previous decade. In this project’s introduction, Angelo Di Renzo, editor of Youngstown’s
Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, laid out a future vision for the United States. Seeking to
address unemployment and the unequal distribution of wealth, he listed multiple
recommendations, including a strong industrial union movement, new government social
safety net programs, and more public works projects.7 In sum, Di Renzo advocated for a
strong, intercessional federal government. Once the New Deal shifted American
governance toward a parallel model, Italian Americans offered their firm support.
The Great Depression hastened and crystalized change rather than caused a
reevaluation in Italian-American beliefs. The Wall Street stock market crash of 1929 and
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subsequent economic depression collapsed two barriers that worked in tandem to
discourage Italian-American political engagement: voter suppression and a lack of
appealing candidates. From large cities to small towns, entrenched politicians and their
business allies relied on fear to keep many in-line. As shown in chapter five, Italian
Americans spent the 1920s organizing into political clubs. They formed potential voter
blocs, but these organizations did not eliminate risk. During a time when most candidate
choices were within the same economically conservative paradigm, rejecting the political
status quo was not worth the potential punishment, which included job loss and
blacklisting. Economic collapse and mass unemployment made these methods moot.
The failure of national politics to address Italian-American concerns encouraged
apathy. Before Roosevelt, grievance, rather than optimism, motivated voters’ decisions.
Italian Americans who went to the polls most often did so to vote against the inferior
candidate. Even during the 1928 election, usually viewed as a precursor to the realignment
of the 1930s, Italian-American newspapers spent much of their space defending Al Smith’s
identity rather than expressing optimism about his ideology and plans. Supporting the
working-class-raised, Irish-Catholic Smith was a protest of ethnic discrimination and bigbusiness dominance in America. This negative motivation, a repudiation of Republican
failures rather than a vote of confidence in a Democratic platform, continued during the
1932 election.
As Unione made clear, these sentiments changed in 1933 because Franklin
Roosevelt addressed issues vital to the community. The New Deal fused together attributes
of civic nationalism, leftism, and Fascism as described in the previous chapters. Rather
than converting Italian Americans to a new philosophy, Roosevelt’s New Deal merged
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onto the road in which Italian Americans were already traveling; his program put their
percolating ideas into practice. First, the reemerged Democratic Party answered criticism
about citizenship rights. The New Deal opened the door to white-ethnic political
engagement because it was responsive to the democratic majority and encouraged the rise
of Italian-American politicians. Second, the New Deal governed using an activist model
that borrowed from Fascism while addressing leftist grievances. An empowered national
leader in the model of Benito Mussolini spurred the federal government toward economic
interventionism, and the National Recovery Administration (NRA) became a domestic
interpretation of Italian corporatism. The Second New Deal further solidified ItalianAmerican support because it solved the NRA’s failure to raise labor to coequality with
capital. New acts after 1935 gave the federal government more authority to intercede. The
labor provisions promised by the NRA, such as maximum working hours and unionization,
continued as stronger, more enforceable laws.

The Catalyst of the Great Depression
The Great Depression was a catalyst, but less for ideological change and more for
finally collapsing the obstacles blocking Italian-American electoral potential. As noted in
chapter one, many Italian Americans lived a precarious economic existence throughout the
1920s. The Depression of 1920–1921 hurt many in the community. Employment
opportunities increased by mid-decade, but many still lacked financial stability. The
unskilled labored for poor wages in the coal and steel industries. Pick and shovel laborers
and skilled construction tradesmen often experienced seasonal downtime when winter
curtailed activity. Upwardly mobile businessmen and professionals succeeded or failed
alongside the Italian-American clientele that they served.
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The Great Depression amplified this financial instability. Between 1929 and 1933,
American gross national product fell by half. The iron and steel industry operated at only
forty percent of its pre-depression output, a rate detrimental for a region centered around
heavy industry.8 Job loss skyrocketed. In January 1931, one in three Italian Americans in
Pittsburgh were unemployed.9 Even this statistic was misleading. In addition to those
without work, a comparatively large group of people experienced reduced hours. Governor
Gifford Pinchot reported in 1932 that only two-fifths of workers in Pennsylvania had fulltime employment.10 Economic considerations had shaped Italian-American political
ideology throughout the 1920s. However, the scope of the Great Depression brought more
urgency to the matter and allowed for the rapid deterioration of barriers that previously
hindered Italian Americans from fully voicing their views at the ballot box.
As explained in chapter two, Italian Americans increasingly believed that civic
engagement offered them political agency in the abstract. Nevertheless, a variety of factors
before the New Deal generally kept them from realizing their potential. While they
theoretically were free to vote as they wished, formal and informal means of voter
suppression lessened the power of the nascent voting bloc. Economic pressures, including
poll taxes in Pennsylvania, the fear of job loss by the political machine or employer, and
potential blacklisting, kept many in-line. When they were free to choose, the options
presented to them often did not fit their ideological preferences, forcing a vote between
two unfavorable choices. Italian Americans understood the potential power of political
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agency, but they concurrently experienced disillusionment with the system before the New
Deal. The political clubs described in chapter five sought to change this, but even their
leadership admitted occasional frustration in candidates who voiced their concerns about
the voters during election season and then disregarded them for the remainder of the year.
People sought politicians who fit their own ideology, but they were few. The entrance of
Italian Americans into the New Deal coalition occurred because barriers began to collapse,
which turned disillusionment into cautious optimism.
The first prerequisite to Italian-American political engagement was citizenship and
voter registration. Only once a large enough electorate existed did the voting bloc have the
ability to influence elections. The ethnic press ran consistent reminders to register and vote,
and these were often detailed and sometimes included specific reasoning why citizens
needed to express their rights.11 This drive had some impact. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
celebrated the extraordinary numbers who registered in 1928, including in “neighborhoods
where the foreign element [was] plentiful.”12 However, even though political engagement
increased, numerous barriers still existed that blunted the full power of the ItalianAmerican electorate.
One potential obstacle was the poll tax, which existed in Pennsylvania until
residents voted to amend the state constitution in 1933.13 According to Joseph Guffey, later
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a Democratic senator from Pennsylvania, the abuses of the system astonished him.
Pittsburgh required either a property tax receipt or a fifty-cent poll tax payment before
voting. Poor voters could not meet the requirements, and the law prohibited political parties
from paying these taxes. Instead, Guffey discovered men “aging” blank tax receipts,
dancing on them so that they appeared used. Democrats and Republicans commonly
distributed aged receipts to ward leaders for their loyal voters. 14 Such fraud fit the model
used by political bosses in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia who desired a low turnout of the
masses and high engagement from select groups that they controlled.15 Ethnic newspapers
reminded Italian Americans of the tax requirement before elections, but there was a feeling
of hypocrisy since the United States was supposedly a democratic society. 16 As one man
wrote, Americans compared Fascist Italy unfavorably to “America’s ‘free’ institutions,
‘free’ country, ‘free’ press and ‘free’ everything else,” but this was an illusion because
“even voting in this ‘free’ country cost ‘half-a-buck.’”17
In 1933, John R. Napoleon, writing in Unione, scolded those who waited: “People
who continually neglect to pay their Poll Tax until the last minute are not very good
citizens. They must not have the interest of their government at heart.” However, while
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arguing that “the obtaining of your tax receipt also displays your civic pride,” Napoleon
admitted that “it is true, of course, that some people are not in the position to pay their
taxes.”18 The writer was optimistic in his assessment. Others noted the potential negative
impact that the poll tax had on poorer voters.19 Even Republican allies admitted before the
1932 election that the tax would help Hoover by suppressing turnout among the
unemployed who would have voted against the sitting president in protest.20 Although it is
difficult to quantify the effect of the poll tax on Italian Americans, it is worth noting that
only 29 percent of Pennsylvania’s population voted in 1932, which compared unfavorably
to the neighboring states of Ohio (39 percent), New Jersey (39 percent), and New York (37
percent). Turnout increased significantly in 1936, after the end of the tax requirements for
voting.21 For the working class, which included many Italian Americans who lacked
property, paying an additional tax for the privilege to choose between often subpar
candidates was not an appealing option.
Various forms of voter suppression caused Italian Americans to reconsider their
ballot choices or avoid the polls altogether. Intimidation and vote stealing were common
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in Italian-American neighborhoods.22 For example, in Cleveland’s Little Italy, located in
the nineteenth ward, voting in 1928 was not without controversy. As urban political power
in metropolises such as Cleveland depended on the ability of the machine bosses to deliver
the vote, the potential of the Italian-American electorate caught their attention. A peaceful
yet unethical attempt to transfer the Italian-American precincts of the nineteenth ward to
the twenty-fifth ward to dilute the group’s power had already failed during the 1921
redistricting.23 In November 1928, political partisans turned to more violent means to upset
free voting. During one Republican rally at the Mayfield Theater attended by local political
boss Maurice Maschke, a tear gas bomb – supposedly set by Democrats who warned
Maschke and others not to campaign in the district – disrupted the gathering. Although no
one was hurt, the bomb, which “let go with a sound like a bursting automobile tire,” forced
a temporary evacuation while organizers cleared the fumes.24 On election day, Maschke
demanded police protection for the ward after telling the board of elections that “hired
gunmen are planning to steal the election for the Democrats … [and] these gunmen have
gone into election booths and are intimidating the voters.” A reporter at the scene “found
a highly charged atmosphere” with various irregularities. People illegally campaigned
within one hundred feet of the polls, and others lounged nearby with “their hands sunk
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deep in their pockets and eyeing all [campaign] banners.” Unnamed people cryptically told
electors entering the polling station to “vote right.”25
These allegedly Democratic threats cannot be validated with certainty as Maschke
had a history of unethical practices. After having first come to power in 1909 for his role
in defeating reformist Mayor Tom L. Johnson, Maschke consolidated his power during the
1920s by subverting the city-manager plan (which ironically had sought to lessen the
influence of machine politics), including an agreement with the Democratic leader to split
patronage sixty-forty in Republican favor.26 Only two days after the controversy in the
nineteenth ward, the Akron Beacon Journal’s editorial section denounced Maschke as “the
evil genius of Ohio Republican politics” who could steal votes “with a reckless
shamelessness that put to blush the notorious ballot thefts of Cincinnati.” However, he was
too intelligent and clever to be linked personally to the actions of his henchmen.27 On some
accounts, the Beacon Journal was correct. Although the public heard reports of voter fraud
during the August primaries by the November 1928 general election (the Ohio secretary of
state had dismissed the entire Cuyahoga County Board of Elections as a response), the
following months provided more clarity.28 According to Edward C. Turner, who by this
time was the former Ohio attorney general for about a month, “Maschke’s influence was
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so potent in the Nineteenth Ward that, with the exception of Senator [Theodore E.] Burton
and a part of the legislative ticket, all the cheating, stealing and ballot box stuffing which
we found in that ward was done for Mr. Maschke’s slate of candidates.” This included
“more than 470 erasures of X marks” on ballots from precinct G, a heavily ItalianAmerican section.29 The fact that Democrats believed they had a good chance at winning
the ward, while the final count provided a two-to-one victory for Hoover, further suggests
interference.30
Maschke’s power declined after 1928, but he remained Republican county
chairman until 1933, including through a notorious embezzlement trial that ended with an
acquittal ruling by a three-judge panel in 1932.31 Whether or not the Democrats were really
to blame for voter intimidation, as Maschke claimed, is not the issue; the actual significance
of these events in the nineteenth ward is that they threatened citizens and undermined fair
elections. These methods scared potential voters into staying home, convinced them to vote
against their interests, or even changed their votes after they had cast them. Italian
Americans were not free to vote as they wished until the collapse of the political machine.
Italian Americans living outside Cleveland’s nineteenth ward also faced
intimidation, unfair practices, and possible repercussions that undermined fair elections. In
1927, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano reported that three Italian-American men physically
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assaulted Celestino Petrarca, the newspaper’s director and a noted member of
Youngstown’s Italian American Political Association. The attack was without provocation,
and Il Cittadino’s only theory was that the men were upset about the previous month’s
election in which Petrarca strongly supported Democrat Joseph Heffernan in the mayoral
race.32 The following year, while Cleveland experienced significant fraud, the board of
elections in Youngstown dealt with numerous improprieties. Although the Youngstown
Vindicator reported “very little trouble” considering the high turnout, there were still
accounts of some polling places opening early or late and many complaints regarding
anonymity. The ballots had attached stubs with registration numbers, which poll workers
were to remove and collect separately to ensure a secret vote. Some neglected to do this,
requiring intervention by election officials.33 This failure to follow procedures may have
been accidental, but any loss of secrecy played into fears. As resident Nicola Criscione
explained years later in an interview, “in the olden days you voted as your bosses and your
superintendent or your owner said,” and failure to adhere meant losing one’s job.34 The risk
of rejecting the endorsed candidate was too high if the employer discovered the vote. As
Criscione continued, elites found other ways to rig the elections. In one case, an ItalianAmerican candidate running for city council lost by a slim margin. A group of ItalianAmerican railroad workers had planned to vote for the man after their shift. On their way
to the polls, a “wreck whistle” sounded, informing them that there had been an accident in
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the yard and all employees needed to return immediately. There was no train wreck, and
Criscione believed someone might have sounded the alarm intentionally to keep the
candidate from winning.35
Employers pressured workers to vote for pro-business Republican candidates
throughout western Pennsylvania. While occupational diversity gave some Italian
Americans in Pittsburgh the opportunity to break away and vote for Al Smith in 1928, this
was impossible in many small communities dominated by one industry. Bosses in company
towns, such as Vandergrift, home of the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company, and
Windber and Carrolltown, built around coal mining interests, threatened to fire ItalianAmerican workers if they refused to vote for the approved candidates.36 Pro-Republican
company foremen kept Indiana County red until 1934.37
Political repression was especially harsh in Aliquippa, where the Jones and
Laughlin Steel Corporation (J&L Steel) controlled the local government tightly. To retain
employment at the mill, workers had to vote Republican.38 As one man claimed, they lived
“under the domination of the Republican Party” and were fearful about speaking out since
the company had informants and worked hand-in-hand with the police.39 Residents
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recounted stories of intimidation and punishment before the fall of the political machine.
Rumors claimed that the local high school football coach lost his job and was forced to
leave town after running for tax collector as a Democrat in 1924.40 Bert Iacobucci
remembered that authorities also arrested a barber named Joe Rossetti for campaigning for
Al Smith in 1928.41 Ormond Montini likely remembered the same man, only in his telling
Rossetti was not a barber but a fired J&L Steel employee who ran a nightclub and sought
to start a Democratic Party organization in Aliquippa. When unknown people destroyed
his club, locals suspected it was another attempt to force Rossetti to leave town.42 During
the 1932 election, Iacobucci’s brother Caesar and another man, Giulio, rented a donkey,
the symbol of the Democratic Party, to parade down Franklin Avenue, the main
thoroughfare, a clever snub to the Republican establishment. J&L Steel blacklisted both
men. 43
It was only after this intimidation began to collapse that people were able to express
their politics freely. The Great Depression and the arrival of the New Deal struck down
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barriers erected by political machines, and Italian Americans voiced their true opinions as
fear subsided. As Montini implied in his interview, the movement to support the Democrats
started around 1928 with Al Smith, but it did not take off because of the repression.44 Only
those not employed by the company risked being political in public. This was why people
like Aliquippa’s barbers were the most active concerning political causes.45 As independent
businessmen, an employer could not extort them for votes.
The Great Depression lessened the fear of J&L Steel since blacklisting no longer
carried much weight during a time of mass unemployment. Tony Riccitelli, who got a
position in the tube mill in 1929, used his jobless status during the 1932 election as an
opportunity to reject Republican candidates. He was only twenty years old, but he
convinced a local Republican to vouch for him as the man assumed that Riccitelli planned
to vote Republican. Barriers to registration collapsed when the local political machine
thought it was in its interest. But as Riccitelli made clear, the shift to overtly supporting
Roosevelt took several years because those still employed in 1932 refused to risk their
jobs.46
A lack of candidates fitting the desired Italian-American political ideology
strengthened apathy. Supporting a mediocre nominee as a protest was not a valid
justification to risk one’s livelihood. Nino Colonna was another underage Aliquippa
resident whom J&L Steel registered to vote for the company’s approved ticket in 1929.
With no suitable choices on a pro-business Republican ballot, he wrote in curse words
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rather than capitulate.47 Others whose families depended on their employment lacked
Colonna’s youthful militancy. Risking a job to snub the Republican establishment without
a viable political alternative was not an attractive option. The potential repercussions were
too high to risk making a statement.
However, the years prior to the New Deal were not a time of complete political
inaction. When a viable, acceptable candidate stood for election, many Italian Americans
crossed these barriers and offered support. Returning to Joseph Heffernan’s election to
mayor of Youngstown in 1927, a victory that may have been the reason for the assault on
Celestino Petrarca, the candidate had widespread Italian-American support. He received
endorsements from the Italian American Political Association and a group of ItalianAmerican Catholic women.48 After his narrow win by a few hundred votes,49 Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano asserted that the mayor-elect’s “victory was undoubtedly a real victory of
the people” as he was a man not beholden to business or Protestant religious crusaders, and
he cared about and respected lesser groups like the Italian Americans.50
Heffernan fit many attributes sought by Italian-American voters. Having spent
much of his youth traveling the United States, he had working-class credentials, including
jobs in a local steel mill, as a cook on an Ohio River steamboat, as a rivet heater in an

47

Nino Colonna, interview by unknown, transcript, 9 October 1979, 6–7, box 2, folder
43, Beaver Valley Labor History Society Collection, 1909–1981, AIS.1981.08, Archives
& Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh.
48
“Italians Back Joe Heffernan,” Youngstown Vindicator, 31 October 1927, 1; “Una
Importante Riunione Delle Donne Cattoliche Italiane A Favore Della Candidatura Del
Giudice Joe Heffernan A Sindaco Della Citta’ Di Youngstown,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 22 October 1927, 1.
49
“I Risultati Completi delle Elezioni della Città di Youngstown,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 12 November 1927, 2. Heffernan defeated his nearest opponent 14,369 to
14,026 with over 36,000 votes cast to all mayoral candidates.
50
“A Sipario Calato,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 12 November 1927, 1.
389

Oklahoma oil field, and as a hotel clerk in California.51 Heffernan spoke the language of
working-class grievance. While campaigning for Al Smith in 1928, he described the United
States as a struggle between democracy and the people against capitalists and their greed.
Republicans failed to help workers, and while the entire party may not have been “thieves,”
far too many found a home under its banner.52 During his previous tenure on the municipal
court, Heffernan ruled fairly and earned the affectionate titles of “Judge Joe” and the
“Humane Judge.”53 Concerning Prohibition, he applied the law based on class and intent,
punishing commercial bootleggers while imposing only small fines against the poor for
possessing “a small bottle of liquor, or homemade wine.”54 As mayor, he temporarily
suspended an overly aggressive vice agent.55 He brought William B. Spagnola into his
administration as a third assistant law director, a sign of respect for the Italian-American
community.56 After improprieties arose concerning wrongfully paid vacations for the city
water department employees, Heffernan dismissed the water commissioner, an act that Il
Cittadino Italo-Americano viewed as protecting the larger public of poor taxpayers.57 He
became associated with notable local public works, including a grade elimination project
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to build bridges over railroad tracks north of the central business district and the opening
of a new park in the Italian-American enclave of Brier Hill.58 Finally, Heffernan had an
independent streak and was willing to break from the local party apparatus when
necessary.59 Many of these attributes – community respect, acknowledgment of workingclass issues, and emphasizing policies and projects that would help their lives – were
political positions that Italian Americans sought over the decade before the New Deal.
Heffernan himself acknowledged this new base of voters. In an interview toward
the end of his life, he believed “that we at Youngstown formed in 1927, a coalition which,
on a small scale, was a prototype of the national coalition formed by Roosevelt in the
campaign of 1932.”60 Furthermore, he was adamant that he “could not have been elected
without strong support by them,” the white ethnics, including Italian, Czechoslovakian,
and Jewish Americans.61 Heffernan inspired disillusioned Italian Americans, proving that
once someone with the proper credentials and ideology arose, then that candidate could
enroll the group into a new political base.

New Deal Realignment
Most scholars assert that the 1928 Herbert Hoover-Al Smith election was the
beginning of a political realignment that ended with white ethnics, including the Italian
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Americans, firmly in the New Deal camp of the Democratic Party. Samuel Lubell famously
wrote in The Future of American Politics that “before the Roosevelt Revolution there was
an Al Smith Revolution.”62 Smith, not Roosevelt, began the reordering of the party
coalitions that ushered in two decades of Democratic presidential power.63 Subsequent
political scientists have repeated Lubell’s thesis that some realignment toward a New Deal
coalition began before Roosevelt.64 The assertion that realignment started before the 1932
election became the standard interpretation. The debate shifted to not when realignment
occurred but whether it was due to a mass conversion of voters from one party to another
or a mobilization of the previously nonvoting or unaffiliated.65
Concerning the topic of Italian-American ideology, this debate about the statistics
– registrations, returns, and turnout – ignores the mood of the community. The approach
tells how people voted but provides little clarity about their motivation, feelings, and
reasoning. First, many Italian Americans failed to see Democrats like Al Smith as
representative of the party. The triumph of New Deal Democrats by the mid-1930s created

62

Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers,
1952), 35.
63
Lubell, 34–35.
64
V. O. Key, Jr., “A Theory of Critical Elections,” Journal of Politics 17, no. 1 (February
1955): 4, https://doi.org/10.2307/2126401; Lawrence G. McMichael and Richard J.
Trilling, “The Structure and Meaning of Critical Realignment: The Case of Pennsylvania,
1928–1932,” in Realignment in American Politics: Toward a Theory, ed. Bruce A.
Campbell and Richard J. Trilling (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1980), 39–40;
James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of
Political Parties in the United States, revised edition (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1983), 193.
65
Kristi Andersen, The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928–1936 (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), xi–xiv; Robert S. Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, “The
1928–1936 Partisan Realignment: The Case for the Conversion Hypothesis,” American
Political Science Review 75, no. 4 (December 1981): 951–62,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1962295.
392

the retrospective illusion of a party moving toward a liberal consensus throughout the
1920s. In arguing his “Theory of Critical Elections,” political scientist V. O. Key, Jr.
merged returns from Robert M. La Follette’s third-party Progressive run in 1924 with those
of Democrat John W. Davis as evidence for an earlier transition of New England voters. 66
Perhaps some supporters did feel that Democrat Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, who
became La Follette’s running mate after he condemned the conservative wing of his party,
was the best hope for a Democratic New Deal-style liberal insurgency after the Progressive
leader’s death in 1925.67 In contrast, Italian Americans specifically named Republican
Fiorello La Guardia as La Follette’s “right-hand man” and the possible heir to the
movement.68 They never closed the door to an ideologically aligned president arising from
the Republican Party.
Furthermore, election returns alone failed to tell the whole story. As Stefano Luconi
argued, Italian-American realignment toward Al Smith and the Democrats was an “urban
phenomenon” as pressures to vote Republican in small towns hid the electorate’s true
feelings.69 Voting likely fit the model expressed by James L. Sundquist in which uneven
patterns of mobilizations and conversions brought people into the Democratic Party during
the 1930s. An extreme example supporting Luconi’s point occurred in Westmoreland
County, Pennsylvania, home to small towns and mining communities named in this and
previous chapters such as Greensburg, Vandergrift, Irwin, and New Derry. Between 1932
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and 1938, the county’s total number of registered voters declined while Democrats still
made substantial gains.70 The issue with these statistical generalizations is that they tell
how people voted but not why. Numbers also obscure levels of enthusiasm and
commitment. Many probably favored Al Smith, and even Roosevelt in 1932, but not
enough to risk their jobs.
From an Italian-American perspective, the elections of 1928 and 1932 were rebukes
of the status quo with voters driven by grievance rather than potential gains.71 A protest
vote does not itself create a lasting coalition. As W. Phillips Shively wrote in “A
Reinterpretation of the New Deal Realignment,” before “the introduction of the New Deal
there was no basis for a permanent shift in voting on economic grounds. The most that
might have been sustained was short-term protest voting, of the sort which presumably
occurred in 1932.”72 Without a substantial platform that met voters’ approval, the elections
of 1928 and 1932 were times of shifting allegiances based on aggravation and protest. In
1928, these involved ethnic and religious defenses, while 1932 was a rebuke of Republican
economic policies.73 Only after the New Deal began in 1933 were Italian Americans given
the opportunity to vote against conservative and bigoted politics, their driving reasons
before 1932, and for a platform, beyond the Prohibition issue, that they found acceptable.
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Once Roosevelt and the New Dealers adopted much of the ideology already favored by the
Italian Americans, the group became a devout constituency.
The 1928 election was a fight about what Al Smith represented, not his ideological
preferences. Smith offered voters a few positives, namely the promise to end Prohibition.
Nevertheless, Italian Americans justified their support as a repudiation of conservative
Republican policies rather than an optimistic acceptance of the Democratic platform. Even
before the 1928 election, grievances against typical Republican positions on immigration
restriction, Prohibition, nativism, and corporate interests pushed Italian Americans away
from the party.74 It was evident by the mid-1920s that conservative pro-business leaders,
like Calvin Coolidge, subverted the more liberal, progressive wing of the party.75 Italian
Americans heavily critiqued the Republican notion of prosperity as a façade. While the
business class thrived, ordinary people suffered.76 Angelo Di Renzo pointed out the
similarities between Coolidge’s message of economic prosperity and the mythical phoenix:
“Everyone talks about it and nobody knows where it is.” He did not dispute Coolidge and
Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s claim that the United States grew richer during the
preceding years. Instead, he reminded readers that the two political leaders refused to
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acknowledge that the vast majority of that new wealth remained with the industrial and
commercial powers at the top, rather than trickling down to the average person.77
Italian-American criticism did not change when Coolidge left office. Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano rebutted the president’s last State of the Union message in which he
claimed that his financial policies “brought to the Nation wealth and prosperity.”
America’s success may have convinced economic theorists and financiers, but average
people “in these last years had to substitute the word prosperity with depression.”
Workers experienced an affordability crisis as tax requirements and the rising cost of
necessities exceeded their pay.78 Leaders built the American economic recovery of the mid1920s on a shaky foundation. In one vivid analogy, Coolidge acted like an optimistic doctor
at the foot of a patient’s deathbed, reassuring the person, a metaphor for the working class,
that improvement – prosperity – was happening.79 Coolidge’s death in January 1933
brought no end to the antagonism. Unione editor Al Tronzo remarked that the timing of the
former president’s passing was appropriate; it kept alive the myth of his economic
achievements before they were wholly refuted, and it promised him a place as “the patron
saint of brokerage firms and banks.”80 Even before the Wall Street stock market crash,
Italian Americans believed that the conservative Republican economic platform failed their
community and most Americans.
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The nomination of Al Smith to represent the Democratic Party against Herbert
Hoover created the intersection of two impetuses for Italian-American political
engagement. First, these voters turned out because of the simmering anger about
Coolidge’s Republican Party harming workers. Second, supporting the Irish-Catholic Al
Smith became akin to defending themselves from discrimination. Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano was clear about this point: “Why are we Democrats in this election? Because
we are guided by common sense – Because we defend our honor. The Italians especially,
today, represent the biggest target of the Klanist scoundrel and of the inept and malicious
Nordics.”81 The focus for Italian Americans was what Smith stood against, rather than for,
which made him the clear winner in the campaign but not someone who provided solutions
to most of their problems.
Backing Al Smith was equivalent to defending themselves as white ethnics and
Catholics. As Joseph Heffernan commented, “he was to them [immigrants and their
children] more than a political leader; he was the personification of their own struggles and
aspirations.”82 Smith was the embodiment of the masses of non-Protestant new immigrants
who, as detailed in chapter two, came to accept the basic tenets of American civic
nationalism. Italian Americans projected themselves onto Smith because his candidacy
represented the principle that one’s birthplace in society did not matter and opportunity
was open to all people.83 Nevertheless, he could not escape the prejudicial stereotypes
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hurled at him by opponents, including socialistic tendencies, rumors of drunkenness, and
jokes about the suitability of his wife as a potential first lady.84
A Smith victory would have meant the fulfillment of the promise that all people,
regardless of national origin or religion, had equal opportunity in the United States.
Unfortunately, critics’ attacks compelled Smith and his allies to respond. The presidential
contest became a debate about identity politics and ethnic-religious grievance rather than
about any reasoned ideology. A spring 1927 open letter that received wide dispersion
across the United States gave people a taste of the coming conflict and anti-Catholic
shaming. Charles C. Marshall, a retired attorney and prominent Episcopalian, raised
questions about a possible Smith presidency by arguing that no Catholic could fully
separate himself from his religion to govern the United States.85 Smith’s response made the
front page of the ethnic press. He defended himself at length and stated his belief in the
separation of Church and State. He cited his record as proof, including the nineteen times
he swore an oath to defend the Constitution.86 Still, the religion issue put Italian-American
voters on the defensive. While the Italian-American press raised questions about
Republican assertions of prosperity, the need to defend the Catholic Smith dominated the
discussion.87
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Supporting Smith meant repudiating the Republican Party, which Italian Americans
increasingly viewed as an organization of bigots and beholden to the almighty dollar and
big business. By the end of September 1928, a belief circulated that Hoover would win
because of his commitment to big money interests that decided the election.88 One late
October article explained the real motivation behind the election: “It is not the drink, it is
not religion, it is the dollar. The Republican Party[, the] true expression of capitalism[,] is
never satisfied of the blood of the victims.”89 Il Cittadino Italo-Americano editor Carlo
Caselli dismissed Hoover’s platform in its entirety, proclaiming that “it deserves no
consideration” because its most salient point was the enforcement of Prohibition, a farcical
commitment considering the nation’s needs. The nominee admitted that alcohol was not
harmful in moderation, but he was too ambitious to challenge Prohibition. The editor
painted Hoover as “una marionetta” (a puppet) who bent to the will of others.90
Al Smith offered Italian Americans a few convincing social issues to justify their
vote, namely an end to Prohibition and more respect to immigrants, the working class, and
Catholics, but the community lacked any real idea of his specific economic ideology. 91
Republicans dominated the national conversation and forced Italian Americans to debate
their talking points rather than envision a Smith presidency beyond a condemnation of
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conservative politics.92 In other words, Italian Americans came to support Smith more out
of anger to address grievances related to pro-business Republican politics, discrimination,
and upholding American civic ideals than out of optimism for a new platform.
After assuming the presidency, Hoover alienated Italian-American voters.
Continuing the previous analogy of Coolidge as a doctor watching a patient die, the duty
now fell to Hoover. Italian Americans wished him to succeed for the general good of the
country, but this did beg the question: “What will he do? Will he be able to devise new
means to cure the tuberculosis of his Nation’s commerce?”93 Hoover adhered to Coolidge’s
remedies, so he failed the ideological test for Italian-American approval of his governance.
First, he offered no resolution to the Prohibition issue. After taking office, he planned to
defer to the courts, which to Italian Americans appeared a dereliction of leadership when
the real solution was a plebiscite and direct legislative action.94 Instead, he allowed the
continuation of an issue that tore Americans apart and was antithetical to their supposed
values. While men like Professor William Starr Myers at Princeton University attacked
Benito Mussolini as a despot, the ethnic press called for self-reflection before condemning
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others: “What does the Government of Washington do, which for 11 years [has oppressed]
a mass [of citizens], imposing with violence and abuse a law against every sense of civility,
… [a law that] chokes the liberty of the people?”95
Hoover’s financial policy also failed to gain Italian-American backing because it
copied Coolidge’s approach. In the spring of 1929, months before the Wall Street crash
brought the reality of financial hardship to millions, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano was
already voicing the opinion that the government’s economic strategy brought misery to the
laboring masses. It bluntly told readers that America was in a “state of financial depression”
as regular people were either out of work or crunched by an affordability crisis in which
wages failed to match rising costs.96 Continuing with remarks that would become more
common in subsequent years, editor Caselli proclaimed that “the capitalist soaks up the
national wealth, while the worker languishes.” For this reason, he called for people to go
beyond mutual aid societies and form a mass organization to reclaim their rights and hold
the government and the financial interests accountable. A peaceful, mass rebellion needed
to occur before conditions sparked a reaction that would rival “the terror of 14 July 1789,”
the Storming of the Bastille during the French Revolution.97 Caselli continued his point the
following week by proclaiming that Hoover was merely the figurehead for the capitalist
control of the government while repeating the need for a mass organization that would
include workers of every social class and every race to challenge the hegemony.98 The Wall
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Street crash of 1929 amplified the message’s urgency, but it did not change the rhetoric as
newspapers still condemned capitalists and Hoover.99
In the days leading up to the 1930 midterm elections, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano
reinforced the importance of Italian Americans voicing their opinions at the ballot box and
suggested that the economic crisis would help illuminate candidate choices, guiding voters’
decisions.100 The Great Depression forced a debate about economic issues and the plight of
the working class. No longer could wealthy interests shape the political discussion solely
around such topics as Prohibition while waffling on economic ideology. It was easy for
some to support Hoover during times of “prosperity,” but with mass unemployment now
unignorable, the economic considerations which had been percolating within the ItalianAmerican community found their way to the forefront of the national political
conversation. The Republican midterm defeats became the overt manifestation of “the just
resentment of a slave people, oppressed by the tyranny of the dollar.”101
Hoover committed himself to a different approach when he realized that
Republicans needed to adopt alternative methods or suffer further losses. New
interventionist plans and the proposal of a more activist federal approach were moves in
the right direction but not the perfect solutions. Italian Americans viewed work-relief plans
as late in arriving and too narrow in scope. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano returned to its
doctor analogy, claiming that this was like injecting the patient with ether when more
radical methods were necessary. Instead, it was time to stop the prolonged suffering and
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change physicians.102 Americans needed structural transformation rather than a means to
dull only the worst effects of a slow economic death. There was some value in Hoover’s
approach concerning the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which foreshowed
the potential of federal intervention to come under the New Deal, but it was not enough. 103
Italian Americans, like others, observed firsthand the effects of the RFC as its loans helped
reopen local businesses, like banks.104 The approach gave those in Youngstown confidence
in their recapitalized financial institutions.105 However, as a whole, Hoover’s methods fell
short. The government bailed out industry and banks rather than helped regular people.106
Aid meant ostensibly to help the nation only confirmed suspicions about Hoover’s
ties to big business. While Mussolini’s government created buildings, new lakes, and other
projects that appeared to benefit the people, local aid in some places was another example
of working-class exploitation that Hoover was uninterested in stopping. For instance,
Italian Americans in Aliquippa questioned arranged local relief because it appeared tied to
the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation and local businessman Paul M. Moore.
Originally an employee of J&L Steel, Moore arrived in the area in 1906 to plan and arrange
the building of the Aliquippa Works for the company. He later served in local government
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and started his own contracting business that profited from deals with the corporation.107
Dominic Del Turco was one employee who sought local relief. Officials sent him to
Moore’s farm, where workers cut down trees and built roads. His compensation was a
dollar a week and food vouchers redeemable for groceries. According to Del Turco, the
local Republican administration worked hand-in-hand with J&L Steel to distribute work
on the properties of area elites, like Moore.108 Joe Di Ciero faced a similar experience,
except after applying at Moore’s store for relief, officials assigned him to pull roots at a
local golf course.109 Tony Riccitelli asked why Moore and entities connected to him
distributed relief food supplied by the government, but his J&L Steel boss fired him –
Riccitelli was working only irregularly by this time – for being “too damn smart.”110
Besides many projects bringing little civic or community value, the work payments were
tainted as people, including Di Ciero and his wife, remembered receiving staples like flour
filled with worms.111
These early Depression experiences amplified the previous Italian-American
distrust of pro-business Republican policies, ensuring that Hoover would not receive much
support in the 1932 presidential race. Unione noted that Hoover had no popular backing at
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the beginning of the election year as three-quarters of people were averse to his governance
and the other quarter were politically indifferent.112 Anger reigned concerning the state of
the American economy, Republican mistruths and inability to accept reality, and the
president’s poor treatment of the Bonus Army.113 In one instance, disillusionment with
Hoover’s United States became comical. Unione printed lyrics set to the tune of “Where
Do You Work-a, John?,” a humorous novelty song about working for the DelawareLackawanna Railroad expressed in the accented English of a recent immigrant.114 In the
parody version, “Wattsa Matter Tony?,” the narrator explained why he needed to return to
Italy:
Sedda Tonee, when election comma,
Myya bossa sedda to me:
“Iffa you wanta pro-sper-a-tie
You votta for Huvaree.”
Soa, Iyya votta for Huvaree
Anda da Demm bossa fire me
Soa, I no canna push
On da Railroad Companee.115
Italian Americans did not support Hoover, but hostility to the sitting president did not
translate into wholehearted acceptance of his Democratic rival.
The issue was that no one seemed sure about the Democratic platform beyond a
few points. As historians have argued, Franklin Roosevelt’s 1932 run for the presidency
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was light on specifics and plans, a characteristic not lost on Italian Americans.116
Roosevelt’s nomination brought a muted, matter-of-fact response.117 His own words failed
to offer faith in his potential governance. As one editor noted concerning an August
address, the candidate denounced Hoover but offered only superficial remedies with no
concrete economic program that would address the core of American financial troubles. 118
A month before the general election, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano summarized and
concurred with Frank Kent of the Baltimore Sun. He argued “that this (presidential)
campaign will not be very enlightening to the thinking voters,” as both sides deferred policy
discussion.119 Without a clear vision, people lacked enthusiasm.120
Furthermore, as conscious as they were about the Republican Party kowtowing to
big business, Italian Americans recognized that the Democratic Party had its share of
nativist politicians. For example, Senator J. Thomas Heflin of Alabama had a long history
of denouncing Italian Americans as foreigners, Catholics, and eventually Fascists.121 Italian
Americans knew his Klan affiliation and racial views, and their press suggested that the
raving senator belonged in a mental institution.122 One article referred to him as “l’asino
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incappucciato” (the hooded ass), a clever reference to his stupidity, political party, and ties
to the Klan.123 Heflin lost his seat in the 1930 election, but the future direction of the
Democratic Party was unknown in 1932, and his specter still lingered as a symbol of
prejudice even after his departure.124
Perhaps the simplest explanation for Hoover’s loss in 1932 came from Bert
Iacobucci in Aliquippa: “People got tired of Hoover.”125 It was a protest vote.126 As Al
Tronzo wrote weeks before the Democratic National Convention presented voters a
candidate:
“Give the Democrats a break. … Vote for a Democratic president, be he who he
may, and give the Jackass a chance to lead us to that corner around which
prosperity, they say, lurks. … And if it doesn’t give you a job, at least you’ll have
the satisfaction of knowing that the party that gave you a four year holiday will also
be walking the streets[.] … Anyway, make it one helluva protest vote; and above
all demand that your representatives represent and not dominate you.”127
Roosevelt’s victory in November elicited relief, but little enthusiasm, as Italian Americans
equated the Democratic triumph to Republican errors.128
Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats promised an end to Prohibition and gave
vague reassurances that they would implement a “New Deal,” but the details were yet to
be known. As Il Cittadino Italo-Americano stated during the lame-duck period after the
election, the alcohol issue preoccupied politicians and the press, but “pane e lavoro” (bread
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and work) appeared to be the more pressing concerns.129 Unfortunately, the campaign failed
to address these needs clearly. The notion of change got Roosevelt into office, but his
policies – his tackling of the pane e lavoro, bread and butter, issues – caused Italian
Americans to reward him and his allies with confidence in their governance and ultimately
reelection.

New Deal Confluence
Days before the 1932 election, Unione editor G. A. Lopez asserted that the outcome
was to be a protest against the sitting president, not an affirmation of his challenger,
because people had no political options that were counter “to the dominant capitalism in
its two manifestations: Republican and Democratic, two branches of a same trunk that
threatens ruin.”130 Educated commentators like Lopez did not foresee that Franklin
Roosevelt would move the Democratic Party in a new direction and reshape the political
paradigm. As political scientist Samuel Lubell stated, “it would be a mistake to regard the
Roosevelt coalition as strictly a product of the depression. … It was not the depression
which made Roosevelt the champion of the urban masses but what he did after he came to
the Presidency.”131 Roosevelt fulfilled the ideological preferences of the Italian-American
electorate, thereby gaining its support. As the New Deal unfolded, it dealt with decadelong issues of concern for the community and satisfied Italian Americans by adopting many
of the same solutions that the ethnic group discussed over the previous years. The New
Deal appropriated their political preferences.
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Italian Americans combined influences from civic nationalism, leftism, and
Fascism to create a new ideological amalgamation that resembled the New Deal. First, they
desired a true democracy, which they viewed as the fulfillment of civic ideals. Native-born
Americans told the ethnic group that American values included principles such as a
government representative of all people and equality for all citizens, but leaders failed to
uphold these values throughout the 1920s. Second, leftists bequeathed ideas about workers’
rights and mass unionism. Leftist cynicism about American politics failing to address
ordinary people’s grievances reinforced the need to fulfill civic equality. Third, Fascism
offered a model worth imitating. Those in the United States spent the better part of a decade
admiring Fascism’s ability to enact structural changes in Italy. Their observations made
them comfortable with an activist government. The more that Mussolini meddled in the
Italian economy – manipulating the currency, regimenting Italian agriculture, and finally
implementing corporatism – the more successful the Italian model appeared next to the
failing United States. They believed the propaganda that the Fascist state delivered
working-class benefits. While leftists had previously feared the state because of its role in
repressing workers’ voices, Fascism showed that the government could collaborate with
labor. Italian Americans came to embrace government intervention, including corporatism,
massive public works programs, and an empowered leader willing to break norms for the
nation’s benefit.
As the New Deal unfolded, it delivered on Italian-American desires. The
Democratic Party opened opportunities for Italian-American political engagement.
Disillusionment turned into excitement as the New Deal tore down barriers to white-ethnic
politicians and allowed qualified community members to rise. It was symbiotic; Italian-
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American voters felt that the New Dealers respected them as a constituency, and they, in
turn, backed the realigned Democratic Party.
Fascism lent ideas concerning an activist state. Mussolini solved crises during the
1920s by consolidating power as a national leader and then reshaping the government to
become interventionist concerning the economy. When the Great Depression devastated
American businesses, the natural response was to seek a domestic Duce willing to act and
prod Congress toward economic interventionism. Roosevelt became that figure, and Italian
Americans compared him to Mussolini. They celebrated the New Deal’s National
Industrial Recovery Act because it mimicked parts of Italian corporatism. In addition to
funding massive public works, the NIRA’s National Recovery Administration theoretically
offered class collaboration with concessions to labor, most notably unionization in section
7(a), maximum working hours, and minimum wages. While conservatives criticized the
NRA for violating free-market norms, Italian Americans decried the act as not having gone
far enough.
As Roosevelt’s New Deal developed and unfolded, its doctrine moved closer to
Italian-American political wishes, consolidating the community’s support. They had built
their interpretation of Fascism on a leftist foundation, which meant that the measure of
success for an activist government and leader was the ability to mediate capital and labor
and raise the working class to parity. The NRA promised but did not fulfill this goal.
Instead, the Second New Deal enshrined the NRA’s lax labor provisions as enforceable
laws. The Second New Deal delivered most of the suggestions raised years prior by Angelo
Di Renzo. The editor had called for industrial unionism and the end of strikebreaking. New
Dealers strengthened the NRA’s section 7(a) into the Wagner Act, and a more powerful
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National Labor Relations Board guaranteed fair collective bargaining. Di Renzo suggested
social safety nets such as pensions and unemployment insurance, which became the 1935
Social Security Act. Finally, the NRA’s hours and wages provisions, which were meant to
solve the issue raised by Di Renzo about automation and the need to redistribute wealth,
continued in a limited form in the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Italian-American
political beliefs and the New Deal coalesced into one ideology.
The first intercession made by the New Deal involved the fulfillment of civic ideals.
As described in chapter five, a driving force behind the rise of political clubs was the belief
that Italian Americans lacked a voice in governance. Many political representatives and
power brokers resented the group’s political engagement, even though the act of becoming
informed and involved was at the core of American democracy. In 1925, the ItaloAmerican Civic League of New Castle, Pennsylvania, mobilized voters for the fall
elections. The organization endorsed a slate of candidates, and it arranged multiple
meetings throughout Lawrence County, including in the seat, New Castle, and in
Mahoningtown, Wampum, and Brent.132 Those involved understood the potential reaction.
In justifying its place, the Civic League pointed to discrimination and that other peoples,
including German, Irish, and Jewish Americans, had more representation in government
than the Italians.133 As one article pointed out before the primaries, the school district in
the small community of Hillsville, Mahoning Township, consisted of around one hundred
and fifty Italian-American families, and the ethnic group contributed sixty percent of
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enrolled schoolchildren. It was logical to run a trusted representative for the school board
of directors.134 The Civic League organized against this “tyranny” with its best weapon,
voting.135 These efforts attracted opposition, including a half-page advertisement printed in
the local newspaper the day before the general election that attacked the group as
conspiratorial. It implored voters to choose candidates “who [did] not owe allegiance to
the Citizen’s League or to the Italian-American League or to any other league or to any
other special interest.”136 The leader of the Civic League, N. De Mita, pastor at St. Vitus
Church, defended the group stating, “we just demanded what every citizen is entitled to –
a square deal – regardless of color, creed or nationality.” De Mita justified his position by
noting that one-sixth of the city of New Castle was Italian American. They paid taxes and
owned homes, and he asked rhetorically, “is it not fitting that they should unite together to
improve their condition as citizens of the country? Should they not with this purpose in
view reasonably expect, not the adverse criticism, but rather the co-operation and
encouragement of their fellow citizens?”137 Political power and control were the issues at
stake, and those who currently had them were unwilling to share them with a new group.
Those in Youngstown expressed this clearly with the belief that Italian-American
candidates failed because they were not part of the “clique.”138 During the 1932 spring
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primaries, Domenico F. Rendinelli, Americanized as D. F. Rendinell, sought a place on the
Republican ticket for county prosecuting attorney.139 The ethnic newspaper painted him as
“one of the most brilliant lawyers” in the city,140 and he was a candidate who could have
united the “foreigners” of various origins.141 Born in Youngstown, Rendinell attended local
public schools before graduating from the University of Michigan in 1910. He returned
home and practiced law for two decades with a specialty in criminal defense.142 The ethnic
press had followed his career for years, and his election to vice president of the Mahoning
County Bar Association in 1930 showed the earned respect of his colleagues. 143
Community figures came to his side,144 including Cesare Amadio, who believed that
Rendinell’s candidacy was an important step “in the march towards our emancipation from
a servility that no longer has reason to exist.”145 Rendinell campaigned on fairness before
the law, and many of his planks included means to lessen discrimination, including: “the
exclusive selection of the members of the grand jury from the jury wheel, in the presence
of the press”; guarantees that defense counsel received all investigation materials before
the trial; no “third degree” (coerced confession) nor any “conferences … with a person
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confined in jail except in the presence of his counsel”; the administration of justice “fairly
and impartially regardless of race, creed or color”; and the promise not to use the office for
the creation of a political machine.146 Rendinell lost the five-way primary, receiving 4,456
votes.147
To Italian Americans, Rendinell’s candidacy failed because Republicans refused to
support him and Democrats sought to split voters. Rendinell was not part of the Republican
“clique.”148 The Mahoning County Republican Central Committee endorsed three of the
five candidates for prosecuting attorney; it did not include Rendinell.149 According to one
letter to the editor, it was not “a big surprise” that the candidate received “little
consideration” from county Republican leader W. P. Barnum.150 Furthermore, the
Democrats enticed around two dozen Italian Americans to stand for precinct
committeemen, which hurt Rendinell by keeping people from voting in the Republican
primary. According to Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, trading these small honorary positions
for a chance of getting a qualified member of the community elected to a county office was
a mistake.151 The newspaper warned them not to be misled by old tricks and called on them
to vote in the Republican primaries to ensure that Rendinell advanced to the general
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election.152 The community tried to get Rendinell on the fall ticket. Various ethnic
organizations either discussed his candidacy or allowed him the floor for a speech,
including at the Italian American Political Association, the Loggia Napoleone Colaianni
(where Democrat Police Prosecutor William B. Spagnola offered his endorsement), Società
Maria S. S. del Carmine in Lowellville, Ohio, and Youngstown’s Third Ward Italian
American Political Club.153 Famed Pennsylvania lawyer, and later state attorney general,
Charles J. Margiotti made a last-minute appeal for Rendinell in the Brier Hill neighborhood
of Youngstown.154 Their efforts fell short.
The New Deal fulfilled Italian-American desires for political parity, respect for the
community, and upholding civic values. A few weeks after Roosevelt’s massive reelection
victory in 1936, Pittsburgh’s Unione remarked about the significant changes that had taken
place: “The Democratic Party for several years has lightened itself of all the dead weights,
has made the most of the young, opening to them the doors of all the offices and of all the
jobs and our young people have thrown themselves with bersagliere’s pace to the
conquest[, and this was] … facilitated by the Democrats.”155 As editor Charles Schisano

“Giuste Osservazione,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 9 April 1932, 1.
“Italian American Citizens’ Political Association,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 2
April 1932, 4; “Parla un Democratico,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 16 April 1932, 1;
“Da Lowellville, Ohio,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 23 April 1932, 4; “Third Ward
Italian American Political Club,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 16 April 1932, 4;
“Attivita’ del 3rd Ward Italian American Political Club,” Il Cittadino Italo-Americano, 30
April 1932, 4.
154
“Il Famoso Avvocato CHAS MARGIOTTI in Youngstown, Ohio,” Il Cittadino ItaloAmericano, 7 May 1932, 1; “L’avv. Charles Margiotti In Youngstown, O.,” Il Cittadino
Italo-Americano, 14 May 1932, 1; Stefano Luconi, From Paesani to White Ethnics: The
Italian Experience in Philadelphia (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
2001), 69–70.
155
“Il Valido Contributo e la Solidarieta’ dei Nostri Connazionali nelle Ultime Elezioni,”
Unione, 27 November 1936, 6. Printed as page 6. This was most likely a typographical
152
153

415

proclaimed, “the Democratic victory is also [an] Italian victory.”156 There was a feeling of
respect as the reformed party emphasized its commitment to ordinary people, especially
the working class.157 After years of complaints about politicians making promises at
election time and then neglecting the community for the rest of the year, Italian Americans
became a constituency of genuine concern as the Democratic Party offered a home for new
ethnic politicians. These facets of the New Deal – caring about ordinary people, delivering
on promises made to them, and allowing Italian-American politicians to cooperate as
partners in that endeavor – flipped Pennsylvania Democratic for the first time in eighty
years.158
The Democratic Party had trended toward more engagement with Italian
Americans, but the New Deal accelerated that movement significantly. There had been
some gains before Roosevelt. Youngstown’s Mayor Joseph Heffernan, for example,
appointed William B. Spagnola to the position of municipal police prosecutor in 1928, and
the ethnic press was still celebrating the honor and Spagnola’s work the following year.159
In Cleveland, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor-elect Ray T. Miller hired Frank D. Celebrezze
as an assistant prosecutor in December 1928.160 Youngstown’s Italian American Political
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Association praised the governor’s nomination of Ralph Vitullo to the Division of
Workmen’s Compensation and M. Melillo’s appointment as an assistant fire marshal in
1931.161 However, the New Deal unleashed a new respect and parity that had not existed
before. In 1936, Unione celebrated the ten victorious Italian-American state lawmakers
that it had endorsed and the over a dozen elected in total.162 These included eight Democrats
from western Pennsylvania, many of whom first gained their seats in the 1934 midterm
elections: Representatives Frank J. Zappala, Al Tronzo, and Joseph F. Piole of Alleghany
County; Representative Eugene A. Caputo, Beaver County; Representative Russell
Marino, Washington County; Representative Philip Lopresti, Cambria County; Senator
Anthony Cavalcante, Fayette County; and, Senator John H. Dent, Westmoreland
County.163
William B. Spagnola offers a clear example of the changes brought over a decade
and a level of advancement that would have been unthinkable to Italian-American voters
during the mid-1920s who fought against revived nativism. He continued his position as
municipal police prosecutor under the next mayor before a failed mayoral bid of his own
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in 1935. However, two years later, he won a municipal judgeship, followed by his election
to mayor in 1939.164 For those who had conversed with Spagnola at the Italian American
Political Association or one of the many local ethnic-society functions over the years, there
was a community pride in seeing the man seated in Franklin Roosevelt’s car when the
president visited the city in October 1940. Described by the press as “the largest [crowd]
Youngstown has ever assembled,” estimated at around 125,000 people who thronged five
miles of streets, Spagnola welcomed the president with a handshake and rode with the
executive to tour a nearby steel mill.165 Roosevelt twice urged Spagnola to visit him at the
White House to discuss unemployment.166 The chief executive even offered some humor.
After being hit in the face with confetti from the enthusiastic crowd, Roosevelt, with a grin
and a wink to Spagnola and Congressman Michael J. Kirwan, “jokingly remarked the only
thing he has against Italians is that they invented confetti.”167
As Italian Americans increasingly felt that they were part of the political system,
they believed that the government became more responsive to their needs. Fascism had
demonstrated the advantages of a government willing to push norms, activism that
benefited regular people in times of crisis. As Di Renzo’s 1928 assessment from the
introduction noted, the American government needed to offer novel solutions to
unemployment and become interventionist. After the Wall Street crash, these ideas took on
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new urgency. Il Cittadino Italo-Americano editor Carlo Caselli asserted in early 1931 that
people desired not relief but structural changes. Pointing to the minute funding allocated
to temporary public works projects thus far and the trend of modern industry employing
more mechanization that subverted labor, he concluded, “the reforms should be radical.” It
was not enough to treat the symptoms; the United States needed to address the causes of
economic instability and inequality.168 As mainstream politics obsessed with Prohibition,
Italian Americans sought answers to more significant issues. The talk about the Eighteenth
Amendment, Prohibition, obscured conversation concerning the Sixteenth Amendment,
the federal income tax. In a nation that had permitted thousands of millionaires at the
expense of the starving masses, the federal government had the power to intervene. As an
April 1932 article contended, it was “the duty of this government, as prescribed by the
Constitution[,] to guarantee labor and this interpreted means a job.”169
There was a condemnation of inaction before the New Deal. Congress formulated
new excise taxes, but these were not systematic changes. 170 Hoover promised that if
reelected, he would serve for a one-dollar salary, but this type of “cheap publicity by the
Republican National Committee” was not what the average American wanted because
“what he most desires now is action.”171 The Republican National Convention only
heightened criticism.172 Unione’s financial writer, Edward W. Castaldi, shifted the blame
for the Great Depression from the banks to the government. Inaction was a political game
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as neither party in Congress wanted to concede. The solution was to lock members in
session and force them to act.173 As another opinion writer explained, Americans obsessed
with the plan handed down by the founding fathers: “No existing laws can be scrapped, no
new and revolutionary ones adopted. … [Government] is inefficient in that it does not allow
for changing times, ideals, philosophy and necessarily the people themselves.”174 The
problem with the system before the New Deal was that few elected officials believed in the
interventionist ideology of which Italian Americans were now proponents. While
Mussolini acted to solve Italian financial instability, Hoover and other American politicians
demurred when presented with a crisis.
Franklin Roosevelt rejected the old leadership style and redefined the presidency.
Before Roosevelt expanded the role of the chief executive, Italian Americans suggested
moving toward a more powerful leader in the mold of Mussolini. When discussing the
Great Depression during the summer of 1932, Il Cittadino Italo-Americano remarked that
American laws did not fit the needs of the people and current governance was not possible
using the methods of the past. The United States was an “antiquated democracy,” and the
newspaper asserted, “one wants a dictator, one wants a Mussolini,” a leader who could
address problems.175 Embracing complete totalitarianism was a stretch. As described in
chapter four, even proponents of Fascism balked at giving up American civil liberties, but
they viewed adopting a more powerful leader favorably.
Mussolini’s rule primed people to accept Roosevelt’s cult of personality and
methods that appeared high-handed to his detractors. Within weeks of taking office,
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Roosevelt operated “with lightning-like suddenness” and “quick action” to tackle the
financial crisis.176 Italian Americans approved of Roosevelt declining to attend the famed
1933 Chicago Exposition to continue working in Washington.177 The press occasionally
printed presidential agendas to confirm the herculean efforts of the new leader.178 When
Americans honored Roosevelt’s birthday, radio allowed him “to be present, in spirit, at all
these celebrations.” The leader found a place alongside George Washington and Abraham
Lincoln “because, if Washington founded the American Nation and Lincoln united it and
made it powerful, Franklin D. Roosevelt saved it from imminent destruction and from
chaos!!” His talk “of social Justice, of [a] New Era, of the forgotten man” caused the people
to vote for a “peaceful revolution.”179
Within months, the United States government appeared to operate “under a very
mild dictator.” According to one opinion writer, this was acceptable because it now forced
Congress to investigate improprieties by the wealthy elites. Noting that Mussolini, Joseph
Stalin, and Adolf Hitler did not have these superrich persons under their rule, the author
concluded that “if liberty and ‘rugged individuals’ produces [J. P.] Morgans and breadlines,
then I’ll try a dose of fascism or communism – and Democracy be damned!”180 As Al
Tronzo pointed out, these inquiries only developed because Congressmen needed
something “to occupy their minds while Roosevelt [was] brandishing the big stick in his
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speedy programs of social and political reforms.”181 This strong, activist leader only
fulfilled what they had wanted. Castaldi claimed in Unione that the people had demanded
a Mussolini figure for years, “but instead of a Mussolini came Roosevelt, who, conscious
of the fact that Mussolini was so ardently wanted in this Nation, began to govern with
mussolinian methods, imposing on the Congress his will.” Politicians and others who had
previously called for these methods now condemned Roosevelt. Fortunately, the president
continued with his actions, which the people favored.182
Months into Roosevelt’s presidency, the celebratory rhetoric echoed that printed
over the previous decade about Mussolini. In one August 1933 editorial, the Fascist
leader’s name could have replaced that of Roosevelt. The United States was in a time of
crisis, on the verge of revolution, but then “the reaction came, … it reunited everyone in a
single vote, a single will, a single iron determination, to choose the Man of the moment,
… Roosevelt, the President of the people.” This new leader and his supporters ushered in
“a RADICAL CHANGE OF DIRECTION IN THE POWERS OF THE STATE,” shifting
the system from one that favored wealth and privilege to a government that respected
working people. The author asked rhetorically if this was the path toward dictatorship, and
he concluded that many of the new ideas and changes came from “Rooseveltian will that
is, in short, the will of his people.” The president was potentially leading “a new Revolution
for the United States of America.” If not, at a minimum, he ushered in “A NEW ERA FOR
THE AMERICAN NATION … [and] better fortunes for all.”183

Al Tronzo, “Have You Paid Your Income Taxes?,” Unione, 26 May 1933, 8.
E. W. C., “Intorno alla umana inconsistenza,” Unione, 19 May 1933, 2.
183
Charles F. Schisano, “L’opera di Roosevelt e le sue riforme,” Unione, 11 August 1933,
1. Capitalized in the original.
181
182

422

This reimagined role of the president and government did not frighten Italian
Americans because a decade of Fascism in Italy had primed them to accept this activist
leadership style. Conservative politicians and elites, such as the dissociated Democrats who
formed the American Liberty League in 1934, warned of tyranny, the usurpation of power
from Congress and the states, and the move toward communism and Fascism. 184 By
contrast, Italian Americans welcomed this move and did not view it as antithetical to
democracy. When Unione adopted the NRA’s Blue Eagle emblem in August 1933, for
example, the newspaper spoke positively about presidential leadership and “the courage of
Franklin D. Roosevelt which – above all – reassured that basic faith of ours in the
imperishable vitality of the principles of American Democracy.”185 Another Unione
contributor, S. V. Albo, addressed the issue of constitutionality in early 1934. Like many
who had attended public schools as a child, he admitted to possessing “an admiration
amounting almost to idolatry” concerning the Constitution, but he asked people to “cast
aside the taboo of constitution worship” and understand “that no document made by man
can be made for all time and is sacred beyond all adaptation to new needs.” The people
rejected reactionaries, and they now had “a leader with the courage to dare ‘renovate life
and our social state’, a President Roosevelt.”186 Rather than rebuking this new leadership
style, Italian Americans embraced it, and the community’s politicians advertised their
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candidacies as supportive of the New Deal and, as one put it, “the benevolent hand of our
President.”187
The example set by the Fascist state encouraged additional government activism.
Scholars have failed to agree on one definition of corporatism, in part because theory never
matched reality.188 Cooperation between industry and labor in Italy was a sham.189 Italian
Americans, as period observers, failed to recognize this. As noted in chapter four, their
definition of the Italian model had come from propaganda. Fascist corporatism was a
system that provided equality to the working class by merging a type of state-mediated
syndicalism into the system, therefore guaranteeing rights and concessions to workers.
Italian Americans had approached the interpretation of Fascism and corporatism from the
left, and they concluded that government involvement in the economy was not only
favorable but necessary.
Direct references to Fascism as an economic model continued as the depression
unfolded. As Castaldi argued in Unione, the trade union movement failed average workers.
The American Federation of Labor borrowed methods from the British trade unionists,
while the organization should have studied and copied the system in Italy. Fascist
legislation to balance capital and labor worked and was worthy of American replication.190
He continued the story of Italian interventionist successes during the general election of
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1932. In the penultimate issue of Unione before the Hoover-Roosevelt contest, Castaldi
summarized il Duce’s actions concerning the lira’s stabilization and reviving the Italian
economy. The Italian currency was a “Cinderella,” poor and neglected but only in need of
a little help and magic. Mussolini proved naysayers wrong with his aggressive methods.191
The implication was that the Italian model offered economic solutions.
In Italian-American minds, the system’s goal was to improve the economy as a
whole while also rebalancing the social classes. This meant providing help for workers
while avoiding open conflict. As far back as the summer of 1928, their press had cited the
Italian Fascist example as a model to avoid class struggle and unrest by utilizing an
arbitration court or tribunal. State intervention was necessary, and the best solution was to
bring representatives of government, workers, and employers together to find consensus. 192
However, because working-class grievances from the left also informed their ideology,
there was a general mistrust of big business, banks, and elites, along with a feeling that
ordinary people, labor, needed more concessions than capital for equilibrium.193 Statistics
deceived the public. For example, various companies still showed a profit during the depths
of the depression. This was due to shady accounting and business practices because
revenues had not rebounded. Wage cuts and unpaid overtime took the balance sheet from
red to black and allowed for dividend payments to investors. The response from the ItalianAmerican press was the belief that “wages should not be cut nor jobs sacrificed to
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accumulate profits. A living wage for the workers is the first charge on industry and until
that claim is met, no profits should be taken.”194 Furthermore, statistics about the cost of
living and wages were nonsense because they failed to account for “real pay,” which was
the actual money taken home by workers after accounting for cuts like reduced hours.195
During the first few months of the new Democratic administration, Italian
Americans noticed that the government was indeed moving toward an interventionist
Fascist model. Under Roosevelt, Congress gained “a new spirit of action” as it quickly
addressed problems in banking and finance, low agricultural prices, and the need for
jobs.196 The Italian-American press reported about the flurry of early New Deal legislation,
including the end of Prohibition, the Bank Holiday and the printing of billions of dollars to
distribute via the regional Federal Reserve banks, tariff adjustments, the Home Owners
Loan Corporation Act, the Securities Act to protect investors, and farm relief measures.197
Nevertheless, Italian Americans awaited more intervention. Mussolini’s model during the
1920s directly put the government’s hand in the economy through tasks like reevaluating
the lira and then providing legal protections for workers. Concerns about these early
American measures turned to the possible repercussions of monetary expansion. 198
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Columnist Albert C. Esposito remarked, “what I believe to be Roosevelt’s first mistake is
the inflation program,” arguing that some governmental measures could create a “big sting
for the average man” if wages stagnated and commodity prices grew. 199 The New Deal
began well, but Italian Americans awaited more direct intervention comparable to Fascism.
The National Industrial Recovery Act caught Italian Americans’ attention more
than any other early New Deal legislation because it was a domestic interpretation of
corporatism. The law consisted of two significant parts. Title I established the National
Recovery Administration to regulate private businesses through negotiated industry codes.
Title II created the Public Works Administration (PWA) to infuse federal money into the
pockets of American workers through major civil works projects. 200 In May 1933, Italian
Americans noticed the parallels to Fascist Italy. For years, legislators had turned away from
the problems associated with capital and labor as factories and plants mechanized, but it
was time to find equilibrium. As Castaldi wrote in Unione, “in Italy, Fascist Legislation
has already for a very long time put under its control the industrial production of the Nation;
in America, Franklin D. Roosevelt is proceeding along Mussolini’s footsteps …
concern[ing] capitalist exploitation.”201 This was not hyperbole. The NRA pioneered a new
method of regulation, and many period Americans viewed it as a domestic interpretation
of Fascist corporatism.202 Italian Americans were justified in believing that this new
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program may have provided the key points of Fascism that they had come to appreciate –
a balance between capital and labor, raising and delivering true equality to the working
class, the ability for an activist state and leader to intervene and guarantee that balance –
as described in chapter four.
Public works projects were a direct means of aiding Americans. After years of
observing Fascist Italy’s public works in the press and through speeches, Italian Americans
came to believe in their value of employing those in need while improving the nation. This
sentiment existed even before the Great Depression. For example, as mentioned previously,
one attribute that Italian Americans in Youngstown celebrated about Mayor Joseph
Heffernan’s tenure was infrastructure improvement, most notably a railroad grade
elimination discussed for forty years.203 According to Il Cittadino Italo-Americano in 1928,
the project meant potential jobs for those “many workers, … enjoying the Republican
Presidential prosperity[, who] stay at home without work.”204 They valued work relief
because it was a fair exchange of payment for services. Almost a year after the Wall Street
crash, the newspaper reported that the suffering community was too proud to beg for
help.205 Those interviewed years later noted this sense of pride.206 Samuel Sciullo, a child
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during the Great Depression, pleaded with his mother to sign a voucher for him to receive
free shoes through a school program after his pair split apart and leaked. His mother
acquiesced after first refusing and then crying about the shame of accepting such charity.
In Sciullo’s words, “it was the first time we ever got anything that we took.”207 Employment
in public works offered a clear distinction between the acts of taking and earning, or as
Sciullo elaborated, the difference between relief (which he compared to then-current views
about welfare) and “the dignity of working.”208 As a former Works Progress Administration
employee asserted, “the government … gave the American people a job.”209 Italian
Americans perceived public works much differently than charity or dole. This philosophy
matched the new Roosevelt administration, which knew that direct relief, such as providing
free food, was cheaper, but it funded public projects because they offered dignity to
workers and long-term investments in communities.210
The New Deal appeared to break with precedent. The ethnic press noted the scope
and substantial funding allocated to new projects, including roads, airports, post offices,
and ports and waterway improvements, such as on the Columbia and Tennessee Rivers. 211

207

Samuel Sciullo, interview by unknown, transcript, 26 August 1997, 6, box 2, folder
Sciullo Heritage (Sam Sciullo), Boundless Lives: Italian Americans of Western
Pennsylvania Oral Histories, 1997–c1999, MSS 691, Detre Library and Archives, Senator
John Heinz History Center, Pittsburgh, PA. Italics in original.
208
Sciullo, 5.
209
Tony Tabasso, interview by Annette Fromm, transcript, 25 January 1978, 3, box 7,
folder 4, Greater Cleveland Ethnographic Museum Records, 1971–1990, MS 5175,
Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.
210
Leighninger, Jr., Long-Range Public Investment, 36.
211
F. L. I. S., “Per provvedere occupazioni a milioni di disoccupati,” Unione, 30 June
1933, 7; “Un miliardo di dollari per lavori pubblici ripartiti agli Stati,” Unione, 18 August
1933, 7; “Occupazione in Lavori Pubblici,” Unione, 6 October 1933, 3; “E’ Stato
Organizzato un Servizio di Rioccupazione Nazionale,” Unione, 13 October 1933, 6; “I
Lavori Pubblici Federali Sono Gia’ in Attuazione,” Unione, 1 December 1933, 1; FLIS,
“Dove Saranno Spesi i Fondi dei Lavori Pubblici,” Unione, 1 December 1933, 6.
429

The emphasis on building appeared similar to Fascist Italy, and people did not miss the
comparison. For example, when Italian-American readers of Unione learned that the NIRA
allocated 3.3 billion dollars to employ three million men, a photograph of Littoria, Italy,
appeared immediately below the article. The city was the centerpiece of the Fascist project
to drain the Pontine Marshes south of Rome and use the new land for cultivation.212
This Italian-American desire for Fascist-type, large-scale public works continued
in subsequent years. The Civil Works Administration (CWA), created as a temporary
program for smaller, local projects, failed to deliver permanent results. As Unione
contributor Frank Cesario wrote in January 1934, he appreciated jobs for the unemployed,
but he did not understand why the government could not assign “real projects[,] not
artificial ones.” Men were “leveling the mud on a sloppy unpaved street” while citizens
clamored for long-lasting civic improvements.213 The problem laid with bureaucracy. The
Hoover administration delayed federal works funding because it argued for local and state
primacy and against running national deficits and competition with private business.214 The
CWA was an emergency measure to provide mass employment for the winter of 1933–
1934. This urgency forced director Harry Hopkins to graft the federal agency onto state
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and local relief organizations to quickly disperse funds, but this lessened oversight. To
rapidly employ millions and not conflict with the PWA’s long-term projects, organizers
favored small assignments that required little planning, ones that they could start and end
immediately.215 New Dealers addressed Cesario and others’ critiques by creating the Works
Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935, which was broader in scope than the CWA and
more aligned with the PWA concerning the long-term impact of its construction projects,
which numbered “over 480 airports, 78,000 bridges, and nearly 40,000 public buildings.”216
As the New Deal progressed, public works became analogous to the types celebrated in the
Italian-American press about Fascist Italy.
Title I of the NIRA, which created the NRA, caught Italian-American attention
more than the public works provisions.217 From the plan’s language, they understood it as
corporatism, which, having approached Fascism from the left, meant the government’s
reorganization of the economy to balance labor and capital, akin to upholding the working
class. Early summaries of the NIRA described the law as “provid[ing] for the government
control of the 700 industries of the U.S., by investing them with public interest.” The NRA
would accomplish this via “voluntary trade codes which [would] reduce working hours, fix
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wages, ration production, and regulate competition[,] … subject to executive approval.”218
An in-depth description of the NRA and codes concentrated on what this meant for labor.
The textile code, for example, gave employees a forty-hour workweek and minimum pay
(thirteen dollars per week in the North, twelve dollars per week in the South). The law
conceded trade associations for industry, organizations that antitrust legislation previously
targeted as illegal; however, labor gained the right to organize, which Italian Americans
viewed as paramount.219
Closer to this project’s geographical area of inquiry, Charles Schisano interpreted
the meaning of the new NRA codes for the miners who populated many towns throughout
western Pennsylvania. The specific rights gained by employees were extensive: shorter
hours and better pay; the protection of unions; guarantees of cash or check payments and
the abolition of company scrip; the prohibition of forced residence in company housing
and forced use of company stores as conditions of employment; and the elimination of
child labor.220 When the ethnic press ran columns about the NRA, it most often included
information and answers concerning labor rights, such as working hours, minimum pay,
age restrictions for employment, and how to file complaints against employers.221 This
perceived equalization of labor and capital is why one Unione writer used the analogy that
work programs were an “ointment,” but the NRA had the potential to be a “surgeon’s
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knife.”222 The agency brought the structural change necessary to address the cause of the
national ailment, not only the symptoms.
There was considerable enthusiasm for and engagement with the program from the
ethnic community. John Cuda, a wholesale grocer operating in Pittsburgh’s Strip District,
announced that he would answer Roosevelt’s appeal to support the NRA, and his company
made the first local Blue Eagle honor roll list.223 The Pittsburgh NRA’s Foreign Language
Speaking Committee included representatives from the various ethnic presses, and the
organization appointed Unione’s Charles F. Schisano as its chairman in August 1933.224
Top-down efforts for involvement with ethnic groups merged with grassroots participation
from the bottom-up. Frank Casper, the Hiram House worker featured prominently in
chapter two, organized a pro-NRA rally of more than six thousand Clevelanders, “which
demonstrated the unanimity of support for the NRA” in the local community.225 ItalianAmerican women played a role. Mrs. Samuel F. Molinari led a group that canvassed
Pittsburgh neighborhoods to explain the NRA and calm inflation fears.226 She also spoke
at the Carnegie Library in East Liberty during a pro-NRA informational event attended by
numerous female representatives of various local ethnic lodges and societies.227
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Since Roosevelt appeared to be operating in the mold of Mussolini concerning
economic improvement and bringing balance to capital and labor, there were calls for
workers to cooperate with him because he was an ally and fair arbitrator.228 A good example
involves the mine workers in southwest Pennsylvania, many of whom had spent the
summer of 1933 agitating for NIRA’s promised union recognition. In August, Roosevelt
intervened to craft a settlement between employers, the leaders of the United Mine Workers
of America (UMW), and the NRA. Labor concessions did not include union recognition;
Roosevelt left it for the subsequent NRA discussions. Some UMW locals rejected the
agreement, and thousands of rank-and-file members remained on the picket lines. 229
Roosevelt created the Pennsylvania Coal Arbitration Board to handle their grievances, and
Unione echoed the agency’s message to stay calm and allow the NRA to operate as
intended.230 Thousands remained out on strike even after the signing of the new coal code
in late September.231 Schisano understood their reluctance. He had seen the terrible
conditions firsthand when he spent two years as the director of welfare work for a coal
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concern in Fayette County, south-southeast of Pittsburgh.232 There had been a fifty-year
“tradition of true CZARISM, of TYRANNICAL and INHUMANE AUTOCRACY” in the
coalfields, justifying the workers’ hesitancy to trust operators.233 However, he also believed
that the NRA’s purpose was worthwhile and hoped that Roosevelt would take the next step,
“a law … to guarantee the agreements between operators and miners.”234 Most employees
likely concurred with Schisano’s assessment because, as he remarked on 13 October, after
some of the continuing strikes turned violent, no Italian names appeared on the lists of
those arrested or hurt.235
Italian-American dissatisfaction with the NRA stemmed not from beliefs that the
plan had been too radical and harmed individual liberty, the critique from conservatives,
but that the intervention had not gone far enough. Schisano remarked early in the NRA’s
history that unrest in area mills came “from some not malicious but ill-informed agitator”
who misunderstood the codes and what they meant for the working class.236 As a columnist,
he was too well-informed about the goals of the NRA and not enough about its
implementation. There was a disconnect between the provisions and the reality experienced
by the workers. Parity between capital and labor guaranteed by the government was
necessary for the system to work; however, the government seldom punished businesses
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that evaded their responsibilities.237 As Al Tronzo stated, “the business men of America are
cheating on Uncle Sam. They are trifling with the bird [the NRA Blue Eagle]. They think
that it’s a huge joke.” The issue was not the theory of economic cooperation and
government intervention, but that business “accepted it in bad faith, and worked out
loopholes in order to defraud.”238 By early 1934, Unione joked that even sweatshops had
adopted the Blue Eagle, and they paid six cents per hour to sew NRA labels onto
garments.239
The NRA failed in practice. The “loopholes” described by Tronzo allowed
companies to skirt provisions, such as section 7(a), the right to unionize. Many businesses
only recognized company-run unions, ranging from as small as the Hazelwood and Grand
Theaters in Hazelwood, Pittsburgh, to the multiplant steel concerns – Republic, United
States Steel, Jones and Laughlin – that dotted the region.240 As historian Daniel Nelson
pointed out, a few company unions during this period operated for their employees’ benefit,

237

Jason E. Taylor, Deconstructing the Monolith: The Microeconomics of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 107–27. The
law allowed the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to arrange
trials to fine and jail those who broke the codes, but Roosevelt decided early in the
NRA’s implementation to rely on public pressure via possible boycotts of those who
rejected the NRA and its Blue Eagle. The NRA eventually brought a few cases forward
for litigation, but they were a fraction of the number of complaints received. The NRA
Compliance Division primarily relied on “adjusters” who sought voluntary fixes from the
offending entities. This practice resulted in lax code enforcement because the Compliance
Division lacked enough staff to handle the volume of violations during the long
bureaucratic process.
238
Al Tronzo, “Merchants Do Their Part?,” Unione, 25 August 1933, 8.
239
“Sweat Shop Operators Put One Over,” Unione, 2 March 1934, 8.
240
“Operators Union Pickets Hazelwood Theatres,” Unione, 20 October 1933, 7; Philip L.
Cook, “Tom M. Girdler and the Labor Policies of Republic Steel Corporation,” Social
Science 42, no. 1 (January 1967): 21–22; John Hinshaw, Steel and Steelworkers: Race
and Class Struggle in Twentieth-Century Pittsburgh (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 2002), 54–55.
436

but “in most instances the new company unions of 1933-37 [created as a response to the
NIRA] were probably the sinister institutions that critics made them out to be.”241
Censorship and propaganda had presented Italian Americans with an unrealistically
successful image of Fascist corporatism. By contrast, they experienced the shortcomings
of the NRA, and this familiarity conditioned their views and explains two letters sent to
Roosevelt from Italian-American steelworkers in Aliquippa. The first, dated August 1934
and written in Italian, informed Roosevelt about how the company wanted to hold them in
“slavery,” but they sought union recognition to gain “a little more freedom.”242 A second
letter, dated November and written in English, reiterated that they were trying to form a
union and asked bluntly, “I wish to know, if this organization is upheld by the government,
and if it’s favorable for the class of workingmen, to join same. I will greatly appreciate
your advice.”243 Competing narratives only created confusion. Italian-American workers
had come to trust Roosevelt and their ethnic press that supported the NRA in principle, but
there was a growing dissonance between intentions and reality.

The Second New Deal
Had the National Recovery Administration expired and disappeared, and Franklin
Roosevelt returned to business as usual, then Italian Americans would have viewed the
New Deal favorably but perhaps not enthusiastically. Instead, Democrats dominated the
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1934 midterms, and Roosevelt won a landslide reelection in 1936 with the help of ItalianAmerican voters.244 This consolidation of the Democratic coalition was because the Second
New Deal, the more controversial legislation passed after the 1934 midterm elections, once
more appropriated Italian-American ideological preferences by doubling down on
government intervention favorable to working people.
In early 1935, Paul Block, the publisher of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, printed a
lengthy, bold-type evaluation titled “The New Deal After Two Years.” Point by point,
Block excoriated the government’s actions. The New Deal ballooned the national debt and
government bureaucracy, created state control of the stock market via the Securities and
Exchange Commission, gave the administration “tremendous supervisory authority over”
most significant industries, including mining, energy, transportation, and communications,
and transferred power from Congress to the executive branch.245 Roosevelt disregarded
federalism and “enacted measures which put us so close to the borderline of fascism that it
would not require much more to render American independence and freedom a thing of the
past.”246 In Block’s view, “the heritage of this country is individualism with freedom – not
state socialism, fascism nor a mixture of the two.”247 Except for the debt issue, the New
Deal features that Block described as detrimental to American politics appealed to Italian
Americans, and they favored further government involvement.248
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The issue with the NRA was lax enforcement. Italian Americans already
understood from Fascist Italy that real change needed to come from legislative intercession,
not optional adherence. Hugh S. Johnson, the NRA’s director, insisted, “we are not trying
to force anybody into the line-up” to participate in the program and receive the Blue Eagle.
The consumer’s choice to patronize NRA code-compliant businesses was the reward.
Where Italian Americans differed was in Johnson’s opinion that “if there is one thing
certain in this great national game of ours[,] it is that nobody can legislate the country out
of its troubles.”249 To continue the director’s sports metaphor, Italian Americans wanted
the government not as an observer to the game but as a referee. The NRA’s real-world
implementation failed, but Italian Americans still desired that the government address the
issues that the agency sought to remedy.
The Supreme Court struck down the NRA in May 1935. It is best to think of the
organization as columnist Frank Cesario did early in its implementation, “a good start.”250
Unione credited Roosevelt and the NRA for increasing union membership among the
miners and pressuring owners to negotiate with labor.251 The NRA’s promises did not
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always match reality; nevertheless, its prolabor provisions were necessary goals. The
solution was to take another step. As Cesario concluded, the government needed to go
further: “Shorter hours and a living wage is the answer to the depression. At present the
government is merely supervising this new system, but I believe that we of the younger
generations will live to see the government take hold of the reins themselves. Business and
industry can no longer be let loose, the government must step in.”252 The federal
government followed through with labor-friendly regulation, albeit not with one
encompassing NRA-style program, but with a series of laws that provided more
permanence and enforcement to the working-class provisions that had been theoretically
proposed but not always carried out.
From this perspective, the sections of the defunct NRA praised by Italian
Americans evolved into new laws rather than marked a clean break in New Deal policy.253
Roosevelt himself expressed this idea when he pushed for an NRA “skeleton organization”
after the Supreme Court decision. The program would instead carry forward via targeted,
enforceable laws passed by Congress.254 Coal miner Richard Furgiuele offered no
demarcation between the First and Second New Deal in his oral history when he explained
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that the law allowed unionization and the fair weighing of coal for payment.255 Even though
his interview was over sixty years after the events, Furgiuele was correct that the NIRA
theoretically permitted unionization in section 7(a) and that the bituminous coal code
required a fair weight check.256 In his explanation, there was no break in what the NRA
gave workers because the fair weight requirement continued even after Furgiuele followed
the rest of his family into the mines in 1936.257 People living through this period viewed
the NRA’s labor provisions as evolving because they continued in other forms. Lawmakers
modeled the Guffey-Snyder Coal Act of 1935 after the defunct NRA’s bituminous coal
code to continue government involvement in the industry. Even after the Supreme Court
invalidated the 1935 law for the same price-fixing features that it had objected to in the
NRA’s code, most of the terms returned in the Guffey-Vinson bill passed in 1937.258 As
Washington, DC columnist William Bruckart claimed concerning the revived law, many
people “believe that in passing the Guffey-Vinson bill … our government has taken a step
which is very close to, even actually a step toward, fascism in America. It is an action so
near to the policies of fascism in Italy that close students of the Mussolini plan say they
can hardly discern any distinction.”259 Bruckart presented the law negatively, but to Italian
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Americans who had prized replicating the Italian model even before the New Deal began,
this amounted to a policy progression.
Parallel New Deal legislation delivered other outcomes that the NRA had promised.
The Supreme Court struck down the codes because they fixed prices and encouraged
cartels, but the New Deal still intervened in entities considered to be in the public’s interest,
notably utilities. Before Roosevelt’s election, Italian Americans complained about costs
associated with necessities like gas and public transportation fares.260 The Great Depression
heightened concerns. In 1932, Unione columnist Al Esposito urged his readers to write to
the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission and demand reform. The ten-cent monthly
electric rate reduction, the utility companies’ response to consumer outrage, was a pittance
for what amounted to a profitable monopoly.261 Reining in public utilities became a talking
point for those seeking office, including Al Tronzo.262 The New Deal responded with the
Wheeler-Rayburn Act, formally the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which
established new regulations. These included registering all interstate utility holding
companies with the Securities and Exchange Commission and examining dividends and
contracts. The Federal Power Act of 1935 regulated interstate electric transmission. The
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law authorized the Federal Power Commission to establish fair rates after considering a
utility company’s accounts.263
Subsequent legislation answered Frank Cesario’s desire for a more activist
government, and they followed the suggestions made by Angelo Di Renzo in his 1928
article. Perhaps the New Deal did not bring the class collaboration Di Renzo favored after
the NRA failed in practice, but the Wagner Act addressed some of his other critiques,
including the need to protect unionization from being undermined by scab labor and for
collective bargaining to spread beyond the skilled trade unions. His recommendations for
old-age pensions and unemployment insurance found a place in the Social Security Act of
1935. The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act addressed Di Renzo’s proposal to limit underage
employment and working hours.264 The Second New Deal fulfilled many of the labor
advances first promised by the NRA.
Most important was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), which
allowed employees to vote freely on a union and entrusted the National Labor Relations
Board to uphold fair practices. During labor unrest in the automobile industry in the spring
of 1934, Roosevelt interceded to stop a potential industry-wide strike. The consequences
of this action resonated across economic sectors because workers saw their agency reduced
to the advantage of business.265 As Edward W. Castaldi commented, government mediation
avoided an economy-crippling walkout, but Roosevelt’s actions aided the automakers. The
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legality of company unions was undecided, and the decision undermined “the spirit of the
N. R. A.” and its codes.266 There was no capital-labor equilibrium without free
unionization, and this is what the Wagner Act intended to correct.
The automobile industry was not unique. Perhaps the clearest example emerged
from the struggle between workers and management at the J&L Steel mill in Aliquippa, a
conflict that formed the basis for the 1937 Supreme Court decision to uphold the Wagner
Act. Concurrent to unrest in automotive plants, turmoil in steel prompted Roosevelt to
create a separate entity to investigate labor practices in that industry. 267 The government’s
Steel Labor Board also failed to bring promised balance. As workers sought their collective
bargaining rights as promised by the NIRA’s section 7(a), J&L Steel intimidated organizers
and arrested unionization. In fall 1934, the Steel Labor Board heard testimony from
workers before dismissing their complaint the following January after the company
promised to stop the harassment. J&L Steel reneged and fired multiple union activists.268
The Wagner Act restored the balance between labor and capital by backing
government intercession with the force of law.269 The empowered National Labor Relations
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Board (NLRB) reviewed the retaliatory dismissals and forced J&L Steel to rehire the men
with back pay, including Italian-American organizers Angelo Razzano, Dominic Brandy,
and Angelo Volpe.270 The NLRB opened the door to industrial unionism, an idea that had
been circulating in the Italian-American community for over a decade. As another
participant, Dominic Del Turco, explained when asked if the union leaders campaigned
before the final vote, “they didn’t have to. All they [the workers] had to do was [mark] yes
or no, whether they wanted the union or not. It was supervised by the N.L.R.B. The federal
government was in charge of it. On there they had, ‘do you want a union or not.’ It was
that simple.”271
Government involvement was essential to secure that right, even if participants
were ill-informed about the mechanisms of the law itself. Guido Ferrari was an employee
at D. L. Clark Company, a confectionery manufacturer in Pittsburgh, when his boss fired
him and others in 1934 or 1935 for talking about unionization. Ferrari and his coworkers
went to a government office and spoke to a man who straightened everything out. He
arranged for Clark Company to rehire the group with a probationary period of a year to
year and a half, after which time they could vote freely to organize. The labor board
certified their union, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Local 12, in 1936.272 The
government supported their choice. As Joseph Meranto of Youngstown stated: “Roosevelt
was doing a great job … He formed the unions, I mean he didn’t form them, we formed
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the unions, but he helped out with that Wagner Act.”273 The New Deal delivered what they
sought: a government that acted as a partner to create and protect workers’ organizations
for fair bargaining.
The Social Security Act of 1935 provided both old-age pensions and unemployment
insurance. Even as optimism in the NRA declined, Italian Americans continued arguing
for a new, moderate social safety net. Unione contributor Al Tronzo, now running for a
statehouse seat in spring 1934, echoed Di Renzo’s call from 1928 by supporting pensions
for the elderly and unemployment insurance.274 Months later, Unione discussed the issue
in philosophical terms: “We have reached a point in which we must absolutely abandon
the old and antiquated principles and leave behind all the old theories of an exceeded
individualism.” Remarking that multiple states had approved pension plans over the
previous year, Unione believed it was only a matter of time before Congress enacted a
national program.275
Italian-American commentators favored Roosevelt’s approach because it was
moderate. Unione contributor Adam Di Vencenzo described the more generous Townsend
Plan, which proposed two-hundred-dollar monthly stipends to the elderly, as “a wonderful
plan but you and I know that it is simply out of the question” because of the level of taxes
required to fund it.276 Pennsylvania state politician Frank J. Zappala described the
Townsend Plan as “absurd” in a speech to the Star and Crescent Old Age Pension Club in
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Pittsburgh; however, he supported “a reasonable pension” and amendments to add medical
care for the aged.277 Social insurance was a collective responsibility in which moderate
allowances would protect and aid people who did not previously receive such benefits. The
Italian-American press concluded that one reason for Democratic victories in 1936, to
which the ethnic group contributed significantly, was that the masses voted against
Republican attacks on social security.278 This defense was even in light of their new tax
requirements when their economic positions were far from secure. The law stipulated for
payroll tax deductions to begin on 1 January 1937 and disbursements in 1940.279
Additionally, workers knew about triennial tax increases for the program scheduled until
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1949.280 Italian Americans favored Roosevelt’s Social Security Act as a moderate and fair
compromise.
The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act codified the NRA’s ideas of limited hours and
minimum pay. During the 1920s, the typical employee worked around fifty hours per
week.281 Those in the steel industry labored more than the average. They gained some relief
in 1922 when most mills agreed to switch from twelve- to eight-hour shifts, but many
employees, especially the unskilled, continued to put in long hours.282 Common laborers
assigned to the blast furnace, Bessemer converter, and open-hearth furnace departments in
the Pittsburgh district, which included western Pennsylvania and Youngstown, averaged,
respectively, 61.2, 55.7, and 59.9 hours per week in 1924.283 Bert Iacobucci, the Aliquippa
resident mentioned earlier, worked as both a coal miner and steelworker during the 1920s.
He preferred laboring in the mines because the eight-hour workdays were substantially
better than the eleven- or twelve-hour shifts he had in the mill.284
The NRA meant to fix this and the new problems created by the Great Depression,
such as businesses slashing wages and forcing overtime on workers who had no agency
during a time of economic turmoil.285 The NRA failed to correct hours and wages despite
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Roosevelt publicly declaring that the agency would target “chisellers,” employers who
disregarded the labor provisions of the NRA codes.286 Nevertheless, Italian Americans still
desired government intervention about the issue. When Cesario asserted that the NRA was
a “good start” and Americans needed more government involvement, he specifically stated
that “shorter hours and a living wage is the answer to the depression.”287 The Roosevelt
administration agreed, and the president incorporated the idea of continuing these
provisions from the defunct NRA into his party platform for his 1936 reelection.288 The
1938 Fair Labor Standards Act banned child labor and took into account the lessons learned
from the NRA codes to enact stepped provisions for hours and wages. The law set the
standard workweek at forty-four hours, which later tapered to forty-two and then finally
forty hours in late 1940. It guaranteed paid overtime at one and a half times the employee’s
regular hourly rate. A twenty-five-cent minimum wage increased to thirty and finally forty
cents per hour in 1945.289 These provisions did not negotiate higher pay and better hours
for all workers, but they set a floor from which labor could bargain.
Congress passed these laws separately, but the unfulfilled labor promises of the
NRA and its codes inspired them. They were part of what academics classified as the
Second New Deal, but to ordinary citizens living through the Great Depression, these
concessions to working people were merely the desired and anticipated evolution of an
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interventionist government. The president’s willingness to support unionization, regulate
specific industries in the public’s interest, provide unemployment and old-age insurance,
and set minimum wages and maximum hours marked a reversal of government policy from
the previous decade.

Conclusion
The celebration of Roosevelt and the New Deal became etched in the minds of
Italian Americans who spoke positively of the leader and his program years later. Guido
Ferrari, a Pittsburgh resident, exclaimed, “oh yeah, everybody voted for Roosevelt at that
time.”290 According to Everett Pesci of Blairsville, Pennsylvania, although his county,
Indiana, was filled with Republican “WASPs” (white Anglo-Saxon Protestants), Italian
Americans wholeheartedly supported Roosevelt. Images of Roosevelt or noted union
leader John L. Lewis were the second most common portraits hanging on the walls of
Italian-American homes after only the Virgin Mary or Jesus Christ.291 In neighboring
Westmoreland County, Samuel Sciullo of Vandergrift summarized support for the New
Deal based on actions: “When Roosevelt was in things started to happen. People started to
hope. All I remember was that people believed in him and he proved what he could do for
them and he pulled us out of the Depression.”292 Bruno Degli of Youngstown had a similar
view. Roosevelt “was a shot in the arm. His inauguration speech just seemed to pick the
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people right off of the ground” as the new president acted immediately to solve the crisis.293
Ormond Montini of Aliquippa asserted, “we was [sic] all the way for Franklin
Roosevelt.”294 Even Ralph Cenname, who served as a Republican committeeman in New
Castle, Pennsylvania, after his service in the Second World War, remembered that during
his youth, “during Roosevelt’s time, it was Democrats. A lot of Democrats.”295
Italian Americans did not begin the 1930s as committed Democrats but most
certainly ended the decade firmly in that camp. Their allegiance was never an assured
conclusion. During the depths of the Great Depression, they sought a new way forward.
Their previous engagement with civic nationalism, leftism, and Fascism during the
preceding decade laid a new ideological foundation for their politics, and they sought a
resemblant national program.
Few during the 1920s would have dreamed of the reversal possible. Roosevelt
entered office with vague promises to a cautiously optimistic Italian-American electorate,
but his presidency reinterpreted the federal government’s relationship with its citizens and
continuously delivered the outcomes sought by the ethnic group. His Democratic Party
opened its doors to Italian-American office seekers, fulfilling the American promise.
Roosevelt appeared to borrow from Fascist Italy, styling himself as a strong leader and
economic interventionist, copying a corporatist approach to address the financial crisis. A
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concern for the working class laid at the core of his presidency, and he continuously
delivered laws and programs that aided ordinary people. Italian Americans had built
themselves a New Deal ideology and envisioned such a government, but Franklin
Roosevelt made that dream a reality.
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